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THE NAVAL HISTORY
OF
GREAT BRITAIN.





ADMIRAL, VISCOUNT NELSON.

DUKE OF BRONTE

THE
NAVAL HISTORY
OF
GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM THE
DECLARATION OF WAR BY FRANCE IN 1793,
TO THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE IV.

BY WILLIAM JAMES.

A NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS AND NOTES,

AND
AN ACCOUNT OF THE BURMESE WAR AND THE BATTLE
OF NAVARINO,

BY CAPTAIN CHAMIER, R.N.

VERITE SANS PEUR.

IN SIX VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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NAVAL HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS.

ON the 19th of February, in the afternoon, Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, in the *Prince-of-Wales* 98, was detached from the Channel fleet to take the command of the blockading squadron off Ferrol, in the room of Rear-admiral the Honourable Alexander Cochrane, who with five sail of the line and a frigate, had quitted the station since the 24th of February for the West Indies, in pursuit of the Rochefort squadron, also of five sail of the line, and of the proceedings, of which we shall hereafter give some account. On the 1st of March, in the evening, the *Prince-of-Wales* arrived off Cape Prior, and joined six sail of the line under the command of Captain the Honourable Arthur Kaye Legge, in the *Repulse* 74, the senior officer at the departure of Rear-admiral Cochrane. The Franco-Spanish fleet in Ferrol at this time amounted to 10 sail of the line ready for sea, and two or three others fitting. Between the 22d of April and the 31st of May Sir Robert, at no one time, had with him a greater force than nine sail of the line, and for days together not so many.

On the 15th of July the vice-admiral was reinforced by five sail of the line under Rear-admiral Stirling in the *Glory* 98, from off Rochefort.* This made Sir Robert Calder's force consist of the following 15 sail of the line and smaller vessels :

* See vol. iii., p. 501.

Gun-ship		
98	Prince-of-Wales . . .	{ Vice-adm. (b.) Sir Robert Calder.
		{ Captain William Cuming.
	Glory	{ Rear-adm. (b.) Charles Stirling.
		{ Captain Samuel Warren.
80	Barfleur	" George Martin.
	Windsor-Castle . . .	" Charles Boyles.
	Malta	" Edward Buller.
	Thunderer	" William Letchmere.
74	Hero	" Hon. Alan Hyde Gardner.
	Repulse	" Hon. Arthur Kaye Legge.
	Defiance	" Philip Charles Durham.
	Ajax	" William Brown.
64	Warrior	" Samuel Hood Linzee.
	Dragon	" Edward Griffiths.
	Triumph	" Henry Inman.
	Agamemnon	" John Harvey.
	Raisable	" Josias Rowley.

Frigates, *Egyptienne*, Captain the Honourable Charles Elphinstone, *Fleming*, and *Sirius*, Captain William Prowse.

Lugger Nile, Lieutenant John Fennell, and *cutter Frisk*, Lieutenant James Nicholson.

With this force the vice-admiral was directed to proceed 30 or 40 leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, and there endeavour to intercept the combined fleet from the West Indies, represented, upon the authority of the Diamond-rock account, to consist of only 16 sail of the line.* Thus had the blockade of two ports been raised, in which, at the time, were about as many ships of the line ready for sea, as, by all accounts, composed the fleet which the blockading squadrons, when united, were ordered to intercept. The policy of this measure does not seem very clear. If the Ferrol squadron, did not, as the Rochefort had done, take advantage of the circumstance and sail out, it was merely because it had received no orders from France.

On the 19th Sir Robert received a copy of Lord Nelson's despatch, of date the 15th of June, addressed to the British commanding officer off the Tagus, stating that the combined fleet, of what force not mentioned, had passed Antigua on the 8th of June, and was probably on its way to Europe. On the 22d of July, in the forenoon, that same combined fleet, composed of 20 sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs,† besides the recaptured galleon *Matilda*, made its appearance to windward, in the manner we shall proceed to relate.

On the morning of the 22d, in latitude 43° 34' north, and longitude 16° 13' west, from Paris, the combined fleet, formed in three divisions, and having a light breeze from west-north-west, was steering in a thick fog, east-south-east, a direct course

* See vol. iii., p. 331.

† Ibid., p. 340.

for Ferrol, when, at about 11 A.M., on a sudden clearing up of the weather, the French leading ship, the *Indomptable*, discovered and signalled 10 sail in the north-north-east, approaching on the starboard tack. The frigates sent ahead to reconnoitre, presently augmented the number to 21 sail; namely, 17 British ships, the lugger and cutter, and two Danish merchant brigs, one brought to by the *Dragon*, the other by the *Egyptienne*. In the mean time the *Defiance*, the British look-out ship, and which then lay about three leagues to windward of her fleet, discovered and signalled a strange fleet in the south-west.

At noon, latitude $43^{\circ} 54'$ north, longitude (from Greenwich) $11^{\circ} 38'$ west, Ferrol east-south-east distant 49, and Cape Finisterre south-east distant 39 leagues, the *Prince-of-Wales* made the signal to prepare for battle, and in a few minutes afterwards to form the order of sailing in two columns. This was followed by a signal to form the line; and at 1 h. 15 m. P.M., to keep in close order. At 2 h. 15 m. P.M. the latter signal was repeated; and at 3 P.M. the *Defiance* having stood on until within less than two miles of the enemy, joined and took her station in the line, the ships of which, when in their places, ranked as follows: *Hero*, *Ajax*, *Triumph*, *Barfleur*, *Agamemnon*, *Windsor-Castle*, *Defiance*, *Prince-of-Wales*, *Repulse*, *Raisonnable*, *Dragon* (then under a press of sail to leeward, as soon as she should join), *Glory*, *Warrior*, *Thunderer*, *Malta*; most of the ships with their topgallantsails set, and all, except the *Dragon*, with their courses up, standing, as before, on the starboard tack.

At about the same time the ships of the combined fleet formed themselves in line of battle, in the following order: *Argonauta*, *Terrible*, *America*, *Espana*, *San-Rafaël*, *Firme*, *Pluton*, *Mont-Blanc*, *Atlas*, *Berwick*, *Neptune*, *Bucentaure*, *Formidable*, *Intrépide*, *Scipion*, *Swiftsure*, *Indomptable*, *Aigle*, *Achille*, *Algésiras*.* At 3 h. 30 m. P.M., after having hove to, some time, the combined fleet filled, and under topsails, stood on upon the larboard tack, rather off the wind, in a close well-formed line; one frigate ahead, another, the *Sirène*, who had just taken the galleon in tow, astern, and the remaining five frigates, in a second line, to windward of the centre and rear. The British fleet was at this time nearly abeam, and about seven miles distant; but, owing to the fog, neither fleet was more than partially in sight of the other.

Since 1 P.M. the *Egyptienne* and *Sirius*, then a short distance to windward of the *Defiance*, had been ordered, by signal, to keep sight of the enemy. The frigates accordingly made sail to get nearer to the latter; and the *Sirius*, the weathermost frigate, as she passed from van to rear of the combined fleet,

* For the names of their several commanders see vol. iii., pp. 323, 327, and 330.

made the signal of the exact number of line-of-battle ships and smaller vessels composing it. At 3 h. 20 m. P.M. Sir Robert made the signal to engage the enemy; and at 3 h. 22 m., to tack together. At 3 h. 26 m. the same signal was repeated and annulled. At 3 h. 27 m. a signal was made for the starboard division to make all possible sail, and steer south-south-west.


At 3 h. 30 m. the same signal was made to the *Hero*, who probably had commenced tacking in obedience to the signal at 3 h. 22 m. At 3 h. 31 m. the signal was made to form the line of battle in open order; at 3 h. 53 m., to alter course one point to starboard; and at 4 h. 21 m., to tack in succession.

The signal to tack in succession appears to have been made by each commander-in-chief about the same time; but, in the foggy state of the weather, neither fleet saw the commencement of the other's manœuvre. The British tacked, to prevent their opponents escaping them on the opposite tack; but the Franco-Spaniards, who had hauled close to the wind on getting within about three miles of the British fleet, wore, in consequence of the *Sirène*, which had the galleon in tow, making signals, by guns fired in quick succession, that the rear was in danger of being cut off.

This was occasioned by the bold approach of the *Sirius*, who, as soon as she had got sufficiently to windward to fetch into the wake of the combined line, had tacked, with the intention of attempting to carry, by boarding, the great object of the enemy's solicitude. While making the necessary preparation to effect his object, Captain Prowse discovered, through the haze on his lee bow, the enemy's van-ship, the *Argonauta*, approaching with the wind nearly abeam. The *Sirius* herself being now in jeopardy, Captain Prowse abandoned his design upon the galleon, and bore up to pass to leeward of the Franco-Spanish line. With a forbearance highly honourable to Admiral Gravina, the *Argonauta* passed the British frigate without firing; and so did the *Terrible* and *America*. By the time, however, that the *Sirius* had got abreast of the *Espana*, which was at about 5 h. 15 m. P.M., the *Hero*, the British van-ship, then with royals set, hove in stays. Instantly the Spanish ships, all of whom had royals and courses set, hoisted their colours and commenced the action; the *Argonauta* firing her larboard guns at the *Hero*, and the *Espana* hers at the *Sirius*, which ship, in consequence, had two men killed and three wounded.

At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Prince-of-Wales* had made the signal to engage the enemy's centre; at 4 h. 45 m., to keep in close order; and, at 5 h. 9 m., to engage the enemy as closely as possible. At 5 h. 20 m. P.M., which was about five minutes after she had tacked, the *Hero* opened a fire from her starboard guns. The reason of the *Hero*'s having tacked without a signal was, that her advanced station had enabled her to see, what the fog concealed from the ships in her wake, that the enemy had

come round on the starboard tack. Precisely as the *Hero* tacked to starboard, the *Windsor-Castle*, the sixth British ship from the van (the majority of the ships now with royals and courses set), tacked to port. We have chosen this moment for representing in a diagram the position of the two fleets; or rather, of the van and rear of the combined, and of the ten leading ships of the British fleet.



At 5 h. 45 m. P.M. the *Ajax* tacked astern of the *Hero*; but, unfortunately for the success of Captain Gardner's gallant manœuvre, the *Ajax* put her helm up, and bore away to speak the admiral. On passing within hail of the *Prince-of-Wales*, Captain Brown informed Sir Robert Calder of the change of position in the two vans. The *Ajax* then wore, and fell into the line astern of the *Glory*; thus making herself, instead of the second, the twelfth ship from the van. At 5 h. 50 m. P.M., by which time the five ships in line between the *Ajax* and *Prince-of-Wales* had successively tacked, the latter, as she probably would have done, had the *Ajax* followed her gallant leader into the thick of the enemy's fire, hoisting the signal to tack in succession, tacked also, and, in a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes, joined in the cannonade, now becoming general and furious. By 6 P.M. all the ships in the British line, except the *Dragon*, which was still to leeward working up, had got round on the starboard tack, and the greater part had found opponents in the

opposite line ; but, what with the fog and the smoke, no ship could see much beyond her own length.

Owing to the disorder to which this gave rise, some of the ships in both fleets had several opponents upon them at once. On the British side, the Windsor-Castle was a principal sufferer ; and the Ajax, Prince-of-Wales, Thunderer, and Malta, the last especially, participated in this unequal warfare. On the part of the combined fleet, the San-Rafaël, Firme, and Espana, having dropped to leeward, became greatly exposed to the fire of the British. Seeing the situation of the Firme, the latter's second astern, the Pluton, gallantly bore up out of the line, and, for a while, covered the Spanish ship from the destructive effects of their enemy's fire ; but the Firme was too powerfully opposed to profit by the aid afforded her, and the Pluton herself with difficulty regained her station.

The critical situation of the Espana induced Captain Cosmao-Kerjulien, a second time, to interpose himself between one of his Spanish allies and the British line. In this instance, being assisted by the Mont-Blanc and Atlas, the Pluton succeeded, and the Espana was rescued. Amidst the derangement of the Franco-Spanish line, the Atlas suffered most severely, and, but for the support of her friends, among whom the Neptune was foremost, would certainly have been captured.

Soon after 8 P. M. the Firme, with the loss of her main and mizen masts, and subsequently of all her masts, struck ; and the San-Rafaël, with the loss of her main topmast, and subsequently of all her masts also, did not hold out many minutes longer. At 8 h. 25 m., at which time the British ships were dis-united and scattered, the body of the combined fleet barely within gun-shot to windward, and the shades of night combining with the fog and smoke to render objects still more indistinct, Sir Robert made the night private signal to discontinue the action. At about 9 P. M. the Windsor-Castle, with her fore topmast gone, passed close to windward of the Prince-of-Wales, and then bore up and was taken in tow by the Dragon ; who, with all her efforts, had not got up in time to take more than a very slight part in the action : indeed, it was nearly 8 P. M. when the Dragon fell into line ahead of the Barfleur, who herself had been unable to get very close to the enemy. The signal to discontinue the action being seen but by few ships, the general firing did not cease until 9 h. 30 m. P. M. The British ships soon afterwards brought too upon the starboard tack, with their heads about south-west by west, and lay by for the night, repairing their damages, in order to be ready to renew the contest on the morrow.

The loss, in gross, sustained by the British fleet, amounted to 39 officers and men killed and 159 wounded ; and, as Sir Robert Calder, in his official return, has, contrary to what is customary, omitted to specify the names or qualities of the

officers killed and wounded, we are constrained to do the same. One ship, the *Warrior*, escaped with entire impunity; and the *Hero*, *Agamemnon*, *Repulse*, *Raisonné*, *Glory*, and *Dragon*, lost between them but three men killed and 14 wounded; nor were the *Dragon's* four men wounded by the enemy's shot; but by an accidental explosion. No ship had a mast shot away but the *Windsor-Castle* and *Agamemnon*, nor a yard except the *Ajax*.* The loss on board the two prizes was stated to consist of about 600 in killed and wounded; but a careful comparison of the number of wounded and unwounded prisoners, with the number of men deposed to have been on board each ship at the commencement of the action, has reduced the number considerably. In this amended state, the gross loss sustained by the combined fleet amounts to 476 officers and men killed and wounded.† With respect to damages, the French and Spanish ships did not exhibit many marks in their masts and rigging; but some of them, undoubtedly, were much hit in the hull. One ship, we believe the *Atlas*, had the head of her bowsprit shot away; another, her fore yard and fore topgallantmast; and a third, a topsail-yard. Had a court-martial on the French, as was the case with the British, commander-in-chief, called for a specific statement of each ship's damage, every wounded topgallantmast and spritsail-yard, every cut rope and shot-graze, would have been formally set forth; and then, and then only, would a fair opportunity have been afforded, of comparing the relative damage on board the two fleets.

It was extremely natural for the French writers to make the most of the minute statement of damages published along with the proceedings of the court-martial which sat upon Sir Robert Calder; but they evinced very little candour, when they confronted the whole loss on the British side with a part only of the loss on their side, and then drew from it the inference that their fleet had suffered the least in the action. To have acted impartially, they should have struck out of the British returns the two ships that had sustained the heaviest loss, as a set-off against the two prizes, whose united loss, although the French were unable to enumerate it, they knew amounted to much more than that of any other two, or any four ships in the combined fleet. This would have made the numbers stand thus: British loss in killed and wounded, except of *Windsor-Castle* and *Malta*, 108; Franco-Spanish loss in killed and wounded, except of *San-Rafaël* and *Firme*, 171. But, if we add the loss of the two omitted ships on each side, as given (with respect to the Spanish ships for the first time) in the preceding page, the relative quantum of loss will be more than two to one in favour of the British.

Daybreak on the 23d found the two fleets about 17 miles

* See Appendix, No. 1.

† See Appendix, No. 2.

apart, reckoning from their respective centres; but, owing to the hazy state of the morning, neither fleet had of the other more than a partial view. The ships of each were lying to, or making very little way, with the wind as on the preceding day, a moderate breeze from north-west by west. The British fleet had just come to the wind on the larboard tack, but the combined fleet still remained on the starboard. The British advanced squadron, consisting of the *Barfleur*, *Hero*, *Triumph*, and *Agamemnon*, lay about five miles to windward of the main body; and, at the distance of about six miles to windward of the former, lay M. Villeneuve's advanced squadron, consisting also of four sail of the line, besides a few frigates. To windward of these again, at the distance of other five or six miles, lay the body of the Franco-Spanish fleet. To leeward of the British main body, about five miles, lay the crippled *Windsor-Castle*, with the *Dragon* approaching to take her in tow; and still further to leeward, at about an equal distance, lay the *Malta*, *Thunderer*, two frigates, and prizes, all of whom were out of sight of the admiral.

At 6 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Prince-of-Wales*, and the ships with her, filled their main topsails; and at 8 A. M. the van-division, by signal, bore up to close the former, which had then wore, and, under their topsails were running to leeward, to join the prizes and the ships with them. At 9 A. M., having concentrated his fleet, the British admiral hauled up on the larboard tack, and steered about north-east; keeping between the Franco-Spanish fleet and his three disabled ships. Of these the *Windsor-Castle* was in tow by the *Dragon*, the *Firme*, by the *Sirius*, and the *San-Rafaël*, at present by the *Egyptienne*, who had recently taken charge of her from the *Malta*.

No sooner had the weathermost British ship bore up to join the prizes, than, imagining that the former, although under topsails only, were flying in disorder, "*fuyant en désordre*," the French admiral went with his staff on board the *Hortense* frigate, and calling to him all the other frigates, except the *Didon*, which latter had been sent ahead to reconnoitre, ordered them to inform his captains, that he meant to bring on a decisive action, and that they were to lay their ships as close as possible alongside of the enemy.* While the five frigates were hailing the line-of-battle ships successively, to acquaint them, "*au port-voix*," with their chief's intention, the *Didon*, confiding in her superior sailing, had approached very near to the British fleet; so near, that the *Triumph*, at 11 A. M., for the want of a frigate to perform the office, tacked and chased her away.

Towards noon the wind veered more to the northward and got very light, and a heavy swell came on from the same quarter. At a few minutes past noon the combined fleet, formed in order of battle, bore up towards the British fleet, then about four

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 142.

leagues off in the east-south-east ; but, owing to the distance, and to the extreme lightness of the breeze, it was not until 3 h. 10 m. P. M. that the advance of the French and Spaniards was noticed by the British. Immediately the ships of the latter hoisted their colours, and hauled closer to the wind, awaiting the expected attack. At 4 P. M., however, the ships of the combined fleet, with colours also hoisted, and then distant about three leagues from their opponents, hauled to the wind on the same tack as the British ships ; thus evidently declining, for the present, a renewal of the engagement. For a fact so important, and so utterly at variance with the statement at first given out by the French, some authority may be requisite. " *A midi, toute la flotte prit chasse sur l'ennemi, qu'on estimait à trois lieues et demie : le vent était faible. A quatre heures, on n'avait encore gagné qu'une lieue à l'escadre anglaise ; il n'y avait par conséquent pas d'espoir de l'atteindre avant la nuit, mais on pouvait au moins l'approcher davantage ; cependant Villeneuve fit signal à la flotte de serrer le vent, son intention étant de n'attaquer l'ennemi que le lendemain ; ce signal étonna autant qu'il affligea les officiers et les marins ; on prévint dès lors qu'on ne parviendrait plus à joindre l'ennemi.*"*

The British admiral resumed his course to the north-east, but was soon driven from it by a change of wind ; which, commencing about midnight at north, became, by 8 A. M. on the 24th, north-north-east, and occasionally north-west, but it was very moderate, amounting almost to a calm. This brought the combined fleet nearly astern of the British fleet ; which was now to windward, and might, in all probability, have renewed the action. No attempt of the kind was made. Sir Robert, for reasons that will appear presently, continued with his prizes, under easy sail, working towards a British port, steering about south-east by east. The combined fleet had steered the same course as the British fleet until 8 A. M. : the ships then edged away and steered south-east by south. At 4 P. M. one ship only of the Franco-Spanish fleet was in sight of the British fleet, and by 6 P. M. the two fleets had wholly disappeared from each other.

In examining the merits of the affair between Sir Robert Calder and M. Villeneuve, we shall take each day's proceeding by itself. The battle was fought as has already been shown, between 14, or, gratuitously adding the *Dragon* (for she was not engaged till at the very close), 15 British, and 20 French and Spanish sail of the line. Cases have occurred, where the French have enumerated frigates as a part of the force opposed to them. Here, be it observed, there were seven on one side, and two only on the other : those seven frigates had also been ordered, as will hereafter be made manifest, to take a part in the action, and one

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 143.

frigate did, for a short time, with other ships, engage the *Wind-sor-Castle*. If, between the four 80-gun ships in the combined fleet, and the four 98-gun ships in the British, any allowance is expected for the nominal (for it is not real*) superiority of the latter, let four of the five surplusage frigates be added to the former; which will be leaving three opposed to the British two, because one of the latter, the *Egyptienne*, mounted 24-pounders on her main deck. When also it is considered, that, from the weight of metal, and number of men she carries, a French 74 is of greater force than a British 74, no objection, on the part of the French or Spaniards, can be urged against an estimate which, grounded on the numerical line-of-battle strength on each side, fixes the ratio of force in their favour as four is to three.

With, then, the inferiority of one fourth in point of force, the British succeeded in capturing two ships out of the adverse line. If these were slow sailers and bad workers, how many slow sailers and bad workers did the British fleet contain? If the density of the fog obstructed the French and Spaniards in their manœuvres, what effect must it have had upon the British, to whom, in spite of all that had been urged to the contrary, so many signals were made and so few seen or understood; and who actually performed the evolution, which brought on the close action, without a signal at all? The tacking of the *Hero*, for instance. Certainly, too, the fog, combined with the smoke, incommoded the British, who were to leeward, more than the French and Spaniards, who were to windward. A victory, therefore, it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a "decisive," nor a "brilliant" victory. To have made the action decisive, one way or the other, was exclusively in the power of M. Villeneuve; but he kept his wind, and the firing ceased, owing principally, if not wholly, to his having hauled out of gunshot.

It may throw some light upon the proceedings of M. Villeneuve, both in this action and generally since he last quitted Toulon, if we transcribe a portion of the instructions which, on the eve of his departure, he addressed to the captains of his fleet. "I do not," he says, "intend to go in search of the enemy: I would even avoid him in order to get to my destination; but, should we meet him, let there be no discreditable evolution: it would dishearten our men and ensure our defeat. If the enemy be to leeward of us, having the power to adopt what evolution we please, we will form our order of battle, and bear down upon him in line abreast; each ship to close with her natural opponent in the enemy's line, and to board him should a favourable opportunity present itself."—"Every captain, who is not closely engaged, is not in his station; and a signal to recal him to his duty will be a stain upon his character. The frigates

* See vol. ii., p. 185.

must equally take part in the action:* no signals to that effect will be necessary; they must proceed to the point where their co-operation may be most advantageous, whether to hasten the surrender of an enemy's ship, or to cover a French ship too closely pressed, and to take her in tow or otherwise assist her."† No shyness betrays itself here; an additional proof that, in his apparent disinclination to close with an inferior force, Vice-admiral Villeneuve was acting a compulsory part.

On the 23d of July the parties, in point of relative force, stood nearly the same. The combined fleet had been reduced from 20 to 18 ships, and the British from 15 to 14. But the one had its seven frigates ready to act upon any service; while the other had its two frigates employed in towing the prizes of the preceding day; and which prizes, in the attention they otherwise claimed, impeded the British fleet in its progress, and prevented it from attempting any manœuvre whereby an advantage might be gained. Considering the little value of the vessels, the *San-Rafaël*, a ship of 34, and the *Firme*, a ship of 51 years old, and both battered to pieces, their destruction would have been not only a justifiable measure, but, under circumstances, the most eligible that could have been devised.

With respect to the power of commencing the action, a continuance of the same wind kept it where it had been on the day previous; yet, with the exception of an hour's demonstration, or show-off, as it may be termed, the party possessing that power declined to use it. On the 24th a change of wind, to nearly an opposite point of the compass, produced a corresponding change in the position of the two fleets; but still they did not approach nearer each other. The truth is, that since the close of the first day's proceedings, Sir Robert Calder, unless some unlooked-for advantage should offer itself, did not intend to be a second time the assailant: he would neither attack nor retreat; nor would he deviate one point from the course necessary to convoy his crippled ship and his two worthless prizes beyond the reach of danger. Each fleet, therefore on the afternoon of the 24th, pursued its route, as if the other were not present, or that no hostility existed between them.

"Notre intention est que vous fassiez votre jonction en évitant le combat," says Napoléon, in his instructions to M. Villeneuve; and, in another place, "Si vous prenez le parti de faire votre réunion avec l'escadre de Brest, vous devez tenter de le faire sans combat." Buonaparte, also, when writing to M. Decrès, asks, "A quoi aboutissait une bataille?" and immediately answers the questions himself,—"*A rien.*"‡ If one admiral,

* See p. 10.

† For the original of this curious production, see Appendix, No. 3.

‡ Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., pp. 248, 252, and 276.

therefore, had the misfortune to act under orders that forbade him to fight unless with such odds in his favour as would ensure success, the other was also controlled, in some degree, by extraneous circumstances; sufficient, if not to excuse him for declining to assail an equal force, to justify him in acting a peculiarly cautious part, when himself assailed by a force decidedly superior. Sir Robert Calder knew that the very ships composing his fleet had been abstracted from watching as many enemy's ships, as had composed the combined fleet on his first meeting it: he himself, with 10, had been ordered from off a port in which lay 15, waiting, as he had every reason to believe, solely for his departure, to slip out and join M. Villeneuve. Rear-admiral Stirling, also, with five ships, had been called from off another port, out of which he knew, and informed Sir Robert, that five French ships had been seen getting under way, just as the blockading squadron was disappearing from the coast;* and which five ships, since known to have sailed on the 16th, were endeavouring to effect their junction, either with M. Villeneuve at sea, or with Rear-admiral Gourdon at Ferrol. So well grounded were Sir Robert Calder's apprehensions on this head, that, on the 23d of July, Rear-admiral Allemand, with his squadron, was on the very spot on which the battle of the preceding day had been fought. Moreover, Sir Robert had been ordered by the admiralty, and by the commanders-in-chief of the Channel and of the Mediterranean fleets, to be on his guard in case of a junction between the fleet of M. Villeneuve and the squadron from Ferrol: whose united force would have been at least 35, and, if the Rochefort squadron had joined, 40 sail of the line.

Matters would have passed off, and Sir Robert Calder's success, in having, with a fleet of 15 sail of the line, captured two out of an enemy's fleet of 20 sail of the line, been taken as an earnest of how much more would have been effected, had the parties met on fairer terms. But the accounts on shore marred all. The British admiralty suppressed an important paragraph in Sir Robert's letter to Admiral Cornwallis; taking care that the published extract (to confirm the delusion, stated to be a "copy" of the official letter) should end where hopes were held out of a renewal of the engagement; thus: "They are now in sight to windward; and, when I have secured the captured ships and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any opportunity that may offer to give you a further account of these combined squadrons." The suppressed paragraph was this: "At the same time it will behove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe

* See Minutes of the court-martial upon Sir Robert Calder, Rear-admiral Stirling's evidence.

they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port;* therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant, with the whole squadron." The admiralty, it is true, may have acted thus upon the oral information of the officer bearing the despatches; and which, in every version of it, conveys an absolute intention on the part of Sir Robert Calder to renew the action. Several of the British captains also understood that to be the nature of the message delivered to them by Lieutenant Nicholson, just as he was quitting the fleet for England.

The French official accounts, really dictated by the French emperor, but purporting to be the statement of the French commander-in-chief, claimed the victory as theirs, and boasted that the combined fleet had repeatedly chased the British fleet, and at length compelled it to fly. These accounts, translated into English, and published in all the newspapers of the country, rivetted the effect produced by the admiralty bulletin, and spread far and wide that spirit of discontent, which finally compelled Sir Robert Calder to demand a court-martial upon his conduct. That court-martial, which sat on board the Prince-of-Wales, in Portsmouth harbour, from the 23d to the 26th of December, "severely reprimanded" the British admiral, for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th of July; but the sentence admitted, that his conduct had not been actuated either by cowardice or disaffection. The preceding details, now for the first time so fully given to the public, will enable even a landman to form some opinion of the justice of the sentence pronounced upon Sir Robert Calder.

The following remarks of an eminent French writer will show what he thought, as well of that sentence as of the "victory" which M. Villeneuve, by his master's arts, had been made to say that he had gained over the British. "Admiral Calder," says M. Dupin, "with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet; in the chase of it, he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder, in England, if he had commanded the superior fleet, and had lost two ships, in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour? What would they have done with the captains?"†

We stated, a page or two back, that the French official accounts of the meeting between M. Villeneuve and Sir Robert Calder were dictated by the French emperor. As this is a very serious charge, we shall endeavour to substantiate it. The

* This may have arisen from the *Defiance's* signal of the preceding day at noon having been for 22 "sail of the line," when on the morning of the 23d, 18 only were counted.

† For the original, see Appendix, No. 4.

Moniteur published two letters, as from Admiral Villeneuve, giving an account of the action; one dated July 27, in the paper of August 11; the other dated July 29, in the paper of August 14. Both letters, of course, make a good story; and both commend (the last, in set terms) the noble behaviour of Admiral Gravina and the Spanish ships. And yet a letter from Napoléon to his minister of marine, dated on the 13th of August, contains these sentences: "De quoi donc se plaint Villeneuve de la part des Espagnols? Ils se sont battus comme des lions."* Hence, the commendations in the published letters were not the sentiments of the nominal writer; nor, by a fair inference, could any of the mistatements in those letters be laid to the charge of M. Villeneuve. But the *Moniteur* of August 13 contained, with a translation of Sir Robert Calder's letter, very copious remarks upon every part of it. And Napoléon, in his letter to M. Decrès of August 11, after observing upon the statements in the British official account, proceeds thus: "L'arrivée de Villeneuve à la Corogne fera tomber ces gasconnades, et, aux yeux de l'Europe, nous donnera l'air de la victoire: cela est beaucoup. *Faites sur-le-champ une relation, et envoyez-la à M. Maret: voici comme je la conçois.*"† All that follows M. le Comte Dumas has left blank. Enough, however, remains to show who penned the remarks in the *Moniteur*; and yet these very remarks, without, apparently, their real origin being suspected, were translated into most of the London journals.

On the 31st of July, after having been escorted by the fleet beyond the probable reach of the Rochefort squadron, the two prizes anchored in Plymouth Sound. The *San-Rafaël* was built at Havana in the year 1771, measured 2130 tons English, and mounted on her first and second decks the same nominal force as the French 80, No. 3, in the small table at p. 54 of the first volume, upon her quarterdeck and forecastle 10 long 8-pounders (two of them brass) and 10 carronades, 36-pounders, and upon her poop six 24-pounder carronades, total 88 guns; with a complement, on the morning of the action, of 800 men and boys, and 104 soldier-passengers. The *Firme* was built at Cadiz in the year 1754, and measured 1805 tons. Neither the *San-Rafaël* nor the *Firme*, as a proof how little their destruction would have been felt, was ever employed in the British service except as a prison-ship.

When, at 8 P. M. on the 26th, he had seen his prizes to the prescribed latitude, Sir Robert Calder, with his 14 sail of the line, wore and stood back to the rendezvous off Cape Finisterre, in the expectation of there being joined by the fleet under Lord Nelson. On the 27th, at a little before noon, the wind changed to the north-west, and the vice-admiral shortly afterwards reached the rendezvous. Not finding Lord Nelson there, Sir Robert, with the wind at west, steered for Ferrol; and, arriving off that

* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 251.

† *Ibid.*, p. 248.

port on the 29th, sent in the *Dragon* to reconnoitre. On a report from the latter, that the combined fleet had not entered Ferrol, Sir Robert concluded that M. Villeneuve had proceeded to the southward, and he resumed the blockade of the port.

On the 31st, the vice-admiral sent the *Malta* to England to get refitted. Taking due advantage of this circumstance, one of the French writers gravely asserts, that almost every ship of Admiral Calder's fleet was obliged to return to an English port to get repaired;* and Napoléon, as soon as he learnt that the *Windsor-Castle* and *Malta* had been ordered home, directed his minister of marine, in his letter of condolence to the Prince of Peace on the loss of the *San-Rafaël* and *Firme*, to acquaint the latter, "*que deux vaisseaux ennemis sont arrivés coulant bas à Plymouth.*"† Respecting these two "sinking" ships, the *Windsor-Castle* did not enter the harbour of Plymouth, but refitted herself in Cawsand bay, and in three weeks was again at sea; and the *Malta* would have been only half that time in port, had she not required to be newly coppered.

On the 1st of August, in the forenoon, Sir Robert Calder was driven by a strong south-westerly wind far to the north-east of his port. On the 2d, at noon, agreeably to his orders from Admiral Cornwallis, the vice-admiral detached, to resume the blockade of the now vacant port of Rochefort, Rear-admiral Stirling, with four sail of the line; and, on the same evening, with his remaining nine sail, regained his station off Ferrol. On the 9th, at 3 P. M., the *Dragon* reconnoitred, in a very gallant and effectual manner, the neighbouring ports of Ferrol and Corunna, and found M. Villeneuve's fleet lying at the entrance of the latter harbour; making, with the ships at anchor in the harbour of Ferrol, 29 French and Spanish sail of the line, ready for sea. In this state of things, Sir Robert, with his nine sail of the line, abandoned the blockade, and on the 14th joined Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant.

It has already on more than one occasion appeared, that M. Villeneuve's primary destination, after quitting the West Indies, was the harbour of Ferrol; there to effect a junction with the Rear-admirals Grandallana and Gourdon and their respective squadrons. Accordingly, after losing sight of the British fleet on the evening of the 24th, the combined fleet steered as direct a course for Ferrol as the prevailing north-east wind would permit. M. Villeneuve, no doubt, soon found that the masts and yards of many of his ships were not in a state to withstand a strong head or beating wind and a heavy sea: moreover, it became necessary that the sick and wounded should be landed as early as possible. Under these circumstances, the French admiral acted wisely in bearing up for the

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 144.

† *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 246.

bay of Vigo ; where, on the evening of the 26th, he came to an anchor with his fleet.

In Napoléon's instructions to Vice-admiral Villeneuve, of May 8, was contained an alternative that, if by events in America, or in the course of his homeward voyage, the latter should find himself in a situation not immediately to appear before Brest or enter the Channel, he was to order away upon a cruise Rear-admiral Gourdon's squadron, accompanied by three or four of the fastest sailing ships out of the squadron of Vice-admiral Grandallana ; and that then, joining himself to the remainder of the latter's ships, and to the Rochefort squadron, he was to proceed off Cadiz, and enable the squadron from Carthagenà to enter that port. With his powerful fleet, M. Villeneuve was next to occupy the Straits of Gibraltar, strip the road of its shipping, and (a feasible plan, indeed !) the town of its stores and provisions. Having effected all this, he was to steer for the Channel, and endeavour to perform the last, and, in Napoléon's estimation, the only important, article in his instructions.*

The first step taken by M. Villeneuve on reaching Vigo, was to despatch a courier to Ferrol, as well to apprize the two rear-admirals of his arrival, as to be put in possession of any fresh instructions which they might have to communicate. Meanwhile the French admiral proceeded to disembark his sick and wounded, also the prisoners made on the voyage. M. Villeneuve then took on board a supply of water, and, as may be supposed (for it is not acknowledged), commenced refitting his ships. The French, indeed, were sedulous in concealing the state of their ships ; but the Spaniards on shore gave out, that the *Terrible*, *America*, and *Espana*, the two last especially, were considerably damaged ; and a neutral merchant master, who rowed round the ships in the harbour, declared, that the larboard or engaged side of the *Atlas* was like a riddle, and that, in the hulls of the two last-named Spanish ships, innumerable shot-holes were visible.

On the 29th or 30th the courier returned, if not with any additional instructions, with the important intelligence, that on the 28th, the day of his departure, no British ships were in sight from Ferrol or Corunna. No time was to be lost. Accordingly, on the 30th of July, leaving behind him the *America*, *Espana*, and *Atlas*, not because they, or any one of them, had been so battered in the action of the 22d as to render them, for the present ineffective ships, but simply because they were "slow sailers" and might "delay the progress of the fleet," M. Villeneuve, with 13 French and two Spanish sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs, got under way, and steered for Corunna ; with a wind, blowing from west-south-west, so fair, and at the same time so strong, that even a slow sailing merchantman, much more a slow sailing man-of-war, would

* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 254.

have found no difficulty in keeping company. On the evening of the very day, the 1st of August, on the morning of which the British fleet, which had so recently arrived off the port, was driven from its station, the combined fleet entered Corunna.

Learning, while at this anchorage, that the Rochefort squadron was at sea in search of him, M. Villeneuve, on the 5th, despatched the Didon frigate to endeavour to find M. Allemand, and enable him to join. On the 9th, in the evening, the combined fleet, the French part of which consisted, besides the whole of the ships named at page 3, except the Atlas, of the 74s Argonaute, Duguay-Trouin, Fougueux, Héros, and Redoutable, and the Spanish part, of the Principe-de-Asturias, three-decker, 80s Argonauta and Neptuno, 74s Terrible, Monarca, Montanez, San-Augustin, San-Francisco de Asis, San-Ildefonso, and San-Juan-Nepomuceno, and 64 San-Fulgencio, making altogether 29 ships of the line, exclusive of frigates and corvettes, weighed and made sail from Ferrol and Corunna; but, the wind being scant, M. Villeneuve, on the 10th, anchored at Zerez, a small port near Ferrol. On the following day, the 11th, the fleet again weighed, and, with a fine easterly wind, got out to sea.

With respect to M. Villeneuve's real destination after quitting Ferrol, not a word, beyond conjecture, appears in any French naval history. The course steered by the combined fleet, when, on the afternoon of the 13th, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Iris, Captain Edward Brace, fell in with it abreast of Cape Ortugal, was about west-north-west; which, with the wind at east, evinced an intention on the part of the French admiral, as soon as he had joined M. Allemand's squadron, then supposed to be (and really) hovering about the coast, to carry his 34 sail of the line straight to the British Channel. On the 14th the wind shifted to north-east; and at 2 P. M. the advanced French ship, which had been chasing the Iris since 6 P. M. on the preceding day, quitted her and bore up for the combined fleet. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. not a ship of that fleet was to be seen from the Iris, then in company with the 38-gun frigate Naiad, Captain Thomas Dundas. On this very day, the 14th, the Rochefort squadron was spoken by an American ship, within two degrees north-east of Cape Ortugal, namely, in latitude 46° 18' north, and longitude 9° west from Greenwich. In two days afterwards M. Allemand anchored in Vigo bay, but did not, it appears, find any instructions left there by M. Villeneuve for his future guidance.

About half an hour before the combined fleet lost sight of the British frigates Naiad and Iris to windward, the British 74-gun ship Dragon, accompanied by the 36-gun frigate Phoenix, Captain Thomas Baker, having in tow her prize the late French frigate Didon, both much disabled, hove in sight to leeward. One of the French advanced frigates was then speaking a

Danish ship, from Lisbon to the Baltic, which had that morning been boarded by the Dragon, and by the latter been informed, that 25 British sail of the line were near her. On gaining this important information from the Dane, the effect of which the Dragon took care to strengthen by firing guns and hoisting signals, the French frigate made several signals, and then tacked towards her fleet; which, when last seen by the Dragon, at about sunset, was steering north-west. Shortly after this, it is believed, M. Villeneuve altered his course and steered to the southward. That M. Villeneuve first steered a north-west, and then a south course, is indeed admitted by a French writer. "Il mit à la voile le 13 par un bon vent d'est, n'ayant en vue aucune force ennemie; il fit d'abord route au nord-ouest, et changeant tout à coup de direction, il mit le cap au sud, longea hors de vue la côte de Portugal, atterra six jours après sur le Cap Saint-Vincent, où il s'empara de quelques bâtimens marchands, et entra à Cadix le 21 août, le jour même qu'il était attendu à Brest."* The dates in this account are wrong: those given by us have their correctness proved by the rôles d'équipage of several of the ships belonging to M. Villeneuve's fleet.

Keeping out of sight of the Portuguese coast, the combined fleet, on the 18th, arrived off Cape St.-Vincent, and there captured and burnt three merchantmen, bound from Gibraltar to Lisbon, under convoy of the British 16-gun brig-sloop Halcyon, which vessel, however, managed to effect her escape. On the 20th, at 10 A. M., Cadiz bearing north-east distant about nine leagues, the combined fleet, steering south-east, with the wind at west-south-west, discovered three British sail of the line right ahead. At 1 P. M. the latter, which were the 98-gun ship Dreadnought, Vice-admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, Captain Edward Rotheram, and 74s Colossus and Achilles, Captains James Nicholl Morris and Richard King, tacked to reconnoitre. On this, the advanced ships of the combined fleet, which had shortened sail, chased away the British to the southward; and at 3 P. M. M. Villeneuve and his whole fleet bore up for the harbour of Cadiz. At midnight, having been joined by the 74-gun ship Mars, Captain George Duff, from Tangier bay, Vice-admiral Collingwood, with his four sail of the line, tacked in-shore, and, before daylight on the 21st, gallantly resumed his station off an enemy's port, in which lay, ready for sea, including six Spanish ships previously at anchor in the harbour, 35 French and Spanish sail of the line. A seventh Spanish ship, the Glorioso 74, had formed part of Rear-admiral Alava's squadron; but, on the 31st of the preceding May, this ship, finding that a frigate and two brigs were the only British force off Cadiz, put to sea; and, after exchanging a few ineffectual broadsides with the

* Précis des Evénemens, tome xii., p. 71.

frigate, which was the *Lively*, Captain Graham Eden Hamond, effected her escape into Carthage.

As soon as he was apprized of the battle between Sir Robert Calder and M. Villeneuve, Napoléon directed his minister of marine to impress upon the latter, how highly dishonourable it would be to the imperial fleets, that a three hours' skirmish, and an action with 14 (a singular admission for Buonaparte to make) sail of the line, "*qu'une échauffourée de trois heures et un engagement avec quatorze vaisseaux,*" should defeat the grand plan. For some days after M. Villeneuve had sailed from Ferrol, Napoléon, ignorant of the circumstance, betrayed the utmost impatience for his departure. He asks if, with 28 or 30 French and Spanish sail of the line, the French admiral would allow himself to be blockaded by 13, or even by 20, English sail of the line. The emperor directs that, if less than 23 of the latter are before Ferrol, M. Villeneuve is to sail out and attack them; and that, if Allemand joins with his five, making "35 sail of the line," he is not to be stopped by less than 29 English sail of the line.

M. Villeneuve, in short, is always to attack, when he is superior in numbers, counting two Spanish ships for one, "*ne comptant deux vaisseaux espagnols que pour un,*" and making some allowance for the three-deckers in the British fleet. This was paying a sorry compliment to the Spaniards, and is hardly reconcilable with Napoléon's declaration, made in another letter of the same date (August 13), and equally meant to be private, that the Spaniards had "*fought like lions.*"* Finally, the French admiral is to save the imperial flag from the shame of being blockaded at Ferrol by an inferior force; that is, he is to save 18 French, and "12" Spanish sail of the line, 30 in all, from the shame of being blockaded by less than 24 British sail of the line, the number which, in Napoléon's estimation, equalizes the two forces.† The same letter authorizes M. Villeneuve, if he should think fit, to man the frigates *Guerrière* and *Revanche*, lying at Corunna, with the officers and crew of the *Atlas*, left at Vigo. He is also at liberty to disembark all his troops, except as many as he thinks will be serviceable on board the fleet.

On some day between the 22d of August and the 4th of September, Napoléon first became apprized of the Franco-Spanish fleet's arrival at Cadiz. If he had previously condemned M. Villeneuve because, in spite of wind and weather, he did not sail from Ferrol, what must he have thought of the latter, now that, instead of going straight to Brest, he had suddenly changed his route and sailed for Cadiz? Some of Napoléon's expressions are very severe. "*Villeneuve,*" he says, "*est un de ces hommes qui ont plutôt besoin d'éperon que de bride.*" Again, he asks,

* See p. 14.

† *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., pp. 246, 249, 250, 254.

“ Ne sera-t-il donc pas possible de trouver dans la marine un homme entreprenant, qui voit de sang froid, et comme il faut voir, soit dans le combat, soit dans les différentes combinaisons des escadres ? ” *

The French emperor's sentiments will be found fully developed in the following set of charges which he is represented to have drawn up with his own hand: “ First; he (Villeneuve) did not disembark at Martinique and Guadaloupe the 67th regiment and the troops that Admiral Magon had on board. Secondly; he placed these colonies in jeopardy by sending back to them, by four frigates, 1200 men only of the pick of the garrisons. Thirdly; he conducted himself ill in the battle of the 23d of July, in not re-engaging a disabled fleet which had two ships in tow. Fourthly; that, having arrived at Ferrol, he left the sea to Admiral Calder, while he waited to be joined by five sail of the line, and did not cruise off Ferrol until that squadron arrived. Fifthly; he (Villeneuve) was informed that the fleet saw some enemy's ships having the Didon frigate in tow, but he did not chase those ships and oblige them to cast off the frigate. Sixthly; he departed from Ferrol the 14th of August,† and, instead of going to Brest, proceeded to Cadiz, thereby violating his positive instructions. Seventhly and finally; he knew that the squadron of M. Allemand was to go to Vigo for orders, and yet he sailed from Ferrol without giving that officer any new orders, having, on the contrary, sent him (by the Didon, it is probable) instructions quite opposite, and such as endangered the squadron, which received orders to repair to Brest, while Villeneuve himself steered for Cadiz.” ‡ In these charges two important facts disclose themselves: one, that M. Villeneuve, in spite of all the nonsense published in the *Moniteur*, did not, on the 23d of July, attempt to bring to action Sir Robert Calder's fleet; the other, that something unexpected, and which, by a fair inference, was the false intelligence received through the Danish ship from the Dragon 74, caused the Franco-Spanish fleet to run from an English ship of the line and two disabled frigates, and subsequently to change its destination from Brest to Cadiz.

A part of Napoléon's vexation with M. Villeneuve arose, no doubt, from the dissatisfaction with which the Spaniards viewed the loss of their two ships. This was augmented by the apparent unwillingness of the French admiral, even though he had under him so powerful a fleet, to sail out, in the face of 11 English sail of the line cruising off Cadiz, and enable the Carthagenæ squadron to form a junction with Admiral Gravina. In a letter of September 17, Napoléon complains of M. Villeneuve for this,

* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 253.

† As to this and other dates, see p. 18.

‡ This extract is of too important a character not to be given in the original; it will therefore be found in the Appendix, at No. 5.

and directs his minister of marine to order out the latter, with the French ships alone (*mon escadre*," not "*les escadres franco-espagnols*," or "*la flotte combinée*"), upon a new expedition. M. Villeneuve is to proceed off Naples, and disembark, at some point on the coast, all the troops on board the French ships, in order that they may join the army under General Saint-Cyr. He is then to capture the English ship of the line (*Excellent 74*) and Russian frigate cruising in the bay of Naples; to do all possible injury to the English; to intercept an expedition (*Sir James Craig's*) which Napoléon supposes to be destined for Malta, and then to enter Toulon; where M. Villeneuve was to find every thing necessary for repairing and victualling his ships. Part of the plan, if not previously accomplished, was to call at Genoa for the new *74 Géois*; and then, with the *Borée* (launched at Toulon, June 26) and *Annibal 74s*, there would be a fleet of 21 sail of the line in Toulon. The emperor's brother Jérôme, who had been appointed to the 40-gun frigate *Pomone*, was also, with the assistance of the *Borée*, and of the *Annibal*, if the latter could be made serviceable, to do all possible mischief to the British in the Mediterranean.

But the most extraordinary part of this letter is Napoléon's apparent persuasion, that the "excessive pusillanimity" of M. Villeneuve would prevent him from undertaking the expedition. He therefore directs, that Vice-admiral Rosily be despatched to supersede M. Villeneuve in the command; and who is to carry out orders to the latter to return immediately to France, to render an account of his conduct. "*J'estime donc*," says Napoléon, "*qu'il faut faire deux choses: 1°. Envoyer un courrier extraordinaire à l'amiral Villeneuve, pour lui prescrire de faire cette manœuvre; 2°. Comme son excessive pusillanimité l'empêchera de l'entreprendre, vous enverrez, pour le remplacer, l'amiral Rosilly, qui sera porteur de lettres qui enjoindront à l'amiral Villeneuve de se rendre en France pour rendre compte de sa conduite.*"*

Harsh and very unmerited was this treatment of M. Villeneuve. The main point in the French admiral's instructions had always been, to avoid an engagement, and to bring his fleet fresh and entire into the English Channel. Doubtless M. Villeneuve had, from the first, been much retarded in his proceedings by the natural supineness of his Spanish friends; and who, now that they knew the object of all this voyaging to and fro, must have felt less inclined than ever to co-operate with the French admiral.

On the 22d of August Vice-admiral Collingwood was reinforced by four sail of the line under Rear-admiral Sir Richard Bickerton; but who subsequently shifted his flag from the *Queen 98* to the *Décade* frigate, and proceeded to England for

* *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 261.

the recovery of his health. On the 30th Sir Robert Calder, last from off Ferrol, where he had learnt that the combined fleet, nine days previous, had made sail for Cadiz, joined with 18 line-of-battle ships.* Some of these were occasionally detached to Gibraltar for water and provisions; and with the remainder Vice-admiral Collingwood continued to cruise before Cadiz, until the evening of the 28th of September, when Vice-admiral Lord Nelson arrived, to take the chief command of the Mediterranean fleet. His lordship had sailed from Portsmouth, in his old ship the *Victory*, on the morning of the 15th, accompanied by the *Euryalus* frigate. On the 18th, when the two ships were off Plymouth, the *Ajax* and *Thunderer* joined. On the 26th Lord Nelson despatched the *Euryalus* ahead, to acquaint Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood with his approach, and to direct that, on his assuming the command, no salute should be fired nor colours hoisted, in order that the enemy might be unapprized of the arrival of a reinforcement.

The force now under Lord Nelson consisted of 27 sail of the line; 22 of which cruised about 15 miles off Cadiz, while the remaining five, under Rear-admiral Louis in the *Canopus*, were stationed close off the harbour, to watch the motions of the combined fleet. Considering that, if he kept the main body of his fleet out of sight of land, the French admiral, being ignorant of the exact amount of the British force, might feel disposed to put to sea, Lord Nelson retired to a station from 16 to 18 leagues west of Cadiz. The force close off the harbour was now reduced to two frigates, the *Euryalus* and *Hydra*; and it may here be remarked that Lord Nelson was continually complaining, as he had done in the preceding war, of the few frigates attached to his command. Beyond these two frigates, at convenient intervals for distinguishing signals, were three or four sail of the line, the westernmost of which could communicate directly with the easternmost ship of the main body. The new station taken by the fleet possessed the additional advantage, that, in case the usual strong westerly gales should prevail, the danger was lessened of being forced into the Mediterranean; in which event the Franco-Spanish fleet, on the first change of wind, might easily effect its escape.

On the 1st of October the *Euryalus* frigate, Captain the Honourable Henry Blackwood, reconnoitred the port of Cadiz, and plainly discovered, at anchor in the outer harbour, and apparently ready for sea, 18 French and 16 Spanish sail of the line, four frigates, and two brigs. On the 2d Lord Nelson detached Rear-admiral Louis, with the *Canopus*, *Queen*, *Spencer*, *Tigre*, and *Zealous*, of the line, to Gibraltar, for provisions and water. On the same day a Swedish ship from Cadiz, bound to Alicante, informed the *Euryalus*, that the combined fleet had re-embarked

* See vol. iii., p. 302.

the troops on the 30th of September, and intended to put to sea the first easterly wind. This intelligence, meeting the rear-admiral on his way to the eastward, induced him, on the 3d, to return with his squadron to the fleet; but Lord Nelson, conceiving the whole to be a stratagem to draw him nearer to Cadiz for the purpose of obtaining a more accurate knowledge of his force, ordered the rear-admiral to proceed in the execution of his orders.

On the 4th, twice in the course of the day, several Spanish gun-boats, taking advantage of the calm state of the weather, pulled out from Cadiz and attacked the *Euryalus* and *Hydra*; but, after the exchange of a few ineffectual shot, the former retired to the harbour's mouth. On the 7th the *Defiance* joined from England, and on the 8th the *Leviathan* from Gibraltar. On the same day, with the aid of a fine south-east wind and clear weather, the *Euryalus* was again enabled to count 34 sail of the line in Cadiz harbour. The proximity of the *Euryalus* to the entrance of the harbour may be judged by the frigate's bearings at the time she tacked to stand out. They were, Rota point north half-west, San-Sebastian south half-west distant two miles and a quarter.

The possibility that the Cadiz, Carthagena, and Rochefort ships might effect a junction, and thereby present a force of 46 sail of the line (a rumour indeed prevailed, that the Brest fleet was out, which, without the junction of the Carthagena and Rochefort squadrons, would have made the combined fleet 54 or 55 sail), induced Lord Nelson, on the 10th, to draw up and transmit to the flag-officers and captains of his fleet, a plan of attack, in which, hourly expecting to be reinforced, particularly by a squadron of fast-sailing two-deckers under Vice-admiral Thornborough, he calculates, by anticipation, the strength, of his fleet at 40 sail of the line. As this plan, or "General Memorandum," of which a translation appears in several French historical works, is universally considered to be a complete masterpiece of the kind; and particularly, as it agrees in principle with that adopted in the great battle presently to be detailed, we shall offer no apology for inserting it entire in these pages.


"Thinking it almost impossible," says the noble chief, "to form a fleet of 40 sail of the line into a line of battle, in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time, that the opportunity would probably be lost; of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships: which will always make, if wanted,

a line of 24 sail, on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct. The second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line, to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

"If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron could fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I should therefore probably make the second in command's signal, to lead through about the twelfth ship from their rear, or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron, to cut two, (cut through?) three, or four ships ahead of their centre; so as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, whom every effort must be made to capture. The whole impression of the British fleet must be, to overpower two or three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief (supposed to be in the centre) to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose 20 sail of the enemy's line to be untouched: it must be some time before they could perform a manœuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible without mixing with the ships engaged. The enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of 46 sail of the line: British 40: if either is less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off. British to be one fourth superior to the enemy cut off. Something must be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea fight, beyond all others: shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as of foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear; and then that the British fleet would, most of them, be ready to receive their 20 sail of the line, or to pursue them should they endeavour to make off. If the van of the enemy tack, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wear, the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured, and disabled British, ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fear for the result.

"The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line, as their rallying point; but, in case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, *no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.*

"Of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of battle ready to receive an attack :



"The divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gun-shot of the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably then be made, for the lee line (three lines ?) to bear up together; to set all their sails, even their steering-sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line, and to cut through, beginning at the twelfth ship from the enemy's rear. Some ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends. If any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of 12 sail of the enemy. Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the 12 ships, composing, in the first position, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the commander-in-chief: which is scarcely to be expected; as the entire management of the lee line, after the intentions of the commander-in-chief are signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, 34 sail of the line, are to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief; who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible."

With the crews of so many ships to victual, Cadiz had become much straitened for provisions. To remedy the evil in part, especially as regarded his own fleet, the French emperor had ordered shipments to be made at Nantes, Bordeaux, and other ports in the bay of Biscay. The carriers were nominally Danish vessels, that landed their cargoes at Ayamonte, Conil, Algeziras, and at some other little harbours between the latter port and Santa-Maria; whence they were conveyed in coasting boats to Cadiz, without any interruption. As some check to this, a vigorous blockade had been adopted by Vice-admiral Collingwood, and was still maintained by his successor; who considered it a more likely mode to drive the combined fleet to sea, than a bombardment by Congreve rockets, as had been contemplated by the British admiralty. The arrival of the *Naïad*, *Phœbe*, *Sirius*, *Juno*, and *Niger* frigates, with one or two smaller vessels, enabled Lord Nelson to detach a part of them; and the interruption thereby given to the coasting trade was of increased annoyance to Cadiz and the shipping within it.

Between the 9th and 13th of October the *Royal-Sovereign*, *Belleisle*, *Africa*, and *Agamemnon*, joined the fleet. The British

force off Cadiz was now at its greatest height, 29 sail of the line; and the whole force under Lord Nelson's command, including the five ships recently gone to Gibraltar, amounted to 33 sail of the line. Since the 10th the Franco-Spanish fleet had moved to the entrance of the harbour, and evinced every disposition to put to sea the first opportunity. On the 14th Lord Nelson, as he had been directed, detached to England Sir Robert Calder, in the *Prince-of-Wales*, and on the 17th was obliged to send the *Donegal* to Gibraltar, to get a ground tier of casks. This done, the fleet under his lordship's immediate command consisted of the following 27 sail of the line, four frigates, one schooner, and one cutter:

Gun-ship

100	Victory . . .	{ Vice-admiral (w) Lord Nelson, K.B.
		{ Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy.
	Royal-Sovereign . . .	{ Vice-admiral (b.) Cuthbert Collingwood.
		{ Captain Edward Rotheram.
	Britannia . . .	{ Rear-admiral (w.) the Earl of Northesk.
		{ Captain Charles Bullen.
98	Téméraire . . .	" Eliab Harvey.
	Prince . . .	" Richard Grindall.
	Neptune . . .	" Thomas Francis Fremantle.
80	Dreadnought . . .	" John Conn.
	Tonnant . . .	" Charles Tyler.
	Belleisle . . .	" William Hargood.
	Revenge . . .	" Robert Moorsom.
	Mars . . .	" George Duff.
	Spartiate . . .	" Sir Francis Laforey, Bart.
	Defiance . . .	" Philip Charles Durham.
	Conqueror . . .	" Israel Pellew.
	Defence . . .	" George Hope.
74	Colossus . . .	" James Nicoll Morris.
	Leviathan . . .	" Henry William Bayntun.
	Achille . . .	" Richard King.
	Bellerophon . . .	" John Cooke.
	Minotaur . . .	" Charles John Moore Mansfield.
	Orion . . .	" Edward Codrington.
	Swiftsure . . .	" William George Rutherford.
	Ajax . . .	Lieut. John Pilfold, { acting.*
	Thunderer . . .	" John Stockham, }
64	Polyphemus . . .	Captain Robert Redmill.
	Africa . . .	" Henry Digby.
	Agamemnon . . .	" Sir Edward Berry.

Frigates, *Euryalus*, *Naiad*, *Phœbe*, and *Sirius*; Captains the Hon. Henry Blackwood, Thomas Dundas, the Hon. Thomas Bladen Capel, and William Prowse.

Schooner, *Pickle*, Lieutenant John Richards Lapenotiere, and *cutter* *Entrepreneur*, Lieutenant John Puer.

On the very day, on which Lord Nelson arrived to take command of the Mediterranean fleet, arrived at Cadiz a courier, with the French emperor's orders for M. Villeneuve to put to sea. These orders, it may be recollected, had issued since the 17th

* For Captains William Brown and William Lechmere, gone to England to attend as witnesses on Sir Robert Calder's court-martial.

of the preceding month, and required that the fleet should pass the Straits, land the troops on the Neapolitan coast, sweep the Mediterranean of all British commerce and cruisers, and enter the port of Toulon to refit and revictual.* Although in M. Villeneuve's instructions no mention is made of the Spanish fleet, it may naturally be supposed that the latter would desire to take advantage of the exit of a formidable French fleet, to effect its junction with the seven sail of the line hitherto so closely blocked up in the port of Carthage. That, indeed, would be but the return of a similar favour, granted nine years before to the French Rear-admiral Richery.† Every exertion was therefore made to fill up the complements of the six ships, which, in all other respects, had been ready for sea, ever since Vice-admiral Villeneuve's arrival. Of the two that had been present in Sir Robert Calder's action, one, the *Argonauta*, had since been repaired and refitted; but the damage done to the other, the *Terrible*, proved of so serious a nature, that she was disarmed, and her crew divided among the short-manned ships.

On the 9th or 10th of October, the French troops having embarked,‡ the Franco-Spanish fleet, with the exception of one ship, the *San-Fulgencio* 64 (for some unknown reason detained), moved to the entrance of the harbour, to be ready for a start at a moment's warning. From the 10th to the 17th hard gales from the westward continued to blow, with very slight intermissions. On the 17th, at midnight, the wind shifted to the eastward; and on the 18th Admiral Villeneuve informed Admiral Gravina, of his intention to put to sea on the following day. On the same evening, as a preparatory measure, a strong force of gun-boats drew up in line across the entrance of the harbour; and on the 19th, at 7 A. M., the Franco-Spanish fleet, by signal from the commander-in-chief, began getting under way, with a light breeze at north by east.

This and every other movement of the Franco-Spanish fleet was seen and reported by the British reconnoitring frigates. Owing to the lightness of the wind, 12 ships only succeeded in getting out, and these lay becalmed till early in the afternoon; when, a breeze springing up from the west-north-west, the whole 12 stood to the northward on the larboard tack, accompanied, at the distance of not more than two or three miles to windward, by the British frigates *Euryalus* and *Sirius*. At 8 A. M. the wind, still very light, shifted to south-west, and the course of the ships became north-west by west; the point of San-Sebastian at this time bearing from the *Euryalus* east half-south distant about four miles. At daylight on the morning of the 20th the remainder of the combined fleet in Cadiz harbour, consisting, with the ships already outside, of 33 sail of the line, five frigates, and two brigs, weighed and put to sea with a light breeze at

* See p. 21.

† See vol. i., p. 310.

‡ See p. 22.

south-east, while the ships in the offing, as was frequently the case on this coast, had the wind from the south-south-west. The French and Spanish ships composing this fleet were as follows :

Gun-ship		FRENCH.	
80	Bucentaure . .	{ Vice-ad.	P.-Ch.-J.-B.-S. Villeneuve.
		{ Captain	Jean-Jacques Magendie.
	Formidable . .	{ Rear-ad.	P.-R.-M.-E. Dumanoir-le-Pelley.
		{ Captain	Jean-Marie Letellier.
	Neptune . . .	Comm.	Esprit-Tranquille Maistral.
74	Indomptable .	"	Jean-Joseph Hubert.
	Algésiras . .	{ Rear-ad.	Charles Magon.
		{ Captain	Gabriel-Auguste Brouard.
	Pluton . . .	Comm.	Julian-Marie Cosmao-Kerjulien.
	Mont-Blanc . .	"	Guill.-Jean-Noël La Villegris.
	Intrépide . .	"	Louis-Antoine-Cyprien Infernet.
	Swiftsure . .	Captain	C.-E.-L'Hospitalier-Villemadrin.
	Aigle	"	Pierre-Paul Gourrège.
	Scipion . . .	"	Charles Berenger.
	Duguay-Trouin	"	Claude Touffet.
	Berwick . . .	"	Jean-Gilles Filhol-Camas,
	Argonaute . .	"	Jacques Epron.
	Achille . . .	"	Gabriel Denieport.
	Redoutable . .	"	Jean-Jacques-Étienne Lucas.
	Fougueux . .	"	Louis-Alexis Beaudouin.
	Héros	"	Jean-Bap.-Jos.-Remi Poulain.

Gun-ship.		SPANISH.	
130	Santisima-Trinidad .	{ Rear-ad.	don B. Hidalgo Cisneros.
		{ Comm.	don Francisco de Uriarte.
112	Principe-de-Asturias	{ Admiral	don Frederico Gravina.
		{ Rear-ad.	don Antonio Escano.
	Santa-Ana	{ Vice-ad.	don Ign. Maria de Alava.
		{ Captain	don Josef Gardoqui.
100	Rayo	Comm.	don Enrique Macdonel.
80	Neptuno	"	don Cayetano Valdés.
	Argonauta . . .	"	don Antonio Parejas.
74	Bahama	Captain	don Dionisio Galiano.
	Montanes . . .	"	don Josef Salzedo.
	San-Augustin . .	"	don Felipe Xado Cagigal.
	San-Ildefonso . .	"	don Josef Bargas.
	S.-Juan-Nepomuceno	"	don Cosme Churruca.
	Monarca	"	don Teodoro Argumosa.
	S.-Francisco-de-Asis .	"	don Luis de Flores.
64	San-Justo	"	don Miguel Gaston.
	San-Leandro . .	"	don Josef Quevedo.

Frigates (all French), *Cornélie*, *Hermione*, *Hortense*, *Rhin*, *Thémis*; *brigs* *Argus* and *Furet*.

Scarcely had the Franco-Spanish fleet cleared the harbour, than the south-south-west wind, attended by thick weather, began to baffle the ships in their progress. Meanwhile the *Euryalus* and *Sirius* kept their stations, watching every manœuvre. At 8 h. 30 m. A.M. the *Agamemnon*, with a heavy merchant brig in tow, was unconsciously running into the midst of the enemy's ships; when, at length, after repeated signals, enforced by guns from the *Euryalus*, the British 64 (but still

without casting off her deeply-laden prize) hauled to the wind on the starboard tack and got clear. Although ordered by telegraph from the *Euryalus*, whose captain was senior to Sir Edward Berry, to hasten to the British fleet, then to the southward of the former, with intelligence of the number and position of the enemy, the *Agamemnon* continued standing to the north-west with her prize in tow. This seemed an unaccountable remissness on the part of Lord Nelson's favourite ship.

The *Sirius* was also in some danger. She had waited so long for the return of her boat from an American vessel, that the enemy's advanced ships found themselves near enough to chase and fire at her; but the frigate, crowding sail, effected her escape. Between 2 and 3 p. m. the horizon cleared, and the wind shifted to west-north-west. Whereupon Vice-admiral Villeneuve ordered his fleet to form in five columns, agreeably to a plan which he had previously communicated to his flag-officers and captains. The fleet accordingly divided itself into two parts. The first part, consisting of 21 sail of the line, and denominated the line of battle, then subdivided itself into three squadrons of seven ships each; of which the centre was commanded by M. Villeneuve himself, the van by Vice-admiral Alava, and the rear by Rear-admiral Dumanoir. The second part, or corps de réserve, divided itself into two squadrons of six ships each; the first was under the orders of Admiral Gravina, and the second of Rear-admiral Magon.

At the time of communicating the foregoing plan of formation, Admiral Villeneuve reminded his officers of the instructions he had given to them previously to his quitting Toulon at the commencement of the year.* In case of being to windward, M. Villeneuve's directions then were, for the line to bear down together, and each ship to take her opponent in the enemy's line, whom she was to engage closely even to boarding. If, on the contrary, the opposite fleet lay to windward, his fleet was to wait the attack in close line of battle. "The enemy," says the French admiral, "will not confine himself to forming a line of battle parallel to ours and engaging us with his cannon, where success often attends the most skilful, and always the most fortunate: he will endeavour to turn our rear, to pass through our line, and, such of our ships as he may succeed in cutting off, will endeavour to surround and reduce with clusters (pelotons) of his own. In this case a captain would do better to trust to his courage and ardour for glory, than to the signals of the commander-in-chief; who, himself engaged and covered with smoke, would perhaps be unable to make them."† "There is nothing to alarm us," adds M. Villeneuve, "in the sight of an English fleet; their 74-gun ships have not 500 men on board;

* See p. 10.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 109.

the seamen are harassed by a two years' cruise" (alluding to the state of Lord Nelson's ships in January, 1805); "they are not more brave than we are, they have infinitely fewer motives to fight well, and possess less love of country. They are skilful at manœuvring. In a month, we shall be as much so as they are. In fine, every thing unites to inspire us with hopes of the most glorious success and of a new era for the imperial marine."* The most remarkable feature in this plan is, that it persists in ordering the movements to be conducted in close line of battle, even while it admits that the enemy, in all likelihood, will adopt a different mode of attack, that of cutting off the rear of the line and making of it an easy conquest. Such, however, were the ancient rules of naval tactics; and France did not yet possess a Rodney or a Nelson to be the first to break through them.

Shortly after the Franco-Spanish fleet had formed, as already mentioned, in five columns, one of the advanced frigates made the signal of 18 sail of British ships in sight. On this the combined fleet, still on the larboard tack, cleared for action, and at about 5 p.m. tacked and stood towards the mouth of the Straits. Shortly afterwards the four British frigates approached, and were chased by the *Argonauta*, *Achille*, and a few other ships; to which, as a reinforcement, and to serve also as a squadron of observation, were added the *Principe-de-Asturias*, *Aigle*, *Algésiras*, and *San-Juan-Nepomuceno*, under the command of Admiral Gravina, with orders to reunite with the main body before nightfall. At 7 h. 30 m. p.m. the *Aigle* made the signal of 18 British ships in line of battle to the southward; and shortly afterwards the combined fleet wore and stood to the north-west.

A little before daybreak on the morning of the 21st, finding that the British were to windward instead of to leeward, and that their force, instead of being only 21 sail of the line, was nearly equal to his own, the French admiral abandoned his plan of restricting his line of battle to 21 ships,† and ordered the three columns composed of the latter, without regard to priority of rank among the ships, to form in close line of battle on the starboard tack, upon the leewardmost division, consisting of the 12 ships in advance under Admiral Gravina and Rear-admiral Magon, and to steer south-west.

The order, in which the French and Spanish ships (the latter we have distinguished by italics) ranged themselves, beginning at the van, or south-east extremity of the line, was, according to a credible French account,‡ as follows: *Principe-de-Asturias*, *Achille*, *San-Ildefonso*, *San-Juan-Nepomuceno*, *Berwick*, *Argonauta*, *Montanez*, *Argonaute*, *Swiftsure*, *Aigle*, *Bahama*, *Algés-*

* For the original passages, see Appendix, No. 6.

† See p. 29.

‡ See *Précis des Evénemens*, tome xiii., p. 187.

siras, Pluton, *Monarca*, Fougueux, *Santa-Ana*, Indomptable, *San-Justo*, Redoutable, *San-Leandro*, Neptune, Bucentaure, *Santisima-Trinidad*, Héros, *San-Augustin*, *San-Francisco-de-Aris*, Mont-Blanc, Duguay-Trouin, Formidable, *Rayo*, Intrépide, Scipion, *Neptuno*; extending over a space, admitting a cable's length, or 200 yards, to be betwixt each ship, of nearly five miles.

This manœuvre executed, daylight found the two hostile fleets at the distance apart of not more than 10 or 12 miles, and therefore fairly in each other's sight. The centre of the Franco-Spanish fleet at this time bore about east by south of the centre of the British fleet, and the wind was a light breeze from west-north-west, accompanied by a heavy westerly swell.

It was on the 19th, at 9 h. 30 m. A.M., while the British fleet was lying to about 16 leagues west-south-west from Cadiz, that the Mars, who, with the Defence and Agamemnon, then formed the cordon of communication between the Euryalus and Victory, repeated the signal, that the enemy was coming out of port. Lord Nelson immediately made sail in chase to the south-east, with light and partial breezes, mostly from the south-south-west. At 3 P.M. the Colossus repeated the signal, that the enemy was at sea. Towards evening Lord Nelson directed that the fleet should observe the motions of the Victory during the night; that the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, being heavy sailers, should take their stations as most convenient to them; and that the Mars, Orion, Belleisle, Leviathan, Bellerophon, and Polyphemus, should proceed ahead, carry a light, and steer for the Straits' mouth.

On the 20th, at daybreak, the British found themselves near the entrance of the Straits, but saw nothing of the enemy. The fleet thereupon wore, and made sail to the north-west, with a fresh breeze at south-south-west. At 7 A.M. the Phœbe made the signal that the enemy bore north; and by noon the Victory and fleet were to the south-west of Cadiz, and within eight or nine leagues of it, standing to the west-north-west on the larboard tack. At 2 P.M. the fleet was taken aback by a breeze from the west-north-west, and at 4 P.M. wore and again came to on the larboard tack, steering north. At 5 P.M., just after the Euryalus had telegraphed that the enemy appeared determined to go to the westward, the Victory telegraphed, that Lord Nelson relied upon Captain Blackwood's keeping sight of the enemy during the night; and the Naiad, shortly afterwards, made the signal of 31 sail of the enemy, bearing north-north-east. At 8 h. 40 m. P.M. the British fleet wore and stood to the south-west; and at 4 A.M. on the 21st the fleet wore again, and steered, under easy sail, north by east. At 6 A.M., Cape Trafalgar bearing east by south distant about seven leagues, the Victory and ships with her obtained a sight of the combined fleet, also bearing about east by south, and distant, as already mentioned, 10 or 12 miles.

. At 6 h. 40 m. A. M. the Victory made the signals (Nos. 72 and 13), to form the order of sailing in two columns, and to prepare for battle; and in 10 minutes afterwards, the signal No. 76, to bear up. The two columns of the British fleet accordingly bore up to the eastward under all sail. This prompt mode of attack was that which Lord Nelson had previously directed,* in order to avoid the inconvenience and delay of forming a line of battle in the usual manner.

The near approach of the British fleet rendering an action unavoidable, the French admiral, at 8 h. 30 m. A. M., made the signal for his ships to wear together, and form the line in close order upon the larboard tack; thereby to bring Cadiz on his lee bow, and to facilitate, if necessary, his escape to that port. It was near 10 A. M. before the manœuvre was completed; and then, owing to the lightness of the wind, the partial flaws from off the land, the heavy ground swell, and the incapacity or inexperience of some of the captains, the Franco-Spanish line was very irregularly formed: so much so that, instead of being straight, it was curved or crescent-like; and, instead of the ships being in line ahead, some were to leeward, others to windward, of their proper stations. For the most part, indeed, the ships were two, and in a few cases three, deep; thus accidentally presenting more obstacles to the success of the plan of attack decided upon by the British admiral, than if each French and Spanish ship had been in the wake of her leader. The ships, generally, were under topsails and topgallantsails, with the main topsail shivering, and lay a point, or rather more, off the wind.

Owing to the lightness of the breeze, the British fleet, after bearing up, made very slow progress, scarcely going, with studding-sails set, three knots an hour. While thus gradually nearing the enemy's line, Lord Nelson, dressed in the same threadbare frock uniform-coat which was his constant wear, having for its appendages, sewed amidst the folds of the left breast, the same four weather-tarnished and lack-lustre stars always to be seen there, visited the different decks of the Victory; and, addressing the men at their quarters, cautioned them not to fire a single shot without being sure of their object.

Considering that the Victory, both as being the van-ship of a column and as bearing the flag of the commander-in-chief, would draw upon herself the whole weight of the enemy's fire, and thereby doubly endanger the life of him to whom all looked up for the success of the day, the principal officers present expressed among themselves a hope that Lord Nelson might be persuaded to allow the *Téméraire*, then close astern, to go ahead. Captain Blackwood undertook the delicate task of broaching the matter to the admiral. He did so; and Lord Nelson, smiling signifi-

* See p. 23.

cantly at Captain Hardy, replied, "Oh! yes, let her go ahead;" meaning, if she could. At about 9 h. 40 m. A. M. the *Téméraire* was accordingly hailed,* to take her station ahead of the *Victory*. At about the same time Lieutenant John Yule, who then commanded upon the forecastle, observing that the lee or starboard lower studding-sail was improperly set, caused it to be taken in for the purpose of setting it afresh. The instant this was done, Lord Nelson ran forward, and rated the lieutenant severely for having, as he supposed, begun to shorten sail without the captain's orders. The studding-sail was quickly replaced; and the *Victory*, as the gallant chief intended, continued to lead the column.†

Shortly after this fruitless attempt to induce Lord Nelson to yield the post of danger, the captains of frigates were ordered back to their ships; and Captain Blackwood, in his way to the *Euryalus*, called on board the *Téméraire*, and explained, what appears to have been but indistinctly heard, the object of the previous hail. Sometime after quitting the *Téméraire*, Captain Blackwood boarded the *Leviathan*, then the fifth ship of the weather column, and acquainted her captain, that it was the commander-in-chief's wish, that the *Leviathan*, as a previous signal had signified, should fall into the line between the *Téméraire* and *Victory*. From the known zeal of Captains Harvey and Bayntun, no doubt can exist as to the earnestness of their endeavours to reach the honourable stations assigned them; but the *Téméraire* was unable to do so from the causes already assigned, and the *Leviathan* did not receive the message by Captain Blackwood until the head of the column was too near the enemy to render any change proper or even practicable.

The direction in which the combined fleet now lay, with a home-port scarcely seven leagues off on the lee bow, and the evident forging ahead of the ships, whereby that distance was every minute diminishing, induced Lord Nelson to steer a trifle more to the northward, and to telegraph his second in command, "I intend to pass through the van of the enemy's line, to prevent him from getting into Cadiz." The reversed order of that line, in the prevailing state of the wind, had produced another danger to be guarded against: it had brought the shoals of San-Pedro and Trafalgar under the lee of both fleets. Accordingly, at 11 h. 30 m. A. M., the *Victory* made the signal (No. 63, with the preparative), for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of day.


This done, no other signal seemed wanting, when Lord

* But not, it is believed, as stated in a popular little work, "by his lordship." See *Authentic Narrative of the death of Lord Nelson*, by William Beatty, M.D. &c., p. 89.

† When the *Téméraire* ranged up on the *Victory's* quarter in order to pass her and lead, Lord Nelson hailed her; and speaking, as he always did, with a slight nasal intonation, said, "I'll thank you Captain Harvey to keep in your proper station, which is *astern* of the *Victory*.—Ed.

Nelson remarked, that he must give the fleet something by way of a fillip. After musing awhile, he said, "Suppose we telegraph that 'Nelson expects every man to do his duty.'" The officer, whom he was then addressing, suggested whether it would not be better, "England expects," &c. Lord Nelson rapturously exclaimed, "Certainly, certainly;" and, at about 11 h. 40 m. A. M., up went to the Victory's mizen topgallantmast-head, the first flag of the celebrated telegraphic message, "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY;"* a signal which, the instant its signification became fully known, was greeted with three cheers on board of every ship in the fleet, and excited among both officers and men the most lively enthusiasm.

The general formation of the Franco-Spanish line, and the manner in which the British fleet, by its two columns, bore down to the attack, will appear with sufficient and, we believe, all attainable accuracy, by the following diagram. As the ships of



the combined fleet were constantly varying their positions, we shall not attempt to point out the stations of any others than the

* There is not, that we are aware of, a single publication which gives this message precisely as it was delivered. The following is a minute of the several flags, as noted down on board of more than one ship in the fleet:

253 269 863 261 471 958 220 370 4 21 19 24

"England expects that every man will do his duty." The French translation, as given in one or two historical works, is equally short and expressive: "L'Angleterre compte que chacun fera son devoir."


ships of the four principal flag-officers. The commander-in-chief in the *Bucentaure*, with the *Santisima-Trinidad* as his second ahead, was directly in front of the *Victory*, the leader of the weather column; and the *Santa-Ana*, the flag-ship of Vice-admiral Alava, was in the same direction from the *Royal-Sovereign*, the leader of the lee column. The Spanish commander-in-chief, Admiral Gravina, in the *Principe-de-Asturias*, was the rearmost ship of the fleet. Of the frigates it may suffice to state, that they were ranged in an inner line considerably to leeward of the fighting line. One, however, in the centre, believed to have been the *Rhin*, was so near as to be seen by the *Royal-Sovereign* repeating signals; a circumstance that induced Vice-admiral Collingwood, a few minutes before the action commenced, to telegraph Lord Nelson, that the enemy's commander-in-chief was on board a frigate.

According to the average time noted down on board the different ships of the British fleet, it was just at noon, the wind very light, the sea smooth with a great ground swell setting from the westward, and the sun shining, in a beautiful manner, upon the fresh painted sides of the long line of French and Spanish ships, that the *Fougueux*, the second astern of the *Santa-Ana*, whose station was a little abaft the centre of the combined line, opened by signal a fire upon the *Royal-Sovereign*, then bearing on the French ship's larboard bow, and considerably within gun-shot; also bearing from the *Victory* south-east, distant about two miles, and from her own second astern, the *Belleisle*, about west by south three quarters of a mile. Immediately the three British admirals hoisted their respective flags, and the ships of both divisions of the fleet, the white or St.-George's ensign; a measure adopted to prevent any confusion in the heat of battle, from a variety of national flags. As an additional mark of distinction, each British ship carried, or was ordered to carry, a union-jack at her main topmast-stay, and another at her fore topgallant-stay. At the *Victory*'s main topgallantmast-head, also, was fast belayed Lord Nelson's customary signal on going into action, No. 16, "Engage the enemy more closely;" consisting of two flags, quarter red and white over blue, white, and red, or the Dutch republican ensign reversed. At about the same time that the firing commenced, the ships of the combined fleet hoisted their ensigns, and the admirals (with the exception, to which we shall presently advert, of the French commander-in-chief), their flags. In addition to her ensign, every Spanish ship also hung to the end of the spanker-boom a large wooden cross.

At about 10 minutes past noon, having reached a position close astern of the *Santa-Ana*, the *Royal-Sovereign* fired into her, with guns double-shotted; and with such precision as, by the subsequent acknowledgment of the Spanish officers, to kill or wound (incredible as it may appear) nearly 400 of her crew,

and to disable 14 of her guns. With her starboard broadside, similarly charged, the Royal-Sovereign raked the Fougueux, but, owing to the distance and the smoke, with little if any effect. It was just as the Royal-Sovereign was passing between these two enemy's ships, that Vice-admiral Collingwood called out to his captain: "Rotheram, what would Nelson give to be here!" And, by a singular coincidence, Lord Nelson, the moment he saw his friend in his enviable position, exclaimed: "See how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action."

Having, in the most gallant manner, passed under the stern of and saluted the Santa-Ana in the way already mentioned, the Royal-Sovereign put her helm a-starboard, and, without any difficulty, ranged close alongside of her; so close that the guns were nearly muzzle to muzzle. Between the two three-deckers a tremendous cannonade ensued. But the Royal-Sovereign soon found that she had more than one opponent to contend with. The Fougueux, having bore up, raked her astern; and, ahead of the English ship, at the distance of about 400 yards, lay the San-Leandro, who, wearing, raked her in that direction; while, upon the Royal-Sovereign's starboard bow and quarter, within less than 300 yards, were the San-Justo and Indomptable; as will better appear by the following diagram:



So incessant was the fire kept up by all these ships, that the people of the Royal-Sovereign frequently saw the shots come in contact with each other. Aware, at length, of the injury which they were thus sustaining by their own cross fire, and observing that three or four British ships were fast approaching to the support of their gallant leader, the four two-deckers, one by one, drew off from the Royal-Sovereign, and left her to combat solely with the Santa-Ana; who, although in force rather more than a match for her antagonist, began already to exhibit proofs that, in practical gunnery, she was decidedly her inferior.



ADMIRAL, LORD COLLINGWOOD.

FROM AN ORIGINAL PICTURE IN THE POSSESSION OF LADY COLLINGWOOD.



For upwards of 15 minutes the Royal-Sovereign was the only British ship in close action. At the end of that time, when the former had taken a position upon her opponent's lee bow, and was making the best possible use of it, the Belleisle, hauling up, fired a broadside into the lee quarter of the Santa-Ana, and then bore away towards the Indomptable. Owing to some of the ships astern of the Fougueux pressing forward to support the centre, while others remained with their sails aback or shivering, the Franco-Spanish line (if line we must call it) was becoming even more irregular than it had been. The slanting direction in which, on account of this movement, the British lee column was obliged to advance, enabled the ships to discharge their starboard guns at the enemy's rear; and an interchange of animated firing ensued, the smoke from which, for the want of a breeze to carry it off, spread its murky mantle over the combatants, and increased the confusion into which the rear of the combined fleet had already been thrown by the crash at its centre.

Lord Nelson had already, in a two-decker, evinced how little he dreaded coming in contact with a Spanish first-rate; and even the towering and formidable looking four-decker at present in front of him had, on that very occasion, been driven from her purpose by his well-known prowess. But, although he directed the Victory to be steered towards the bow of his old opponent, it was not with the intention of attacking her: a Spanish rear-admiral, whatever the force of his ship, was considered an unworthy object while a French vice-admiral commanded the fleet. Lord Nelson did not feel a doubt, and the sequel proved he was correct, that M. Villeneuve was in one of the two or three ships next astern of the four-decker; and, knowing that, to fetch a ship lying to at a distance ahead, he must keep her on his lee bow, he ordered the Victory to be steered in the manner just related.

Although every glass on board the Victory was put in requisition to discover the flag of the French commander-in-chief, all the answers to the repeated questions of Lord Nelson on the subject ended in disappointment. The four-decker's flag at the mizen could be made out, and some signals were occasionally seen at the main of two or three of the ships, but no French flag at the fore.* Often did the little man himself, with his remaining eye, cast an anxious glance towards the Franco-Spanish line in search of the ship which he meant the Victory first to grapple with; and so lightly did Lord Nelson value personal risk, that, although urged more than once on the subject, he would not suffer those barriers from the enemy's grape and musketry, the

* It was probably signals, made when the Victory was much closer, that gave rise to the following entry in the log of the Spartiate: "Observed her bearing down between a Spanish four-decker and a French two-decker, with admiral's flags at the main."

hammocks, to be placed one inch higher than, to facilitate his view of objects around him, they were accustomed to be stowed. The Victory, meanwhile, was slowly advancing to a gun-shot distance from the enemy's line.

At 20 minutes past noon, which was about 20 minutes after the Fougueux had opened her fire upon the Royal-Sovereign, and about 10 after the latter had passed under the stern of the Santa-Ana, the Bucentaure fired a shot at the Victory, then, with studding-sails set on both sides, steering about east and going scarcely a knot and a half through the water. The shot fell short. Two or three minutes elapsed, and a second shot was fired; which, the Victory then about a mile and a quarter distant, fell alongside. A third shot almost immediately followed, and that went over the ship. One or two others did the same, until, at length, a shot went through the Victory's main topgallantsail; affording to the enemy the first visible proof that his shot would reach. A minute or two of awful silence ensued; and then, as if by signal from the French admiral, the whole van, or at least seven or eight of the weathermost ships opened a fire upon the Victory, such a fire as had scarcely before been directed at a single ship. In a few minutes a round shot killed Mr. John Scott, Lord Nelson's public secretary, while he was conversing with Captain Hardy.

Since the commencement of the firing the wind had gradually died away to a mere breath. Still the Victory driven onward by the swell and the remains of her previous impetus, was going slowly ahead, in the direction, now, of the interval between the Santissima-Trinidad and Bucentaure: both of which ships, aided occasionally by the Redoutable astern of the latter, continued upon her a very heavy and destructive fire. To this heavy and unrelenting cannonade the Victory neither did, nor from her position could, bestow any return. In a very few minutes, however, after the firing had opened upon her, one of the foremost guns on the starboard side went off by accident. In a private ship this would scarcely have been noticed; but, as happening on board the ship of the commander-in-chief, it excited the attention of the fleet, and was minuted down in the log of one ship, the Polyphemus, as a real commencement of the action by the Victory; thus: "About 20 m. past 12 Victory fired upon by the enemy's van, which was returned with a few of her foremost guns on the starboard side."

Seeing, by the direction of her course, that the Victory was about to follow the example of the Royal-Sovereign, the French and Spanish ships ahead of the British weather column closed like a forest. This movement, headed by the stoppage in the headway of the Santa-Ana, and by the bearing up of the two Spanish ships ahead of her in the manner already related, divided the combined line nearly in the centre, leaving, including the Redoutable from her station astern of the San-Leandro, 14 ships

in the van, and 19 in the rear, with an interval between them of at least three quarters of a mile.

Just as she had got within about 500 yards of the larboard beam of the Bucentaure the Victory's mizen topmast was shot away about two thirds up. A shot also struck and knocked to pieces the wheel; and the ship was obliged to be steered in the gun-room, the first lieutenant (John Quilliam) and master (Thomas Atkinson) relieving each other at this duty. Scarcely had two minutes elapsed before a double-headed shot killed eight marines on the poop, and wounded several others: on which the admiral ordered Captain Adair to disperse his men round the ship, that they might not suffer so much from being together. Presently a shot, that had come through a thickness of four hammocks near the larboard chess-tree, and had carried away a part of the larboard quarter of the launch as she lay on the booms, struck the fore-brace bits on the quarterdeck, and passed between Lord Nelson and Captain Hardy; a splinter from the bits bruising the left foot of the latter, and tearing the buckle from his shoe. "They both," says Doctor Beatty, "instantly stopped, and were observed by the officers on deck to survey each other with inquiring looks, each supposing the other to be wounded. His lordship then smiled and said, 'This is too warm work, Hardy, to last long;' and declared that, through all the battles he had been in, he had never witnessed more cool courage than was displayed by the Victory's crew on this occasion."*


In a few seconds afterwards, as the Bucentaure slowly forged ahead, a large French ship was seen upon her lee quarter, and another ship astern of the former, in the act of ranging up, as if with the intention of completely closing the interval. Now it was that Captain Hardy, represented to Lord Nelson the impracticability of passing through the line without running on board one of the ships. His lordship quickly replied, "I cannot help it: it does not signify which we run on board of. Go on board which you please: take your choice."† At this moment, such had been the effect of the heavy and unrelenting fire to which she had so long been exposed, the loss on board the Victory amounted to 20 officers and men killed, and 30 wounded; a loss that would have been still more severe, had not the enemy's guns been pointed at the rigging and sails, rather than at the hull of the ship. In consequence of this, every studding-sail boom on the foremast (the Victory, unlike other ships, had no booms rigged out upon her mainmast) had been shot off close to the yard-arm, and every sail, especially on the foremast, was like a riddle: her almost new foresail, indeed, had from 80 to 100 yards of it stripped from the yard. This clearly shows what an advantage the centre and rear had lost in not having opened an earlier fire

* Beatty's Narrative, p. 27.

† Ibid., p. 30.

upon the Royal-Sovereign. "Quel but avantageux," says a French writer, "offraient aux canonniers ces deux groupes de vaisseaux, dont chacun présentait une quantité de mâts et de vergues et une masse de cordages et de voiles, où pas un boulet ne devait être perdu."*

At 1 P.M.† the 68-pounder carronade on the larboard side of the Victory's forecastle, containing its customary charge of one round shot and a keg filled with 500 musket-balls, was fired right into the cabin windows of the Bucentaure. As the Victory slowly moved ahead, every gun of the remaining 50 upon her broadside, all double, and some of them treble shotted, was deliberately discharged in the same raking manner. So close were the ships, that the larboard main yard-arm of the British three-decker, as she rolled, touched the vangs of her opponent's gaff: so close indeed, that had there been wind enough to blow it out, the large French ensign trailing at the Bucentaure's peak might, even at this early period of the action, have been a trophy



* Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvi., p. 170.

† According to the Victory's log, at four minutes past noon; but that would allow 14 minutes only for the Victory, with scarcely a breath of wind, to go a distance of at least a mile and a half. We know also that, owing to the death early in the action of the two persons whose places (in succession) it was to take minutes, the log entries were written the next day. Moreover the log of the Spartiate, one of the best kept in the fleet, says: "At 12 h. 59 m. Victory commenced firing."

in the hands of the Victory's crew. While listening, with characteristic avidity, to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French ship's hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated with the clouds of black smoke that entered the Victory's port-holes; and Lord Nelson, Captain Hardy, and others that were walking the quarterdeck, had their clothes covered with the dust which issued from the crumbled wood-work of the Bucentaure's stern. The position of the Victory just as, while receiving into her bows the foremost guns of a French 74 and the whole broadside of a French 80, she is about to pour her broadside into the stern of a second French 80, we have endeavoured to illustrate by the first set of figures in the preceding diagram.

Although the work of scarcely two minutes, and although not a mast or yard of the Bucentaure was seen to come down, the effects of the British three-decker's broadside upon the personnel of the French ship, as acknowledged a day or two afterwards by Vice-admiral Villeneuve, and long subsequently by his flag-captain, M. Magendie, was of the same destructive character as the broadside poured by the Royal-Sovereign into the stern of the Santa-Ana. The amount which the Bucentaure's officers gave, as the extent of their loss in killed and wounded by the Victory's fire, was "nearly 400 men." They represented also, that 20 of their guns were dismounted by it, and that the Bucentaure was reduced to a comparatively defenceless state.

Prevented by position, even had she not been incapacitated by loss, from returning the Victory's tremendous salute, the Bucentaure found an able second in the Neptune. This fine French 80, the moment the Victory's bows opened clear of the Bucentaure's stern, poured into them a most destructive fire. Among other damages occasioned by it, the flying jib-boom and sprit and sprit topsail-yards were cut away; also the starboard cathead was shot completely off, notwithstanding its immense stoutness. The bower anchor, and a sheet anchor stowed near it, were also quite disabled; and a third anchor on that side was much injured. Several shot also entered the Victory's bows between wind and water, and the foremast and bowsprit were badly wounded.

The Neptune, fearing, as the Victory advanced, that she intended to run on board of her, set her jib, and keeping away a little, ranged ahead; but, Captain Hardy having decided to run on board the ship on his starboard hand, and into which a broadside had been poured the instant it would bear with effect, the Victory put her helm hard a-port. This quickly brought her head in the direction of the Redoubtable; who, with her foremost guns continued to aid the Neptune in raking the Victory, and with her aftermost ones fired occasionally at the *Téméraire*, as the latter drew out from the wake of her leader. Just, however, as the Victory was coming in contact with her,

the Redoutable shut most of her lowerdeck ports, and fired from them no more. In about a minute after she had shifted her helm, the Victory ran foul of the Redoutable; the sheet anchor of the one striking the spare anchor of the other.

Very soon afterwards, or at about 1 h. 10 m. P. M., the two ships dropped alongside of each other. This account corresponds with that given by the French. "Nelson," says M. Parisot, "*voyant qu'il (the Redoutable's captain) n'était pas disposé à plier, fit venir le Victory au vent tout d'un coup, et le laissant tomber en travers, il aborda de long en long le Redoutable.*"* Owing to the slight impetus in the Victory, caused by the want of wind, the concussion of the firing would probably have separated her from the Redoutable, had not the Victory's starboard fore topmast studding-sail boom-iron, as the ships were in the act of rebounding off, hooked into the leech of the Redoutable's fore topsail. This held the ships together; and, with the lower deck guns of the Victory touching the side of the Redoutable, and the latter's mainmast in a line about midway between the former's fore and main masts, the two ships fell off a few points from the wind.†

Almost immediately after the Victory had got hooked alongside the Redoutable, Mr. William Willmet, the boatswain of the former, found a ready means of clearing the French ship's gangways by firing the starboard 68-pounder carronade, loaded as the larboard one had been, right upon the Redoutable's decks. The guns of the middle and lower decks were also occasionally fired into the Redoutable, but very few of the 12-pounders, on account chiefly of the heavy loss among those who had been stationed at them. The Redoutable, on her part, fired her maindeck guns into the Victory, and used musketry, as well through her ports into those of the Victory, as from her three tops down upon the latter's deck. In her fore and main tops, also, the Redoutable had some brass cohorns, which, loaded with langridge, were frequently fired with destructive effect upon the Victory's forecastle. The larboard guns of the Victory were fired occasionally at the Bucentaure; but it was with little or no effect, the latter ship continuing to move to the northward, while the victory and Redoutable kept inclining their heads to the eastward. The Santissima-Trinidad also received into her starboard or lee quarter and stern a portion of the Victory's fire.

Never allowing mere personal comfort to interfere with, what he considered to be, the good of the service, Lord Nelson, when the Victory was fitting to receive his flag, ordered the large skylight over his cabin to be removed, and the space planked up, so as to afford him a walk amidships, clear of the guns and ropes. Here, along an extent of deck of about 21 feet in

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 171.

† See second position in Diagram at p. 41.


length, bounded abaft by the stanchion of the wheel and forward by the combings of the cabin ladder-way, were the admiral and Captain Hardy, during the whole of the operations we have just detailed, taking their customary promenade. At about 1 h. 25 m. P. M., just as the two had arrived within one pace of the regular turning spot at the cabin ladder-way, Lord Nelson, who, regardless of quarterdeck etiquette, was walking on the larboard side,* suddenly faced left about. Captain Hardy, as soon as he had taken the other step, turned also, and saw the admiral in the act of falling. He was then on his knees with his left hand just touching the deck. The arm giving way, Lord Nelson fell on his left side, exactly upon the spot where his secretary, Mr. Scott, had breathed his last, and with whose blood his lordship's clothes were soiled.

On Captain Hardy's expressing a hope that he was not severely wounded, Lord Nelson replied: "They have done for me at last, Hardy." "I hope not," answered Captain Hardy. "Yes," replied his lordship, "my backbone is shot through."† The wound was by a musket-ball, which had entered the left shoulder through the fore part of the epaulet, and, descending, had lodged in the spine. That the wound had been given by some one stationed in the Redoubtable's mizen top was rendered certain, not only from the nearness (about 15 yards) and situation of the mizen top in reference to the course of the ball, but from the circumstance that the French ship's main top was screened by a portion of the Victory's mainsail as it hung when clewed up. That the ball was intended for Lord Nelson is doubtful, because, when the aim must have been taken, he was walking on the outer side, concealed in a great measure from view by a much taller and stouter man. Admitting, also (which is very doubtful), that the French seaman or marine, whose shot had proved so fatal, had selected for his object, as the British commander-in-chief, the best dressed officer of the two, he would most probably have fixed upon Captain Hardy, or, indeed, such, in spite of Dr. Beatty's print, was Lord Nelson's habitual carelessness, upon any one of the Victory's lieutenants who might have been walking by the side of him. Sergeant Secker of the marines, and two seamen, who had come up on seeing the admiral fall, now, by Captain Hardy's direction, bore their revered and much lamented chief to the cockpit; where we will for the present leave him. The position of the Victory and of the ships near to her at the time Lord Nelson received his wound, drawn up

* This may be relied upon as correct, although completely at variance with the account published by the Victory's surgeon (Beatty, p. 32), and which, owing to its apparent authenticity, has been made the groundwork of every other published account, including that in the first edition of this work.

† Beatty's Narrative, p. 33.

with as much accuracy as the case admits, will be found in the following diagram.



Previously to our entering upon the account of each ship's proceedings, we will endeavour to present a general view of the engagement, and of its immediate result. Soon after the first four ships of the British lee division had cut through between the centre and rear of the Franco-Spanish line, the remainder successively as they came up, pierced the mass (for it could no longer be called line) of enemy's ships, in various directions, and found opponents as they could. Meanwhile the leading ships of the weather division had begun to engage in a similar manner, a little ahead of the centre. The action, which had commenced, as we have elsewhere shown, at noon, arrived at its height about 1 h. 30 m. P.M. At 3 P.M. the firing began to slacken, and, at about 5 P.M., wholly ceased. Of the 14 van-ships of the combined line, reckoning to the Redoutable inclusive, three only were captured in their places. The remaining 11 wore out of the line. Of these 11, three were captured, and eight escaped; four, by hauling to windward, and four by running for Cadiz. Of the 19 rear-ships, 12, including one burnt, were taken, and seven escaped into Cadiz; making, as the result of the first day's proceedings, nine French (including one burnt), and nine Spanish, sail of the line captured, total 18, and nine French, and six Spanish, sail of the line escaped, total 15: of which latter number four French ships got away to the southward, and 11, five of them French and six Spanish, and most of the ships much shattered, with all the frigates and brigs, reached the bay of Cadiz.

So far as to the collective operations of the two fleets in the Trafalgar battle. Our attention is now due to the individual exertions of the ships on each side; and we shall proceed to give the most accurate account that our researches, far and near,

have enabled us to obtain, taking the British ships of each division, in the order in which, according to the best judgment to be formed from the variety of times noted down in their logs, they successively got into action.

The Royal-Sovereign we left just as, after 15 minutes of close action with three or four ships, the Belleisle had come to her relief. The latter, passing on to the eastward, left the Royal-Sovereign upon the Santa-Ana's starboard bow. In a short time the Spanish three-decker lost her mizen topmast; and, at the end of about an hour and a quarter from the commencement of the combat, her three masts fell over the side. At about 2 h. 15 m. p. m., after a hot, and with the exception of the Belleisle's broadside, an uninterrupted, engagement between the two ships from 10 minutes past noon, the Santa-Ana struck to the Royal-Sovereign.

This occurrence took place just as the mizenmast of the Royal-Sovereign came down, and when her fore and main masts from their shattered condition, were ready to follow it. No sooner, indeed, did the Royal-Sovereign, in order to put herself a little to rights, move a short distance ahead of her prize, then her mainmast fell over on the starboard side, tearing off two of the lowerdeck ports. The foremast, having been shot through in several places, and stripped of nearly the whole of its rigging, was left in a tottering state. Hence the English three-decker was reduced to almost, if not quite, as unmanageable a state as the Spanish three-decker, which she had so gallantly fought and captured.

The French accounts say: "*Le vaisseau la Santa-Ana, vaillamment attaqué par l'amiral Collingwood, fut non moins vaillamment défendu par le vice-amiral Alava; mais, accablé par le nombre, il dut céder.*"* And yet out of the 26 remaining British ships, no ship except the Belleisle, and that with merely a broadside in passing, asserts that she fired into the Santa-Ana. Here is the proper place to notice the modesty with which Vice-admiral Collingwood, in his official despatch, refers to the part taken by his own ship. "The commander-in-chief in the Victory," he says, "led the weather column, and the Royal-Sovereign, which bore my flag, the lee. The action began at 12 o'clock by the leading ships of the columns breaking through the enemy's line, the commander-in-chief about the tenth ship from the van, the second in command about the twelfth from the rear, &c." The Royal-Sovereign is not again mentioned, except in reference to matters that occurred subsequently to the battle.

The loss sustained by the Royal-Sovereign was tolerably severe: she had one lieutenant (Brice Gilliland), her master (William Chalmers), one lieutenant of marines (Robert Green), two midshipmen (John Aikenhead and Thomas Braund), 29

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 179.

seamen, and 13 marines killed, two lieutenants (John Clavell and James Bashford), one lieutenant of marines (James le Vesconte), one master's mate (William Watson), four midshipmen (Gilbert Kennicott, Grenville Thompson, John Farrant, and John Campbell), her boatswain (Isaac Wilkinson), 69 seamen, and 16 marines wounded.

Respecting the Santa-Ana's loss in killed and wounded, nothing is known beyond the amount already specified as the alleged effect of her opponent's raking fire. That the Spanish ship's loss must have been uncommonly severe may be inferred, as well from the length and closeness of the action, as from the fact, that her starboard side was nearly beaten in by the Royal-Sovereign's shot. Among the Santa-Ana's dangerously, if not mortally wounded, was Vice-admiral Alava; and it was understood that her killed and wounded comprised a great proportion of officers.

After having, for the space of 20 minutes, sustained the tremendous fire opened by the rear of the combined line, and after having suffered, in consequence, a loss of between 50 and 60 men in killed and wounded, the Belleisle, at about a quarter past noon, exchanged a few shot with the Monarca, and passed through the line abreast of the Fougueux, then distantly raking the Royal-Sovereign. In hauling up on the larboard tack, the Belleisle was enabled, owing to the advanced position of the latter, to pour a full broadside into the lee quarter of the Santa-Ana. Bearing away a little, the Belleisle then passed close astern of the Indomptable; who, quickly wearing, exchanged a few broadsides with her, and then bore up to the south-east. In the mean time the Belleisle was engaged with a Spanish ship, the San-Juan-Nepomuceno, at some distance on her starboard beam. At about 45 minutes past noon the Belleisle's main topmast was shot away; and, as the enemy's rear ships were now pressing forward to support the centre, her situation became extremely critical.

At 1 p. m. the Fougueux ranged up in the smoke on the Belleisle's starboard beam, and struck her at the gangway with her larboard bow, rolling at the same time with her fore yard over the British ship's quarterdeck. The Fougueux immediately began engaging the Belleisle, and in 10 minutes shot away her mizenmast about six feet above the deck, the wreck falling over the larboard quarter. In about 10 minutes more, on the Mars beginning to engage her, the Fougueux, who had received a smart fire from the Belleisle's aftmost guns, dropped astern and hauled to the northward. At 1 h. 30 m. p. m. the French Achille came ranging past the stern of the Belleisle, then with her head a little to the southward of east, and stationed herself on the latter's larboard quarter. In this position, the Achille kept up a steady fire, with comparative impunity, on account of the wreck of the Belleisle's mizenmast masking her aftermost guns. Meanwhile


the *Aigle*, having replaced the *San-Juan*, was distantly cannonading the British ship on the starboard side; and the *San-Justo* and *San-Leandro*, as they stood athwart the bows of the *Belleisle* to join Admiral Gravina in the rear, opened a passing fire.

Thus in a manner surrounded, the *Belleisle* soon had her rigging and sails cut to pieces, and at 2 h. 10 m. p.m. lost her mainmast about four feet above the deck; the wreck of which fell upon the break of the poop, while the topmast, with the yards, sails, and shrouds, hung over upon the larboard side, where already lay the wreck of the mizenmast. Her larboard guns thus completely covered by wreck, the *Belleisle* was prevented from returning by a single shot the *Achille's* animated and destructive fire. At 2 h. 30 m. p.m., driven from her capital station upon the bows of the *Victory* and *Téméraire*, by the approach of the *Leviathan*, the French *Neptune* placed herself across the starboard bow of the *Belleisle*; and at 2 h. 45 m. the foremast and bowsprit of the latter, still engaged by two other ships, were shot away by the board.

At 3 h. 15 m. p.m. the *Polyphemus* interposed herself between the *Belleisle* and *Neptune*. In five minutes more the *Defiance* took off the fire of the *Aigle*; and at 3 h. 25 m. p.m. the *Swiftsure*, passing astern of the *Belleisle*, commenced engaging the *Achille*, who about this time lost her main and mizen topmasts. As the *Swiftsure* passed close under the *Belleisle's* stern the two ships cheered each other; and to signify that, notwithstanding her dismasted and shattered state, the *Belleisle* still remained unconquered, a union-jack was suspended at the end of a pike and held up to view, while an ensign was being made fast to the stump of her mizenmast. Thus, by the timely arrival of her friends, saved from being crushed by the overwhelming force around her, the *Belleisle* ceased firing. Observing soon afterwards on his larboard beam a Spanish two-decker that had already surrendered, Captain Hargood sent the master, Mr. William Hudson, and Lieutenant Owen of the marines (who volunteered although wounded), in the only remaining boat, the pinnace, and took possession of the 80-gun ship *Argonauta*. The position of the *Belleisle*, at the time she was so fortunately relieved, we have endeavoured to illustrate by the following diagram.

The *Belleisle's* hull was knocked almost to pieces: both sides of it were about equally damaged. Ports, port-timbers, channels, chain-plates, all exhibited unequivocal marks of the terrible mauling she had received. Her three masts and bowsprit, as we have seen, were shot away, and so was her figure-head. Her boats and anchors shared the same fate. If the *Belleisle's* damages were severe, her loss of men was not less so: she had two lieutenants (Ebenezer Geall and John Woodin), one midshipman (George Nind), 22 seamen, and eight marines killed, one lieu-

tenant (William Ferrie), one lieutenant of marines (John Owen), her boatswain (Andrew Gibson), two master's mates (William Henry Pearson and William Cutfield), one midshipman (Samuel Jago), one first-class volunteer (J. T. Hodge), 67 seamen, and 19 marines wounded.



In her way down astern of the Belleisle, the Mars suffered severely from the heavy raking fire of the ships ahead of her, the San-Juan-Nepomuceno, Pluton, Monarca, and Algésiras. As the Mars was directing her course to cut the line between the first two of these ships, the Pluton, who was to windward of the San-Juan, ranged ahead: whereupon, to avoid being raked by so close an opponent, the Mars hauled up, with the intention to pass on and cut the line ahead of the San-Juan. In attempting this manœuvre, the Mars was followed and engaged by the Pluton. Having by that time had her rigging and sails greatly damaged, the Mars was obliged to come head to wind in order to avoid running on board the Santa-Ana; whereby the Mars lay with her stern exposed to the Monarca and Algésiras. At this moment, however, the Tonnant came up, and soon found full employment for both of those ships. Meanwhile, as she paid off in her completely unmanageable state, the Mars became also exposed to a heavy fire from the Fougueux, then with her larboard guns engaging the Belleisle, and presently received into her stern a most destructive fire from the Pluton; a fire that almost cleared the poop and quarterdeck of both officers and men. It was at about 1 h. 15 m. P. M., while Captain Duff was standing at the break of the quarterdeck looking over the side, that a cannon-shot from the Pluton struck him on the breast, knocked off his head, and cast his body on the gangway. The same shot killed two seamen, who were standing close behind their captain. The command now devolved upon Lieutenant William Hennah. By this time succour was at hand; and,

while the *Fougueux* made off to the northward in the direction of the *Téméraire*, the *Pluton* stood away to the south-east to join Admiral Gravina.*

The *Mars* had her main topmast and spankerboom shot away, and her three lower masts, fore and main yards, and fore topmast, very badly wounded: her foremast, indeed, was left in so shattered a state that it subsequently fell overboard. The main piece of her rudder was badly wounded, her stern and quarters much cut, and nine of the poop-beams, besides sundry knees, &c., shot to pieces. The ship had also some guns disabled, and had received several shot between wind and water. The loss on board the *Mars* was proportionably severe: she had her captain, one master's mate (Alexander Duff), two midshipmen (Edward Corbyn and Henry Morgan), 17 seamen, and eight marines killed, and two lieutenants (Edward William Garrett and James Black), her master (Thomas Cook), one captain of marines (Thomas Norman), five midshipmen (John Young, George Guiren, William John Cook, John Jenkins, and Alfred Luckraft), 44 seamen, and sixteen marines wounded.

With respect to the injuries sustained by the *Pluton*, the ship is represented to have been unable, after the action, to muster more than 400 effective men out of a complement of about 700: consequently, her loss must have been severe. It appears, also, that the *Pluton* made three feet water an hour from the shot she had received in the hull.


Having, as already stated, fired at the ships that were pressing upon the *Mars*, the *Tonnant* steered straight for the larboard bow of the *Algésiras*, then moving slowly onwards the same as her companions in the line, and very near to her present leader, the *Monarca*. As the *Tonnant* advanced, the *Algésiras*, having already her main topsail to the mast, backed her mizen topsail, and thus enabled the former, at about 45 minutes past noon, to run close under the Spanish ship's stern. Pouring in a raking fire, the *Tonnant* hauled up, and engaged the *Monarca* alongside; but, dreading to encounter so large and powerful a ship, the latter fired a few ineffective shot, dropped astern, and struck her colours, although she afterwards rehoisted them. The *Tonnant's* people believed, although they were not certain, that the *Monarca* struck; but the Spartiate, who, not being engaged until late, had leisure for observation, saw the flag hauled down, and in her log says accordingly: "At 1 h. 7 m. a Spanish two-decker struck to the *Tonnant*."

Filling her main and mizen topsails, the *Algésiras* now evinced an intention to cross the stern of the *Tonnant*, who, by this time, had had her fore topmast and main yard shot away; but the *Tonnant*, putting her helm hard-a-port, ran the *Algésiras* on board, and defeated the manœuvre. The bowsprit and anchors

* See second set of figures in diagram at p. 50.

of the *Algésiras* getting entangled with the main rigging of the *Tonnant*, the two ships were held fast together, greatly, on account of their relative positions, to the advantage of the *Tonnant*. It was, doubtless, while the *Tonnant*'s attention was thus occupied, that the *Monarca*, being left to herself, and having suffered comparatively little in the action, rehoisted her colours.

While thus fast to the *Algésiras* on her starboard side, the *Tonnant* fired her larboard aftermost guns athwart the hawse of the *Mars* at the *Pluton* lying upon the latter's larboard bow, and her larboard foremost guns at the *San-Juan Nepomuceno* lying upon her own bow. Meanwhile the *Mars*, until she and the *Pluton* dropped astern, fired several well-directed shot into the larboard quarter of the *Algésiras*. The position of the *Tonnant* and ships around her at this time, which was about 1 h. 35 m. P. M., we have endeavoured to illustrate by the following diagram.



At about 1 h. 40 m. P. M. Captain Tyler received a severe wound, and was obliged to be taken below. The command of the *Tonnant* thereupon devolved upon Lieutenant John Bedford. In the mean time an animated cannonade was kept up between the two ships; by which the *Algésiras* soon lost her foremast, and the *Tonnant* her main and mizen topmasts. The *Algésiras* made a serious attempt to board; but the marines of the *Tonnant* maintained so steady and well-directed a fire, that the French crew did not succeed, except in the case of one man, who contrived to enter one of the *Tonnant*'s maindeck ports, and whose life, to the credit of those who took him, was spared. At about 2 h. 15 m. P. M., just as her main and mizen masts were about to share the fate of her foremast, the *Algésiras*, after a very gallant defence, struck her colours; and Lieutenant Charles Bennett, with Lieutenant of marines Arthur Ball, and about 48 men, stepped on board and took possession of her. In another quarter of an hour the *San-Juan* hailed that she surrendered; and Lieutenant Benjamin Clement was sent in the jollyboat, with two hands, to take possession. The boat being damaged by shot, swamped, before she reached a quarter of the way. The two men could swim, but not the lieutenant. While the latter was clinging to the boat, a shot struck her and

knocked off her quarter. The boat then turned bottom upwards; and Lieutenant Clement held fast by the boat's fall until one of his two companions, a black man, Macnamara by name, swam to the Tonnant, and returned with a rope that lead out of the ship's stern port. By this means a brave young officer, who had been in two or three of the general actions of the preceding war, was saved to his country.


Among the damages sustained by the Tonnant in the hull, was a bad wound in the rudder, a portion of the head of which was shot away; and a great part of her starboard quarter-piece, with the rails and gallery, was carried away by the *Algésiras* when the vessels got foul. The loss on board the Tonnant amounted to one midshipman (William Brown), 16 seamen, and nine marines killed, her captain (severely), boatswain (Richard Little), the captain's clerk (William Allen), one master's mate (Henry Ready), 30 seamen, and 16 marines wounded. The *Algésiras* had upwards of 200 men killed and wounded, including several officers, and among the mortally wounded, the brave and highly respected Rear-admiral Magon, who had previously been wounded in two places, but would not quit the deck.

After having captured the *Algésiras* and disengaged herself from her prize, the Tonnant fired several shot at the squadron of *M. Dumanoir* passing to windward; but, having no boat left, could not send again to take possession of the *San-Juan*. That Spanish ship, however, was shortly afterwards engaged and secured by the *Dreadnought*.

In consequence of the novel mode of attack adopted by the commander-in-chief, each British ship, as she bore up in line ahead, was obliged to follow in the wake of her leader until close upon the enemy's line: her commander, then, acting up to Lord Nelson's instructions, as contained in the memorandum at a previous page, that no captain could do very wrong who placed his ship alongside that of an enemy, attached himself to the first Frenchman or Spaniard that crossed his path. Most of the captains had also received, on the morning of the action Lord Nelson's verbal directions, transmitted through the captains of the frigates, that they were to break the enemy's line wherever they conveniently could. This, in effect, discretionary power was particularly beneficial towards the height of the battle, when the enemy's ships, by an irregular movement from the rear to the centre, and, in some instances, from the centre and van to the rear, were every instant shifting their positions, and giving to their line, if line it could be called, a new face.

It was not until full 15 minutes after the Tonnant had cut the line, that her second astern, the *Bellerophon*, owing to her distance from the former and the lightness of the wind, was enabled to do the same. This she accomplished by passing under the stern of the *Monarca*, as the latter, with colours rehoisted, was dropping away from the Tonnant. In luffing up

to lay the *Monarca* alongside to leeward, the *Bellerophon*, at about 50 minutes past noon, ran foul of the *Aigle*, the latter's main yard locking with her fore yard. The British ship now fired from both sides, having the *Monarca* on the larboard, and the *Aigle* on the opposite bow. In a short time three other enemy's ships opened a cannonade upon her, the *Montanez* (we believe), with her aftermost guns on the larboard quarter, the French *Swiftsure* on the starboard quarter, and the *Bahama*, with some of her foremost guns, athwart her stern. The first set of figures in the following diagram will perhaps assist in showing the situation of the British ship at this period of the battle.



At about 1 P. M. the *Bellerophon*'s main and mizen topmasts fell over on the starboard side, and the main topsail and top-gallantsail immediately caught fire with the flash of the guns, assisted by the hand-grenades which the *Aigle*'s people kept throwing from her tops. At 1 h. 5 m. P. M. the master was killed; and at 1 h. 11 m. Captain Cooke. The command now devolved upon Lieutenant William Pryce Cumby. Shortly afterwards the *Montanez* dropped out of gun-shot astern, and the *Bahama* and French *Swiftsure* became engaged with the *Colossus*. The musketry from the *Aigle* had by this time played sad havoc upon the *Bellerophon*'s quarterdeck, forecastle, and poop. At 1 h. 40 m. P. M. the *Aigle*, who had once or twice vainly attempted to board her opponent, dropped astern, exposed as she fell off to a raking fire, first from the *Bellerophon* herself, and then from the *Revenge*. The *Bellerophon*, now quite in an unmanageable state, fired a few shot at the *Monarca*, who instantly hauled down her colours for the last time, and was taken possession of by the former; as, nearly at the same time, was the *Bahama*, who had previously struck, to relieve herself from the destructive fire of the *Colossus*.

The *Bellerophon* had her main and mizen topmasts shot away, her fore topmast, all three lower masts, and most of her yards, badly wounded, and her standing and running rigging nearly cut to pieces. In hull also she was much injured; having had several knees and riders shot away, and part of her lower deck

ripped up, besides other damage. Her loss consisted of her captain, master (Edward Overton), one midshipman (John Simmons), 20 seamen, and four marines killed, one captain of marines (James Wemyss), her boatswain (Thomas Robinson), one master's mate (Edward Hartley), four midshipmen (William N. Jewell, James Stone, Thomas Bant, and George Pearson), 96 seamen, and 20 marines wounded. A great proportion of this heavy loss unfortunately arose from the explosion of a quantity of loose powder spilt about the decks from the cartridges; and which, but for the water that lay around the entrance of the magazine, must have destroyed the ship and all on board of her.

Although no particular account can be given of the damage or loss sustained by the *Aigle*, it may with certainty be stated, that she suffered greatly in masts, rigging, and hull, and lost in killed and wounded, from the successive fire of the *Bellerophon*, *Revenge*, and *Defiance*, nearly two thirds of her crew, including among the killed, her captain and first lieutenant, and among the wounded several of her officers. The loss on board the *Monarca* does not appear to have been recorded; but it must have been severe, from her first action with the *Tonnant*, and from the length of time she was exposed to the close and uninterrupted fire of the *Bellerophon*, one of the best manned, although one of the smallest, 74s in the British fleet.

At 1 P. M., or thereabouts, after having, during 10 minutes or so, in her efforts to close, received the fire of two or three enemy's ships, the *Colossus* ran past the starboard side of the French *Swiftsure*;* who had just before bore up, as well to avoid being raked by the *Colossus*, as to bring her larboard guns to bear upon the *Bellerophon*. The density of the smoke on the starboard side hid from view all the enemy's ships in that direction, until, having run a short distance to leeward, the *Colossus* found herself close alongside of the *Argonaute*, whose larboard yard-arms locked into her starboard ones. A spirited cannonade now ensued between the two ships, and lasted for about 10 minutes, when the *Argonaute*'s fire became nearly silenced, except from a few of her aftermost guns; a shot from one of which, just as the ships, driven apart by the concussion of the guns, began to settle broadside off, struck Captain Morris a little above the knee. As soon as, by this lateral movement, she had cleared her yards, the *Argonaute* paid off, and went away, receiving into her stern the parting fire of the *Colossus*. The latter, in the mean while, was warmly engaged on her larboard quarter, with the French *Swiftsure*, and also with the *Bahama*, who lay close on that ship's larboard bow, and fired at the *Colossus* across the *Swiftsure*'s fore-foot.

At a few minutes before 3 P. M., having forged ahead, the *Swiftsure* got between the *Bahama* and *Colossus*, and being thus

* See the diagram at p. 52.

more fully exposed to the latter's well-directed broadsides, soon slackened her fire and dropped astern. The Colossus was now enabled to devote her sole attention to the Bahama; who, on her mainmast falling, as it presently did, over her engaged side, showed an English jack from the hen-coops on her poop, to denote that she had struck. Meanwhile the French Swiftsure endeavoured to bear up under the stern of the Colossus; but the latter, wearing more quickly, received a few only of the former's larboard guns, before she poured in her starboard broadside. This brought down the French Swiftsure's mizenmast. At the same time the Orion, in passing, gave the French ship a broadside, which brought down her tottering mainmast; whereupon the Swiftsure made signs to the Colossus of having surrendered. In hauling up to take possession of her two prizes, the latter lost her wounded mizenmast over the starboard side.

The mainmast of the Colossus was so badly wounded, that she was compelled, during the ensuing night, to cut it away; and her damages altogether were extremely severe. Her only remaining stick, the foremast, had been shot through in several places; two of her anchors and three of her boats had been destroyed, and some of her guns disabled. Four of her starboard lowerdeck ports had also been knocked away by running on board the Argonaute, and her hull in every part of it was much shattered. The Colossus lost in the action her master (Thomas Scriven), 31 seamen, and eight marines killed, her captain,* two lieutenants (George Bully and William Forster), one lieutenant of marines (John Benson), her boatswain (William Adamson), one master's mate (Henry Milbanke), eight midshipmen (William Herringham, Frederick Thistlewayte, Thomas G. Reece, Henry Snellgrove, Rawden M'Lean, George Wharrie, Timothy Renou, and George Denton), 115 seamen, and 31 marines wounded.

The Argonaute, the first broadside-opponent of the Colossus, although she lost none of her masts, must have suffered severely in the hull, having had, according to the French accounts, nearly 160 of her crew killed and wounded: she, nevertheless, effected her escape. Some of the French writers are very severe in their strictures upon the conduct of the French Argonaute. It appears that the Hermione frigate, in compliance with the practice of the French navy, hoisted the signal, for ships unengaged to engage, and, finding no attention paid to it, added the number of the Argonaute, and kept both signal and pendant flying for one

* With a truly gallant spirit, Captain Morris would not go below, but, applying a tourniquet to his thigh, remained at his post near the head of the poop-ladder until, to avoid the fall of the mizenmast, he descended to the quarterdeck. After the battle was over, and the Agamemnon had come down to take the Colossus in tow, Captain Morris, having become faint from loss of blood, was carried below, and was landed in his cot some days afterwards at Gibraltar.

hour.* The Bahama and French Swiftsure, reduced to the state of wrecks, suffered a proportionate loss of men; the first having had nearly 400 killed and wounded, including among the former her captain, and the second very little short of that number.

Being close astern of the Colossus and sailing well, the English Achille became, in a few minutes after the former, warmly engaged. Having passed close astern of the Montanez, the Achille luffed up and engaged that ship to leeward. In less than a quarter of an hour the Montanez sheered off, and the Achille made sail to succour the Belleisle, then lying to leeward totally dismasted, with three enemy's ships upon her. While on her way to perform this duty, the Achille found herself obstructed by the Argonauta. The British 74 immediately brought to on the Spanish 80's larboard beam, and a close action ensued, which lasted an hour. The Argonauta now attempted to set her mainsail to shoot ahead, but, failing in that, ceased firing, shut her lowerdeck ports, and, as it appeared on board the Achille, threw an English jack or ensign over her larboard quarter.

At this moment two French ships came up, and one of them soon found other employment for the English Achille than taking possession of the Argonauta. The French Achille edged down on her English namesake's larboard quarter, and engaged her in passing to windward; and the Berwick, who had been distantly engaged with the Defence, ranged up on the English Achille's starboard side, between the latter and the Argonauta. The French Achille passing on in the direction of the Belleisle, and the Argonauta dropping to leeward, the English Achille and Berwick were left in fair single combat. The action continued for upwards of an hour, when the Berwick hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the Achille.

The masts of the latter, although all standing, were badly wounded, and so was her bowsprit: her hull had also received considerable damage. The loss on board the English Achille amounted to one midshipman (Francis John Mugg), six seamen, and six marines killed, and two lieutenants (Parkins Prynn and Josias Bray), one captain and one lieutenant of marines (Palms Westropp and William Leddon), one master's mate (George Pegge), three midshipmen (William H. Staines, William J. Snow, and William Smith Warren), 37 seamen, and 14 marines wounded.

The Argonauta, the English Achille's first steady opponent appears to have suffered greatly in rigging, hull, and crew, but to have had no spars of any consequence shot away: her loss is represented to have amounted to nearly 400 in killed and wounded, including among the dangerously wounded her

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 178.

captain. It is doubtful if the whole of this damage and loss was inflicted by the English *Achille*: the *Argonauta* must have exchanged some broadsides in passing with other British ships. The *Berwick* was dreadfully cut up in her hull, and her three masts were left in a tottering state. The *Achille*'s officer, who took possession of the ship, counted, upon her decks and in her cockpit and tiers 51 dead bodies, including that of her gallant captain, M. Camas; and the wounded of the *Berwick*, according to the report of her few surviving officers, amounted to nearly 200: her loss in officers was very severe, the quarterdeck having been twice cleared. Nearly the whole of this loss was attributable to the close and unremitting cannonade kept up, for more than an hour, by the English *Achille*. On the other hand, the principal part of the latter's damage and loss was caused by the steady fire and determined opposition of the *Berwick*.

We quitted the *Victory* at about 1 h. 30 m. P. M., or just as Lord Nelson had been carried to the cockpit, mortally wounded from the mizentop of the *Redoutable*.^{*} So destructive to the *Victory* was the fire kept up from the *Redoutable*'s tops, as well as from her seconddeck guns, occasionally pointed upwards, that, within a few minutes of Lord Nelson's fall, several officers and about 40 men, nearly the whole of them upon the third or upper deck, were killed or wounded. A single 18-pounder carronade on the poop, mounted upon an elevating carriage, might very soon have destroyed the *Redoutable*'s mizentop and all that were in it; but the *Victory* had no guns whatever mounted on her poop. The same effect might have been produced upon the fore and main tops by one of the 68-pounder carronades; but their carriages would not give the required elevation. Nor, we believe, could the 68-pounder on the starboard side be even fired a second time upon the decks of the *Redoutable*,† owing to some accident that had since befallen it.

Although, from the loss of the men stationed at them, the 12-pounders of the *Victory* were for the most part abandoned, the larboard guns, her 24 and 32 pounders upon the decks below continued to fire, for a few minutes (until the English *Neptune* and ships astern of her intervened), distantly at the starboard quarters of the *Bucentaure* and *Santisima-Trinidad*, and the starboard guns, with much more certain effect, right into the hull of the *Redoutable*. "The starboard guns of the lower and middle decks," says Dr. Beatty, "were depressed, and fired with a diminished charge of powder, and three shot each, into the *Redoutable*. This mode of firing was adopted by Lieutenants Williams, King, Yule, and Brown, to obviate the danger of the *Téméraire*'s suffering from the *Victory*'s shot

^{*} See p. 43.

[†] See p. 42.

passing through the Redoutable; which must have been the case if the usual quantity of powder, and the common elevation, had been given to the guns. A circumstance occurred in this situation, which showed in a most striking manner the cool intrepidity of the officers and men stationed on the lower deck of the Victory. When the guns on this deck were run out, their muzzles came into contact with the Redoutable's side; and consequently at every discharge there was reason to fear that the enemy would take fire, and both the Victory and the *Téméraire* be involved in her flames. Here then was seen the astonishing spectacle of the fireman of each gun standing ready with a bucket full of water, which as soon as his gun was discharged he dashed into the enemy through the holes made in her side by the shot.*

The respectability of the authority has induced us to give this quotation entire, yet we positively deny that the Victory's guns were fired in the manner there stated. Not only have our inquiries fully satisfied us respecting this fact; but we doubt even if the *Téméraire* had come in contact with the Redoutable at the period to which the statement refers. When, too, the *Téméraire* did lash herself to the Redoutable, all effective opposition on the part of the latter had ceased, to the Victory at least; and, after firing a few shot, and ascertaining that the *Téméraire* was foul on the Redoutable's starboard side, the Victory began to busy herself in getting clear, to seek a more worthy antagonist. This hitherto disputed fact, the details of the *Téméraire*'s proceedings, into which we are now about to enter, will more clearly establish.

Being an extraordinary fast sailing line-of-battle ship, the Victory, urged as she was, would probably have been, like the Royal-Sovereign, far ahead of the ships in her wake; but that the *Téméraire*, having on board very little water or provisions, was, what the sailors call, "flying light." After the *Téméraire*, having closed the Victory, had, instead of leading the column as at first proposed, been directed to take her station astern of the Victory,† the dismantled state of the latter from the enemy's shot, rendered it very difficult for the *Téméraire* to avoid going ahead of her leader; and to keep astern she was obliged, besides cutting away her studding-sails, occasionally to yaw or make a traverse in her course. Hence the *Téméraire* shared with the Victory, although by no means to so great an extent, the damage and loss sustained by the head of the weather column from the enemy's heavy and incessant raking fire. Shortly after the Victory had poured her larboard broadside into the Bucentaure's stern, the *Téméraire* opened her fire at the Neptune and Redoutable. When the Victory put her helm a-port to steer towards the Redoutable, the *Téméraire*, to keep clear of her leader, was

* Beatty's Narrative, p. 31.

† See Note, p. 33.

compelled to do the same ; receiving, as she passed the Redoutable, a fire that carried away the head of her mizen topmast. When, after striking the Redoutable, the Victory again brought her head to the northward, the Téméraire stood slowly on a short distance to the south-east ; and then hauled up to pass through the enemy's line. Meanwhile the Victory had, as already stated, dropped alongside the Redoutable, and the two ships were paying off to the eastward.

Scarcely had she begun to haul up, so as to avoid being raked by the French Neptune, ere the Téméraire discovered, through the smoke, the Redoutable driving towards and almost on board of her. Even had the breeze, now barely sufficient to fill the sails, permitted the Téméraire to manœuvre to clear herself from the Redoutable, the Neptune, who, to avoid getting foul of the Redoutable and Victory, had wore and come to again on the same tack, and at this time lay with her larboard broadside bearing upon the starboard bow of the Téméraire, opened so heavy a raking fire, that in a few minutes the latter's fore yard and main topmast were shot away, and her foremast and bowsprit, particularly the latter, greatly damaged. In this unmanageable state, the Téméraire could do no more than continue to cannonade the Redoutable with her larboard guns. This the former did until, having, as she had done those on the opposite side, shut down her lowerdeck ports, the Redoutable, at about 1 h. 40 m. p. m., fell on board the Téméraire, the French ship's bowsprit passing over the British ship's gangway a little before the main rigging ; and where, in order to have the benefit of bestowing a raking fire, the crew of the Téméraire immediately lashed it. The raking fire was poured in, and very destructive, as we shall soon show, did it prove.

Most of the few effective men, left upon the Victory's upper deck after the Redoutable's destructive fire formerly noticed,* being employed in carrying their wounded comrades to the cockpit, Captain Hardy, Captain Adair of the marines, and one or two other officers, were nearly all that remained upon the quarterdeck and poop. The men in the Redoutable's mizentop soon made this known to their officers below ; and a considerable portion of the French crew quickly assembled in the chains and along the gangway of their ship, in order to board the British three-decker ; whose defenceless state they inferred, not merely from her abandoned upper deck, but from the temporary silence of her guns on the decks below, occasioned by a supposition that the Redoutable, having discontinued her fire, was on the eve of surrendering. A party of the Victory's officers and men quickly ascended from the middle and lower decks ; and, after an interchange of musketry, the French crew, who, in addition to the unexpected opposition they experienced, found that the curve in

* See p. 56.

the hulls of the two ships prevented their stepping from one to the other, retired within-board.

The repulse of this very gallant assault cost the *Victory* dearly. Captain Adair and 18 men were killed, and one lieutenant (William Ram, mortally), one midshipman (George Augustus Westphal), and 20 men wounded. Captain Adair met his death by a musket-ball received at the back of the neck, while standing upon the *Victory's* gangway encouraging his men, and several seamen and marines were also killed by the French musketry; but the lieutenant and midshipman, and four or five seamen standing near them, were struck by a round shot, or the splinters it occasioned, which shot had come obliquely through the quarterdeck, and must have been fired from one of the *Redoutable's* maindeck guns pointed upwards in the manner already described.

The account which the French give of the origin of this boarding attempt, and of the cause that led to its failure, is as follows: "In the twinkling of an eye" (alluding to the time when Lord Nelson was carried below), "the quarterdeck of this ship (the *Victory*) was deserted: the gallant fellows of the *Redoutable* wanted to rush upon it; but the *rentrée* of the two vessels presented an obstacle. In order to obviate this, Captain Lucas directed the main yard of his ship to be lowered, meaning to make of it a bridge whereon to pass on board the *Victory*. At that moment the three-decker *Téméraire* ran foul of the *Redoutable* on the side opposite to that on which the *Victory* lay, pouring in at the same time the whole of her broadside. The effect of this fire was terrible upon the crew of the *Redoutable*, the whole of whom were then assembled upon the forecastle, gangway, and quarterdeck. Nearly 200 were placed hors de combat. The brave Captain Lucas, although wounded, remained on deck. The junction of the *Téméraire* giving fresh courage to the crew of the *Victory*, the latter recommenced firing, but soon afterwards ceased in order to disengage herself from the French ship."*

Is it likely that a French 74 would attempt to board a British three-decker fast to her on one side, while a second British three-decker was foul of her on the other? We have not a doubt, therefore, that the French account is in this respect correct. In fixing the relative time of these occurrences, we should say that, in about five minutes after Lord Nelson was carried off the deck, or at 1 h. 35 m. P. M., the boarding indication commenced. Admitting the contest, when the *Téméraire* put an end to it, by lashing the *Redoutable's* bowsprit to the fore part of her main rigging, and pouring in her destructive raking fire, to have continued five minutes, that would fix the time of the *Téméraire's* getting foul, as we have already stated it, at 1 h. 40 m. P. M.;

* For the original, see Appendix, No. 7.

and another five minutes may be allowed for the ship to drop fairly alongside.

Less considerate than either of her antagonists about fire, although in equal if not greater danger from its effects, the Redoutable continued throwing hand-grenades from her tops and yard-arms ("les grenades pleuvent des hunes du Redoutable"*), some of which, falling on board herself, set fire to her larboard fore chains and starboard fore shrouds. The fire from the fore shrouds presently communicated to the foresail of the *Téméraire*; but, by the active exertions of her forecandle-men, led by the boatswain, the flames on board both ships were presently extinguished. The *Victory*'s crew, after having put out a fire that had spread itself among some ropes and canvass on the booms, also lent their assistance in extinguishing the flames on board the Redoutable, by throwing buckets of water from the gangway upon her chains and forecandle.

All further hostility having, as well it might, ceased on board the Redoutable, Captain Hardy ordered two midshipmen, Messieurs David Ogilvie and Francis E. Collingwood, with the sergeant-major of marines and eight or ten hands, to go on board the French ship, and (not to "take possession,"* for, had that been deemed of any importance, a lieutenant would have been sent, but) to assist in putting out a fire which had just broken out afresh. This party, not being able to step on board for the reason already given, embarked from one of the *Victory*'s stern-ports in the only remaining boat of the two that had been towing astern, and got to the Redoutable through one of her stern-ports. As a proof, too, that all hostility had then ceased on board the French ship, the *Victory*'s people were well received. Their boat, we believe, was soon afterwards knocked to pieces by a shot. The other boat had been cut adrift by a shot just as the *Victory* was about to open her fire, and was afterwards picked up with her oars and tackle as complete as when, early in the forenoon, she had been lowered down from the quarter.

Very soon after these young midshipmen had been despatched, a lieutenant of the *Victory*, looking out of one of her aftermost ports on the starboard side, saw a second French two-decker lying close upon the *Téméraire*'s starboard side; and, as the *Victory*, a few minutes afterwards, was in the act of booming her bows off from the Redoutable, the same officer read the name upon the stern of each French ship. The circumstances under which the second French ship came in contact with the *Téméraire*, we shall now proceed to relate.

In our account of the proceedings of the *Belleisle* and *Mars*, we noticed the hauling off from the former of the French ship

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 174.

† Beatty's Narrative, p. 55.

Fougueux. After quitting the Belleisle, the Fougueux stood slowly across the wide space between the Santa-Ana and Redoutable, steering a course directly for the starboard beam of the Téméraire, then with her head nearly east. The object of the Fougueux was probably to pass to windward of the Téméraire and rake her; or it might have been (and the French crew were actually assembled on the forecastle in apparent readiness) to board the British three-decker, the appearance of the latter indicating that she was much disabled, and her colours being at this time down, owing to the fall of her gaff. Indeed, as the number of men with which the Téméraire had begun the action was only about 660, and as, of the number at this time fit for duty, not perhaps exceeding 550, nearly the whole were below, whither they had been sent by Captain Harvey, that they might not be injured by the hand-grenades constantly thrown from the Redoutable's tops, the Fougueux, with her 700, or, allowing for a slight loss, 680 men, might have made a serious impression upon the Téméraire's decks.

While Captain Harvey devoted his attention to the Redoutable on the larboard side, the first lieutenant, Thomas Fortescue Kennedy, assembled a portion of the crew on the opposite side, to receive the Fougueux. Not having yet discharged her starboard broadside, the Téméraire was in perfect readiness there, but delayed firing until the Fougueux arrived so close that she could not well escape. At length the latter got within 100 yards. Instantly the Téméraire's broadside opened, and a terrible crash was heard on board the Fougueux. Crippled and confused, the French ship, at about 2 h. P. M., ran foul of the Téméraire, and was immediately lashed, by her fore rigging, to the latter ship's spare anchor. Lieutenant Kennedy, accompanied by Mr. James Arscott, master's mate, and Mr. Robert Holgate, midshipman, and 20 seamen and six marines, then boarded the Fougueux in her larboard main rigging. On the French ship's quarterdeck lay Captain Beaudoin, mortally wounded; and the second captain and other officers were encouraging the men to repel the boarders. In the onset, however, the second captain became severely wounded; whereupon the French crew suffered themselves to be driven off the quarterdeck by the British, few as they were; and, in 10 minutes from the time of her being boarded by Lieutenant Kennedy and his 28 followers, the Fougueux was completely in the possession of the Téméraire.

This occurrence took place at about 2 h. 10 m. P. M.; and it was within five minutes afterwards, or at 2 h. 15 m. P. M., that the Victory, by fire booms and the slight assistance which her helm and sails could afford, disengaged herself from the Redoutable. While the Victory gradually got her head to the northward, the three fast-locked ships from which she had just parted, the

Redoutable, Téméraire, and Fougueux, swang with their heads to the southward.

Scarcely had the Victory broken away from the group, ere the main and mizen masts of the Redoutable came down. The mainmast, falling on board the Téméraire, carried away the stump of the latter's mizen topmast, broke down the poop-rail, and with its wreck encumbered the whole after-part of the ship. This accident put an entire stop to the Redoutable's hitherto formidable musketry (even admitting it to have continued till this time, which we doubt), and her only remaining antagonist prepared to take possession. The mainmast of the Redoutable, as it lay upon the Téméraire's poop, forming a bridge of easy descent, this was soon accomplished; and, at about 2h. 20 m. p. m., a portion of the British crew, headed by Lieutenant John Wallace, second of the Téméraire, stepped on board, and took quiet possession of the gallantly fought Redoutable. About the time that this occurrence happened, having got her head well to the southward, the Téméraire was enabled to fire a few of her foremost guns on the larboard side, clear of the Redoutable's bows, at the French Neptune; whereupon the latter, who also observed the Leviathan approaching, ceased her annoyance and bore away.

Before we enter upon the proceedings of any other ship, we will give a brief description of the damage and loss sustained by the Victory and Téméraire and the two French 74s on board of them. The Victory's mizen topmast, as already stated, was shot away; and her fore and main masts and their yards, bowsprit, jib-boom, main topmast, and cap, and fore and main tops, were badly wounded. All her rigging was cut to pieces, and her spare spars were rendered unfit for use: hull much damaged, particularly in the wales, clamps, and waterways; and some shot had been received between wind and water. Several beams, knees, and riders were injured, and ports and port-timbers knocked off. The starboard cathead was also shot away, and the starboard bower and spare anchor totally disabled.

The loss on board the Victory will show, that the top-cornets and musketry of the Redoutable had made ample amends for the comparative silence of her great guns. Besides Lord Nelson and his secretary, the Victory had one captain of marines (Charles W. Adair), one lieutenant (William Ram), two midshipmen (Robert Smith and Alexander Palmer), the captain's clerk (Thomas Whipple*), 32 seamen, and 18 marines killed, two lieutenants (John Pasco and George Miller Bligh), two lieutenants of marines (Lewis Buckle Reeves and J. G.

* This gentleman was killed by the wind of a round shot, whilst speaking to Mr. (now Sir) George Westphale. He had no wound or scratch on any part of his body, and is perhaps the only instance on record of such an event.

Peake), three midshipmen (William Rivers, George Augustus Westphal, and Richard Bulkeley), 59 seamen, and nine marines wounded. This was according to the official account; but 27 additional wounded men reported themselves to the surgeon after the returns had been drawn up.* Among this number was included the boatswain, William Willmet; who, although painfully wounded in the thigh, did not quit his quarters.

The damages of the *Téméraire* were scarcely less than those of the *Victory*. The former had her main topmast, the head of her mizenmast, her fore yard, and her fore and main topsail yards shot away, her fore and main masts so wounded as to render them unfit to carry sail, and her bowsprit shot through in several places. Her rigging of every sort was cut to pieces, and her starboard cathead and bumpkin were shot away; also the head of her rudder at the water's edge, by the fire of the *Redoutable*, while rounding the latter's stern. Eight feet of the starboard side of the lower deck abreast of the mainmast was also stove in, and the whole of her quarter galleries on both sides were carried away by the two ships that had run foul of her.

The *Téméraire*'s loss amounted to one captain and one lieutenant of marines (Simeon Busigny and John Kingston), her carpenter (Lewis Oades), one midshipman (William Pitts), 35 seamen, and eight marines killed, and one lieutenant (James Mould), one lieutenant of marines (Samuel J. Payne), her boatswain (John Brooks), one master's mate (Francis S. Price), one midshipman (John Eastman), 59 seamen, and 12 marines wounded. A part of this heavy loss in killed and wounded arose from the following accident. A stink-pot thrown from the *Redoutable* entered the powder-screen on the quarterdeck, and caused a destructive explosion upon the main deck. Had it not, indeed, been for the presence of mind of the master at arms, John Toohig, who was quartered in the light-room, the fire would have communicated to the after magazine, and probably have occasioned the loss not only of the *Téméraire*, but of the ships lashed to her.

The damages and loss of the *Redoutable*, jammed as she had been betwixt two such formidable antagonists, might well be severe. The fall of her main and mizen masts has already been stated: her fore topmast and bowsprit shared the same fate. Her rudder was destroyed, and her hull shot through in every direction, above and below water. An 18-pounder gun, and a 36-pounder carronade near the stern, had burst, and 20 of her guns, including nine low-deckers on the side opposite to the *Victory*, lay dismounted. Out of a crew of 643, the *Redoutable* had, according to the French official returns, 300 killed and 222 wounded, including nearly the whole of her officers. Neither the damage nor the loss of the *Fougueux* was by any means

* Beatty's Narrative, p. 61.

so severe as that incurred by the generality of the captured ships. None of her masts had, at this time, actually fallen, although one or more of them had been badly struck, and her loss could not have well exceeded its reputed amount, 40 in killed and wounded, including among the latter her first lieutenant, and among the former her captain.

We formerly mentioned that Captain Blackwood went on board the *Téméraire* with the commander-in-chief's instructions to Captain Harvey.* After quitting the latter, Captain Blackwood proceeded to the *Leviathan*, and informed Captain Bayntun that Lord Nelson had consented that his ship should precede the *Victory* in going into action. From her station astern of the *Conqueror*, the *Leviathan* immediately crowded all sail to reach the enviable post assigned her: but, owing to the late hour (about 11 h. 30 m.) at which the message was delivered, the *Leviathan* did not get further ahead than just abreast of the *Conqueror*, before the *Victory* was beginning to suffer from the enemy's fire.

The necessity of shortening sail for awhile, to facilitate the endeavours of the *Leviathan* to pass ahead to her newly-allotted station, and the almost calm state of the weather after the firing had lasted a short time, made it 1 h. 45 m. p.m. before the English *Neptune* became closely engaged. At this time, having with all her endeavours been unable to go ahead, the *Leviathan* had resumed her station in the line, and was close in the wake of the *Neptune*, and a short distance ahead of the *Conqueror*. Hauling up towards the nearest ship, the English *Neptune* soon found herself close under the stern of the *Bucentaure*. The broadside of the *Neptune*, as she passed on in this direction, shot away the *Bucentaure's* main and mizen masts nearly by the board, and doubtless killed or wounded a great many of her crew. The *Leviathan* poured in her fire within 30 yards of the French ship's stern, and the *Conqueror* soon afterwards did the same.

The *Conqueror* then hauled up on the lee quarter and beam of the *Bucentaure*, and shot away her foremast. In a few minutes afterwards the ship of the commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, whose fate had been previously sealed by the *Victory's* tremendous broadside, hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the *Conqueror*. The officer in charge of the boat was Captain James Atcherley, of the marines, who had with him but five hands, a corporal and two privates of his corps, and two seamen. On the captain's stepping upon the *Bucentaure's* quarterdeck, M. Villeneuve and his two captains presented their swords; but, conceiving that it more properly belonged to Captain Pellew to disarm officers of their rank, Captain Atcherley declined the honour of receiving them. Having secured the

* See p. 33.

magazine and put the key in his pocket, and placed two of his men as sentries, one at each cabin-door, Captain Atcherley, accompanied by the French admiral and his two captains, pulled off, with his three remaining hands, and at length boarded, not the Conqueror, who had proceeded in chase, but the Mars, her sister-ship; where on account of some mistake about the nature of the message sent by Lieutenant Hennah, the acting commander of the Mars, to Captain Hardy, the French officers were ordered to remain.

Hauling up, after having raked the Bucentaure,* the Neptune soon found herself in a similar position astern of the Santissima-Trinidad, whose main and mizen masts came down with a tremendous crash, just as the Leviathan was in the act of seconding a fire which her leader had so successfully opened. The English Neptune then luffed up alongside the Santissima-Trinidad to leeward, while the Conqueror, with her starboard guns, kept up a distant fire upon her to windward. At about 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the foremast of the Spanish four-decker shared the fate of her main and mizen masts, and she lay an unmanageable wreck upon the water. At this moment the Neptune had her attention suddenly called off by the movement that was making in the combined van, some of the ships of which, on bearing up, raked her, and caused the principal part of the damage and loss which she sustained in the action.

The Africa 64, having had the misfortune to lose sight of her fleet in the night, was, when the firing commenced, broad upon the Victory's larboard beam, and nearly abreast of the van ship of the combined line. Seeing her danger, Lord Nelson ordered the Africa's signal to be thrown out, to make all possible sail. The intention of this signal appears to have been misunderstood; and, instead of using means to run his ship out of danger, Captain Digby set every sail he could spread to hasten her into it. Passing along, and exchanging broadsides in succession with the ships of the combined van, the Africa, with much less injury done to her than might have been expected, bore down ahead of the Santissima-Trinidad.

Meeting no return to her fire, and seeing no colours hoisted on board the latter, Captain Digby concluded that the four-decker, had surrendered, and sent Lieutenant John Smith in a boat to take possession. Upon the lieutenant's reaching the quarterdeck, and asking an officer who advanced to meet him, whether or not the Santissima-Trinidad had surrendered, the Spaniard replied, "Non, non," pointing at the same time to one Spanish and four French sail of the line then passing to windward. As, for the want of masts, the Santissima-Trinidad was settling fast to windward of the two fleets, and he had only a

* See diagram at p. 44.

boat's crew with him, Lieutenant Smith quitted the Spanish ship (the crew of which, singularly enough, permitted him to do so), and returned on board the *Africa*.

The *Santisima-Trinidad* remained without a prize-crew until 5 h. 30 m. p. m.; when the *Prince*, by signal, boarded and took her in tow. The *Trinidad's* loss, although we are unable to particularize it, is described to have been, and no doubt was, extremely severe: she had been exposed to the raking fire, in succession, of four ships, the *Victory* (distantly and partially), *Neptune*, *Leviathan*, and *Conqueror*; and her hull, in consequence, had been dreadfully shattered, especially about the stern and quarters.

Before we proceed in our relation of the further part which the *Leviathan* took in the action, we will briefly state what damages and loss were sustained by the *Neptune*, *Conqueror*, and *Bucentaure*. The *Neptune's* masts were all more or less wounded, but not dangerously so, and her standing and running rigging somewhat damaged: she had received nine shot between wind and water, and had incurred a loss of 10 seamen killed, her captain's clerk, 30 seamen, and three marines wounded.

The *Conqueror* had her mizen topmast and main topgallant-mast shot away, her fore and main masts badly wounded, and her rigging of every sort much cut: several shot had also struck her on the larboard side between wind and water. The loss on the part of the *Conqueror*, up to the period of the *Bucentaure's* surrender (her further loss will be shown presently), was comparatively trifling: she had one seaman killed, and one lieutenant of marines (Thomas Wearing), one lieutenant of the Russian navy (Philip Mendel), and seven seamen wounded. The damages of the *Bucentaure* in her masts have already been described: her hull also was much cut up; and her loss in killed and wounded, according to the verbal report of her few surviving officers, amounted to upwards of 400 officers and men, including among the slightly wounded Admiral Villeneuve and his captain.

Leaving the *Santisima-Trinidad* to the care of the English *Neptune*, the *Leviathan* stood on towards the French *Neptune*, then amusing herself in the manner we have related,* with now a second French ship, the *Fougueux*, joined to the *Téméraire*. As the *Leviathan* approached, and before she was in a position to fire a shot, the *Neptune*, at whom the *Téméraire* had just brought some of her foremost guns to bear, wore round, and, in going off before the wind, at least enabled the former to identify, by the name on her stern, the French ship that chose to fly, the moment an antagonist appeared, who was in a condition


* See p. 62.

to oppose her, although, evidently, not of force enough to maintain the combat with any prospect of success.

Disappointed here, Captain Bayntun hauled up on the larboard tack, and presently observed that all the ships of the combined van ahead of the *Santisima-Trinidad* were tacking or wearing, as if to double upon the headmost ships of the British weather column, and place them betwixt two fires. Sure of finding an opponent among those; and, such is the confidence inspired among the ships of a British fleet, as sure that, if likely to be overmatched, some friend or other would hasten to her rescue, the *Leviathan* stood on to the north-east.

A Spanish 74, the *San-Augustin*, who was steering south-east, appeared to be desirous to measure her strength with the British 74; and at about 3 P.M., when within 100 yards, put her helm hard a-starboard, in the hope to be able to rake the *Leviathan* ahead. To frustrate a manœuvre so likely to be serious in its effects, the *Leviathan* put her helm hard a-port, and, having fresher way than the *San-Augustin*, felt its influence more quickly. The consequence was, that the guns of the British ship were brought to bear before those of her antagonist: and, loaded with three shot each, were discharged, with admirable precision, and at the distance of less than 50 yards, into the starboard quarter of the *San-Augustin*. Down went, in an instant, the Spanish ship's mizenmast, and with it her colours, and feeble was the return she bestowed.

The probability now was, that, as the *Leviathan* kept forging ahead, and could not, on account of the previously damaged state of her rigging, back her sails, the *San-Augustin* would be able to wear under her stern. To prevent this, the *Leviathan*, putting her helm a-starboard, ran on board the *San-Augustin*, in such a way, that the latter's jib-boom entangled itself in the former's larboard main rigging, thereby exposing the *San-Augustin's* upper deck to the poop-carronades and marines of the *Leviathan*. A smart and well-directed fire soon drove the Spaniards below; and Lieutenant John Baldwin third of the *Leviathan*, at the head of a party of seamen and marines, leaped on board the *San-Augustin*, and carried her without further opposition. The British 74, with her stream-cable, then lashed the prize to herself. Scarcely had the *Leviathan* effected this, ere the *Intrépide*, another fresh ship from the combined van, came crowding up, and, after raking the *Leviathan* ahead, ranged along her starboard side; but waited only to exchange a passing fire, as the *Africa* and one or two other British ships were fast approaching to the assistance of their friend. The first two set of figures in the following diagram will assist in explaining the manœuvres of the *Leviathan* and her Spanish opponent.



In this spirited, and, for its undisturbed occurrence in a general action, rather singular combat, the *Leviathan's* damages and loss, although we are not enabled to exhibit them separately, were, it is certain, of trifling amount. Including what she had previously sustained, the *Leviathan* had the main piece of her head shot through, all three masts and bowsprit, and most of her lower and topsail yards wounded, her mizentopsail yard shot away, and a great part of her rigging cut to pieces. She received eight shot between wind and water, and had one long 32 and one long 18 pounder, and one 18-pounder carronade, completely disabled. Her loss amounted to two seamen and two marines killed, one midshipman (J. W. Watson), 17 seamen, and four marines wounded. Besides the loss of her mizenmast, the *San-Augustin* had her remaining masts injured, and her hull struck in several places, particularly near the starboard quarter: her loss was represented by her officers to have amounted to 160 in killed and wounded, including among the latter her captain, Don Felipe Xado Cagigal.

Being, except the *Leviathan*, the nearest British ship to the *Intrépide*, the *Africa* was the first that brought the latter to action. This, at about 3 h. 20 m. P. M., the *Africa* most gallantly did, and, in spite of her decided inferiority of force, maintained the contest for nearly three quarters of an hour; when the *Orion* came up, and opened a fire upon the *Intrépide's* starboard quarter. The *Orion* then wore round the French ship's stern, and, bringing to on the lee bow of the latter between her and the *Africa*, whose fire, without any disparagement to her, was nearly silenced, maintained so heavy and well-directed a can-

nonade, that in less than a quarter of an hour the main and mizen masts of the *Intrépide*, already injured by the *Africa*'s fire, fell over her side. The proximity of the *Conqueror*, and the approach of the *Ajax* and *Agamemnon*, left to the *Intrépide* no alternative but to strike her colours. This the French ship did at 5 p.m., having been greatly damaged in hull as well as masts, and incurred a loss, according to the representation of her officers, of nearly 200 in killed and wounded. The second set of figures in the last diagram will show the track of the *Orion* in her way towards, and during the time she engaged, the *Intrépide*.

The *Africa* had her maintopsail yard shot away, and her bowsprit and three lower masts so badly wounded that none of the latter could afterwards stand. Her remaining masts and yards were also more or less injured; her rigging and sails cut to pieces; and her hull, besides its other serious damage, had received several shot between wind and water. Her loss amounted to 12 seamen and six marines killed, one lieutenant (Matthew Hay), one captain of marines (James Tynmore), two master's mates (Henry West and Abraham Turner), three midshipmen (Frederick White, Philip J. Elmhurst, and John P. Bailey), 30 seamen, and seven marines wounded; a loss which, considering that her complement was only 490 men and boys, and that Captain Digby had voluntarily engaged so superior a force, proves that, although but a 64, the *Africa* had performed as gallant a part as any ship in the British line. The *Orion*, who came so opportunely to the aid of the *Africa*, had her foremast wounded, and her maintopsail yard and main topgallantmast shot away. The loss on board the *Orion*, however, amounted to only one seaman killed, and two midshipmen (Charles Tause and Charles P. Cable, both slightly), 17 seamen, and four marines wounded.

It was at about 2 h. 30 m. p.m. that the whole of the Franco-Spanish van, except the *Santisima Trinidad*, who lay dismasted abreast and to leeward of the *Bucentaure*, equally a wreck and either a prize or in the act of becoming one, began to put about, some by staying, others by wearing, in obedience to a signal made by the commander-in-chief at 1 h. 50 m. p.m. to the following purport: "The French fleet, engaging to windward or to leeward, orders the ships which, from their present position, are not engaging, to take such a position as will bring them the most quickly into action." "*L'armée navale Française, combattant au vent ou sous le vent, ordre aux vaisseaux qui, par leur position actuelle, ne combattant pas, d'en prendre une quelconque, qui les reporte le plus promptement possible au feu.*"* It appears that, five minutes before, Rear-admiral Dumanoir had signalled

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 173.

the commander-in chief that the van had no enemy to contend with.

According to the admiral's previous instructions to his captains, the above signal was to be considered as casting a stigma upon those to whom it was addressed.* At all events no immediate attempt was made by the generality of the ships to comply with the signal, and those that were the most prompt in obeying it were baffled by the calm state of the weather. The *Formidable*, and one or two of the other ships, had to employ their boats to tow themselves round. Hence the manœuvre was slow, partial, and imperfect. When the 10 ships did at length get on the starboard tack, five (four French and one Spanish), under Rear-admiral Dumanoir, hauled their wind, and the remaining five kept away, as if to join Admiral Gravina, then to leeward of the rear, in the act of making off.

It was in the height of all this confusion in the combined van, that the *Britannia*, *Agamemnon*, *Orion*, and *Ajax* got intermingled among the French and Spanish ships, which had wore and edged away in the manner related. The *Britannia* appears to have been engaged, a short time, with the *San-Francisco-de-Asis*, and subsequently with the *Rayo* three-decker. It was considered on board the *Britannia*, that the ship she engaged, after the *San-Francisco-de-Asis*, was the French *Neptune*, with "a tier of guns on her gangway." Owing to the obscurity occasioned by the smoke, and to the want of wind to blow out the flags, a mistake respecting the colours might easily be made; and certainly the *Neptune* had no guns on her gangway, but was a regular 80, similar to the *Bucentaure*.


The *Agamemnon* and *Ajax* also exchanged a few broadsides with some of the ships that had bore up; and the *Orion*, as already stated, was the first, after the *Africa*, that became closely engaged with the *Intrépide*. The latter and the *San-Augustin* were the only ships of the five, that seemed to have any other object in view than a retreat. The *San-Francisco-de-Asis* might reasonably have declined closing with the *Britannia*; but the *Héros* appears to have had no three-decker opposed to her, although she probably was one of the ships that raked the British *Neptune*, after the latter had silenced the *Santisima-Trinidad*. The *Héros* had her captain killed, but sustained no other loss of consequence, and very slight damage. What loss the *Rayo* suffered is not known; but she did undoubtedly incur a loss, and had her masts and rigging tolerably wounded and cut up.

The *Britannia*, with some slight damage to her masts and still less to her hull, had one lieutenant (*Francis Roskrige*), eight seamen, and one marine killed, her master (*Stephen Trounce*), one midshipman (*William Grant*), 33 seamen, and seven marines

* See p. 10.

wounded. The Ajax was very slightly damaged, and had only two seamen killed and nine wounded. The principal damages sustained by the Agamemnon was a large hole below the quarter, probably from a shot fired by one of M. Dumanoir's ships. In consequence of this the ship made four feet water an hour: her loss consisted of only two seamen killed and eight wounded.*

The five French and Spanish ships which hauled to the wind, after wearing in the manner already stated, where the Formidable, commanded by Rear-admiral Dumanoir, Duguay-Trouin, Mont-Blanc, Scipion, and Neptuneo. The very British ships that, from their disabled state, were calculated to offer the least opposition, having little or no sail to force them to leeward, lay nearest to the track of M. Dumanoir's squadron. Among those the Victory, Téméraire, and Royal-Sovereign were the most



exposed. The Victory, with her mizen topmast gone, lay with her head to the northward, having the Bucentaure, a mere hulk

* The Agamemnon expended 6781lb of powder, and fired 1145 shot.

a point or two on her weather bow, two or three ships' lengths off, and the Santísima-Trinidad, another hulk, at a somewhat greater distance on her lee bow. At about three quarters of a mile astern of the Victory, or rather upon her weather quarter, lay the *Téméraire* with her two prizes. The head of the *Téméraire*, and of the *Redoutable* also, whose mainmast still held her fast to the former, was pointed to the southward; and her crew were busied in booming off the *Fougueux* from her starboard side, to be ready to salute the French ships as they passed. The Royal-Sovereign, with only her foremast standing, lay a short distance astern and to leeward of the *Téméraire*, in the act of being towed clear of her dismasted prize, the *Santa-Ana*, by the *Euryalus* frigate. The relative position of all these ships will perhaps be better understood by the preceding diagram; which, however, as respects some of its details, is not given with quite so much confidence as the generality of the others.

Among the first shots fired by M. Dumanoir's ships, after they had put about, was one that killed two of the *Conqueror's* lieutenants. The manner in which this fatal accident happened, is as extraordinary as it was distressing. Lieutenant William M. St.-George, third of the ship, while passing Lieutenant Robert Lloyd, who was first, good-humouredly tapped him on the shoulder, and gave him joy of his approaching epaulet as a commander. Just as Lieutenant St.-George, having moved on a step or two and turned his face round, was in the act of smiling on his friend, a cannon-shot took off the head of the latter, and struck the former senseless on the deck.

In passing the *Victory*, M. Dumanoir's squadron, having kept away a little for the purpose, exchanged a few distant and ineffectual shot with her. By the time the van-ship, the *Formidable*, had arrived abreast of the *Téméraire*, the latter had succeeded in clearing her starboard broadside of the *Fougueux*, who now lay athwart the *Téméraire's* stern, with her head to the eastward, and consequently with her stern exposed to the raking fire of the enemy. One or two broadsides were exchanged between the *Téméraire* and the ships to windward; and the fire from the latter cut away the main and mizen masts of the *Fougueux*, and killed and wounded some of her people. One shot also shattered the leg of a midshipman belonging to the *Téméraire*, who had been sent on board the *Redoutable* to assist Lieutenant Wallace, and who died the same evening, after having undergone amputation by the French surgeon.

A great deal of odium has been cast by the English journals and even by grave historical works, upon Rear-admiral Dumanoir, for having fired upon the French and Spanish prizes in his passage to windward of the fleets. Admitting the inutility of the act to be an argument (its "barbarity" is none, because the prisoners ought to have been stationed below) against the propriety of its adoption, it surely was the duty of the French

admiral to fire at, and injure as much as he could, the different British ships within the reach of his guns. In his letter to the editor of the Gibraltar Chronicle, whose gross inaccuracy on another point we shall soon have to expose, M. Dumanoir positively denies that he intentionally fired at the prizes; but how, let us ask, was it possible for the shot to pass clear of them, when, in some instances, they lay within less than their own length of, and, in others, absolutely masked, the ships that had captured them?

The hauling to windward of M. Dumanoir afforded to the *Minotaur* and *Spartiate* an opportunity which, as the two rear-most ships of the weather column, they would otherwise have sought in vain. At about 3 h. 10 m. p.m., having hauled close on the larboard tack, the *Minotaur* and *Spartiate* lay to with their main topsails to the masts, and exchanged broadsides in passing with the *Formidable*, *Duguay-Trouin*, *Mont-Blanc*, and *Scipion*, and, as the *Neptuno* was considerably astern, succeeded in cutting her off. At 4 p.m. the two British 74s wore, and got close alongside of the Spanish 80; who, after defending herself in the most gallant manner, surrendered at about 5 h. 10 m. p.m. with the loss of her mizenmast and fore and main topmasts, and with, no doubt, a serious loss in men, although it has not been recorded. Having been captured directly to windward of the *Téméraire* and her two prizes, the *Neptuno* drifted upon and fell on board the former. This gave rise to the extraordinary mistake contained in Lord Collingwood's official despatch, representing that the *Téméraire* had been boarded by a French ship on one side and a Spaniard on the other.

The *Minotaur* had her foretopsail yard shot away; and both she and the *Spartiate* had their masts, yards, and rigging in general a good deal damaged. The *Minotaur* had three seamen killed, her boatswain (James Robinson), one midshipman (John Samuel Smith), 17 seamen, and three marines wounded; and the *Spartiate* had also three seamen killed, and her boatswain (John Clarke), two midshipmen (Henry Bellairs and Edward Knapman), 16 seamen, and one marine wounded. A great proportion of the loss suffered by these two ships was no doubt inflicted by the *Neptuno*; who, as the *Intrépide* was the last French, was herself the last Spanish, ship that struck to the British on this eventful day. We have still some arrears to bring up in the lee column, a task we shall hasten to execute.

It was about 2 p.m. when the Dreadnought got into action with the *San-Juan Nepomuceno*, then surrounded by the *Principe-de-Asturias*, *San-Justo*, and a French 80-gun ship, the *Indomptable*. In about 15 minutes the Dreadnought ran on board of and captured the *San-Juan*; who had previously been engaged by the *Tonnant*, *Bellerophon*, *Defiance*, and some other ships, and was nearly in a defenceless state. Without, as

it would appear, staying to take possession of the Spanish 74, the Dreadnought pursued and fired at the Spanish three-decker; but, after the exchange of two or three broadsides, a shot from one of which struck off the left arm of Admiral Gravina, the *Principe-de-Asturias* made sail and effected her escape.

The Dreadnought had her masts cut with shot, but none carried away: her loss amounted to six seamen and one marine killed, and one lieutenant (James L. Lloyd), two midshipmen (Andrew M'Culloch and James Sabin), 19 seamen, and four marines wounded. Besides being dismasted, the *San-Juan Nepomuceno* was much shattered in her hull, and sustained a loss, as represented, of nearly 300 in killed and wounded, including among the mortally wounded her gallant commander.

Having yawed to starboard to allow the Dreadnought to pass on to the Spanish three-decker, then the rearmost enemy's ship by two, the *Polyphemus* attempted to haul up again; but, finding the English *Swiftsure* close upon her larboard quarter, she was obliged to wait until the latter passed ahead. It was at about 3 h. 25 m. P. M. that the English *Swiftsure*, having passed the *Belleisle's* stern, opened her fire upon the French *Achille*; who, passing along the larboard beam of the *Belleisle*, edged away to the south-east, followed and engaged by the former. The *Swiftsure* presently succeeded in crossing her opponent's stern and in getting to leeward of her;* when the *Polyphemus*, who had received a heavy fire from the French *Neptune*, in passing between the latter and the *Belleisle*, advanced on the French *Achille's* weather quarter. In about 40 minutes after the *Swiftsure* had commenced the action with the *Achille*, the latter, having had her mizenmast and fore yard shot away, and having also caught fire in the fore top, ceased engaging, and, as it appeared to the *Polyphemus*, waved a union jack at her starboard cathead. The *Polyphemus* then stood away to assist the Defence in engaging the *San-Ildefonso*, but who struck before the *Polyphemus* got up; and the Prince three-decker bore down between the French *Achille* and English *Swiftsure*, just as the latter, considering the *Achille* a beaten ship, was hauling off to seek a more worthy opponent. But the business of the day, at this end of the line at least, was now nearly over.

The *Swiftsure* had her mizen topmast shot away, and mizenmast badly wounded, and lost seven seamen and two marines killed, and one midshipman (Alexander Bell Handcock), six seamen, and one marine wounded. The *Polyphemus* had her main and main top masts badly wounded, her spanker-boom cut through, and one lowerdeck gun disabled, but escaped with the slight loss of two men killed and four wounded.

While the *Revenge* was attempting to pass through the

* See diagram at p. 48, where the tracks cross.

enemy's line, and just as she had put her helm a-port, to place herself athwart the hawse of the *Aigle*,* the latter's jib-boom caught the mizen topsail of the former; and, before the two ships got clear, the *Revenge* was enabled to pour into the *Aigle*'s bows two deliberate broadsides. The *Revenge* then stood on, and, while hauling up on the larboard tack, received a tremendous fire into her lee quarter from the *Principe-de-Asturias*; who, in conjunction with three two-deckers, probably the *Neptune*, *Indomptable*, and *San-Justo*, nearly fresh ships from the centre, continued cannonading the *Revenge*, until the *Dreadnought* and *Thunderer* came up and engaged the Spanish three-decker. The latter, who, it appears, would suffer no British ship to get to leeward of her, soon afterwards bore away, along with the most efficient of the ships in her company.

The exposed situation of the *Revenge* had occasioned her damages and loss of men to be very severe. Her bowsprit, three lower masts, main topmast, and gaff were badly wounded: she had received nine shot below the copper; her stern, transoms, and timbers, and several beams, knees, riders, and iron standards, were very much wounded, and so was her hull generally. She had several chain-plates shot away, several of her lowerdeck ports destroyed, and three of her guns dismounted. With respect to the loss, the *Revenge* had two midshipmen (Thomas Grier and Edward F. Brooks), 18 seamen, and eight marines killed, and her captain, master (Luke Brokenshaw), one lieutenant (John Berry), one captain of marines (Peter Lily), 38 seamen, and nine marines wounded.

At about 2 h. 30 m. p. m. the Defence commenced firing at the *Berwick*; who, in less than half an hour, hauled off and was engaged, as already stated, by the *Achille*.† The Defence, shortly afterwards, began engaging the *San-Ildefonso*, and, at the end of an hour's action, compelled the Spanish ship to strike. The Defence had her mainmast shot through and wounded in several places, her gaff cut in two, and her lower and topmast rigging much injured: she had, also, several hanging knees and chain-plates carried away, one shot-hole through the knee of the head, and five between wind and water. Her loss amounted to four seamen and three marines killed, and 23 seamen and six marines wounded. The *San-Ildefonso*, having been engaged by one or two other British ships before the Defence arrived up, had suffered greatly in masts, rigging and hull, and lost a full third of her crew in killed and wounded.

It was about 3 p. m. when, having bore up to assist the *Revenge*, the *Thunderer* wore athwart the hawse of the *Principe-de-Asturias*, and having raked her distantly, brought to on the starboard tack. In about five minutes the French *Neptune* came to the assistance of the Spanish three-decker (into whom

* See second set of figures in diagram at p. 52.

† See p. 55.

the Dreadnought was now firing), and engaged the Thunderer for a short time; when these two ships, with most of the others near them bore up and made off. The Thunderer's main and mizen masts and bowsprit had a shot in each, but otherwise her damages were not material. Her loss amounted to two seamen and two marines killed, and one master's mate (John Snell), one midshipman (Alexander Galloway), nine seamen, and one marine wounded. The Principe-de-Asturias, at the time she bore up to escape, had been partially engaged by the Revenge and Defiance, and had received two broadsides from the Prince, in addition to the contest she had previously maintained with the Dreadnought and other British ships: hence her damages and loss were comparatively severe. None of the Spanish three-decker's masts appear to have been shot away, but that all were more or less damaged may be inferred from the fact, that her main and mizen masts were unable to withstand the gale that ensued. The loss sustained by the Principe-de-Asturias amounted to a lieutenant and 40 men killed, and 107 men badly wounded, including Admiral Gravina himself, as already mentioned, in the left arm (which was afterwards amputated, but too late to save his life), and some other officers.

Finding her rigging and sails too much cut to enable her to follow the Principe-de-Asturias, the Defiance stood for the Aigle, whose crippled state had prevented her from making sail. At about 3 P.M. the Defiance ran alongside of the Aigle, lashed the latter to herself, boarded her with little resistance, got possession of the poop and quarterdeck, hauled down the French colours, and hoisted the English in their stead; when, suddenly, so destructive a fire of musketry was opened upon the boarders from the forecastle, waist, and tops of the Aigle, that the British, before they had been well five minutes in possession of their prize, were glad to quit her and escape back to their ship.

As soon as the lashings were cut loose, the Defiance sheered off to a half-pistol-shot distance, and there kept up so well-directed a cannonade that, in less than 25 minutes, the Aigle, the fire from whose great guns had also been nobly maintained, called for quarter, and was presently taken quiet possession of. The Defiance afterwards took possession of the San-Juan Nepomuceno; which ship, besides her crippled state from the previous attacks she had sustained, had already surrendered to the Dreadnought. On the coming up, therefore, of the latter ship, Captain Durham sent the San-Juan's captain and officers to her.

The Defiance had her bowsprit and fore and main masts shot through in the centre of each, also her mizenmast, three top-masts, jib and driver booms, and gaff wounded: her rigging and sails were likewise much cut, and her hull struck with shot in several places. She had one lieutenant (Thomas Simens), her boatswain (William Forster), one midshipman (James Williamson), eight seamen, and six marines killed, and

her captain (slightly), two master's mates (James Spratt and Robert Browne), two midshipmen (John Hodge and Edmund Andrew Chapman), 39 seamen, and nine marines wounded. The *Aigle*, although her principal masts do not appear to have been shot away, had received several shot through them, and was otherwise much disabled. Her hull was pierced in every direction, and her starboard quarter nearly beaten in. The *Aigle* had been successively engaged by six or seven British ships, and had conducted herself in the most gallant manner. Her loss amounted to about 270 in killed and wounded, including several of her officers.

Of the 19 ships composing the combined rear, 11 have been captured, and seven have quitted the line and run to leeward; thus leaving one ship only, the French *Achille*, whose fate remains to be shown. This ship, in her successive encounters with the English *Achille*, *Belleisle*, *Swiftsure*, and *Polyphemus*, had lost her mizenmast, main topmast, and fore yard, and having since, owing, in all probability, to her swivels or musketry there, caught fire in her fore top, was without the means of extinguishing the flames on account of the destruction of her engine by the enemy's shot. The only alternative left was to cut away the mast. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M., while the crew were preparing to do this, so that it might fall clear of the ship, a broadside from the *Prince* cut the mast in two at about its centre; and the wreck, with its flaming top, fell directly upon the boats in the waist. These soon caught fire, and so in succession did the decks below.

After the discharge of one or two broadsides, the *Prince* discovered the accident that had befallen her antagonist, and, wearing, hove to, and in company with the *Swiftsure*, sent her boats to save as many as possible of the French *Achille*'s crew: in which laudable attempt, soon afterwards, the *Pickle* schooner and *Entreprenante* cutter zealously employed themselves. This was a dangerous service, on account of the French ship's guns, when heated discharging their contents. The *Swiftsure*'s boats had two or three men killed and wounded in consequence. The *Achille* had already suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, including among the latter her captain and the principal part of her officers; leaving not a doubt, that the ship had most gallantly conducted herself throughout the engagement.

It was at about 5 h. 45 m. P. M. that the *Achille* exploded, and with her perished her then commanding-officer, *Enseigne de vaisseau* Charles-Alexandre Cauchard, and a great portion of her crew. It may be, as the French say, that the *Achille* at this time had her colours flying; but the ship certainly had, two hours before, made signs of submission, and was, in consequence, spared by the British ship (*Polyphemus*) then in action with her. The damages of the *Prince* consisted of a shot in her bowsprit, three shots in her foremast, and the same in her mizen-

mast; but she experienced the singular good fortune, as a ship of this fleet, not to have a man of her crew injured.

We have now, according to the best information in our power, gone through the details of each British ship's proceedings in the battle of Trafalgar. Should justice not have been done to the exertions of any particular ship on this glorious occasion, we hope it will be attributed, rather to the confused manner in which the attack, the latter part of it especially, was carried on, than to any deficiency of research in us. How far the published accounts on either side are calculated to guide the historian, has already in part appeared, and will be more fully shown when some of those accounts pass under review. As to the accounts furnished exclusively for this work by individuals present in the battle, much as we, and through us the public, owe to them, they are, in many instances, imperfect, obscure, and even contradictory. Nor can it be wondered at, considering how each officer's attention must have been absorbed in the immediate duties of his station; and how few yards, beyond the side of his own ship, the smoke of so many combatants would permit him to see.

According to the official returns the aggregate loss in killed and wounded on the part of the British amounted to 1690;* of which amount about six sevenths, or 1452, fell to the share of 14 out of the 27 ships in the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns. This was a consequence of the peculiar mode of attack adopted by Lord Nelson, coupled with the fall of the breeze after the firing had begun. For instance, the leading ships of each column, as they approached within gun-shot of the combined fleet, were exposed to the deliberate and uninterrupted fire of seven or eight ships drawn up in line ahead, without being able, until nearly on board of them to bring a gun to bear in return. The moment the former did begin to engage, the French and Spanish ships closed for mutual support; whereby the latter not only prevented each other from firing at such of the British ships as were still bearing down, but became too seriously occupied with close antagonists, to bestow much attention upon distant ones.

We regret our inability to particularize as usual, the loss sustained by the ships of the Franco-Spanish fleet. Of the many

* The following is a recapitulation of the loss of men and masts sustained by the British fleet, the ships of each column being ranged in the order in which they appear to have bore down to the attack. The masts "left tottering," actually fell, or were taken down a day or two after the action. Besides these, many bowsprits, masts, yards, and topmasts, were badly wounded, and subsequently replaced by new ones. A column has been added, with the names, as accurately as we have been able to get them, of the officers acting as first, second, third, and fourth lieutenants of the Victory, first and second of the Royal-Sovereign, and first of the ships remaining, at the close of the battle.

that were captured, not one has her loss stated in the British official account; and neither the French nor the Spaniards, except in the case of the Redoubtable and of one or two Spanish ships, have published any returns. It is therefore impossible for us to do more than point to the effects of the British shot upon the majority of the French and Spanish ships, deducible from the state of their masts and rigging already so fully described; leaving it to be inferred, that the antagonist of a British ship seldom has her masts shot away, until her hull has been greatly shattered, and a large proportion of her crew killed or disabled.

While the British ships are securing their prizes, and getting the latter and themselves into a state to keep the sea; and while the more fortunate of the French and Spanish ships are profiting by the occasion to effect their escape from the scene of so much disaster, we will conduct the reader to the cockpit of the Victory,

Ships.	Loss.			Bowsprit, lower and top masts and their yards.		First lieutenants.
	Kill.	Wd.	Tot.	Shot away.	Left tottering.	
<i>Weather column.</i>						
Victory	57	102	159	Mizen topmast	Mizentmast ,...	{ John Quilliam. Edward Williams. Andrew King. John Yule.
Téméraire	47	76	123	{ Main & head of mizentmasts, fore- topsail & fore yds. }		Thomas Kennedy.
Neptune	10	34	44			George Acklom.
Leviathan	4	22	26	Mizenttopsail yard ...		Eyles Mounsher.
Britannia	10	42	52			Arthur Atchison.
Conqueror	3	9	12	Mizen topmast		James Couch.
Africa	18	44	62	Maintopsail yard	{ All three lower masts. }	John Smith.
Agamemnon ...	2	8	10			Hugh Cook.
Ajax	2	9	11			Jerem. Brown.
Orion	1	23	24	Maintopsail yard		Richard Croft.
Minotaur	3	22	25	Foretopsail yard		James Stuart.
Spartiate	3	20	23		Main topmast	John M'Kerlie.
<i>Lee column.</i>						
Royal-Sovereign	47	94	141	{ Main and mizen masts and fore- topsail yard .. }	Foremast	{ John Ellis. William Stephens.
Belleisle	33	93	126	{ All three masts & bowsprit		Thomas Fife.
Mars	29	69	98	{ Main topmast and spanker-boom. }	Foremast ,...	Benjamin Patey.
Tonnant	26	50	76	{ Three topmasts & main yard		John Bedford.
Bellerophon ...	27	123	150	Main & miz. topmasts	Fore topmast	Edwd. F. Thomas.
Colossus	40	160	200	Mizentmast	Fore & main masts	Thos. Rd. Toker.
Achille	13	59	72			Wm. W. Daniel.
Dreadnought ...	7	26	33	Maintopsail yard		John Clavell.
Polyphemus ...	2	4	6			George Mowbray.
Revenge	28	51	79			Lewis Hole.
Swiftsure	9	8	17	Mizen topmast		James Lilburne.
Defiance	17	53	70			William Hellard.
Thunderer	4	12	16			John Clark.
Defence	7	29	36			James Green.
Prince	0	0	0			William Godfrey.
Total..	449	1241	1690			

where lay the chief hero of this triumphant day eking out the last remnant of that life's blood, which he had so often before lavishly shed in the cause of his country. The manner in which Lord Nelson received his wound has already been described. "The ball," emphatically adds Doctor Beatty and who states that he has it still in his possession, "was not fired from a rifle piece:" and yet Messieurs Clarke and M'Arthur, and after them Mr. Southey, have since declared, that the Redoubtable and all the French ships had riflemen in their tops, and that it was one of these who aimed at and wounded Lord Nelson.* With marked illiberality too, the gentlemen exult over the supposed death of "the fellow;"† who at least did his duty on the occasion, and none sooner than the noble victim would have been ready to acknowledge it. A French writer, well known in England for his general accuracy and candour, says, "Dans la *Vie de Nelson*, écrite par Southey, panégyriste-salarié de la cour de l'Angleterre, sous le nom de poète lauréat, il est dit qu'au combat de Trafalgar Nelson fut tué par un des arquebusiers tyroliens, apostés pour tirer sur lui. C'est une grossière imposture: il n'y avait pas un seul Tyrolien sur notre flotte; il n'y avait pas même d'armes carabinées."‡

"While the men," says Doctor Beatty, "were carrying him (Lord Nelson) down the ladder from the middle deck, his lordship observed that the tiller-ropes were not yet replaced: and desired one of the midshipmen stationed there to go upon the quarterdeck and remind Captain Hardy of that circumstance, and request that new ones should be immediately rove. Having delivered this order, he took his handkerchief from his pocket and covered his face with it; that he might be conveyed to the cockpit at this crisis unnoticed by the crew."§

Although the very unlikely circumstance, that a practised seaman, like Lord Nelson, would expect the tiller-ropes to have been rove when the wheel was shot away and the ship foul of another, coupled with the fact that no orders to that effect reached the second in command, renders it doubtful if any remark was made by his lordship about the tiller-ropes, or even about the relieving tackles, the usual substitutes when the wheel is gone, the covering of his face and stars with his handkerchief (of which there is no doubt), lest the crew of the Victory should be disheartened at the sight of the bleeding body of him upon whom they justly reckoned so much, proved that even the pangs of death could not weaken the interest which the hero felt in the final success of the day.

"It must occur to the reader," says Doctor Beatty, "that

* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., pp. 445, 449.

† Southey, vol. ii., p. 264.

‡ Dupin's *Voyage dans la Grande Bretagne*, tome iv., p. 10.

§ Beatty's Narrative, p. 35.

from the nature of the scene passing in the cockpit, and the noise of the guns, the whole of his lordship's expressions could not be borne in mind, nor even distinctly heard, by the different persons attending him."* Doctor Beatty has not, however, scrupled to give to the world every disjointed sentence, every half-uttered word, which he or his relaters could catch from the lips of a dying, and at times, such was the intensity of his sufferings, irrational man. Our strictures upon the conduct of Lord Nelson in the bay of Naples show, that we would blink nothing which we considered to be the fair subject of historical observation; but we should have rejected as matters irrelevant to the subject, the rhapsodies of a disordered mind: more especially, when the subject to which they related was wholly of a private, and, compared with passing events, of an uninteresting nature.

Doctor Beatty's narrative having gone through two editions and having been considered authentic, the objectionable circulation of private remarks has been much increased by other authors having transferred them to their pages and under which the press, in reference especially to Messieurs Clarke and M'Arthur's two ponderous volumes, may be said to have groaned. To our increased regret, a slight mistake, which we made, but hastened to correct and apologize for, has been the ostensible cause of the appearance, very recently, of a third edition of Doctor Beatty's doubtless well intended, but much misnamed, "tribute of respect to the memory of the departed hero." The discrepancy, that exists between our present and our former account of the Victory's proceedings in the battle of Trafalgar, shows how much we erred, in relying upon the accuracy of statements which, as emanating from an officer of the ship, we took to be authentic. In justice to ourselves we must observe, that it was owing to causes over which we had no control, and not to any lack of exertion in collecting facts, that the whole of the amended statements now given did not appear in the first edition of this work.

After Lord Nelson had been laid upon a purser's bed on the deck of the cockpit, he was stripped of his clothes, for the purpose of having the wound examined and the course of the ball probed. The surgeon soon ascertained that the wound was mortal; and Lord Nelson himself appears, from the first, to have entertained a similar opinion. His sufferings from pain and thirst were manifestly great. "He frequently called for drink, and to be fanned with paper, making use of these words: 'Fan, fan,' and 'Drink, drink.'" He kept constantly pushing away the sheet, the sole covering upon him; and one attendant was constantly employed in drawing it up again over his slender

* Beatty's Narrative, p. 52.

limbs and emaciated body. This recklessness about exposing his person afforded a strong proof of the injury done to his intellect; and well would it have been for Lord Nelson's memory, had the listeners around his dying couch possessed discernment enough to distinguish, and friendship enough (as writers) to separate, the irrelevant utterings of a mind in a paroxysm of delirium, from the patriotic effusions of the same mind, when lit up, for a moment or so, by a ray of returning reason.

In about an hour and 10 minutes after Lord Nelson had received his wound, or at about 2 h. 35 m. P. M., Captain Hardy found a moment's leisure from his anxious duty on deck to comply with the frequently repeated request of the admiral, conveyed through the surgeon, to visit him in the cockpit. "They shook hands affectionately, and Lord Nelson said: 'Well, Hardy, how goes the battle? How goes the day with us?'—'Very well, my lord,' replied Captain Hardy: 'we have got 12 or 14 of the enemy's ships in our possession; but five of their van have tacked, and show an intention of bearing down upon the Victory. I have therefore called two or three of our fresh ships round us, and have no doubt of giving them a drubbing.'—'I hope,' said his lordship, 'none of our ships have struck, Hardy.'—'No, my lord,' replied Captain Hardy; 'there is no fear of that.' Lord Nelson then said: 'I am a dead man Hardy. I am going fast: it will be all over with me soon.'"^{*}

Captain Hardy, in a minute or two, returned to the deck. Soon afterwards the Victory opened her larboard guns upon Rear-admiral Dumanoir's squadron passing to windward, and fired a few of her foremost starboard guns at the Swiftsure, then preparing to rake the Colossus.[†] The concussion of the firing so affected Lord Nelson, that, apostrophizing his ship, he called out: "Oh, Victory, Victory, how you distract my poor brain!" Then adding, after a short pause, "How dear is life to all men!" M. Dumanoir's ships passing on to the southward, and the Orion ranging up athwart the Swiftsure's stern, the Victory ceased her fire; and, after an interval of about 50 minutes from the conclusion of his former visit, Captain Hardy descended a second time to the cockpit. "Lord Nelson and Captain Hardy shook hands again; and while the captain retained his lordship's hand, he congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his brilliant victory; which, he said, was complete, though he did not know how many of the enemy were captured, as it was impossible to perceive every ship distinctly. He was certain, however, of 14 or 15 having surrendered. His lordship answered, 'That is well, but I bargained for 20;' and then emphatically exclaimed, 'Anchor, Hardy, anchor!'—'I suppose,

^{*} Beatty's Narrative, p. 42.

[†] See diagram at p. 71.

my lord, Admiral Collingwood will now take upon himself the direction of affairs.'—'Not while I live, I hope, Hardy,' cried the dying chief; and at that moment endeavoured ineffectually to raise himself from the bed. 'No,' added he, 'do *you* anchor, Hardy.' Captain Hardy then said, 'Shall *we* make the signal, sir?'—'Yes,' answered his lordship, 'for, if I live, I'll anchor;' meaning," adds the doctor in a note, "that in case of his lordship's surviving till all resistance on the part of the enemy had ceased, Captain Hardy was then to anchor the British fleet and prizes, if it should be found practicable."* Captain Hardy remained with the dying chief in all about three (not "eight"†) minutes. In about a quarter of an hour after the captain had quitted the cockpit, Lord Nelson became speechless; and, great as must have been his previous sufferings, he expired without a struggle or a groan at, by the Victory's time, 4 h. 30 m. P. M., or, according to the time we have thought it preferable to use, about ten minutes or a quarter of an hour later.‡

The moment it was announced to him that Lord Nelson was no more, and not previously as stated by Doctor Beatty,§ Captain Hardy directed Lieutenant Alexander Hills to take the punt, the only remaining boat, proceed in her to the Royal-Sovereign, and acquaint Vice-admiral Collingwood, not that Lord Nelson was actually dead, but, to save the feelings of a dear friend of the deceased, that he was mortally or dangerously wounded. Shortly afterwards Captain Blackwood came on board the Victory, to inquire after the safety of his friend and patron, and then learnt the first tidings of Lord Nelson's wound and death. Captain Hardy, soon afterwards, embarking with Captain Blackwood in the Euryalus's boat, went himself to acquaint Vice-admiral Collingwood with what had really happened, as well as to deliver to the new commander-in-chief Lord Nelson's dying request, that, for their preservation in reference to the shore and the prospect of a gale, the fleet and prizes, as soon as was practicable, might be brought to an anchor. Bosom friends as they always had been, Nelson and Collingwood were diametrically opposed in their plans of proceeding; as was most

* Beatty's Narrative, p. 47.

† Ibid., p. 49.

‡ Doctor Beatty's official report of the course and site of the ball, as ascertained since death, will be found in the Appendix, No. 8.

The editor of this new edition differs greatly in opinion with Mr. James, relative to the suppression of *all* the conversation related by Beatty. Surely there was no wandering of thought when Nelson requested "that his carcass might be sent to England, and not thrown overboard." And when after the ejaculation of "Oh, Victory, Victory!" he added, "How dear is life to all men." That his last wish was for his country is beyond a doubt; but the human heart may retain feelings of affection for those it loved, and who loved it, and find a relief in its expression, although dying on a bed of glory, wrapped in the arms of victory.

§ Beatty's Narrative, p. 46.

evident when the latter exclaimed : " Anchor the fleet ? Why, it is the last thing I should have thought of." Accordingly it was not done, and the consequences followed, which we shall presently have to relate.

To die in the arms of victory is, of all deaths, that which a true warrior most covets. What then was there so particularly to deplore in the death of Lord Nelson ? Had he survived the battle, he would perhaps have passed some 15 or 20 years in inglorious inactivity ; for nothing more, and certainly nothing greater, was left for him to do. His time come, he would have died, not on a midshipman's pallet in the cockpit of the *Victory*, but on a down bed in a chamber of his seat at Merton. What a contrast ! Lord Nelson's friends, strictly such, did probably wish a slight modification in the manner of his death—that he had died on the spot where he had fallen, and where he wished he had remained, the *Victory's* quarterdeck, and that the only words heard from his lips had been the last which he actually uttered :—" I have done my duty ; I praise God for it."

As, in bestowing our humble tribute of praise upon the professional character of Lord Nelson, we may not, after all that has been written upon the subject, be able to steer clear of plagiarism, we shall be contented with transcribing three, as they appear to us, not less eloquently than justly drawn opinions. The first, penned by an Englishman and a friend to the deceased ; the second, either by, or for, the author of a contemporary work ; and the third, by a Frenchman who, if not personally an enemy of the British admiral, belonged to a nation whose brightest hopes had been humbled by repeated acts of his skill and valour, by the last act in particular.

" Thus," says Doctor Beatty, " died this matchless hero, after performing in a short but brilliant and well-filled life, a series of naval exploits, unexampled in any age of the world. None of the sons of fame ever possessed greater zeal to promote the honour and interest of his king and country ; none ever served them with more devotedness and glory, or with more successful and important results. His character will for ever cast a lustre over the annals of this nation, to whose enemies his very name was a terror. In the battle off Cape St.-Vincent, though then in the subordinate station of a captain, his unprecedented personal prowess will long be recorded with admiration among his profession. The shores of Aboukir and Copenhagen subsequently witnessed those stupendous achievements which struck the whole civilized world with astonishment. Still these were only preludes to the battle of Trafalgar ; in which he shone with a majesty of dignity as far surpassing even his own former renown, as that renown had already exceeded every thing else to be found in the pages of naval history ; the transcendently brightest star in a galaxy of heroes. His splendid example will

operate as an everlasting impulse to the enterprising genius of the British navy.”*

“Thus,” says Captain Brenton, “fell the greatest sea officer, of this or any other nation, recorded in history; his talents, his courage, his fidelity, his zeal, his love for his king and country, were exceeded by none. Never had any man the happy intuitive faculty, of seizing the moment of propitious fortune, equal to Nelson. His whole career, from his earliest entrance into the service, offers to the youth of the British navy the most illustrious examples of every manly virtue; whether we view him as a midshipman, a lieutenant, as the captain of a frigate, or a commander-in-chief. We have seen him, as captain of the *Agamemnon*, in Larra bay, writing his despatches while his ship lay aground in an enemy’s port; we have seen him, as captain of a 74-gun ship, on the 14th of February, lay a Spanish first-rate, and an 84-gun ship on board, and with his little band of heroes rush from ship to ship, and take them both. Equally great in the hour of defeat as of victory, see him at Teneriffe with his shattered arm going to the rescue of his companions and saving their lives, while every moment of delay increased the peril of his own by hemorrhage and exhaustion: see him walk up the ship’s side—hear him command the surgeon to proceed to amputation; and see the fortitude with which he bore the agonizing pain. Follow him to the Nile, and contemplate the destruction of the fleet of France, and the consequent loss of her vast army led by Buonaparte. How great was his professional knowledge and decision at Copenhagen, when, despising death, he refused to obey the signal of recal; because he knew that by such obedience his country would have been disgraced, the great object of the expedition frustrated, and Britain, overpowered by the increased energy of the northern confederacy, might have sunk under the multiplied force of her enemies. See him on the same occasion sit down in the midst of carnage, and address a letter to the Crown Prince of Denmark, which, while it gave a victory to his country, added to her glory by stopping the useless effusion of human blood. We have seen him the patient, watchful, and anxious guardian of our honour, in the Mediterranean, where, for two years, he sought an opportunity to engage an enemy of superior force. Three times we have seen him pursue the foes of his country to Egypt, and once to the West Indies. And these great steps he took entirely on his own responsibility, disregarding any personal consideration, any calculation of force, or any allurements of gain. Coming at last to the termination of his glorious career, the end of his life was worthy of all his other deeds; the battle of Trafalgar will stand, without the aid of sculpture or painting, the greatest memorial of British naval valour ever exhibited; no pen can do

* Beatty’s Narrative, p. 53.

justice, no description can convey an adequate idea of the glories of that day ; and the event, which deprived us of our favourite chief, consummated his earthly fame, and rendered his name for ever dear to his country. Had not his transcendent virtues been shaded by a fault, we might have been accused of flattery. No human being was ever perfect, and however we may regret the blemish in the affair of Caraccioli, we must ever acknowledge, that the character of Nelson, as a public servant, is not exceeded in the history of the world.”*

“Nelson,” says M. Dupin, “ought to be held up as a pattern for admirals, by the extreme pains he took to impress upon his flag-officers and captains, the spirit of the enterprises which he resolved to undertake. He unfolded to them his general plan of operations, and the modifications with which the weather, or the manœuvres of the enemy, might force him to qualify his original design. When once he had explained his system to the flag and superior officers of his fleet, he confided to them the charge of acting according to circumstances, so as to lead, in the most favourable manner, to the consummation of the enterprise thus planned. And Nelson, who was allowed to choose the companions of his glory, possessed the talent and the happiness to find men worthy of his instruction and confidence ; they learnt, in action, to supply what had escaped his forethought, and in success, to surpass even his hopes.”†

Just as the battle with the combined fleet had terminated, Cape Trafalgar was seen from the Royal-Sovereign, bearing south-east by east distant eight miles. Hence the name given to this battle ; of which the immediate result, as a French writer, not always so liberally disposed, has been brought to admit, was 17 French and Spanish ships captured, and one French ship burnt, if not after the flag which she had so long and so gallantly supported had been struck, at least when, an enemy's three-decker having attacked her, she had ceased to make resistance, and when 200 of her officers and men (unfortunately all that could be saved out of a crew, as deposed by her officers, originally numbering 700) were being received on board the tenders of the British fleet. Four other ships, as we have seen, had hauled to the southward ; and, no four British ships being sufficiently to windward, and at the same time sufficiently perfect in their rigging and sails, for an immediate pursuit, they effected their escape. Meanwhile Admiral Gravina, with 11 French and Spanish ships of the line, and all the smaller vessels, was running to the north-east. Several of these ships, the *Indomptable*, *Héros*, *San-Francisco-de-Asis*, and *Montanez*, in particular, having scarcely a hole in their sails, were in excellent order for flight. Others were in tow by the frigates ; and the whole in the

* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 463.

† For the original see *Appendix*, No. 2.

course of the night, anchored about a mile and a half from Rota, not being able to enter the bay or harbour of Cadiz on account of the strong south-south-east wind then blowing in shore. In the offing, however, the wind was still from the west-south-west.

At 6 P. M. Vice-admiral Collingwood, now the commander-in-chief of the British fleet, shifted his flag to the *Euryalus* frigate; and at 6 h. 15 m. P. M. the latter, taking the *Royal-Sovereign* in tow, stood off-shore with her. At this time several of the British ships were more or less dismasted, and very few in a condition to carry sail; and out of the 27 in the fleet, 14 were tolerably damaged in hull. Of the 17 prizes, eight were wholly, and the remainder partially, dismasted. Some of these ships, too, were nearly in a sinking state, and none were without shattered hulls. To add to the perilous condition of the British fleet and prizes, the ships were then in 13 fathoms' water, with the shoals of Trafalgar but a few miles to leeward. Fortunately the wind, which was at west-south-west, and therefore dead on the shore, blew moderately; but there was a very uneasy swell, highly distressing to the ships, particularly the dismasted ones. At 9 P. M., which was about four hours too late, the vice-admiral made the signal for the fleet to prepare to anchor. It is stated, that few of the ships had an anchor to let go, their cables having been cut by shot. Towards midnight the wind veered to south-south-west, and freshened considerably. Taking immediate advantage of this favourable change, the vice-admiral made the signal for the ships to wear with their heads to the westward. Four of the dismasted prizes, in proof that their cables would hold, had previously anchored off Cape Trafalgar. The remaining ships wore, as directed, and drifted to seaward.

On the 22d, at 8 A. M., the *Euryalus* cast off the *Royal-Sovereign*, and signalled the *Neptune* to take the latter in tow. In the course of the forenoon the vice-admiral issued a general order of thanks to the officers and men of the fleet for their valour and skill in the action; and he also ordered a day to be appointed for returning thanks to God for the success which had attended the British arms. During the whole of this day, the 22d, the wind blew fresh from the southward, with repeated squalls; but, through the skill and activity of British seamen, the whole 13 prizes, that remained under way, were got hold of, and towed towards the appointed rendezvous in the west, round the *Neptune* and *Royal-Sovereign*.

At 5 P. M. the *Redoutable*, in tow by the *Swiftsure*, being actually sinking, hoisted a signal of distress. The latter ship immediately sent her boats, and brought off part of the prize-crew, and about 120 Frenchmen, which were as many as the boats would contain. At 10 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Redoutable* being with her stern entirely under water, the *Swiftsure* cut herself clear. At about midnight the wind shifted to north-west, and still blew a gale. At 3 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 23d, attracted by

the cries of the people, the Swiftsure, who had wore to the southward, again sent her boats, and, from three rafts which the French crew, amidst a dreadful night of wind, rain, and lightning, had constructed from the spars of their sunken ship, saved 50 more of the sufferers: making a total of about 170, including 70 out of the 222 described as wounded.* Captain Lucas had been previously removed to the *Téméraire*. The remaining survivors of the *Redoutable*'s late officers and crew, and 13 of the *Téméraire*'s, and five of the *Swiftsure*'s men, perished in her.

Other casualties were the consequence of this night's gale. The *Fougueux*, having on board, besides a great portion of her late crew, 30 men belonging to the *Téméraire* drifted on the rocks between *Torre-Bermeja* and the river *Sancti-Petri*, and was totally wrecked, with the loss of all on board, except about 25 persons.

When the *Algésiras* parted from the *Tonnant*,† the situation of Lieutenant Bennett and his small party was critical in the extreme. The ship had lost all three masts nearly by the board. Her hull had been much battered by shot; but, so far fortunately, no holes were below the water line. Of her anchors the two at the bows were all that remained: one of these was broken in the shank, and the stock of the other shot nearly away. On board the *Algésiras* at this time, including 40 or 50 wounded, were about 600 Frenchmen; and the whole of these were to be kept in subjection by 50 British. The prisoners were sent below, and the gratings secured over them. It was then found that not a man could be spared from guarding the hatchways, to rig jurmasts and endeavour to work the ship off a lee-shore; nor was there any chance of being taken in tow, the few British ships near at hand being almost in as dismasted a state as the prize.

In this state was passed the whole of the blowing night of the 21st; and the morning of the 22d found the *Algésiras* separated from the British fleet, and drifting bodily towards the rocky shore to the northward of Cape Trafalgar. On the evening of that day, being three miles only to windward of the spot where the *Fougueux* was then beating to pieces, Lieutenant Bennett ordered the hatches to be taken off, to afford to the French crew an opportunity of saving the lives of the 650 beings whose existence was now at stake. The French crew rushed on deck, and, after confining Lieutenant Bennett and his party in the after-cabin, began to rig jurmasts. Three topgallantmasts were soon stepped, and some small sails set upon them. With the aid of these, the *Algésiras* bent her head to the northward, and presently brought the port of Cadiz about two points on her lee bow. The ship, however, still continued in so unmanageable a state, owing to the strength of the wind, and the frequent blowing away of the sails, that she barely trailed along

* See p. 64.

† See p. 50.

the shore clear of the rocks. At length the *Algésiras* reached Cadiz; and, to the credit of those whose prisoners they then were, Lieutenant Bennett and his 49 companions were allowed to return to their friends outside in one of the two French frigates which, by Vice-admiral Collingwood's permission gratuitously conveyed to the governor of Andalusia, the Marquess of Solano, went with a flag of truce to receive, upon the usual conditions of not serving again till exchanged, the wounded Spaniards found on board the captured ships. In return for this courtesy, the Spanish governor offered the use of the Cadiz hospitals for the British wounded, and pledged the honour of Spain that they should be carefully attended.

The *Bucentaure*, another hull, having on board Lieutenant Richard Spear and a party of men from the *Conqueror*, by whom, amidst the severity of the gale, a vain attempt had been made to take her in tow, drifted towards the shore, and was compelled for safety to anchor near the castle of San-Sebastian. On the following day, the 22d, the *Bucentaure* was wrecked on the *Puerques*; but her crew were all, or the greater part, saved, including the British. These were taken out of the wreck by the boats of one of the French frigates; and, notwithstanding that the *Gibraltar Chronicle*, of November 9, in this year, contains a long paragraph, filled with abuse of the "dastardly French," the "infamous and cowardly crew of the frigate," for alleged ill-treatment of the British taken out of the *Bucentaure*, the latter, by their own acknowledgment, were treated with humanity and kindness. Unfortunately, the co-authors of the "*Life of Nelson*," with reckless haste, have copied into their pages* the atrocious falsehood; and, to give additional currency to a statement so accordant with their repeatedly expressed sentiments towards the French, Messieurs Clarke and M'Arthur have omitted to add, that they took the paragraph from the columns of a newspaper.

The north-westerly wind, that blew on the morning of the 23d, being fair for quitting his anchorage at the bay or entrance of the outer harbour of Cadiz, Captain Cosmao-Kerjulien, the senior French officer in the port, weighed and made sail, with the *Pluton*, inefficient as she was, *Indomptable*, *Neptune*, *Rayo*, and *San-Francisco-de-Asis*, the five frigates, and the two brigs, hoping to be able to recapture some of the remaining prize-hulls, then driving about the coast. It is doubtful if any of the remaining six French and Spanish ships in Cadiz, unless it was the *Héros* and *Montanez*, were in a state to put to sea. At all events the *Principe-de-Asturias* and *San-Leandro* had each rolled away their main and mizen masts soon after anchoring on the night of the 21st. Nor could Admiral Gravina, as Vice-admiral Collingwood supposed, have commanded the squadron, as he was then suffering the pains of a mortal wound.

Soon after the above five sail of the line, five frigates, and

* Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 456.

two brigs had sailed out, the wind shifted to the west-south-west, and blew with extreme violence, raising such a sea, that most of the prizes broke their tow-ropes, and drifting far to leeward, were in part only again secured. The Franco-Spanish squadron making its appearance about noon, the most efficient of the British line-of-battle ships cast off the hulls of which they had with so much difficulty recovered possession, and by 3 p.m. were formed in line, to the number of 10 sail, between the greater part of those prizes and the ships of M. Cosmao. The odds were far too great for the French commodore, even had the wind been in his favour, to venture within gun-shot; but his frigates soon effected the principal object for which he had sailed out: they recaptured the *Santa-Ana* and *Neptuno*, and carried both safe into port. The recapture of the two Spanish prizes was not, however, without its alloy. On the 24th the fine French 80-gun ship *Indomptable* was wrecked off the town of Rota, situated on the north-west point of the bay of Cadiz. Unfortunately the *Indomptable* had on board, in addition to her own, the survivors of the *Bucentaure's* crew, amounting to nearly 500 men; making in all, 1100 or 1200 souls, of whom not more than 100 are represented to have been saved. The *San-Francisco-de-Asis* parted her cables, and went on shore in Cadiz bay, near Fort Santa-Catalina: her crew, except a small portion, were saved. The *Rayo*, three-decker, another of M. Cosmao's squadron, not being able to enter Cadiz bay, anchored off San-Lucar, a town at the mouth of the river Guadalquivir, a few leagues to the north-west of Rota. There the *Rayo* soon rolled away her masts, which had been previously wounded by shot.

Observing that some of the leewardmost of the prizes were running for, and had already approached very near to, the Spanish coast, the *Leviathan* obtained leave of the commander-in-chief to endeavour to bring them to anchor. On the 24th, at daylight, when standing after the *Monarca*, the *Leviathan* discovered the *Rayo*, with Spanish colours flying, still at an anchor off the shoals of San-Lucar. At this time the 74-gun ship *Donegal*, Captain Pulteney Malcolm, from Gibraltar,* was stretching in from the southward, on the larboard tack, with a moderate breeze from north-west by north, and steering direct for the Spanish three-decker. At about 10 A.M., just as the *Monarca* had got within little more than a mile of the *Rayo*, who was at about an equal distance from the *Donegal* and *Leviathan*, the latter fired a shot wide of the *Monarca*, in order to oblige her to drop anchor. The shot falling about midway between the *Monarca* and the *Rayo*, the latter, conceiving probably that it was intended for her, hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the *Donegal*; who presently anchored alongside and took out the prisoners. Meanwhile the *Leviathan* kept standing on towards the *Monarca*, and, on boarding her, found

See p. 26.

that she was in a sinking state. Captain Bayntun, as quickly as possible, removed all the Englishmen, and nearly the whole* of the Spaniards. It was well the *Leviathan* did so, for, in the gale of the ensuing night, the *Monarca* parted her cable and went on shore. A similar fate, a day or two afterwards, attended the *Rayo*; and, of the 107 officers and men put on board by the *Donegal*, 25 were drowned: the remainder were made prisoners by the Spaniards.

The supposition that the Franco-Spanish squadron, which had sailed out of Cadiz on the 22d, consisted of 10, instead of five sail of the line, was doubtless the reason that as many as 10 sail of British line-of-battle ships had been ordered to cut adrift their prizes, and form in order of battle. This untoward circumstance, and the continuance of bad weather, determined Vice-admiral Collingwood to destroy all the leewardmost of the captured ships. Accordingly the *Santisima-Trinidad* was cleared, scuttled, and sunk by the *Neptune* and *Prince*; but, in spite of every pains to remove the wounded by lowering them down in cots from the stern and quarter-gallery windows, 28 of them perished in the ship. The south-west gale increasing to a most violent degree, it took several days to collect and anchor the remaining hulls preparatory to their destruction. Notwithstanding every exertion was used on the part of the *Defiance*, the *Aigle* drifted into Cadiz bay on the night of the 25th, and was stranded on the bar off Port Santa-Maria.

The few remaining prizes were at length anchored between Cadiz and about six leagues to the westward of San-Lucar; and on the 28th the body of the British fleet lay also at anchor to the north-west of Lucar, the *Royal-Sovereign* without any masts except jury main and mizen ones, and the *Mars* with main and mizen masts only, each ship having lost her foremast in the last severe gale. Between the 28th and 30th the *Intrépide* was burnt by the *Britannia*, and the *San-Augustin* by the *Leviathan* and *Orion*; and the *Argonauta* was scuttled and sunk by the *Ajax*. Another of the hulls, the *Berwick*, after having anchored in apparent safety, was wrecked off San-Lucar, entirely owing to the frenzied behaviour of a portion of the prisoners who cut the cables. The *Donegal*, being at anchor near, cut her cables, and, standing towards the drifting ship, sent her boats to save the people on board. This noble proceeding of Captain Malcolm was only partially successful, when the *Berwick* struck upon the shoals; and in her perished about 200 persons.

As a practical proof of the benefit that might have been derived to the fleet and prizes by attending to Lord Nelson's dying injunctions, the *Defence*, accompanied by her prize, the *San-Ildefonso*, anchored on the evening of the action, and weathered the gale in safety. The example of these ships was followed by two other of the prizes, the *Swiftsure* and *Bahama*; and, with the assistance rendered by the *Donegal* and *Phœbe*, these also were saved. The fourth and only remaining prize,

the San-Juan-Nepomuceno, being less disabled, had not been in such imminent danger, and was already safe in the offing.

On the 30th, in the afternoon, Vice-admiral Collingwood was joined by Rear-admiral Louis, with the 80-gun ship Canopus, Captain Francis William Austin, 98-gun ship Queen, Captain Francis Pender, and 74-gun ships Spencer, Captain the Honourable Robert Stopford, and Tigre, Captain Benjamin Hallowell; which squadron, as already stated, had been detached to Gibraltar for water, and to escort a convoy up the Mediterranean.* While reconnoitring Cadiz, just before the squadron joined, the Queen had a slight brush with the batteries and with the Argonaute, who, with only her foremast standing, lay at anchor at the entrance of the bay. On the 31st, in the morning, Vice-admiral Collingwood shifted his flag from the Euryalus to the Queen.

To sum up the result of the battle of Trafalgar, the French, out of 18 sail of the line, preserved only nine, and the Spaniards, out of 15 sail of the line, lost all except six. Of the 19 French and Spanish ships, including the Rayo, which the British captured, one, the Achille, was accidentally burnt, and 14 were recaptured, wrecked, foundered, or destroyed; leaving but four ships, one French and three Spanish 74s, as trophies in the hands of the conquerors. The following recapitulatory table may here be usefully introduced:

		French.		Spanish.							Tot.	
		Gun-ships.		Gun-ships.								
		80	74	130	112	100	80	74	64			
		No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.		
Combined fleet.	On the day of battle.	present...	4	14	1	2	1	2	8	1	33	
		captured...	1	8	1	1	...	2	5	...	18	
	Recaptured on the 23d	escaped...	3	6	...	1	1	...	3	1	15	
				1	1	...	1	...	1	...	4	
	Wrecked and captured on the 24th	}	...	4	7	...	2	1	1	3	1	19
				2	...	...	...	1	...	1	...	4
	Remaining to France and Spain,	}	at sea...	2	7	...	2	...	1	2	1	15
				1	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	4
			in Cadiz	1	4	...	2	...	1	2	1	11
Brit. prizes.	Accidentally burnt.....	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	1		
	Recaptured on the 23d	1	1	...	1	...	1	...	...	4		
	Wrecked or foundered...	...	4	...	...	1	...	1	...	6		
	Destroyed.....	...	1	1	...	...	1	1	...	4		
	Sent to Gibraltar.....	...	1	...	...	...	...	3	...	4		
Total captured on 21st and 24th		1	8	1	1	1	2	5	...	19		

* See p. 22.

In reviewing the merits of the battle of Trafalgar, we shall take the number of ships in each line, 27 and 33, as a fair criterion of the relative force of the two fleets. It is singular that the aggregate of the rated number of guns on each side, 2148 and 2626, affords about the same result, a full sixth part in favour of the French and Spaniards. The real number of guns on each side would very slightly reduce the disparity. A few examples will establish this. The *Victory* and *Téméraire* mounted, the one two, the other four, guns only more than the numbers of their respective classes, or 102 guns each. Those of the *Victory* consisted, in equal divisions upon her first, second, and third decks, of 90 long 32, 24, and 12 pounders, and of 10 long 12-pounders and two 68-pounder carronades on her quarterdeck and forecastle. The guns upon the three principal decks of the *Téméraire* were 86 long 32 and 18-pounders (30 of the latter on the third or upper deck), and those upon the quarterdeck and forecastle were four long 18-pounders and twelve 32-pounder carronades. These two ships, therefore, although of different rates (first and second), mounted the same number of guns; and the 98 was actually 50lbs heavier in her broadside than the 100.

As the *Victory* and *Téméraire* were the two ships of the British fleet whose rated and real number of guns approximated the nearest, so were the *Tonnant* and *Belleisle*, the latter in particular, the two in which there was in that respect the greatest difference. The *Tonnant*, for instance, whose rate was 80, mounted 90 guns; and the same number were mounted by the *Belleisle*, although she was only a 74. The latter was even the heavier ship in broadside force, the age and weakness of the former having required the substitution of 18 for 24 pounders on the main deck; while the *Belleisle* was enabled to carry on her main deck a whole tier of the larger of those calibers. No other 74-gun ship, however, in the British fleet, to our knowledge, mounted more than 82 guns; and that number would of course include six light poop-carronades.

With respect to the gun force of the ships in the Franco-Spanish fleet, our previous statements upon the subject have left little to add. The force, in long guns, of the *Santisima-Trinidad*, and of a Spanish first-rate of the class of the *Santa-Ana* and *Principe-de-Asturias*, has already appeared; and so has the force of a Spanish 80 and 74 gun ship of the old or small construction.* For an 80 of a more recent build and equipment, the *San-Rafael*, taken by Sir Robert Calder, may be referred to;† and, for a 74, the *San-Ildefonso*, captured on the present occasion. The guns of the latter consisted of 58 long 24-pounders on the first and second decks, four long 8s and 10 iron 36-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, and six iron 24-pounder carronades on the poop; total 78. The pre-

* See vol. ii., p. 66.

† See p. 14.

sence of these carronades renders it probable, that most if not all of the other Spanish ships in the fleet carried a proportion of them, thereby adding four at least to their rated number of guns.

The force of that fine and powerful ship of war, a French 80, has already appeared in the statement of the guns found on board the Franklin.* It is doubtful, however, if either of the French 80s in the combined fleet carried any brass long guns: if not, their guns, instead of being 92, would be 86, as formerly mentioned to be the establishment of the class,† and as subsequently ascertained to have been the armament of the *Formidable*, one of the ships in this fleet. All the French 74s captured out of this fleet were found to mount, upon their first and second decks, the 58 guns already so frequently specified, except the *Berwick* and *Swiftsure*, which, having been English ships, carried 28 instead of 30 guns on the second deck. Upon the quarterdeck many of the ships appear to have mounted, by filling the cabin ports, 20 instead of 16 long eights: thus making their total force, including four, and in some instances six, brass carronades on the poop, 82, and in the latter case 84 guns. These were exclusive of brass cohorns in the tops, the fire from which, at close quarters, had in this very engagement proved extremely destructive. Most of the captured French ships were also found to have on board one field-piece (in some instances two), with carriage and apparatus complete.

No deduction need be made for inexperience in the Franco-Spanish crews; for the whole of the 18 French, and nine out of the 15 Spanish, ships had been some time at sea, and 13 of the former had, as recently as the 22d of the preceding July, gained over the British, what the French considered, a victory. The British and the Franco-Spanish fleets, therefore, which met and fought off Cape Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, with the exception of a difference in force of say a sixth in favour of the latter, were fairly opposed.

The French and Spaniards, in general, fought bravely: some individual ships, indeed, of both nations behaved most heroically. Those who, writing when Spain was at peace and France still at war with England, declared, that "the Spaniards, throughout the battle, showed a more uniform firmness and spirit than the French,"‡ did but prove how completely their judgment was held in thralldom by their politics. Thinking to compliment Spain at the expense of France, the same writers wished their readers to infer, that there was a want of unanimity between the ships of the two nations. That a native of France or of Spain, as some excuse for his country's share of the defeat, should have

* See vol. ii., p. 185.

† See vol. i., p. 54.

‡ Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 455. Mr. Southey indulges in the same strain,

alleged a want of co-operation in her ally, might be expected ; but is it not singular that Englishmen should resort to such a method to enhance the victory which Englishmen gained at the battle of Trafalgar ? Not only does no French or Spanish writer, as far as we can discover, make any complaint of the kind, but it was obvious to many of the British ships engaged, that the French and Spanish ships came indiscriminately to each other's aid when attacked ; and that, as they had been stationed in the line, so they mingled in the battle, without the slightest national prejudice.

All Europe must recollect how, the instant Sir Robert Calder's action became known in France, the *Moniteur* filled its columns with the details. For weeks together, long accounts were published, and great pains taken, in several successive numbers, to refute the British statements, and to prove that the engagement terminated in a victory to the combined fleet. Far otherwise was it, when the news of the battle of Trafalgar reached Paris. A grave-like silence was imposed : not a word, not a whisper transpired. Not, at least, until towards the end of the year, when the captain and principal surviving officers of the Redoubtable had the honour to figure in public as heroes, the single prowess of whose ship, even in Napoléon's opinion, shed a lustre upon the events of a day in other respects so disastrous to the French. The French emperor appears to have believed every tittle of the account transmitted to him by Captain Lucas, and a great deal more than even that account contained ; for, at a subsequent day (March 2, 1806), in his address to the legislative body, his imperial majesty had the effrontery to use these words, and these words only, in reference to the fate of his fleet at the battle of Trafalgar : "The storm has occasioned to us the loss of a few ships, after a battle imprudently fought." "*Les tempêtes nous ont fait perdre quelques vaisseaux après un combat imprudemment engagé.*" The writer of the French work, from which we quote the passage, adds in a note, "That of Trafalgar. We have already shown that the storm was not the sole cause of these losses. Was it not committing an outrage upon the French nation thus to mistake the result of this *imprudently fought battle*?" "*Celui de Trafalgar. Nous avons fait voir plus haut que les tempêtes ne furent pas les seules causes de ces pertes. N'était-ce pas outrager la nation française, que de dénaturer ainsi les résultats de ce combat imprudemment engagé ?*"*

The account, given in the French work from which this extract is taken, of the proceedings of the generality of French and Spanish ships engaged at Trafalgar, is tolerably fair, but, to our regret, very brief ; partly, no doubt, in consequence of the sad havoc caused by the gale that so quickly succeeded the battle.

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 217.

In one point the French writer, who is evidently a naval officer, is quite wrong. He states, that the Bucentaure, Santissima-Trinidad, and Redoubtable, sustained, for some time, nearly the whole united efforts of the 12 ships in Lord Nelson's column.* The ample details given in these pages afford the most complete refutation of that statement. The fact is, that the leading ship of the lee column, the Royal-Sovereign, was in hot action, after having cut through the combined line, for upwards of a quarter of an hour before any ship did or could come to her assistance. The Victory and Téméraire were also closely engaged for even a longer period, before the three or four ships astern of them could get to their support. The nature of the attack, combined with the lightness of the breeze, was such, indeed, that the whole business was done by 12 or 14 ships of the 27; and that without the slightest disparagement to the conduct of the remainder.

On the 28th the Victory, towed by the Neptune, arrived at Gibraltar; where she found, among other ships, the Belleisle, who, having been taken in tow by the Naiad, sent to her assistance by Captain Hardy, had anchored in the bay on the third day after the termination of the battle in which she had performed so distinguished a part. On the 3d of November, having been partially refitted, the Victory sailed for England, passed the Straits on the 4th, and on the 4th of the following month, anchored at St.-Helen's, having on board, preserved in spirits, the body of the lamented hero, whose flag she had so long borne, and which was then flying on board of her, but in a melancholy position, at half-mast. On the 10th of December the Victory again sailed, and on the 22d, when crossing the flats from Margate, was boarded by Commissioner Grey's yacht, the Chatham, which had been despatched by the board of admiralty to receive Lord Nelson's body, and convey it to Greenwich. The body was removed into the coffin made from a part of the wreck of the Orient, burnt at the battle of the Nile, and which had been presented to Lord Nelson by Captain Hal-lowell, of the Swiftsure, in 1799. This coffin with its contents was placed within a leaden coffin. The latter was then soldered, and never afterwards opened. On the coffin's being lowered into the yacht, the Victory struck, for the last time, Lord Nelson's flag at the fore, and the same was hoisted half-mast high on board the yacht.

On the 24th, at 2 p.m., the yacht, having in the passage up had military honours paid to her illustrious charge on both sides of the river, anchored off Greenwich; and at 7 p.m. the body was landed at the centre gate of the royal hospital, amidst an immense crowd of spectators. The awful and imposing ceremony which subsequently took place having been minutely described by other publications, we shall content ourselves with stating,

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 182.

that on the 9th of January, 1806, this first of naval captains was buried at St.-Paul's cathedral, with all the pomp and solemnity befitting the occasion.*

The honours paid by a grateful country to the memory of Lord Nelson were commensurate with his worth, and with the importance of the achievement which he had died in consummating. His brother William was made an earl, with a grant of 6000*l.* per annum; 10,000*l.* were voted for each of his sisters, and 100,000*l.* for the purchase of an estate. Two ships, a first and a second rate, were ordered to be built, one of 120 guns, named Nelson, the other of 98 (afterwards increased to 120) guns, named Trafalgar.

The living participators in the great and glorious victory received also their share of the national honours and rewards. A unanimous vote of thanks of both houses of parliament was a matter of course. Vice-admiral Collingwood was made a baron of the united kingdom, under the title of Baron Collingwood, of Caldburne and Hethpoole, in the county of Northumberland, with a grant of 2000*l.* per annum. Rear-admiral the Earl of Northesk was honoured with the insignia of the order of the Bath, and Captain Hardy was made a baronet. It was probably owing to a paucity of vacant ribands of the Bath, and the intention of the British government to institute a new military order of merit, that the remaining captains of the Trafalgar fleet received no honorary distinctions. Medals were of course granted in the customary way. The first lieutenant of the Victory, the lieutenants acting as captains of the Ajax and Thunderer, and the first lieutenants of the Mars and Bellerophon, whose captains had been killed in the action, were promoted to post-captains; and the first, second, third, and fourth lieutenants of the Victory, the first and second lieutenants of the Royal-Sovereign, and the first lieutenants of all the other ships engaged, were made commanders. Four midshipmen of the Victory, three of the Royal-Sovereign, two of the Britannia, and one belonging to every other ship of the line and frigate present in the action, were also promoted to lieutenants.

Passing over as unworthy of notice a ludicrous account of the state of the British fleet after the action, inserted by some wag in the Journal de Paris of the 7th of December, we shall bestow a few words upon the accounts of the battle published in England. The letter of Vice-admiral Collingwood to the secretary of the admiralty claims our first attention. This letter has been praised for its style: we wish we could say as much of its accuracy. The accidental irregularity of the enemy's line is represented as the result of design. "They formed their line of battle," says the admiral, "with great closeness and correctness."

* See Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii., p. 460, *et seq.* See also the Annual Register for the year 1806, the January Number of the Gentleman's Magazine, and the Naval Chronicle, vol. xv., p. 45.

"The structure of their line was new: it formed a crescent convexing to leeward." "Before the fire opened every alternate ship was about a cable's length to windward of her second ahead and astern, forming a kind of double line." With such authority for a guide, no wonder that tacticians should set about investigating M. Villeneuve's new line of battle, "the double crescent convexing to leeward."*

"A circumstance occurred during the action," observes Vice-admiral Collingwood, "which so strongly marks the invincible spirit of British seamen when engaging the enemies of their country, that I cannot resist the pleasure in making it known to their lordships. The *Téméraire* was boarded, by accident or design, by a French ship on one side, and a Spaniard on the other: the contest was vigorous, but in the end the combined ensigns were torn from the poop, and the British hoisted in their places." Unfortunately for the fame of those concerned, this soul-inspiring passage contains not a word of truth. The mistake arose thus. The Spanish ship *Neptuno*, after having, with the loss of her mizenmast and other damage, surrendered to the *Minotaur* and *Spartiate*, drifted on board the *Téméraire*, while the latter had still foul of her, on the lee or larboard side, the late French ship *Redoutable*, and scarcely clear of her astern, the *Fougueux*.†

Long before Captain Harvey and his officers landed in England, a spirited representation of this their valorous exploit was exhibited in the London printshops; and many persons to this day, have not the most remote idea that the fact was ever questioned: especially as, although the London Gazette contained two or three supplementary letters from Vice-admiral Collingwood, not a hint was given that the first contained a misstatement. For even the letter, showing that the admiral had overrated by one (20 for 19) the number of prizes made on the 21st and 24th, was written by Captain Blackwood at the office of the admiralty. That the various periodical publications of the day should place full confidence in an uncontradicted official statement was to be expected; but it will hardly be credited that, nearly 20 years afterwards, an historical writer, who, at the period of the battle, had attained the rank of commander in the British navy, and who boasts, and may well boast, of the "great opportunities he enjoys of obtaining the most correct information,"‡ should first declare that the "real facts" of the Trafalgar battle are detailed "in the admirable letters of Vice-admiral Collingwood,"§ and then do no more than cast a reluctant doubt upon the passage in question, by the

* For the representation of this line see Ekins's *Naval Battles*, part 2, plate xxix. (51) Fig. 4.

† For the position of these three ships just before the *Neptuno* surrendered, see diagram at p. 71.

‡ Brenton, vol. iii., Preface, p. 1.

§ Ibid., p. 472.

following note: "Subsequent information has proved this statement wanted confirmation:"*—a note that, we verily believe, would not have been added, but for our positive denial, in the first edition of this work, of the statement to which it refers.

"I have not only," says Vice-admiral Collingwood, "to lament, in common with the British navy and the British nation, in the fall of the commander-in-chief, the loss of a hero whose name will be immortal, and his memory ever dear to his country, but my heart is rent with the most poignant grief for the death of a friend, to whom, by many years' intimacy, and a perfect knowledge of the virtues of his mind, which inspired ideas superior to the common race of men, I was bound by the strongest ties of affection; a grief to which even the glorious occasion in which he fell does not bring the consolation which perhaps it ought. His lordship received a musket ball in his left breast about the middle of the action, and sent an officer to me immediately with his last farewell, and soon after expired."

Admiring, as we must, the feeling and impressive manner in which the death of Lord Nelson is here adverted to, we are obliged to refer to a previous page of this work for a satisfactory proof that the statement with which the extract concludes is incorrect.† The death of Lord Nelson in the moment of victory, and the delay until then of any announcement to the second in command that the first was incapable of acting, show that the following passage in Vice-admiral Collingwood's letter, as far as regards the inference meant to be drawn from it, rests upon no better foundation. "The Royal-Sovereign having lost her masts, except her tottering foremast, I called the Euryalus to me while the action continued, which ship, lying within hail, made my signals; a service which Captain Blackwood performed with great attention."

The few signals, made by the Euryalus for the dismayed Royal-Sovereign, while the action continued, must have been such only as the second in command of the fleet had been directed to make, if necessary, to his own division or column. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, when Lord Nelson flatly refused to give up the command of the fleet, and did not breathe his last until the action had virtually terminated? Even then, agreeably to the rules of the service, the Victory's flag remained flying.

Among the numerous omissions and mistatements that pervade the official accounts of this celebrated battle, the most extraordinary, as well as the most unjust, is the neglect to notice the services, or even to mention the name, of the Victory's captain; of the officer who, from a few minutes before the action was at its height to the moment of its successful termination, a period of three hours, acted in the capacity, and held the re-

* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 475.

† See p. 88.

sponsibility, of the commander-in-chief. Unfortunately the mere omission of Captain Hardy's name in the public letter of Vice-admiral Collingwood is not all the injury done to him. That might have arisen from unintentional neglect, and have been atoned for, in part, by a subsequent explanation and apology. But nothing short of the most humiliating acknowledgment could nullify the statement, that Lord Nelson sent to inform Vice-admiral Collingwood of his mortal wound "immediately" after he had received it; and that the latter thereupon took upon himself the direction of the fleet, and ordered the *Euryalus*, "while the action continued," to make his signals. Truth, however, will ultimately prevail; and Captain Hardy became rewarded, not only in a baronetcy, but in the marked approbation of the board of admiralty, who have never lost sight of him when a service was to be performed, that required the exercise of a large proportion of those qualities which characterize the good officer.

Two published accounts of this battle, one historical, the other tactical, come next under consideration. In the first few details are given, except in reference to the proceedings of the *Victory*; and, as the relation of the occurrences on board that ship, including the manner of Lord Nelson's death, is little more than a transcript from the works of Doctor Beatty, Messieurs Clarke and M^r Arthur, and Mr. Southey, the value of that part of the account may be appreciated by what has already appeared in these pages. Nor have the other authorities, upon which our contemporary has relied for information, benefited him a whit more. Where, for instance, did he learn that the captain of the *Redoubtable* was "mortally wounded"?* or that the *Tonnant*, and not the *Belleisle*, came to the assistance of the *Royal-Sovereign*?† or that the *San-Augustin*, and not the *Neptuno*, struck to the *Spartiate* and *Minotaur*?‡

But, for these errors of the pen, the pencil is to atone, in the shape of "a rough sketch of the action taken after the firing had ceased in the rear, and the enemy's van had wore to recover the prizes." This is the description given by the draftsman in his "Key to the plate;" but, according to the statement of Captain Brenton himself (p. 458), the "very moment" referred to is two hours afterwards, or just as Lord Nelson had expired in the cockpit of the *Victory*. As is often the case in much more elaborate performances of the kind, one time will answer as well as another. For instance, the *Formidable* and the four ships in her train are seen just hauled up on the starboard tack, almost ready to begin firing at the northernmost British ship, the *Neptune*. Let us suppose this to have been at about 2 h. 30 m. P. M. But then the *Minotaur* and *Spartiate* are also represented

* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 455.

† Ibid., p. 466.

‡ Ibid., p. 467.



on the starboard tack ; whereas they were not so until about 4 h. 30 m. P. M., after M. Dumanoir and his four countrymen had passed on to the southward, and left the Spanish *Neptuno* to her fate. Another division of the sketch would answer for three hours later in the day. The *Victory*, for example, appears with her mizenmast and main topmast gone ; whereas that ship did not lose her mizenmast until 7 P. M., nor strike her main topmast (at which time her fore one also was struck) until within a few minutes of the same period. Of the remaining ships scattered over this much vaunted plate, few that are named are correct either in their positions or the state of their masts. The *Téméraire* lies with her head directly where her stern ought to be, and, instead of having her three lower masts and their yards (the fore yard broken in two), and her foretop and topgallant masts, standing, is represented as bare as a hulk.

An attempt to sketch the state, positions, and relative bearings of nearly 50 vessels, spread over an extent of at least five miles, was not very likely to succeed ; especially when the draftsman was on board a ship situated at one extremity of the line. If it was a degree of presumption in "a young gentleman, a midshipman of the *Neptune*," to attempt a sketch of so complicated, so numerous, and so expanded a group of figures, as must have been spread over the field of Trafalgar, what was it in a post-captain of 16 years' standing, quite away from the spot, to entitle Mr. Herbert's "rough sketch," "a view of the British and combined fleets at the conclusion of the battle of Trafalgar," and to recommend it to the British public as "an invaluable memorandum of the battle" ?*


For an unprofessional writer to arraign the merits of a work on naval tactics, would seem to be a presumption equal to the highest degree of that which we have just been condemning. But tactical reasoning, like all other reasoning, must be built upon facts, or upon what are assumed as facts. Surely, then, to inquire into the reality of those alleged facts, is within the province of a writer, whose avowed purpose, to the extent of his subject, and of his ability, is to separate truth from fiction.

Bold as is the assertion, yet do we confidently make it,—Admiral Ekins has entirely misunderstood the principle upon which the battle of Trafalgar was fought. After describing the plan of attack, as set forth in Vice-admiral Collingwood's letter, and illustrated by a diagram taken from one in the possession of the board of admiralty, the writer says : "Whatever degree of credit the above plan may be entitled to, backed as it is by the vice-admiral's letter, it is well known to all the captains of that fleet, that the plan of attack from the windward was, by previous concert, to have been of a different and still more for—

* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 459.

midable nature ; for, as the order of sailing was the order of battle, and the enemy seen to leeward, the commander-in-chief in that case would ' bring the British fleet nearly within gunshot of the enemy's centre, and the signal, most probably, then be made for the lee division to *bear up together*, to set all sails, even steering-sails, &c.' The secret memorandum at the end of these remarks, will best explain his lordship's intention and remove the doubt. We therefore venture to give the approach as in fig. 1, Plate XXVIII. The lee division bearing up together, followed soon after by the centre ; the fleet originally formed in the order of sailing upon a wind on the larboard tack : the enemy formed in close line convexing to leeward, heads to the northward. This must be considered as the preconceived plan of attack ; but that it may have deviated from the exact design, from circumstances to which events of this nature are always liable, it is easy to believe ; and it will be particularly apparent to sea officers : for, supposing a line, like that of Lord Collingwood's, of 15 ships, all in their station when the signal to bear up together should be made ; and supposing the signal to be obeyed with equal alacrity by all ; yet the different rates of sailing in them will soon be conspicuous ; and the advantages of some over others, neither to be reckoned upon nor accounted for, they will consequently be found to tail away as in the fig. 2. Be it as it may, it will be readily admitted that, both from the design and the execution, no mode of attack could have been formed better calculated for effecting the purpose of the determined chief ; the capture or destruction of the centre and rear of the enemy."*

In his interpretation of Lord Nelson's plan of attack from to-windward, the writer of this passage is certainly borne out by the literal meaning of the words, "the lee line to bear up together ; but the context ought to have convinced him, that this could not have been the mode of attack contemplated by Lord Nelson. If the ships of the lee line were to "bear up together," so must those of the weather and the advanced lines ; and then see how the ships would have been arranged :



The confidential friends of Lord Nelson, many of whom are now living, can testify, that he had the strongest objection to the plan of bearing up in line abreast, and that he attributed the partial success of Lord Howe on the 1st of June to his having

* Ekins's Naval Battles, p. 268.

adopted that mode of attack. His own plan appears to have been, to bring his force, in the most effective state, into contact with the force of the enemy, and, for that purpose, to present, while advancing to close, the smallest possible front to the enemy's fire. As the leading ship of the attacking line or column would of necessity receive the whole weight of that fire, Lord Nelson very naturally chose the post himself. If more lines or columns than one, the commanding officer of each would of course follow the example of the chief.

In order to make quick, as well as decisive work of it, Lord Nelson purposed, in the first instance, cutting off a portion of the enemy's line: he then left every thing to the valour and address of his captains; well observing, that no captain could do very wrong who placed his ship alongside that of an enemy. The greater the confusion, the greater were his hopes of success, because he knew that the British, besides being better prepared for fighting their guns on either side, or in any direction, were better skilled in working their ships than the French or Spaniards. A gale of wind, or a dark night, was accordingly considered as a ship or two in his favour. The reason that Lord Nelson gave, for placing so little dependance upon evolutions, was, that he generally found the inconvenience, which resulted from the mistakes too frequently made, to outweigh the benefit expected to be derived from the most correct performance of the manœuvre. Hence the sum of Lord Nelson's tactics was, to close his enemy, and to overpower and annihilate him as quickly as possible.

There are, we believe, very few of the captains present in the Trafalgar battle, with whom we have not conversed or corresponded; and yet no one of them has ever raised a doubt as to the meaning of Lord Nelson's instructions, or the manner in which he purposed to bear down upon the enemy's line. That the expression used in the memorandum is at variance with what we still contend was the meaning of the gallant chief, we have already admitted; but would not so simple an alteration as the change of one word to another of similar sound, and of another word from the singular to the plural number (an interpolation we have ventured to make in our transcript of the memorandum*), reconcile the difference? That a mistake of the kind may easily have happened, we can see no difficulty in supposing. For instance, Lord Nelson, when he drew up his instructions, was almost certain that the combined fleet would sail with an easterly wind, and therefore be found to windward. Hence the principal part of the memorandum is filled with the plan of attack from to-leeward. The attack from to-windward, being a very doubtful contingency, occupied much less of his lordship's attention. Nor did he, of course, write a line of the

* See p. 24.

memorandum. The secretary, or the clerk, wrote it by his lordship's dictation. How easy, then, for either of the former to have mistaken, "The signal will be made for the *three lines* to bear up together," for "The signal will be made for the *lee line* to bear up together"? The two words once miswritten would scarcely be looked at again; especially as all the principal officers of the fleet had heard Lord Nelson repeatedly describe, in his own clear and energetic manner, the plan which he meant to adopt.

But, after all, what was the signal by which the British fleet actually steered towards the fleet of the enemy? Was it No. 81, with the east compass signal, "Alter the course *together* to east"? Or, rather, was it not No. 76, "Bear up *in succession*"* to that point? That No. 76 was the signal hoisted, the author of "Naval Battles" must have been satisfied, because it is so stated in the quotation which he himself makes from the log of the Bellerophon.† The argument, about the British ships "tailing away" because of their inequality of sailing, can hold good only until it is known that, with the exception perhaps of the Royal-Sovereign, Belleisle, Victory, and Téméraire, the ships in the two principal divisions sailed nearly alike. And with respect to the Britannia, Prince, and Dreadnought, whose slowness was far more conspicuous than the velocity of the ships just named, they were allowed to depart from the prescribed order of sailing in line ahead, that they might steer obliquely between the two columns, and by that means get more of their sails to draw.

Having thus, as we conceive, shown the fallacy of the premises, by which a tactical writer of the present day has hoped to throw a new light upon a celebrated naval battle fought 20 years ago,‡ we shall merely observe, that his remaining statements are, for the most part, equally ill founded. As to the "six plans of the battle, delineated by the same hand, to the accuracy of which, many who were engaged have borne testimony,"§ if the three plans not published tend as little to "illustrate" this great victory, as the three which the writer has selected for his work, a great deal of pains and expense has been bestowed to a very little purpose. The three plans selected are the fourth, fifth, and sixth, representing different periods of the action, from the moment the combined van began wearing, to the termination of the battle by the capture of the Neptuno. In every one of these plans, the Victory is represented clear of the Redoubtable, but upon the starboard tack, with her head to the southward. The Agamemnon is shifted from the weather,

* The signal merely expresses, "Bear up and sail large, on the course steered by the admiral, or that pointed out by signal;" but the 14th article of the printed "Sailing Instructions" refers to this signal, as that to be used "when the fleet is to bear up in succession."

† Ekins's Naval Battles, p. 284.

‡ Mr. James's new edition was published in 1826.

§ Ekins's Naval Battles, p. 271.

to the lee column: and equally misplaced in their relative positions are the *Orion*, *Africa* and their gallant opponent, the *Intrépide*. In short there is scarcely a ship, among those of the British especially, that seems to be in her proper situation. Nor are these plans little unpretending sketches, but large and costly copper-plate engravings, by their imposing size, numerous figures, and laboured appearance, calculated to inthral the judgment, and to divert, if not to defy, the efforts of criticism.

If a printed mistatement upon an important point of history may be justifiably set right, have we not an equal privilege over a painted mistatement of the same nature; especially when produced under circumstances the most likely of any to inspire a confidence in its accuracy? Previously to our submitting any remarks upon the merits of the painting of the *Victory* going into, or (for, as we shall presently see, it is doubtful which is meant) coming out of, the battle of *Trafalgar*, we will endeavour to relate how it happened that that distinguished artist, Mr. J. M. W. Turner, of the Royal Academy, became engaged to trace with his powerful pencil so interesting an epocha in British naval history; a subject which, well executed, would, we conceive, have done that gentleman as much honour as any of his previous performances.

Soon after the battle of the 1st of June the justly celebrated marine painter, P. J. de Louthembourg, was employed by some enterprising individual to represent the *Queen-Charlotte* engaging the *Montagne*. In about four years the picture, which measured 12 feet by eight and a half, and cost, we believe, 500*l.*, was completed, and soon afterwards exhibited to the public. Without descending to minutiae, the grand mistake in it was, that the *Queen-Charlotte* was placed where Lord Howe wanted to get, but never could get, a little before the lee beam of his antagonist. Among others, the officer, whose duty it was (and who would have succeeded, but for the hasty flight of the *Montagne* and the loss of the *Queen-Charlotte's* fore topmast*) to place the British ship in the desired position, went to see the picture. At the first glance the gallant seaman pronounced the picture a libel upon the *Queen-Charlotte*; inasmuch as, had she been in the position represented, it would have been her fault for letting the *Montagne* escape. Whether it was owing to this capital blemish, or to the half a dozen minor offences against truth in different parts of it, we cannot say, but the picture gradually sank into disrepute, and eventually became, we believe, lodged with an eminent printseller for some debt amounting to less than a third of its prime cost. After lying rolled up in a corner of one of his rooms, encased in dust, for a number of years, the printseller was fortunate enough, as we have understood, to find a purchaser in his late majesty's surveyor-general of the Board of Works.

* See vol. i., p. 149.

The painting, thus restored to credit and the light, was intended to be hung up, as a national memento of the naval victory to which it relates, in the council-room of St.-James's palace. As a companion to it, a picture was required, representing the Victory engaged in the battle of Trafalgar. The first marine painter of the day undertook the task ; and, in due time, the large area of canvass, which, to correspond with the other picture, became necessary for this, was covered with all the varied tints which Mr. Turner knows so well how to mingle and combine, to give effect to his pictures and excite the admiration of the beholder.

Unfortunately for the subject which this splendid picture is meant to represent, scarcely a line of truth, beyond perhaps the broadside view of the Victory's hull, is to be seen upon it. To say what time of the day, or what particular incident in the Victory's proceedings, is meant to be referred to, we do not pretend ; for the telegraphic message is going up, which was hoisted at about 11 h. 40 m. A. M., the mizen topmast is falling, which went about 1 P. M., a strong light is reflected upon the Victory's bow and sides from the burning Achille, which ship did not catch fire until 4 h. 30 m., nor explode until 5 h. 45 m. P. M., the fore topmast, or rather, if our memory is correct, the foremast, of the British three-decker is falling, which never fell at all, and the Redoubtable is sinking under the bows of the Victory, although the French ship did not sink until the night of the 22d, and then under the stern of the Swiftsure.

We are sorry to be obliged to add that, with all these glaring falsehoods and palpable inconsistencies upon it, the picture stands, or until very lately did stand, in that room of the king's palace, for which it was originally designed. The principal reason urged for giving to this very costly and highly honoured performance so preposterous a character, is that an adherence to truth would have destroyed the pictorial effect. Here is a ship, shattered in her hull, and stripped of the best part of her sails, pushing into a cluster of enemy's ships without a grazed plank or a torn piece of canvass, to fire her first gun. Here is symbolized the first of naval heroes, with chivalric valour, devoting himself to his country's cause ; and yet, says an artist of high repute, "there is a lack of pictorial materials." We hope some public-spirited individual, if not the state itself, will show whether this is really the case ; for it is almost a national disgrace that there should yet be wanted a picture which, in accuracy of representation, no less than in strength and brilliancy of execution, is calculated to illustrate, and to stand as a lasting memorial of, one of the greatest sea-battles that ever has been, or that perhaps ever will be fought : a battle to the success of which England at this time owes, if not her political existence, her prosperity, happiness, and exalted station.

To any artist, who may consider it worth his while, or within

his powers, to attempt such a picture, the following remarks, in addition to those he will find a few pages back,* may not be un-useful. Let his point of view be the small cross in the diagram at p. 40. He will then have, for his two principal figures, the Victory on the right, and the Bucentaure on the left. Behind these will be the Neptune and Redoutable; both firing, the latter her foremost guns, the former her whole broadside, right into the bows of the Victory. On the extreme right of the picture will be the bows of the *Téméraire*, and on the extreme left, the stern and quartergalleries of the *Santisima-Trinidad*. Quite in the foreground may be represented the boat, which a shot had cut adrift a few minutes before. With this hint to the painter, we end our long, but, we hope, not uninteresting account of the battle of Trafalgar.

Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, now the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, continued throughout the greater part of the remainder of the year at his station off Cadiz, watching the 10 or 11 shattered enemy's ships that lay at anchor within it. Four days after the action Vice-admiral François-Etienne Rosily arrived at the port direct from Paris, to supersede Vice-admiral Villeneuve in the command. Instead of 18 fine fresh ships, the new admiral found five disabled ones, or rather four, the *Héros* having considerably kept herself in so efficient a state, that she was able at once to hoist the flag of Admiral Rosily, and even to carry him to sea, had such been his intention, and no blockading force been cruising off the harbour. There were still four ships of the combined fleet present at the battle of Trafalgar, whose movements require to be traced. These, it will be recollected, were the four French ships that escaped to the southward, under the command of Rear-admiral Dumanoir, in the 80-gun ship *Formidable*.

Having by dark on the day of the battle gained a safe offing, M. Dumanoir commenced repairing the few damages which his squadron had sustained; few, indeed, for his ships, in making off, carried royals upon a wind, and to the British, who were attentively observing them, exhibited no signs of injury. One or two of the ships, however, were certainly struck in the hull by some of the British ships, most probably by the *Minotaur* and *Spartiate*; for the *Formidable* made a good deal of water, and had three of her guns dismounted, and the *Duguay-Trouin* had one petty officer mortally and four others slightly wounded. Upon looking into the rôles d'équipage of the four ships, we cannot discover that they sustained any other loss in the battle of Trafalgar.

With the wind as it blew, the French admiral would have steered towards Toulon, had he not received intelligence that Rear-admiral Louis, with a squadron of four or five sail of the line, was cruising in the neighbourhood of the Straits. Nothing

* See pp. 35, 36, 40, 41, and 60.

now remained but to proceed on a cruise, or to endeavour to make a home port to the northward. Fortunately for British interests, M. Dumanoir chose the latter alternative, and, having stood to the westward until the squadron doubled Cape St.-Vincent, which it did not do until the 29th, he steered north, intending to enter the road of the isle of Aix.

The celebrated Rochefort squadron of five sail of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, under Rear-admiral Allemand, had escaped from their anchorage since the preceding July, and was now at sea, playing sad havoc with British commerce. Two or three squadrons were seeking M. Allemand, and every British cruiser was on the alert, in the hope of hearing some tidings of him. In the latter part of October the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phoenix*, Captain Thomas Baker, steering, with sealed orders, to a prescribed spot, a short distance to the westward of Scilly, received intelligence from two or three neutrals, that the Rochefort squadron had recently been seen in the bay of Biscay. Considering that the importance of this communication would justify him in prematurely breaking open his despatches, Captain Baker did so, and found they merely contained an order to proceed to what was likely to prove to the *Phoenix* and those on board of her a profitable cruising ground.

Without a moment's hesitation in the choice between private interest and public duty, Captain Baker made all sail towards the bay of Biscay; and, having crossed it, had just reached the latitude of Cape Finisterre, when, on the 2d of November, at 11 A. M. standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north-north-west, the *Phoenix* discovered and chased four large sail, bearing west-north-west. Soon after noon the strangers bore up, under all sail, in chase of the *Phoenix*; who thereupon bore up also, and steered south, Captain Baker being aware that a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan was cruising off Ferrol; and into whose hands he hoped to be able to lead, what he believed to be, a part of the Rochefort squadron.

At 3 P. M. the *Phoenix* discovered four additional sail of large ships bearing south. In a quarter of an hour more the four sail first seen, having made the same discovery, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. Immediately the *Phoenix*, then steering south-south-east, hauled up to south by west, the better to keep sight of the ships first seen. These, which were, as it will be conjectured, the French 80-gun ship *Formidable*, and 74s *Mont-Blanc*, *Scipion*, and *Duguay-Trouin*, under Rear-admiral Dumanoir,* subsequently wore and stood to the eastward; and the *Phoenix*, firing guns and covering herself with signals, stood again to the south-south-east, to join the four large sail seen in that direction, and judged, but not yet ascertained, to be friends.

Much about the time that the *Phoenix* gained a sight of the

* For the names of the captains see p. 28.

four ships of M. Dumanoir, bearing from her west-north-west, the British 38-gun frigate *Boadicea*, Captain John Maitland, and 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Dryad*, Captain Adam Drummond, discovered and chased them in the east by south. At about 8 h. 45 m. p. m. the *Phoenix* saw the *Boadicea* and *Dryad*; but, as the latter were between herself and the supposed Rochefort squadron, the rockets they threw up failed to produce the desired effect, and the *Phoenix* continued to stand from them. At about 9 h. 30 m. the *Boadicea* and *Dryad* discovered to leeward the same four ships, towards which the *Phoenix* was hastening, together with three others at no great distance from them, making seven sail in all. These were a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan, which had been detached from the Channel fleet since the 29th of October, in search of the Rochefort squadron, and consisted of the

Gun-ship			
80	<i>Cæsar</i>	Captain Sir Richard John Strachan, bt.	
73	{ <i>Hero</i>	"	Hon. Alan Hyde Gardner.
	{ <i>Namur</i>	"	Lawrence William Halsted.
	{ <i>Courageux</i>	"	Richard Lee.
	{ <i>Bellona</i>	"	Charles Dudley Pater.
Gun-frig.			
36	<i>Santa-Margarita</i>	"	Wilson Rathborne.
32	<i>Æolus</i>	"	Lord William Fitz-Roy.

Having, without getting any answer to their signals, arrived within two miles of the *Cæsar*, which was the weathermost ship of this squadron, and then standing close hauled on the larboard tack, the *Boadicea* and *Dryad*, at about 10 h. 30 m. p. m., tacked to the north-east, and soon lost sight of friends and foes. At 11 p. m. the *Phoenix* passed under the stern of the *Cæsar*, steering as before about north by east; and, after the receipt of a shot and the interchange of a few hails, discovering the ship to be what she was, Captain Baker informed Sir Richard Strachan that the Rochefort squadron, or four ships at least of it, were then not far distant upon his lee bow.

Sir Richard's squadron being at this time very much scattered, the commodore directed Captain Baker to make sail to the south-south-east, and hasten forward the ships astern. The *Cæsar* then bore away under all sail, with the wind at west-north-west, followed at a great distance by the *Hero*, *Courageux*, and *Æolus*. Scarcely had the *Phoenix* stood away from the *Cæsar* before the light of the moon discovered to Sir Richard the objects of his chase, then in the east-north-east, under a press of canvass, in the act of bearing away, closely formed in a sort of bow and quarter line. The *Cæsar* and her three nearest consorts continued the pursuit until the setting of the moon, at about 1 h. 30 m. a. m. on the 3d, accompanied by hazy blowing weather, concealed the enemy from view: they then shortened sail, to await the coming up of their friends astern.

At daylight on the 3d, by which time the wind had veered to

west-south-west, the Santa-Margarita joined the Cæsar and her three companions; and at 7 h. 30 m. A. M. Cape Ortugal appeared in sight, bearing south-east half-east distant 36 miles. At 9 A. M. the French ships again showed themselves in the north-north-east; and the British ships, spreading every thing they could set, immediately chased in that direction. At 11 A. M. the Namur, preceded by the Phoenix, and followed at some distance by a frigate which afterwards proved to be the Révolutionnaire 38, Captain the Honourable Henry Hotham, appeared far astern, using every effort to get up. At noon the French ships were about 14 miles distant, and in the same line of bearing as when first seen, the wind south-south-west, blowing strong. Towards 3 P. M. the Santa-Margarita, by her superior sailing, became the leading ship in the chase; and the Phoenix, upon joining in the evening, was despatched ahead, to assist the former in harassing the enemy's rear. To the great mortification of her officers and crew, the Bellona had by this time parted company.


On the 4th, at daylight, owing to the indifferent sailing of the Formidable, aided by the partial influence of the wind in its fluctuations throughout the night, and which now blew moderately from the south-east, the British ships had gained so far in the chase, that scarcely six miles intervened between the Cæsar, still the leading line-of-battle ship of her squadron, and the Scipion, the rearmost ship in the French line. Such also, during the preceding night's chase, had been the zeal and activity on board the Santa-Margarita, that, by 5 h. 45 m. A. M. this frigate got near enough to fire her starboard foremost guns at the Scipion; who, in a quarter of an hour afterwards brought her stern-chasers to bear, and presently killed the boatswain, and badly struck the hull, of the Santa-Margarita. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the Phoenix got up, and opened a fire from her larboard guns into the Scipion's starboard quarter. In this way the two British frigates, practising every feasible manœuvre to keep clear of the broadsides of their formidable opponents, continued to harass the French rear. Meanwhile the Cæsar, Hero, and Courageux, now formed in line ahead, and just favoured by a shift of wind to south-south-east, were rapidly approaching, to give a more decided feature to the combat.

At about 11 h. 45 m. A. M., finding an action unavoidable, the French admiral threw out the signal for his ships to take in their small sails, and haul up together on the starboard tack, with their heads to the north-east by east. This they presently did, and then fell into a line ahead in the following order: Duguay-Trouin, Formidable, Mont-Blanc, Scipion. From the last-named ship the Cæsar at this time bore about south by west rather more than a mile distant: consequently she was well on the weather quarter of the French rear. The Namur and Révolutionnaire had been great gainers by the slight change in the wind. They were now running with it upon the quarter, and

bore from the commodore and his line, the one south-west, or nearly astern, distant about 14 miles, the other west-south-west, or a little upon the lee quarter, distant about seven miles. A trifle to the westward of the Révolutionnaire's line of bearing, and just out of gun-shot from the enemy, lay the *Æolus*; and, much nearer, the *Santa-Margarita* and *Phoenix*, who had already performed so well, and who were still doing their utmost to cripple the rearmost French ship.

Having announced to Captains Gardner and Lee, by hailing, that he should attack the centre and rear of the enemy, Sir Richard edged away for the French admiral; as did the two former, in like manner, for M. Dumanoir's two seconds astern. At about 15 minutes past noon the *Cæsar* opened her larboard guns upon the *Formidable*, then, as well as her three companions, carrying topsails and topgallantsails with courses clewed up, and having the wind, as before, about a point abaft the starboard beam. In a minute or two after the *Cæsar* had begun firing, the *Héro* and *Courageux*, in quick succession, discharged their broadsides into the *Mont-Blanc* and *Scipion*. The three French ships instantly returned the fire, and a spirited action ensued. At this time the *Namur* was about 10 miles astern, using every effort to get up.

At about 50 minutes past noon the *Cæsar* hoisted the signal for close action. At 10 h. 55 m. P.M. the *Duguay-Trouin* gallantly luffed up, with the intention of raking the *Cæsar* ahead; but the latter, luffing up also, avoided the salute. This period of the action we have endeavoured to illustrate by the following diagram.



Either by accident or design, the *Duguay-Trouin* went in stays, and, while rapidly passing, on the larboard tack, under the lee, successively, of the *Cæsar* and *Héro*, received from each of them, particularly from the latter, which ship she almost touched, a heavy and destructive fire.

The French admiral, in the mean time, having made a signal to that effect, tacked to support his gallant second ahead, and was followed in the manœuvre by the two ships in his wake; but, having had her rigging much disabled by the *Cæsar*'s fire,

and being at best a bad-working ship, the *Formidable* could not get round quick enough to regain her station in the line. The latter thereupon became third instead of second, the French ships, when on the larboard tack, ranging as follows: *Duguay-Trouin*,¹ *Mont-Blanc*, *Formidable*, *Scipion*; having the wind about half a point before the beam.

At about 1 h. 20 m. P. M. the *Cæsar*, being too much disabled in her rigging to tack, wore; but the *Hero* and, we believe, the *Courageux* succeeded in tacking. Finding that the *Cæsar*, after she had got round, was making but slow progress in the chase, Sir Richard, at 1 h. 40 m. P. M., signalled the *Namur*, then on the weather bow of the French ships, to attack the enemy's van, and at the same time made the *Hero*'s signal to lead on the larboard tack. The *Hero*, followed at some distance by the *Courageux*, and at a much greater distance by the *Cæsar*, edged away towards the French squadron.

About this time, observing that the *Namur* was lying to, as it appeared, out of gun-shot of the enemy, the *Cæsar*, by way of enforcing attention to the signal she had previously made, fired at the former ship "two guns shotted."* Of this fact we were fully aware when drawing up the account for our first edition; but, observing, among the official papers in the gazette, a "General Memorandum," communicating Sir Richard Strachan's thanks to his captains for their "zealous and gallant conduct," we considered that there might have been some mistake in the log-entry, and refrained, upon a principle which we still feel to be just, from making the slightest allusion to it. We have since learnt that the *Namur* was fired at in the manner stated; but that Sir Richard, whose impatience, we believe, is not always of the most discriminative kind, subsequently acknowledged that he had been unnecessarily harsh. Even in this view of the case we should perhaps have withheld the statement, had not our previous omission been attributed to motives incompatible with the impartiality which gives to these pages their principal value.


At a few minutes before 2 P. M., while running down to close the *Formidable*, the *Hero* recommenced the action by firing her starboard guns at the *Scipion*; who, losing in consequence her main topmast, fell to leeward. Here the *Scipion* was engaged by the *Courageux* to windward, and by the *Phœnix* and *Révolutionnaire* (which latter had just joined) to leeward. The *Hero*, in the mean time, had got upon the weather beam of the *Formidable*, and kept gradually forereaching until she gained a station upon the latter ship's larboard bow. At about 2 h. 45 m. P. M. the *Namur* arrived up astern of the *Hero*, and began engaging the *Formidable*. The *Hero* then made sail to close the *Mont-Blanc*; which ship, as well as the *Duguay-Trouin*,

* Log of *Hero*.

had occasionally raked the former while engaging the Formidable.

At 3 h. 5 m. P.M., having had her mizen topmast shot away and her fore topmast and mainmast left in a tottering state, and observing the Cæsar, who had since refitted her damaged rigging, in the act of opening her fire, the Formidable hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the Namur; who, having had her main yard cut in two by the French 80-gun ship's fire, was incapacitated from making sail. At 3 h. 10 m. P.M., just as the Duguay-Trouin and Mont-Blanc had bore up, to form a fresh line ahead of the Scipion, the latter ship, having, by the united fire of the Courageux and frigates, had her fore topmast and main and mizen masts shot away, struck her colours, and was taken possession of by the Phoenix and Révolutionnaire.

Seeing the fate of the Scipion and Formidable, the Duguay-Trouin and Mont-Blanc endeavoured to make off; but they were soon overtaken by the Hero and Cæsar. After a close and well-maintained cannonade of about 20 minutes' duration, in which the British 80-gun ship's heavy broadsides were most sensibly felt, the two French 74s, being reduced to a shattered and defenceless state, and observing the Courageux ready to open her fire, hauled down their colours, the Duguay-Trouin to the Hero, and the Mont-Blanc to the Cæsar. This occurrence took place at about 3 h. 35 m. P.M.; when the ships of both squadrons were nearly in the positions represented in the following diagram :



The Cæsar lost four men killed and 25 wounded; the Hero, as a proof of the conspicuous part she took in the action, one second lieutenant of marines (Robert Morrison) and nine men killed, one lieutenant (John Shekel), one second lieutenant of

marines (Cornelius James Stevenson), one purser (Thomas Titterton), and 48 men wounded; the *Courageux*, one man killed, her first lieutenant (Robert Clephane), one master's mate (Thomas Daws), one midshipman (John Gibbs Bird), her gunner (John Austin), and nine men wounded; the *Namur*, four men killed, one captain of marines (William Clements), one lieutenant (Thomas Osborne), one midshipman (Frederick Beasley), and five men wounded; the *Santa-Margarita*, her boatswain (Thomas Edwards), killed, and one man wounded; the *Révolutionnaire*, two men killed and six wounded; the *Phoenix*, two killed and four wounded; and the *Æolus*, three wounded: making a total of 24 killed and 111 wounded. None of the British ships had any spars shot away, except the *Cæsar* her main topgallantmast, the *Hero* her foretopsail yard, and the *Namur* her main yard; but the *Cæsar* and *Hero* had received considerable damage in their masts generally, as well as in their rigging and sails.

The loss sustained by the French ships was extremely severe. The *Formidable* had 200 killed and wounded, including among the latter Rear-admiral Dumanoir in two places; the *Scipion*, the same number, including among the wounded her captain; the *Mont-Blanc* 180, and the *Duguay-Trouin* 150, including among the latter's killed her captain: making a total of 730 killed and wounded.* All four French ships had been so struck in their masts, that, soon after the action ended, the foremasts of the *Formidable* and *Mont-Blanc* were the only sticks left standing. This, coupled with the heavy loss just enumerated, affords a decisive proof that the French ships did not surrender until they were compelled to do so: it proves, also, that the British ships fired their guns, which is not invariably the case, with both quickness and precision.

The force of the four French ships has already appeared (see p. 94); but it must in justice be stated, that in this action the *Formidable* mounted 65 guns only, three having been dismounted in the battle of Trafalgar (see p. 107), and 12 of her quarterdeck 12-pounders having been thrown overboard during the chase of the squadron by Sir Richard Strachan. This fact is stated on oath in the written depositions of the *Formidable*'s late officers, lodged in the admiralty prize-court, and is confirmed by the official return of the prize broker, it there appearing that no more than 68 guns were found on board the ship.

In the battle of Trafalgar, neither the French nor the British frigates fired a shot: in this battle all four British frigates, three of them especially, contributed their full share towards achieving the victory. It is true that the official letter, the extraordinary brevity of which has been so admired by some and blamed by others, states that, when the French ships tacked, "the frigates were to leeward of the enemy. But Sir Richard surely never

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 195.

intended to have it thence inferred, that they took no further part in the action. An officer of one of the line-of-battle ships, apparently the *Namur*, in a letter published on the same day as the official account, considers that the tacking of the French ships "gave the frigates in the rear the credit of taking a good share in the action." The French indeed represent, that every one of their ships, when the squadron got on the larboard tack, found herself assailed by a ship of the line to windward and a frigate to leeward, the latter placing herself in a comparatively safe but harassing position on the quarter. This is saying too much. What the frigates really did may be thus stated: The *Phoenix*, by her skilful manœuvres, decoyed the French squadron within sight of the British squadron. This frigate, then, accompanied by the *Santa-Margarita*, gallantly fought, and considerably annoyed, the rearmost French ship; so much so, doubtless, as to have checked the way of all the French ships, and thereby enabled Sir Richard the more quickly to overtake them. When the French squadron tacked, the *Santa-Margarita* got thrown out, because she had received a dangerous shot in the magazine, besides several other shot in her starboard side; to stop the holes of which the ship was obliged to be kept on the heel for two hours. But the *Santa-Margarita's* place was ably supplied by the *Révolutionnaire*, who, with the *Phoenix*, gave the finishing blow to the *Scipion*. The *Æolus* exchanged a few distant shot with the French ships as they passed to windward, and made herself useful in taking possession of the *Mont-Blanc* after that ship had struck to the *Cæsar*.

The capture of *M. Dumanoir's* squadron may fairly be considered as an emanation from the battle of *Trafalgar*. So that, out of the 18 sail of the line which France possessed on the morning of the 21st of October, in a fortnight afterwards she could count only five, and those five shut up in a Spanish port, helpless to themselves and useless to their country. The news of these sad reverses reached the French emperor in Austria, in the midst of his brilliant triumphs. *Napoléon* is said to have flown into the most violent rage, and to have declared, in allusion to *Byng's* fate, that he would "teach French admirals how to conquer." "*Je saurai bien apprendre aux amiraux français à vaincre.*"* In a little time, however, *Buonaparte's* habitual duplicity resumed its sway over his mind; and he was weak enough to imagine that, because he told the legislative assembly that a few of his ships had been lost in a storm,† and the *Moniteur* and other French papers refrained from publishing a word on the subject, the world at large were a jot less wise respecting the real fate of the Franco-Spanish fleet.

The French emperor subsequently gave a gracious reception to Captains *Lucas*, *Infernet*, *Magendie*, and *Villemadrin*; saying to

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 197.

† See p. 109.

the first two: "Those captains who, instead of closing with the enemy, kept out of gun-shot, shall be prosecuted, and if there is cause, shall be made a striking example of;" "*Les capitaines de vaisseau qui, au lieu d'aborder l'ennemi, se sont tenus hors de portée de canon, seront pour-suivis, et, s'il y a lieu, il en sera fait un exemple éclatant;*"* and to the last two: "You are among those who fought well; you shall have your reward." "*Vous êtes du nombre de ceux qui se sont bien battus, vous prendrez votre revanche.*"†

Napoléon's intentions respecting M. Villeneuve are not very clear. This unfortunate admiral, having obtained his parole, sailed from Plymouth in a cartel on the 9th of April, and on the night of the 22d landed at Morlaix; intending, it was understood, to proceed straight to Paris to justify himself before the French emperor. A few evenings afterwards M. Villeneuve, while waiting at the Hotel de la Patrie at Rennes for Napoléon's orders respecting his future movements, was found dead in his bed, stabbed in several places, as alleged, by his own hand, but, as very generally suspected, by the agency of Buonaparte. Buonaparte has since denied this;‡ but who would confess such an act? On the 20th of October, 1809, and not before, Rear-admiral Dumanoir, for his conduct on the 21st of October, 1805, was tried by a court of inquiry, which had been summoned by Napoléon's orders, and was acquitted. The court sat at Paris, and was composed of the two senators, the Comtes de Fleurieu and Bougainville, and the two Vice-admirals Thevenard and Rosily; who gave it as their opinion, "That Rear-admiral Dumanoir manœuvred conformably to signals and the dictates of duty and honour." "*Que le contre-amiral Dumanoir a manœuvré conformément aux signaux, et à l'impulsion du devoir et de l'honneur.*" "That he did all that the wind and circumstances would permit to succour the commander-in-chief." "*Qu'il a fait ce que les vents et les circonstances ont pu lui permettre pour venir au secours de l'amiral.*" "That he engaged, as closely as he could, all the ships that he met in his way to the centre." "*Qu'il a combattu, d'aussi près qu'il a pu, tous les vaisseaux qu'il a rencontrés jusqu'au centre.*" "In short, that he did not individually abandon the contest until forced to do so by the damages of his ship, and in particular by the impracticability of manœuvring, owing to the state of his masts and rigging." "*Enfin, qu'il n'a personnellement quitté le combat, que forcé par les avaries de tout genre de son vaisseau, et particulièrement par l'impossibilité de manœuvrer dans l'état où se trouvait sa mâture.*"

On the 29th of December, 1809, the same court of inquiry sat to investigate M. Dumanoir's conduct on the battle of the

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 198.

† *Ibid.*

‡ See O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. i., p. 56.

5th of November. The members would not question the bravery of a French admiral, but they found fault with his tactics. There was some colour for this ; and the question still lies open, " Why did not M. Dumanoir, on the 4th, or on the day preceding the battle, with his four sail of the line, tack and fall upon the three British sail of the line and three frigates then solely in pursuit of him ? " Not satisfied with the sentence pronounced upon him, M. Dumanoir demanded and obtained a naval court-martial. It was held at Toulon, and honourably acquitted him. M. Dumanoir is now the fifth vice-admiral on the list. Captains Maistrail and Epron outlived Napoléon's displeasure ; and the name of the survivor of the two, Captain Epron, is not eclipsed in honorary marks of distinction by that of any officer of the same rank in the " *Etat Général de la Marine*."

Sir Richard Strachan carried his four prizes in safety to Plymouth, and they were all added to the British navy ; the *Formidable*, under the name of *Brave*, the *Duguay-Trouin*, under that of *Implacable*, and the remaining two under their own names. The *Implacable* and *Scipion* were the only ships that afterwards went to sea. On the 9th of November, two days before his despatches reached the admiralty, and consequently without reference to his recent success over the enemy, Sir Richard was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral. On the 29th of the ensuing January, Sir Richard, for his conduct in the action of the 5th of November, became invested with the order of the Bath ; and, about the same time, the rear-admiral, and the captains and officers who served under him, received the thanks of parliament. Gold medals were also distributed, and the first lieutenants of the line-of-battle ships, we believe, made commanders.

LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 21st of January the British schooner *Gipsy* (tender to the flag-ship at Port-Royal, Jamaica), of ten 4-pounders and 45 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Michael Fitton, while lying to off Cape Antonio, waiting to deliver despatches from the commander-in-chief to the 36-gun frigate *Princess-Charlotte*, Captain the Honourable Francis Fayerman Gardner, was chased by two schooner and three felucca privateers from under the land. Lieutenant Fitton immediately filled and stood out to the offing, in the hope that the privateers would separate in the chase, and afford him a chance of capturing one or two of them. In a short time the largest of the two schooners got considerably ahead of her companions. By way of encouraging this vessel to continue the pursuit, the *Gipsy* paid a cable out of her stern-port, which slackened her way, and appeared to produce its intended effect. Having run the leading privateer to a sufficient distance from the rest, the *Gipsy* tacked and stood for her. The

privateer immediately put about, and a running action ensued between her and the Gipsy; so much, however, to the former's disadvantage, that she ran on the Colorados reef, and was totally wrecked. Seeing the fate of their companion, the remaining four privateers crowded sail away, and left the Gipsy to remain unmolested upon her station. In three days afterwards the Princess-Charlotte arrived on the spot, and Lieutenant Fitton delivered to Captain Gardner the despatches with which he had been charged.

On the 3d of February, at daylight, Cape Caxine in sight bearing south, as the British ship-sloop Arrow, Captain Richard Budd Vincent, and bomb-ship Acheron, Captain Arthur Farquhar, having in charge (except one which had foundered in a squall three days before) the whole of a convoy of 35 merchant vessels from Malta bound to England, were steering west by north, with a light breeze from the north-east, two large sail were discovered bearing east-south-east of the Acheron, then in the rear of the fleet. At 8 h. 30 m. A.M. the course of the fleet was altered by signal to west-north-west. At 10 h. 30 m. A.M., in obedience to a signal from the Arrow, the Acheron wore and stood towards the strangers, to ascertain their character. At 11 h. 15 m. A.M. Captain Farquhar communicated that they were suspicious, and presently afterwards, that they were frigates. The vessels of the convoy on each quarter were now signalled to close. At noon Cape Albatel bore south by west half-west distant 10 or 11 leagues.

At two minutes past noon the Arrow cast off the brig which she had been towing, wore, and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, for the purpose of joining the Acheron; who had also wore, and was returning to the convoy, under all sail, with light winds from the eastward. In the course of the succeeding quarter of an hour, the customary signals were made to the convoy for its safety; and the Duchess-of-Rutland, a warlike-looking transport, was directed to lead the fleet on its course. At half past noon the Acheron hoisted her colours and fired a gun. The chasing ships paying no attention to this, not a doubt remained that they were enemies; and a signal to that effect was immediately made to the ships of the convoy, with orders for them to make all possible sail to the appointed rendezvous. At 2 p.m. the Arrow, having tacked to the northward, brought to for the Acheron. At this time the two strangers, which were the French 40-gun frigate Hortense, Captain Louis-Charles-Auguste La Marre-le-Meillierie, and 38-gun frigate Incorruptible, Captain Simon Billiet, continued their course about west-north-west, under all sail, with light winds. These frigates, having parted from the Toulon fleet in a violent gale of wind,* had since cruised near the Straits of Gibraltar for some days, and not finding their

* See vol. iii., p. 325.

fleet at the appointed rendezvous, were now on their return to Toulon.

At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. the Acheron joined the Arrow; and it was determined by the two commanders, that they would keep between the convoy and the French frigates, who were now about five miles distant. At 5 P. M. it became quite calm; the convoy then bearing from the Arrow and Acheron north-west by west distant three miles, and the land between Cape Albatel and Cape Tennis south-south-west half-west, distant 11 leagues. At about 11 P. M. a light air sprang up from the south-west. The body of the convoy at this time bore from the Arrow west-north-west distant four miles, and the French frigates, who were on the larboard tack steering towards the convoy, bore north-north-east distant three miles. The Arrow and Acheron were also on the larboard tack, standing in line ahead in close order.

At about 4 h. 15 m. A. M. on the 4th the Hortense, having tacked, passed to leeward of and hailed the Arrow, but did not fire. On arriving abreast of the Acheron, the frigate was herself hailed. After hailing in return, the Hortense opened a fire of round and grape upon the Acheron; which considerably damaged her rigging and sails, and carried away the main top-gallant yard and the slings of the main yard, but did not injure any person on board. The Acheron returned the fire with her starboard guns, and then hove about and discharged the opposite ones. The Arrow, who had in the mean time bore up, raked the Hortense astern, as the latter stood on to the westward. At 5 h. 30 m. A. M. the Incorruptible, whom the light and baffling winds had somewhat separated from her consort, passed, without firing, under the lee of the Arrow, then lying to on the starboard tack. Shortly afterwards, in wearing round on the starboard tack, the Incorruptible exposed her stern to the Acheron's guns, and received from them, at too great a distance probably for carronades to be effective, two rounds of shot. The Incorruptible at length came to the wind, and then stood after her consort.

Daylight, which had been anxiously looked for by the weaker party, showed the two frigates with their heads to the southward and their colours flying. Soon afterwards the Hortense hoisted a broad pendant at the main. At 6 A. M. the Arrow made the signal "for action" to the Duchess-of-Rutland, she being the most effective ship of the convoy; but although even a show of coming to the assistance of either of the men of war would have been of service, the Duchess-of-Rutland neither answered nor obeyed the signal. The Arrow then made sail on the starboard tack, followed in close order, by the Acheron; the wind still very light from the north-west, and the convoy about four miles to windward, mostly on the larboard tack, much scattered, and making all sail to the westward. In a little while the two French frigates wore to the eastward, and hauled on the

larboard tack; apparently with the intention of engaging the British ships to leeward.

At about 7 h. 25 m. A. M., being abreast of the *Arrow*, within half musket-shot distance, the *Incorruptible* opened her broad side, and received that of the *Arrow* in return. In five minutes more this frigate arrived abreast of and began engaging the *Acheron*. The *Hortense* having, in the mean while, closed with the *Arrow*, the action became general between all four ships. As the French ships were wearing to renew the action on the opposite tack, the *Arrow* put her helm hard a-weather, and raked them; but, the lightness of the wind preventing her from steering, the *Arrow*, in her turn, became exposed to a heavy fire from both frigates. The *Acheron* then hauled close to the wind, to clear her consort, and, in passing, became again engaged with the *Hortense*; who, after having poured a destructive fire into the starboard quarter of the *Arrow*, hauled after the *Acheron*.

The *Arrow*, in her immovable and shattered state, was now left to the *Incorruptible*, and a warm and close action ensued between these ships. At length, at about 8 h. 30 m. A. M., just one hour and 20 minutes since the two had begun engaging, having had her running rigging shot to pieces, her lower masts badly wounded, her standing rigging, yards, and sails much cut, many shot between wind and water, and the ship leaky in consequence, four guns dismantled, her rudder machinery disabled, and having, moreover, incurred a severe loss in killed and wounded, the *Arrow* struck her colours. In 20 minutes more the *Acheron*, who, on the *Arrow*'s surrender, had made all sail to the southward, having also been much disabled in masts, sails, and rigging, and had a part of her stern-post carried away, and finding it in vain to attempt escaping from a ship that sailed so much faster, hauled down her colours to the *Hortense*.

The *Arrow*'s guns consisted of twenty-eight 32-pounder carronades, 24 of them on a flush deck;* and her complement at quarters, including seven invalid male passengers,† was 132 men and boys. Of these, she had 13 killed and 27 wounded. The *Acheron*, exclusive of her two bombs, mounted only eight 24-pounder carronades, with a complement of 67 men and boys; of whom (although omitted to be stated in the gazette-letter) she had three men killed and eight wounded.

The *Hortense* was a fine new frigate, mounting 48 long guns and carronades, 18-pounders on the main deck; with a complement of 340 or 350 men, exclusive of about 300 troops. Her loss cannot be ascertained, but was probably trifling. The *Incorruptible* mounted 42 guns, the same, we believe, as those specified at No. 7 in the small table at p. 54 of the first volume.

* See vol. i., p. 403, note Q*, where the *Arrow* and her sister-vessel are described.

† One lady, her female attendant, and a very young child, were also unfortunately on board.

Her complement, including troops, extended to 640 men. Of these the Incorruptible doubtless sustained a greater loss than one killed and five wounded, the amount stated in the *Moniteur*, otherwise her damages would not have detained this frigate in port on the second departure of the Toulon fleet.*

The noble defence made by this sloop and bomb-vessel did something more than display an additional proof of the bravery and devotedness of British seamen: it preserved from capture 31 out of 34 sail of merchantmen, (the *Duchess-of-Rutland* and two others were all that fell into the hands of the frigates,) and the captured men-of-war had been so long and so bravely defended as to be useless in the French service. Indeed scarcely had the surviving crew and passengers been removed from the *Arrow*, and that by the French boats, her own having been destroyed by shot, than the ship settled on her beam-ends and sank; and the shattered state of the *Acheron* induced the captors, as soon as her people were removed, to set that vessel on fire.

Had the *Arrow*, with her powerful battery and gallant crew, fallen in with the *Incorruptible* alone, under such circumstances of wind and weather, as would have allowed the former to maintain a close position, the combat might have resembled, in its result, that fought in the preceding war between the British brig *Pelican* and the French frigate *Medée*.† As it was, the conduct of both commanders received its just reward in their almost immediate promotion to post-rank. We regret to be obliged to add, that the brave defence of the *Arrow* failed to produce for her late officers and crew the slightest sympathy in the breast of Captain Billiet; who, in the treatment of his prisoners, appears to have fallen very little short of the celebrated Captain Lejoille.‡

On the 8th of February, at daybreak, the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Curieux*, Captain George Edmund Byron Bettesworth, being about 20 leagues to the eastward of Barbadoes, discovered on her lee bow a large brig, that immediately bore up and made all sail. Chase was given; and, after a run of 12 hours, during which the brig tried every point of sailing to escape, the *Curieux* got within point-blank shot. The former, which was the French privateer *Dame-Ernouf*, then took in her studding-sails, brought to on the starboard tack, hoisted French colours, and commenced a brisk fire of great guns and small arms. As soon as she had arrived within musket-shot upon the privateer's weather quarter, the *Curieux* opened her fire. The action continued with great obstinacy for 40 minutes; when the *Dame-Ernouf* ceased firing, and, after three cheers had been given by her crew, steered for the *Curieux*'s lee quarter. Aware of the intent, Captain

* See vol. iii., p. 327.

† See vol. i., p. 356.

‡ See vol. ii., p. 234.

Bettesworth put his helm a-starboard, and caught his opponent's jib-boom between the *Curieux's* after fore-shroud and foremast. In this exposed situation the *Dame-Ernouf* remained, until her decks were completely cleared by the guns of the *Curieux*; when, just as the latter was about to board the former, the two vessels parted, the fore topmast of the *Dame-Ernouf* falling over the side just as she dropped clear. The privateer continued a short time firing musketry, and then hauled down her colours.

Both ships mounted 16 long French 6-pounders.* The *Curieux* had a complement of 67 men and boys; of whom she lost five, including the purser, Mr. Maddox (who, in the absence of the first lieutenant, gallantly volunteered his services, and was killed at the head of the small-arm men), killed, and four, including her commander, by a musket-ball in the head,† wounded. The *Dame-Ernouf* commenced action with 120 men, of whom she had 30 killed and 40 wounded; a sufficient proof that her officers and crew persevered in their resistance while any hope remained. In his modest account of an action so creditable to himself and his brig's company, Captain Bettesworth omits not to pass a very handsome encomium on the gallantry of his antagonist.

On the 13th of February, at 5 A.M., as the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *San-Fiorenzo*, Captain Henry Lambert, was in latitude $19^{\circ} 35'$ north, longitude $85^{\circ} 25'$ east, standing on the starboard tack, with a light wind at west-south-west, in search of the French (late privateer,‡ but now) 32-gun frigate *Psyché*, Captain Jacques Bergeret, reported to be off Vizagapatam, three sail were discovered at anchor under the land to the southward. These, which were the *Psyché* and two ships, her prizes, immediately weighed and made sail, pursued by the *San-Fiorenzo*. Light and baffling winds continued during the day, and towards midnight it became quite calm. At about 20 minutes past midnight, a light breeze having sprung up, the *San-Fiorenzo* braced round on the larboard tack, and made all sail, trimming and wetting them to quicken her progress. In this way the chase continued throughout the remainder of the night, the *San-Fiorenzo* gradually gaining until 5 h. 30 m. P.M. on the 14th; when the *Psyché* and her companions hoisted English colours, as did also the *San-Fiorenzo*. At 7 h. 30 m. P.M. the latter arrived within hail and took possession of the sternmost vessel of the three, the *Thetis*, late country-ship, and which had just

* The *Curieux* had been captured the preceding year, see p. 109. By admiralty order of December 10, 1804, the *Curieux* was ordered fourteen 38-pounder carronades, but it is believed retained her French guns, until by admiralty orders of August 9 and September 12, 1805, she was established with eight long 6-pounders and ten 24-pounder carronades.

† He had also received three wounds at the cutting out of the brig he now commanded. See vol. iii., p. 245.

‡ See vol. iii., p. 264.

been abandoned by the *Psyché*, then a short distance ahead. From the crew of the *Thetis* it was ascertained, that the other prize had been the Pigeon country-ship, but was now the *Equivoque* privateer, of 10 guns and 40 men, commanded by one of M. Bergeret's lieutenants.

Continuing the chase under all sail, the *San-Fiorenzo*, at 8 P. M., got within gun-shot of, and fired a bow-chaser at, the *Psyché*, who returned it with two guns from her stern. In 10 minutes more the two frigates commenced a furious action, at the distance of about 100 yards, and continued hotly engaged until a few minutes before 9 P. M., when the *Psyché* fell on board the *San-Fiorenzo*. In about a quarter of an hour the *Psyché* got clear, and the cannonade was renewed with spirit, the *Equivoque* occasionally taking a part in it, to the no slight annoyance of the *San-Fiorenzo*. At about 9 h. 40 m. P. M. the latter shot away the *Psyché*'s main yard, and the firing still continued with unabated fury. At 11 h. 30 m. P. M. the *San-Fiorenzo* hauled off to reeve new braces and repair her rigging. At midnight, being again ready, the latter bore up to renew the conflict; but, just as the British frigate was about to reopen her broadside, a boat from the *Psyché* came on board with a message to Captain Lambert, stating that Captain Bergeret, out of humanity to the survivors of his crew, had struck, although he might have borne the contest longer.

Of her 253 men and boys on board, the *San Fiorenzo* had one midshipman (Christopher H. B. Lefroy), eight seamen, one drummer, and two marines killed, and one lieutenant (William Dawson), her master (James Finlayson), one lieutenant of marines (Samuel Ashmore), one midshipman (Samuel Marsingal), 30 seamen, and two marines wounded; total, 12 killed and 36 wounded. Severe as this loss was, that on board the *Psyché* was far more so. The latter ship had her second captain, two lieutenants, and 54 seamen and soldiers killed, and 70 officers, seamen, and soldiers wounded.

The *San-Fiorenzo* mounted, besides her 26 long 18-pounders on the main deck, 14 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long mines on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 42 guns. Since her affair with the *Wilhelmina*, the *Psyché* had been purchased for the national navy by General Decaen, the governor of the Isle of France; and Rear-admiral Linois had allowed the enterprising officer to whom she had belonged to continue in the command of her. Her 36 guns appear to have been the same that she mounted as a privateer, and will be found at a preceding page.*

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		SAN-FIORENZO.	PSYCHE.
Broadside-guns.....	{ No.	21	18
	{ lbs.	467	252
Crew.....	No.	253	240
Size.....	tons	1032	848

* See vol. iii., p. 264.

The 10-gun ship *Equivoque* is here left out, partly because the calibers of her guns are not known, and partly because the aid she afforded the *Psyché* was not constant, but occasional. As to the two frigates, although nominally equal, they were very far from being a match, and yet what a resistance the *Psyché's* was. Her loss in killed and wounded amounted to more than half her crew; and among the killed were the second captain and her two lieutenants. Her third lieutenant was on board the *Equivoque*. This act of Captain Bergeret's surpassed what had been expected even of him;* and every Frenchman, who wishes well to the navy of his country, should hold in honourable recollection the heroic defence of the *Psyché*. The prize became added to the British navy as a 12-pounder 32-gun frigate; but owing partly to her age and partly to the damage done to her by getting aground, the *Psyché* did not continue more than a few years in the service.

On the 16th of February, at daybreak, in latitude 28° north, longitude 67° west, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Cleopatra*, Captain Sir Robert Laurie, Bart., saw a ship in the south-east, standing to the east-north-east, with the wind at north-west, and immediately went in chase of her. At 11 A. M. the stranger was discovered to be a large frigate, with 15 ports of a side on the main deck. The *Cleopatra*, whose force was that of her class,† with the exception that four of her nines had been exchanged for ten 24-pounder carronades, making her guns in all 38, cleared for action, and hoisted American colours, to induce the stranger to bring to. Instead, however, of doing so, the latter made more sail. She was the French 40-gun frigate *Ville-de-Milan*, Captain Jeanne-Marie Renaud, armed with 46 guns, eight more long 8-pounders than the establishment,‡ no carronades apparently, and her two aftmost maindeck guns left at Martinique; from which island she was 19 days, with despatches for France, and with express orders not to speak any thing during the passage.

Under these circumstances, a trial of speed was alone to determine, whether or not there should follow a trial of strength. Each ship spread all the canvass she could set, and night left the two frigates still in chase. At daybreak, on the 17th, they were only about four miles apart. The British frigate continued to gain upon the French frigate; and, at 10 h. 30 m. A. M., the *Ville-de-Milan* took in her studding-sails, and hauled more up. The *Cleopatra*, as soon as she approached within three quarters of a mile, did the same. At 11 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Ville-de-Milan* hauled up her mainsail and kept more off the wind; but, upon the *Cleopatra's* steering to close with her upon her quarter, the

* See vol. i., p. 325, and vol. ii., p. 236.

† See *H* in the table at p. 91, of vol. i.

‡ See No. 5 in the table at p. 54 of vol. i.

Ville-de-Milan again set her mainsail and staysails, in the hope to gain the wind of her adversary, that being her own best point of sailing. Each ship now hoisted her colours; and, the Ville-de-Milan seeming to draw rather ahead, the Cleopatra, when at the distance of about half gun-shot, fired her bow-chasers. An occasional well-directed fire in return from the stern-chasers of the Ville-de-Milan obliged the Cleopatra to steer more upon the latter's quarter; a course which, although it prolonged the chase, became necessary, in order to avoid being raked by what were now discovered to be heavy shot.

At 2 h. 30 m. P. M., latitude at noon $29^{\circ} 24'$ north, longitude $64^{\circ} 20'$ west, just as the Cleopatra had got within 100 yards of the Ville-de-Milan, the latter luffed close to the wind, and gave her two broadsides. The former, as soon as she had approached to half the distance, returned the compliment, and a warm action ensued; both ships trimming sails, and steering, sometimes close to the wind, and at other times about three points free, in which latter case the Cleopatra had considerably the advantage. At about 5 P. M., having shot away the Ville-de-Milan's maintopsail yard, the Cleopatra forged ahead, and this although the mizen topsail was squared and both jib-stay and halliards gone. Having neither fore nor main clue-garnets left by which to haul up the courses, her running rigging being cut to pieces so as to render it impossible to shorten or to back her sails, the main and the spring stay being shot away, and the mainmast supported only by the storm stay-sail-stay, the Cleopatra prepared to cross her opponent's bow, so that by luffing up she might rake the Milan, in preference to exposing her stern to the latter's powerful broadside. Just as the Cleopatra was in the act of attempting this manœuvre, a shot struck the wheel, and the broken spokes, becoming jammed against the deck, rendered the rudder, already clogged by splinters, totally immovable.

Availing herself of this ungovernable state of her antagonist, and of her own windward position, the Ville-de-Milan bore up and gave the Cleopatra her stem; running her head and bowsprit over the latter's quarterdeck, just abaft the main rigging. Covered by a heavy fire of musketry, the French crew now attempted to board, but were repulsed. A continued stream of musketry from the Ville-de-Milan's forecastle and tops soon cleared the Cleopatra's decks; and all the resistance the latter could offer in return was by two maindeck guns, which, as their shot passed in a line with the Milan's lower deck, did very little injury. In this dilemma, with her principal sails shivering, or partly aback, and a ship more than a third larger pressing upon her with all the accumulated force of a strong wind and heavy sea, the Cleopatra attempted to hoist the foretopmast staysail and set the sprit-sail; but the fire from the French musketry, and from the swivels in the enemy's tops, was too destructive to admit of its being done. At length, at about 5 h. 15 m. P. M.,

the *Ville-de-Milan* boarded and took possession of her shattered and defenceless antagonist. Almost immediately afterwards the *Cleopatra's* fore and main masts went over the side, her bowsprit soon followed ; and she lay almost in a foundering state under the bows of the *Ville-de-Milan*.

Being 10 able seamen short of her complement, the *Cleopatra* mustered at quarters, including one supernumerary lieutenant, only 200 men and boys ; and several of these were so sick as to be of very little service. Of this comparatively small crew the *Cleopatra* had 16 seamen, three marines, and one boy killed, her first and second lieutenants (William Balfour and James Croke), one acting lieutenant (Charles Mitchell), one supernumerary lieutenant (William Bowen), one lieutenant of marines (Thomas Appleton), her master (John Bell), boatswain (John M'Carthy), one midshipman (Robert Standly), 23 seamen, and seven marines (two of the latter mortally) wounded : total, 22 killed and dead of wounds, and 36 wounded.

The loss on board the *Ville-de-Milan*, out of a crew, as deposed to by her officers, of 350, although admitted to have been severe, has not been enumerated. The last shot fired by the *Cleopatra* killed Captain Renaud ; and a previous shot had badly wounded the frigate's second in command, M. Guillet. The surviving crew of the *Ville-de-Milan*, after the action had ceased, amounted to 340, including the wounded. This would give 10 as the number killed, which is perhaps near the amount. As a proof that the *Cleopatra's* shot had done considerable execution on board the *Ville-de-Milan*, the latter's main and mizen masts went over the side in the course of the night succeeding the action.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		CLEOPATRA.	VILLE-DE-MILAN.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	19	23
	{ lbs.	282	340
Crew	No.	200	350
Size	tons	689	1097

Had it not been for the carronades of the *Cleopatra*, more than a twofold disparity in weight of metal would here have been exhibited ; and, in crew and size, the relative proportion still stands nearly as seven to four. Moreover the *Cleopatra's* was quite a young ship's company, many of the men being under 20 years of age ; and of the marines, three only had joined that corps more than two weeks before they embarked in the summer of 1804.

A less ardent mind than Sir Robert Laurie's might have suggested some reasons, and those of a substantial kind, for not persisting to bring to action a ship so decidedly superior. It will not take a particle from the gallantry displayed upon this

occasion, to suppose that the mere circumstance of a ship, of such apparent force as the Milan, flying from the Cleopatra, tended greatly to augment the confidence of the officers and crew of the latter. But it was not only a 32 hours' chase, a more than three hours' engagement, close engagement, followed. Nor did the Cleopatra yield until a fourth of her crew lay dead or disabled upon her decks; until her sails and rigging were destroyed, her masts left tottering, and her riddled hull pressed upon, and nearly borne beneath the waves by, the large and heavy body of her antagonist.

Having disengaged his prize, placed on board of her his first Lieutenant and 49 petty officers and men, shifted the prisoners, and partially refitted the two ships, Capitaine de frégate Pierre Guillet, the late first lieutenant of the Ville-de-Milan, slowly continued his route towards a French port. On the 23d, at noon, the British 50-gun ship Leander, Captain John Talbot, obtained a distant view of the Cleopatra, bearing south, the weather at this time being hazy, with squalls of wind and rain from the northward. The Leander instantly made sail, but, the haze increasing, lost sight of the chase. At 2 h. 30 m. p. m., the weather clearing a little to the southward, the Cleopatra again presented herself to view, and was now made out to be a frigate, under jury-masts, standing to the south-east. At 3 p. m. another and a much larger ship, also under jury-masts and steering the same course, was seen a short distance ahead of the Cleopatra. In about a quarter of an hour the two frigates closed for mutual support. Each then fired a gun to leeward, and hoisted a French ensign at her main stay. At 4 p. m. the Leander arrived within gun-shot. The two frigates immediately separated, the Cleopatra putting before the wind, the Milan steering with it on the larboard quarter. At 4 h. 30 m. p. m., being within half musket-shot of the Cleopatra, the Leander gave her one of the maindeck guns; when, after a slight hesitation, the newly-made French frigate hauled down her colours and hove to.

Those of the Cleopatra's original crew, that had been left on board, now came on deck and took possession of their recovered ship. Observing this, the Leander directed them to follow her, and immediately made sail after the Ville-de-Milan. In another hour the British 50 got alongside of the French frigate; and the Ville-de-Milan, without waiting for the discharge of a shot on either side, surrendered to the Leander. "It is not possible," says Captain Talbot in his official letter, "for officers to speak in stronger terms, than the French officers do, in praise of Sir Robert Laurie's perseverance in so long a chase, except it is in the praise they bestow upon him, his officers, seamen, and marines, for their gallant conduct during so long and severe an action." These sentiments, no less than the candid avowal of them, reflect the highest honour upon those by whom they were uttered. Captors of every nation may here take a lesson, and

learn how much they exalt themselves by a promptitude in doing justice to the merits of an enemy.

The capture of the *Ville-de-Milan*, and the recapture of the *Cleopatra*, became a sore subject to the French naval writers. They consoled themselves, however, with the idea, that they could make up a story, which would both gain credit and give satisfaction on their side of the Channel, without its being confuted, or perhaps even seen, on the other. They pretended to believe, that the *Cleopatra* had exchanged her long 12 for long 18 pounders, being ignorant enough, as naval men, not to know, that the ports for the first, would not answer for the second, caliber; and, in short, that the ship was scarcely large or strong enough to carry her battery of twelves. The inference meant to be drawn was, that the *Cleopatra*, in every respect, was the equal of the *Ville-de-Milan*; and that, therefore, the victory gained by the latter redounded to the honour of the French navy.

One admission has slipped out, which, as coming from a Frenchman, is rather important, and so precisely applicable to the case of the *Cleopatra* and *Ville-de-Milan*, that, offering our acknowledgments, we adopt the very words: "We should seem here" (alluding to an opinion just given) "to be passing sentence upon several French captains, did we not hasten to remark, that, to be equal in force, it is not enough that two vessels be armed with the same guns, in number and caliber, but they ought to be of an equal strength in their hull, masts, and rigging." "*Nous semblerions prononcer ici l'arrêt de plusieurs capitaines de vaisseau français, si nous ne nous hâtions de faire remarquer que, pour être égaux en force, il ne suffit pas que deux bâtimens soient armés d'une artillerie pareille, quant au nombre et au calibre, mais qu'ils doivent être d'une égale solidité dans leur coque, leur mâture, et leur gréement.*"*

All curiosity about the circumstances that attended the capture of the *Ville-de-Milan* herself is stifled at once by the sweeping falsehood, that the British 40-gun frigate *Cambrian* was aiding and assisting the *Leander* in the very difficult task she had to perform. And yet he, whom, after what has already appeared in these pages, it will be no libel to call the imperial fictionist, and who actually took some interest in this particular case, wholly overlooked the circumstance of the alleged interference of a second British ship. "Il paraît," says Napoléon, in a letter to his minister of marine, dated May 10, 1805, "que la *Ville-de-Milan* a été prise, mais non la *Cléopâtre* qui s'est sauvée. Les renseignemens que j'ai me donnent lieu de croire que la *Cléopâtre* était très-loin de la *Ville-de-Milan*, et n'a pu prendre part au léger combat qui a eu lieu contre le *Léandre*; que le commandant de la *Ville-de-Milan*, voyant que l'état de délabrement où elle était la compromettrait, lui fit le signal de s'éloigner,

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 66, note.

et que lorsqu'il la vit hors de danger, il amena son pavillon : c'est dans ce sens que vous devez en parler."* The last sentence of this account would lead us to infer, that Buonaparte had, in reality, received no intelligence, but was inventing a story to deceive his minister of marine, and, through him, the public.

Our assertion, that the Cambrian had parted company from the Leander on the night of the 15th, and, at the moment of the Ville-de-Milan's capture, was in the act of coming to an anchor in a harbour of the Bermudas, may not carry conviction to the quarter intended; but the depositions of the two principal surviving officers, late belonging to the French frigate, probably will. Both of them, then, have sworn and certified, and the documents are at hand to be referred to, that no other ship than the Leander was present, either at the recapture of the Cleopatra, or at the capture of the Ville-de-Milan. That the Ville-de-Milan's late officers were not the authors of the mistatement is clear from the fact, that the writer in the "Victoires et Conquêtes" complains of having no French official account to resort to, and of his consequent inability to specify the loss which the Ville-de-Milan had sustained.

Sir Robert Laurie, in his official letter, rather incautiously stated, that the Ville-de-Milan had "been intended for a 74." This, as being contrary to the fact, very naturally gave umbrage to the French. The truth is, the Ville-de-Milan was a regular frigate, and, instead of being, as a contemporary states, "1200 tons,"† was even a trifle smaller than several French frigates which had previously been captured. The ship was afterwards purchased for the British navy, and classed, under the same name, or rather, under that of Milan, as a 38-gun frigate. It affords us pleasure to state, that the first captain appointed to her was Sir Robert Laurie himself; and that Lieutenant Balfour, late senior lieutenant of the Cleopatra, and already named among her wounded, received the promotion which he had so honourably earned.

On the 20th of March the 18-gun ship-sloop Renard, Captain Jeremiah Coghlan, being in latitude $21^{\circ} 14'$ north, longitude $71^{\circ} 30'$ west, discovered a ship to leeward, standing under easy sail to the north-west. The Renard immediately chased, and the stranger, which was the French privateer Général-Ernouf, Captain Lapointe, shortened sail to engage. At 2 h. 25 m. P. M., being on the weather-bow of the Général-Ernouf, the Renard received her fire; but the latter reserved hers until she had dropped within pistol-shot of her opponent. The Renard then opened her broadside with such effect, that in 35 minutes the Général-Ernouf was set on fire, and in 10 minutes more blew up with a tremendous explosion. Every exertion was now made by the British to save the lives of their late

* Précis des Evénemens, tome xi., p. 259.
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† Brenton, vol. iii., p. 509.

enemies, and the only boat that could swim was launched for the purpose. By this means 55 persons that were floating on the scattered remains of the wreck, the survivors of a crew of 160, were rescued from a watery grave.

The *Renard's* establishment of guns was 16 carronades, 18-pounders, with two long sixes, and a complement of 121 men and boys; none of whom are represented to have been hurt in the action. The *Général-Ernouf* had been the British sloop of war *Lily*, and was armed with 18 English 12-pounder carronades (four more than she mounted when captured by the *Dame-Ambert**), and two long 6-pounders. The fatal precision of the *Renard's* fire shows the high state of discipline of her crew; and the already-established gallantry of her command† needs no assurance, that, had the *Général-Ernouf* been even more formidably armed, her officers and crew would have found it a difficult task to avoid becoming the prize of the *Renard*. It has appeared somewhere in print, that the *Général-Ernouf*, on first coming alongside, hailed the *Renard*, in English, desiring her to strike, and that Captain Coghlan replied, he would strike, and d——d hard too. If the account be true, the captain amply fulfilled his promise.

On the 23d of March, as the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Stork*, Captain George Le Geyt, was cruising off the port of Cape Roxo in the island of Porto-Rico, a large armed schooner was discovered lashed alongside a brig in the harbour. For the purpose of cutting out this vessel Captain Le Geyt, in the evening, despatched the pinnace and cutter of the *Stork*, containing between them 18 men, under the command of Lieutenant George Robertson, assisted by Lieutenant James Murray.

As the schooner, which was the Dutch privateer *Antelope*, was preparing to heave down on the following day, her five guns were on board the brig, and the two vessels were defended by 40 out of her 54 in crew. Both the schooner and the brig were boarded simultaneously by the two boats, and gallantly carried, without any other casualty to the British than Lieutenant Murray and one seaman slightly wounded. The privateer's men having taken to the water soon after the boats got alongside, 15 prisoners were all that were secured.

On the 5th of April, as the British 22-gun ship *Bacchante*, Captain Charles Dashwood, was cruising off Havana, island of Cuba, information was received that there were three French privateers lying in the harbour of Mariel, a small convenient port situated a little to the westward, and defended by a round tower nearly 40 feet high, on the top of which were three long 24-pounders, and round its circumference numerous loop-holes for musketry. The daring and piratical conduct of these privateers, who plundered and maltreated Americans as well as

* See vol. iii., p. 271.

† See vol. ii., p. 44.

Englishmen navigating the gulf, determined Captain Dashwood, notwithstanding the strength of their position, to endeavour to cut them out. Accordingly, in the evening, he despatched on that service two boats, containing about 35 seamen and marines, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Oliver, assisted by Lieutenant John Campbell, with directions to attack and carry the fort previously to entering the harbour, so as to secure a safe retreat.

The boats pushed off, and, on nearing the tower, were discovered and fired at. Seeing that no time was to be lost, Lieutenant Oliver, without waiting for his companion, who was astern, pulled rapidly for the shore, in the face of a heavy fire, which badly wounded one man. Leaving in the boat a midshipman, the Honourable Almeida De Courcy, and three men, including the one wounded, Lieutenant Oliver, then, with 13 men, gallantly rushed to the foot of the tower, and, by means of a ladder which his men had brought, scaled, and without any further loss carried, the tower, although garrisoned by a Spanish captain and 30 soldiers; of whom two were killed and three wounded. Having performed this noble exploit, left a sergeant of marines and six men as a guard at the fort, and been joined by Lieutenant Campbell and his boat's crew, Lieutenant Oliver proceeded to execute the second branch of the duty assigned him. To the mortification, however, of both lieutenants, the three privateers had, the day previous, sailed on a cruise.

Not to quit the harbour empty-handed, Lieutenant Oliver took possession of two schooners laden with sugar; and which he gallantly brought away from alongside a wharf, in spite of several discharges of musketry from the troops and militia, that were pouring down in numbers from the surrounding country. The name of Thomas Oliver among the commanders of the year shows, that this officer's conduct, as all similar conduct ought, excited the notice of those to whom the power belonged of dispensing rewards to the brave and meritorious.

On the 8th of April, at 1 P. M., the British 12-gun schooner *Gracieuse*, midshipman John B. Smith, tender to the 74-gun ship *Hercule*, the flag-ship of Rear-admiral Dacres at Port-Royal, Jamaica, cruising off the city of Santo-Domingo, fell in with and captured a large Spanish schooner, bound from that port to Porto-Rico, with passengers. On the 9th, at 6 A. M., the *Gracieuse* chased and fired at a French sloop within gunshot of the forts of Santo-Domingo, but could not succeed in overtaking her.

At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. an armed schooner was seen coming out of Santo-Domingo, as if to attack the *Gracieuse*. The latter, accompanied by her prize, immediately hauled off shore, in order to have sea-room, should the schooner attempt to retreat. At 8 P. M. the *Gracieuse* shortened sail and hove to, with her prize, the Spanish schooner, under her lee quarter. At 8 h. 30 m. P. M.

the armed schooner, which, according to the report of the Spaniards late belonging to the prize, was a French national vessel, edged down within musket-shot, and opened upon the *Gracieuse* a very heavy fire of musketry and great guns. This the latter quickly returned, and a smart action ensued. At 9 P.M. the schooner bore down with an intention to board the *Gracieuse*; but, seeing the opposition she was likely to experience, hauled her wind and renewed the cannonade. At 9 h. 20 m. the attempt was repeated, but again failed. Upon this the schooner made all sail to escape, firing her stern-chasers and musketry. At 11 P.M. she tacked and stood in for the land; and, after receiving from the *Gracieuse* a heavy fire of grape, canister, and musketry until 3 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 10th, the schooner ran on shore upon Point Vizoa.

Finding it impossible to close with the schooner on account of a reef that intervened, the *Gracieuse* hove to about half a mile off. At 4 h. 30 m. A.M., observing the schooner afloat again, and sweeping alongshore, the *Gracieuse* filled and proceeded in chase, and finally compelled the schooner, at 8 h. 15 m. A.M., to run on shore upon Point de Selma. The *Gracieuse* stood in; and, having anchored with a spring in four fathoms, Mr. Smith sent a boat with a hawser, for the purpose of getting off the vessel, whose crew had by this time landed from her bowsprit. The attempt, however, was found impracticable, the schooner having already filled from the number of shot-holes in her hull. Her force was found to consist of one long brass 12-pounder, mounted on a circle amidships, two long brass 4-pounder carriage-guns, and four brass 3-pounder swivels, with a crew of 96 men. On the next day, the 11th, Mr. Smith, by means of his boats, brought away the long twelve, and set fire to and destroyed the vessel. The service, thus creditably performed, cost the *Gracieuse* no heavier loss than one midshipman (Robert Marley) and two seamen wounded.

On the 15th of April, while the 14-gun brig-sloop *Papillon*, Captain William Woolsey, was lying at an anchor in the harbour of Savana la Mar, island of Jamaica, intelligence was received that a Spanish felucca-rigged privateer was cruising off the west end of the island to the great annoyance of the coast. Being apprehensive that, if the *Papillon* stood out after her, the privateer would make her escape, Captain Woolsey borrowed a shallop from one of the merchant ships in the port, and disguising her as a drogger, despatched her with Lieutenant Peter Stephen Prieur and 25 men, including the purser, Mr. John Christie, who volunteered his services on the occasion, to endeavour to take the privateer by stratagem.

At 8 P.M. the drogger fell in with the privateer close under the land; and Lieutenant Prieur, with great coolness allowed her to run alongside and make herself fast. He then ordered his men from below, fired a volley of musketry, and boarded,

and in four minutes carried, the Spanish privateer *Concepcion*, of one brass 3-pounder and 25 men, well armed and equipped. In this ably conducted little enterprise the British sustained no greater loss than two men slightly wounded; but the Spaniards suffered severely, having had seven men killed and drowned, and eight badly wounded.

On the 6th of May, in the morning, Cape François in the island of St.-Domingo bearing south-west by south distant eight or nine leagues, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Unicorn*, Captain Lucius Hardyman, discovered a French armed cutter, distant seven or eight miles on her larboard bow. The prevailing calm rendering a chase by the ship impracticable, Captain Hardyman despatched four boats, under the command of Lieutenant Henry Smith Wilson, assisted by Lieutenant James Tait and Henry Bouchier, Midshipman Thomas Tudor Tucker (a passenger from the Northumberland), Lieutenant of Marines Walter Powell, and the purser Charles Rundle. After a pull of several hours, the boats reached the object of attack, and, in the face of a heavy fire of great guns and musketry, boarded and carried, without the slightest casualty, the French cutter privateer *Tape-à-bord*, of four long 6-pounders and 46 men, commanded by Citizen Hemigueth.

On the 4th of May the British 38-gun frigate *Seahorse*, Captain the Honourable Courtenay Boyle, while cruising off Cape de Gata, received intelligence, that a Spanish convoy, laden chiefly on government account with gunpowder, ordnance, and naval stores for the gun-boats at Malaga, Ceuta, and Algeziras, was upon the coast. Keeping close alongshore, the *Seahorse*, at 2 P. M., discovered the convoy from her mast-head, and at 5 P. M. observed the vessels haul into San-Pedro, an anchorage to the eastward of Cape de Gata, under the protection of a fort, two armed schooners, and three gun and mortar launches.

Covered by the fire of the *Seahorse*, her first lieutenant, George Downie, in the six-oared cutter, assisted by Midshipman Thomas Napper, in the four-oared boat, went in and gallantly boarded and brought out an ordnance-brig, laden with 1170 quintals of powder and various other stores, and commanded by Don Juan Terragut, a master in the Spanish navy. The *Seahorse*, in the mean time, had, as it was believed on board, sunk one of the gun-launches, and damaged, if not sunk, several of the convoy. Finding that the gun-boats, by their well-directed fire, were constantly striking her, having already had her main topgallantmast, and several braces and bowlines shot away, and one man killed, and wishing to get from the coast while the breeze and daylight lasted, the *Seahorse* discontinued the engagement and stood out to the offing.

On the 27th of May, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Seine*, Captain David Atkins, while cruising off Aguadilla,

island of Porto-Rico, despatched her barge, under the command of Lieutenant of marines Thomas Bland, in pursuit of an armed schooner; which, after some resistance, but no loss on either side, was captured, and proved to be the Concepcion, mounting two long 6-pounders, with a crew of 10 men, besides several passengers, who escaped in a small boat. About three weeks afterwards the same enterprising officer, assisted by Midshipman Edward Cook, being on a cruise in the barge and away from the ship, destroyed a Spanish sloop, and captured, after an action of three quarters of an hour, a second Concepcion, a large felucca, bound from Porto-Rico to Cadiz with a cargo of cocoa and cochineal, and armed with two long 4-pounders and 14 men; of whom five were severely wounded. No loss whatever was sustained by the barge.

On the 1st of June the British 38-gun frigate Loire, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, being off the coast of Spain, discovered and chased a small privateer, standing into the bay of Camarinas, situated to the eastward of Cape Finisterre. The weather becoming quite calm after dark, Captain Maitland despatched the launch and two cutters, with 35 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant James Lucas Yeo, assisted by Lieutenant of marines Samuel Mallock, master's mate Charles Clinch, and midshipmen, Massey Hutchinson, Herbert and Matthew Mildridge, to endeavour to bring the vessel out. Owing to the intricacy of the passage, the boats did not reach the point of attack until break of day on the 2d; when, instead of one, they found two privateers, and these moored under a battery of 10 guns. Ordering the launch, commanded by Mr. Clinch, to board the smaller vessel, Lieutenant Yeo, with the two cutters, gallantly attacked and carried, without loss, the other; which was the Spanish felucca Esperanza, alias San-Pedro, armed with three long 18-pounders, four 4-pounder brass swivels, and 50 men. Of her complement, when mustered, 19 were found missing, including several that had been killed by the pike and sabre, the only weapons, to prevent discovery on the part of the battery, used by the British. The launch attacked her opponent, a lugger of two 6-pounders and 32 men, with equal success and freedom from loss.

The weather being still perfectly calm, the two prizes close under the guns of the battery, which, since the moment of their capture, had opened an ill-directed fire upon the British, and the distance from the ship precluding all chance of assistance, Lieutenant Yeo was obliged to abandon the small vessel to secure the other. This he at length effected, with the loss of only three men slightly wounded. In his way out with the felucca, Lieutenant Yeo took possession of three small merchant vessels, laden with wine for the combined squadron at Ferrol.

Receiving information, from some of the Spanish prisoners probably, that a French privateer of 26 guns was fitting out at

Muros, and nearly ready for sea, and being acquainted, by having formerly entered it on service, with the navigation of the bay, Captain Maitland resolved to attempt the capture or destruction of the vessel. Accordingly, on the 4th, at 9 A. M., having prepared the Loire for anchoring with springs and settled the plan of attack, Captain Maitland stood into the bay, with the sea breeze, having in tow the boats, containing 50 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant Yeo, assisted by Lieutenants of marines Samuel Mallock and Joseph Douglas, and master's mate Charles Clinch.

As the Loire hauled round the point of Muros road, a small battery of two long 18-pounders opened a fire upon her. A few shot were returned; but, perceiving that the battery, from its commanding situation, would considerably annoy the ship, Captain Maitland directed Lieutenant Yeo to push for the shore and spike the guns. That active officer, with his men, quickly departed, and the Loire stood on. As she opened the bay, the frigate discovered at anchor within it a long corvette, pierced with 13 ports of a side, apparently ready for sea, and a brig pierced with 10, in a state of fitting; but, as neither of them fired, they were considered to be, and were, in fact, without their guns. This circumstance enabled the Loire to bestow the whole of her attention upon a fort of 12 long 18-pounders, which now opened to view within less than a quarter of a mile of her, and which immediately commenced a well-directed fire at the frigate, almost every shot striking her hull. Perceiving that, by standing further on, more guns would be brought to bear upon her, and that the Loire would still be at too great a distance to fire her guns with any effect, Captain Maitland ordered the helm to be put down; and, as soon as she had run a little closer in, the frigate anchored with a spring, and opened her broadside. So completely, however, were the Spaniards in the fort covered by their embrasures, that the frigate's fire, although well directed, was comparatively ineffectual. After a few minutes of this unequal warfare, during which the Loire had nine of her seamen wounded, three of them dangerously (one having his leg above the knee, and another the calf of his leg, shot off), the fire from the fort ceased; and, as a reason for it, the British union was just then making its appearance above the walls.

We will now quit the frigate awhile, and attend to the party on shore. Lieutenant Yeo, whom we left proceeding to storm the battery on the point, landed under it; but, as he and his men advanced to execute the service, the Spaniards in the battery, amounting to 18, including eight artillerymen, abandoned their guns and fled. Scarcely had the British seamen time to spike the two 18-pounders, when, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile, and close to the entrance of the town of Muros, was descried the fort, whose destructive cannonade upon the frigate has already been related, and which had just then

commenced its fire. Notwithstanding that it was a regular ditched fort, and appeared a very strong one, relying upon the bravery of his followers, and, in a case of such imminent danger to the ship, readily incurring the responsibility of exceeding his orders, Lieutenant Yeo resolved to attempt its immediate reduction.

Not suspecting an attack by land, and being wholly occupied in firing at the frigate, the garrison had left open the outer gate of the fort. Through this a French sentinel, having fired his musket, retreated, and was quickly followed by the van of the storming party. At the inner gate the garrison, headed by the governor, stood ready to oppose the British; but Lieutenant Yeo, setting a noble example to his men, sprang forward, and, attacking the governor sword in hand, laid him dead at his feet, breaking his own sabre by the force of the blow. The contest now became most severe; the greater part of the officers, who had advanced with the governor, shortly experiencing a similar fate from such of the British, as the narrowness of the entrance had permitted to be at hand to second their gallant leader. The boldness and vigour of the assault was irresistible, and the remainder of the garrison, although numbering, at that time, 90 or 100 effective men, fled to the farther end of the fort; from the embrasures of which many of them leaped upon the rocks, a height of about 25 feet. Shortly after this, the survivors within the fort laid down their arms, and the British colours were hoisted on the flagstaff.

Considering the force opposed to them, which, at the beginning of the attack, consisted of 22 Spanish soldiers, several Spanish gentlemen and townsmen, volunteers, and about 100 of the crew of the French privateer *Confiance*, at anchor in the harbour, the British were fortunate in escaping with only six slightly wounded; Lieutenant Yeo, Mr. Clinch the master's mate, three seamen, and one marine. The loss on the part of the garrison was extremely severe: the governor of the fort, a Spanish gentleman who had volunteered, the second captain of the *Confiance*, and nine others were killed; and 30, including nearly all the officers of the privateer, were wounded.

The character of this achievement, as it here has been detailed, is too obvious to need elucidation by any remarks that can be offered. Yet we cannot quit the subject without showing, to what an extent the brave man's attributes, modesty and humanity, were possessed by the officer who had so distinguished himself on the occasion. Not a word is to be found in Lieutenant Yeo's letter, respecting the personal conflict between himself and the Spanish governor. It is Captain Maitland who discloses the fact, and who states that he derived it from the testimony of the prisoners, and of those who accompanied his first lieutenant to the attack. As a proof that the tenderest sympathy may exist in the boldest heart, we here quote the concluding words of

Lieutenant Yeo's letter to Captain Maitland: "To their credit as Englishmen, as well as (to the credit of) their profession, the instant the fort was in our possession, they (the seamen and marines) seemed to try who could be the first to relieve and assist the poor wounded prisoners, who were lying in numbers in different parts of the fort; and I had the pleasure to see their humanity amply repaid by the gratitude the unfortunate men's friends expressed when they came to take them away."

The twelve 18-pounders being spiked and thrown over the parapet, the carriages broken, and the embrasures, with a part of the fort, blown up, the British, taking with them 40 barrels of powder, two small brass cannon, and 50 stands of arms, retired from the scene of their exploits to their boats on the beach, and soon pulled back to the Loire. Captain Maitland, meanwhile, had, by an officer and boat's crew, taken quiet possession of the two unarmed French privateers, also of a Spanish merchant brig in ballast. The *Confiance* was a ship of 490 tons, and had carried 24 guns on a flush deck; probably long 6-pounders, or 18-pounder carronades;* her ports being too close together and too small for any higher caliber of long gun or carronade. The brig was the *Bélier*, the same probably that, in the spring of 1803, carried out despatches to Rear-admiral Linois in the *East Indies*.† Her guns, stated to be 18-pounder carronades, were also on shore; and the vessel herself was quite in an unprepared state, having only her lower rigging overhead.

As soon as possession had been taken of these vessels, Captain Maitland sent a flag of truce to the town, with a message to the effect that; if the inhabitants would deliver up such stores of the ship as were on shore, they should receive no further molestation. This proposal was readily agreed to; and the British brought off all the stores of the *Confiance*, except her guns; which, as the embarkation of them would have occupied some time, and a large body of troops was in the vicinity, were left behind. A great many small merchant vessels were afloat in the bay and hauled up on the beach; but, having a just sense of the inhumanity of depriving the poorer inhabitants of the means of gaining a livelihood, and knowing that the cargoes of such vessels as had any would be worth little or nothing to the captors (of which others, besides himself and his ship's company, formed a part), Captain Maitland left them untouched. As if to give the finish to an exploit so gallantly begun, and so handsomely concluded, the bishop and one of the principal inhabitants of Muros came off to the Loire, to express their gratitude for the orderly behaviour of the British seamen and marines, who had not, they acknowledged, committed one act of pillage, and to offer

* The guns are called by Captain Maitland twelves and nines; but he evidently had not seen them, nor is it clear that those had who made the report.

† See vol. iii., p. 211.

to Captain Maitland and his officers every refreshment which the place afforded.

Immediately on arriving home, Lieutenant Yeo received his well-earned reward in the commission of commander, and sailed upon his first cruise in the ship which he had been so instrumental in capturing. On the 21st of December, 1807, Captain Yeo was promoted to post-rank, but retained the command of the *Confiance*, by her captain's elevation, now raised in rank from a sloop to a post-ship. It is singular that, although no increase was or could be made in her armament (22 carronades, 18-pounders, and two sixes), the *Confiance* had her complement increased from 121 to 140 men and boys.

On the 13th of June, in latitude 29° north, longitude 62° west, the British 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Cambrian*, Captain John Poer Beresford, despatched her boats under the command of Lieutenant Robert Pigot, to attack the Spanish privateer schooner *Maria*, of 14 guns and 60 men. Lieutenant Pigot, with the launch as the leading boat, gallantly boarded the privateer; and, assisted by Lieutenant the Honourable George Alfred Crofton in the barge, gallantly carried the vessel in spite of a stout resistance. Just as this had been accomplished the other boats succeeded in getting up. The loss sustained by the British, in this very spirited enterprise, amounted to two seamen killed and two wounded.

On the 3d of July, after a chase of 22 hours, the *Cambrian* overtook and captured the French privateer schooner *Matilda*, of, according to Captain Beresford's public letter, "20 guns, 9-pounders;" but, taking this to be a typographical error (no unfrequent case in the *London Gazette*, as we have already shown), we shall say, of 10 long 8-pounders, and 95 men. The schooner surrendered in very shoal water; and, but for the exertions of Lieutenant Pigot with one of the boats, every soul in the privateer would in all probability have been lost.

Having placed Lieutenant Pigot and a party of officers and men on board the prize, Captain Beresford despatched her to St.-Mary's river, forming the southern boundary of the United States of America, in search of a Spanish schooner privateer and two captured merchant ships. On the 6th, Lieutenant Pigot arrived off the harbour of St.-Mary's, and on the 7th proceeded 12 miles up the river, through a continual fire from the militia and riflemen stationed on the bank. On arriving within gunshot of the three vessels, he found them lashed in a line across the river; the privateer being armed with six guns and 70 men, the ship, which was the *Golden-Grove*, late of London, with eight 6-pounders, six swivels, and 50 men, and the brig, which was the *Ceres*, late of London, with swivels and small-arms. The *Matilda* immediately opened her fire, and continued it for an hour until she grounded. Lieutenant Pigot then took to his boats; and, in spite of an obstinate resistance, carried the ship.

With her guns he obliged the enemy to quit the brig and schooner; and, after taking possession of them, he turned the fire of all three vessels upon the militia, about 100 in number, drawn up on the bank with a field-piece. These he at length completely routed; but, owing to adverse winds, was not, until the 21st, able to descend the river with his prizes and rejoin the Cambrian.

The loss sustained by the British in this very gallant affair amounted to two men killed and 14 wounded, including among the latter, Lieutenant Pigot himself, by musket-balls in three places, two in the head and one in the leg. That brave and enterprising officer would not quit the deck, except to have his wounds dressed, during the whole time this arduous service was performing. The 14 wounded also included master's mate William Lawson (severely) and Midshipman Andrew Mitchell. Three other midshipmen, Messieurs Thomas Saville Griffinhoofe, Henry Bolman, and George Williamson, are spoken of, in similar terms of approbation, by Captain Beresford in his despatch. The loss on the Spanish side is represented to have amounted to 25 seamen killed, including five Americans, and 22 seamen wounded. For the gallantry, perseverance, and ability he had displayed, Lieutenant Pigot was justly promoted to the rank of commander.

In the early part of July the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Zachary Mudge, quitted the squadron of Commodore Michael de Courcy cruising off the east end of Jamaica, bound to the island of Barbadoes, with despatches for Vice-admiral Lord Nelson. On the 17th, when about 40 leagues to the westward of the island of Sombbrero, the *Blanche* spoke a British merchant ship from Grenada to Dublin, and learnt that the homeward-bound Leeward-island fleet were to sail in three or four days after her departure, under convoy of the 20-gun ship *Proselyte*.

On the 19th, at 8 A. M., latitude 20° 20' north, and longitude 66° 44' west, being close hauled on the larboard tack, with a fresh breeze at east, the *Blanche* discovered off the weather cat-head four sail, three ships and a brig, standing on the opposite tack, under easy sail; and which, from the course they steered, and their indistinct appearance through the prevailing haze, were taken for a part of the above-mentioned convoy. The *Blanche* therefore continued to stand on, until, having hoisted the customary signals without effect, Captain Mudge began to suspect that the strangers were enemies, and, making sail, kept more away. At 8 h. 30 m. A. M., when about three miles distant, the French 40-gun frigate *Topaze*, Captain François-André Baudin, followed by the ship-corvettes, *Département-des-Landes*, of 20 long 8-pounders on the main deck, and two brass 6-pounders on the poop, or short quarterdeck, Lieutenant René-Jacques-Henri Desmontils, and *Torche*, of 18 long 12-pounders,

Lieutenant Nicolas-Philippe Dehen, and by the brig-corvette *Faune*, of 16 long 6-pounders, Lieutenant Charles Brunet,* bore down, under English colours.† But," says Captain Mudge in his public letter, "from the make of the union and colour of the bunting, with other circumstances, I concluded they were French."

At 9 h. 45 m. A. M.,‡ having advanced still more ahead of her companions, and, as well as they, substituted French for English colours, the *Topaze* discharged her larboard broadside into the starboard quarter of the *Blanche*; who, finding that she could not escape from her pursuers (having at the time very little copper upon her bottom), had shortened sail, and was at the distance of about 500 yards from the *Topaze*. As soon as the latter arrived within pistol-shot, the *Blanche* returned the fire, and the action continued with spirit; all the vessels running large under easy sail, "the ships," continues Captain Mudge, "never without hail of each other, the *Département-des-Landes* on the starboard quarter, and the two corvettes close astern." At about 10 h. 15 m. A. M. the *Blanche* attempted to cross the bows of the *Topaze*, and would probably have succeeded, had not the latter suddenly hauled up her foresail, and put her helm hard a-starboard. By this manœuvre the *Topaze* grazed with her jib-boom the mizen shrouds of the *Blanche*, and, in passing under the latter's stern, poured in a heavy, but comparatively harmless, raking fire. The engagement continued until about 11 A. M.;§ when, having her sails totally destroyed, 10 shot in the foremast, several in the mainmast, her rigging cut to pieces, seven of her guns dismounted, and six feet water in the hold, the *Blanche* struck her colours. At this moment, according to M. Baudin's account, the *Département-des-Landes* was in the wake of the *Blanche*, the *Torche* within gun-shot on her starboard side, and the *Faune* farther off, "en observation."

The net complement of the *Blanche* was 261 men and boys; but, having 28 men absent, and being deficient of some others, she commenced the action with only 215. Of these the *Blanche* had seven seamen and one marine killed, her boatswain (William Hewett), 12 seamen (three mortally), and one lieutenant (Thomas

* Captain Mudge names this officer as commanding the *Torche*.

† The British official account makes the bearing down take place "at ten." This must be another mistake; for, if the French ships were on the *Blanche*'s "weather cat-head at eight, on the opposite tack" to her, it could scarcely have taken them even as much as half an hour to get "abreast:" whereas, at the end of two hours, namely, till 10 A. M., the two parties, each steering an opposite course, would have been many miles apart. This mistake is important, as it leads to several others in the minutes of the action that ensued.

‡ Here again occurs a variation, but it will be best explained when we come to the close of the action.

§ At noon, according to Captain Mudge's letter; but, as respects the duration of the action, the only important point, the British and the French accounts exactly correspond. See ‡ the preceding Note.

Peebles), and one private of marines wounded. The *Topaze* had a crew of 340 men and boys, exclusively, Captain Mudge says, of 70 officers and privates of the French army as passengers, making a total of 410. Of these, according to Captain Baudin's account, (and there is nothing in the British account to contradict the statement), the *Topaze* had but one man killed and 11 wounded, two of them mortally. Not a man appears to have been hurt, nor the slightest damage to have happened, on board either of the three remaining French vessels.

The French captain also states, that the *Département-des-Landes* fired only 18 shot, and the *Torche*, towards the close of the action, three broadsides. The *Faune*, upon the same authority, did not fire a shot. Moreover, Captain Baudin positively declares, that Captain Mudge acknowledged to him, that the *Département-des-Landes* was the only vessel, except the *Topaze*, which had done the *Blanche* any injury, and that that injury was confined to the rigging and sails.

The *Blanche*, a fine frigate of 951 tons, was armed upon her quarterdeck and forecastle with 14 carronades, 32-pounders, and four long nines; making her total of guns 44. The *Topaze*, a remarkably fine frigate of 1132 tons, also mounted 44 guns, including 10 iron carronades, 36-pounders, the first of the kind we have observed in the French navy. The force of the three corvettes has already been given.

Without the aid of a comparative statement, sufficient appears to show, that the *Blanche* had, although not a "three to one,"* a very superior force to contend with; and that no resistance in her power to offer, without some extraordinary mishap to her principal antagonist, could have absolutely reversed the issue of the battle. By a more close and animated carronade at the onset, the *Blanche* might, perhaps, have beaten off the French frigate. In that event, the British frigate, if necessary, could have outrun the corvettes, they, as admitted, being slow sailers; or she might have drawn them apart from their consort, and have captured one at least of them. This, if done promptly, and before much damage had been suffered by the *Blanche* or her prize, would have greatly reduced the odds, and been an additional motive for Captain Baudin to have permitted the *Blanche* to proceed to her destination.

The moderate loss sustained by the *Blanche* would lead us to infer that she struck too soon; as would the much slighter loss inflicted by her upon the *Topaze*, that the *Blanche* did not employ her force in a manner becoming a British frigate of her class. M. Baudin states, from the information probably of Captain Mudge himself, that he put more than 30 shot in the *Blanche*, both above and below water; but what was that to perform in a two hours' engagement? He boasts, with greater

* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 515.

reason, of having wounded the masts, and cut to pieces the rigging and sails, of his prize, and assigns the delay it would cause to repair them as his motive for setting the *Blanche* on fire. And we feel the more disposed to attach credit to the statements of M. Baudin, on account of the uncommon accuracy with which he describes the force of his prize, giving her "vingt-seize canons de 18 en batterie, quatorze carronades de 32 et quatre canons de 9 sur les gaillards."

Although scarcely five years' old and an oak-built ship, the *Blanche* had become so thoroughly infected with the dry rot, that the enemy's shot passed clean through her side, scattering dust instead of splinters. To this, and to her short-manned state, has been mainly attributed the smallness of the *Blanche's* loss, in reference to the time the ship was engaged, the force opposed to her, and the alleged closeness of the action.* As respects the British frigate, this reasoning may carry weight; but how are we to explain the truly insignificant loss sustained by the French frigate; as well as the entire state of impunity which, notwithstanding their alleged important share in the action, attended the three corvettes? The *Topaze*, as the British records prove, was a sound ship four years after she had captured the *Blanche*, and went into action, Captain Mudge himself informs us, with a crew nearly twice as numerous as his own.

Admitting, as Captain Mudge alleges, that the *Blanche* did really engage the *Topaze* closely, what was she about with her guns not to do more execution than to kill or wound one man every 10 minutes, or 12 men in two hours? This is the more unaccountable, because the crew of the *Blanche* were a remarkably fine set of men, and the very last from whom such treatment of an enemy was to be expected. If, contrary to what has been officially asserted, the *Blanche*, having mistaken the national character of the *Topaze* and her consorts until the French frigate had begun to open her fire, had been all in confusion when the attack commenced; if, instead of endeavouring to retrieve her error by a prompt and vigorous application of her means of defence, the *Blanche* had sought to avoid a combat by a hurried resort to her means of escape, firing an occasional ill-directed shot at one or the other of her opponents: if, we say, all this had been the case, the very cheap rate at which M. Baudin gained his prize would need no other explanation.

The duty of an historian, who, in most cases, has to elicit truth from conflicting statements, has often obliged us to animadvert, with more or less of severity, upon the bombastical accounts published by the French. In common fairness, therefore, we cannot avoid noticing the three letters, one official and

* The same cause, although we omitted to notice it, contributed to the slight loss sustained by the *Wilhelmina* in her action with the *Psyché*. See vol. iii., p. 265.

two private, written by the captain of the *Blanche*, and published in all the English, and some of the foreign newspapers. Two of those letters, including the official one, are dated on one day, the 22d of July. One of the two private accounts is in the form of an extract from the *Blanche's* log, thus: "July 19th, at 8 A. M., fell in with a squadron of French ships cruising; at eleven in close action with the same; at half past eleven reduced to a perfect wreck, ship filling fast; at twelve struck the colours, and at six she sank."

The official letter requiring to be more circumstantial and precise, the "French squadron as per margin" is made to consist, with a slight overrating in the force, of the three ships and brig described in our account of the action. "I concluded they were French," says the captain, "and therefore determined to sell the ship as dearly as possible." As a proof that he did so, he declares that a quarter of an hour (not half, as stated in the above private account) before the *Blanche* struck, she was "a perfect wreck;" meaning, not, as might be imagined, that her masts were all shot away, but that her sails were "totally destroyed," and that she had "ten shot in the foremast (expecting it to fall every minute), the mainmast and rigging cut to pieces." The inference here is, making every allowance for figurative language, that the mainmast, being "cut to pieces," was actually in a tottering state. Unfortunately, however, the surgeon of the *Blanche*, in his letter, published on the same day as his captain's, sums up the damages to her masts thus: "Eleven shot received in our foremast, several in the mainmast, and the spanker-boom shot away."

"The crew reduced to 190," proceeds Captain Mudge in his letter, "and the rest falling fast, with no probability of escape, I called a council of officers for their opinion," &c. He then states the surrender of the *Blanche* "at twelve at noon," and that he was immediately "hurried on board the commodore." "At six," he adds, "the officers who had charge of the *Blanche* returned, and reported the ship to be sinking fast; on which she was fired, and in about an hour after she sunk,* for the magazine had been some time under water." In a postscript the captain states, that the ship commenced action with 215 men, and that the loss, as far as came within his notice, amounted to eight killed and 13 wounded. The surgeon, in his letter, states the loss (and he was the officer whose duty it was to report it) at eight killed and 15 wounded, making a total of 23. This number, deducted from 215, leaves 192 men; and yet "the crew was reduced to 190, and they were falling fast."

Captain Mudge's second private letter, according to the public papers, was addressed to his brother-in-law, and bears date on board the *Topaze*, August 10. "On my return from Jamaica

* "At six she sank." See the private account above.

to Barbadoes," he says, "I fell in with M. Baudin's squadron, cruising for our homeward-bound convoy. I fought the ship till she was cut to pieces, and then sunk. I cannot say what our loss is, as there have been no returns, the crew being all divided between the two frigates and two corvettes which engaged us. Twenty-one fell nobly within my own knowledge; I am afraid many more. I thank God the *Blanche* never wore French colours.* Lieutenant Thomas Peebles, of the marines, was the only officer materially wounded: his legs were broken by a splinter. During the severe contest, the squadron was never without hail. I have the consolation of knowing they were so much damaged as to spoil their cruise; they all stood to the northward as soon as repaired, leaving the passage open to the convoy under a 20-gun ship."†

After what has appeared, this letter will require very few comments. We may, however, just notice the extensive application given to the word "fell," as well as the singular circumstance, that Captain Mudge should have had "no returns" of loss, when the late *Blanche's* surgeon was a fellow-prisoner with him on board the *Topaze*; and when, three days previous to the date of the captain's letter to Major Fletcher, the surgeon had enumerated that loss in a letter to a friend.

One of Captain Mudge's "two frigates," by his own account, mounted 22 guns. Nor was the *Département-des-Landes* so large, or so well armed a ship as the *Constance*, which, in the year 1800, gave Captain Mudge his post-rank; and which, had he fought a battle in her, he would have been very indignant to have heard called a "frigate." M. Baudin was not "on a cruise," but bound straight from Martinique to France, and, besides being in the direct track to Europe, had made an excellent three days' run. The convoy, which did not sail from Tortola until 12 days after the *Blanche's* capture, was therefore not the French captain's object; nor was the *Proselyte* its only protection, the *Illustrious 74* and *Barbadoes* frigate being in her company.

We will conclude this case with stating, that, although she was "filling fast," at "half past eleven," the *Blanche* did not sink till late in the evening; and not then, the wet state of her magazine preventing an explosion, until she had been burnt to the water's edge by her captors; nor until they had removed every man of her crew, wounded and well, and, no doubt, as many of her stores as they required. Nor, even at this time, had one of her masts fallen. The surgeon says, that the *Blanche*, when she struck, had six feet water in the hold; which accords tolerably well with Captain Baudin's expression, "*Déjà de l'eau*

* Nearly the same words occur in the official letter: "Thank God, she was not destined to bear French colours, or to assist the fleet of the enemy."

† See *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xiv., p. 186.

était dans sa calle," and accounts for his preferring her immediate and certain destruction by fire, to awaiting her tardy, and perhaps, in his opinion, doubtful destruction by sinking. In a respectable French account, M. Baudin is blamed for having destroyed the *Blanche*, when, according to the information afforded to the writer, he might so easily have manned and refitted her.*

Now that we have taken the trouble to sift the chaff from the grain, we confess our inability to discover any thing calculated to distinguish this case of defence and surrender from others that have occurred ; not, at least, on the score of superior merit. Captain Mudge defended his ship until he thought it useless to waste more blood ; for we are called upon fairly to state, that, after the first half-hour's action, escape was almost impossible, without some very unlikely accident should have happened to his determined opponent.

After having effectually disposed of his prize, Captain Baudin, with his little squadron, made the best of his way home. On the 14th of August, in the evening, when in the latitude of Rochefort, and about 200 leagues from it, the British 20-gun ship *Camilla*, Captain Bridges Watkinson Taylor, discovered and pursued the *Faune*, who had rather separated from her companions. On the 15th, at daylight, the 74-gun ship *Goliath*, Captain Robert Barton, joined in the chase, and at 8 A. M. the *Faune*, with, not, as Captain Mudge had stated, 123, but with 98 men on board (exclusive of 22 late of the *Blanche*), was captured. While the *Camilla* and the prize steered for England, the *Goliath* continued her course to the southward ; and, in the same afternoon, just as the latter was joined by the 64-gun ship *Raisable*, Captain Josias Rowley, the *Topaze* and the two ship-corvettes were discovered and chased. The corvettes, by signal, separated from the frigate: one, the *Département-des-Landes*, effected her escape ; but the other, the *Torche*, at about 8 P. M., was captured by the *Goliath*, and had on board, not "213,"† but 196, of her own, and 52 of the late *Blanche*'s men.

On the 16th, at daybreak, the *Raisable* and *Topaze* found themselves singly in each other's sight ; the latter about three miles ahead of the former, and both ships steering to the southward, under all sail, with a fresh northerly wind. At 9 A. M., when the wind, having begun to fall, was favouring the weathermost ship, and gradually approximating the two, the *Topaze* hoisted her colours, and opened from her stern-chasers a steady and well-directed fire of round and grape, evidently for the purpose of crippling the *Raisable*. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M., by which time her fore topsail had been completely riddled, and

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 150.

† Official letter of Captain Mudge.

her lower studdingsail balliards shot away, the *Raisable* hoisted her colours, and commenced firing her bow-guns at the frigate, then nearly becalmed. In another 10 minutes, and just as she was bringing her broadside to bear, the *Raisable* became also becalmed. Shortly afterwards, on a light breeze springing up from the westward, the *Topaze* wore round, and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. The *Raisable* succeeded after a while in doing the same; but the frigate, having first got the wind and being on her favourite point, left the former fast, wounding the 64's rigging with her stern-guns, and sending a shot through her main yard. The *Raisable* continued the chase, but after it became dark saw no more of the *Topaze*; who, with the loss of three men wounded from her opponent's fire, steered for Lisbon, and on the 20th anchored in safety in the Tagus.

Shortly after the arrival of the *Topaze* at Lisbon, the British consul, Mr. Gambier, applied for and obtained the release of Captain Mudge and such of the late *Blanche*'s officers and crew as had been transferred to the French frigate. During the stay of Captain Mudge in the Portuguese capital, the French official account, copied from the *Moniteur* of the 12th of September, appeared in the Lisbon papers. In that account M. Baudin not only represented the capture of the *Blanche* as having been effected by the *Topaze*, without any material assistance from either of her consorts; but, judging from the impunity with which his ship and her crew had escaped, insisted that, had the *Topaze* been alone, the same result would have ensued.

On the 14th of October, which was soon after their return to England, Captain Mudge, and the late officers and crew of the *Blanche*, were tried by a court-martial, at Plymouth, for the loss of their ship, and most honourably acquitted. The following has appeared in print, as the speech of Captain John Sutton, the president of that court, on returning Captain Mudge his sword: "I feel the greatest satisfaction and pleasure in the discharge of this part of my duty, having to convey to you the just sentiments which the members of this court entertain of your very able and gallant conduct in the defence made by you of his majesty's late ship *Blanche*, against a very superior force of the enemy's ships; and likewise of the spirited support afforded you by the officers of every description, as well as the seamen and royal marines, under your command, in the discharge of their duty; and which reflects upon you and them, on that occasion, the highest degree of merit and approbation."*

Without meaning to say a word in disparagement of courts-martial in general, we may observe, that an investigation of the causes which have led to the capture of one ship by another ship, or by a squadron of ships, can never be satisfactorily carried on, while the parties to be tried are the only witnesses to be examined.

* See Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv., p. 341.

Where one ship of a fleet misconducts, or is supposed to misconduct herself in action, a host of disinterested witnesses may be obtained from among the ships in company. But, where a ship, cruising alone, is engaged by, and surrenders to, an enemy's ship or ships, that advantage is lost; and, as the smallest boy on board feels himself implicated in the sentence which a court-martial has to pronounce upon the officers and crew, the evil follows of which we have just complained. It is this ex-parte mode of proceeding that has occasioned us, in frequent instances, to blame captors for not doing justice, in their official statements, to the exertions of an unsuccessful antagonist; in order that the public at large, as well as the small conclave assembled to try the crew of the captured ship, may see the grounds upon which a defence, like that of the *Blanche*, is declared to have displayed "very able and gallant conduct" on the part of her commander.*

On the 3d of August the British 54-gun ship *Calcutta*, Captain Daniel Woodriff, sailed from the island of St.-Helena, with the *Indus* Indiaman, three whalers, and two other ships, under her protection, bound to Europe. On the 14th of September she fell in with the British merchant ship *Brothers*, of London, which had separated in a gale of wind, along with many other ships, from a fleet of 200 sail, in charge of the 74-gun ship *Illustrious*, from the Leeward islands.† Being very leaky and short of provisions, the *Brothers* requested and obtained the protection of the *Calcutta*, but was so ill-found, and sailed so heavily, that she detained the convoy at least one-third of its hitherto daily run.

On the 25th of September, at noon, being in latitude 49° 30' north, and longitude about 9° west, the *Calcutta* discovered several ships in the west-north-west. It was then nearly calm, but a light breeze from the westward enabled the strangers to approach fast. Night came on; and the *Calcutta*, doubtful yet whether her pursuers were friends or foes, kept between them and her charge. At daylight on the 26th the strangers neared the *Calcutta* considerably; all owing to the slow progress of the *Brothers*. At 11 A.M. the *Calcutta* made the private signal, and, having by noon received no answer to it, hailed the *Indus*, and directed her to make all possible sail ahead with the convoy. The *Calcutta* then dropped astern to speak the *Brothers*; and

* There cannot be any blame imputed to Captain Mudge for the surrender of his ship; she was fought until she had six feet water in her hold, and all seamen know, that in such a state, a ship is little calculated to escape. The force opposed to her was certainly more than double; and a court-martial having acquitted Captain Mudge, the public may rest satisfied, that the different captains who formed the court, delivered their opinions conscientiously, that the *Blanche* was bravely defended, and only surrendered when it was hopeless to continue the contest. The discrepancies in the letters referred to are hardly worth notice.—*Ed.*

† See p. 144.

Captain Woodriff strongly recommended the master of her to haul upon a wind to the northward, which the latter immediately did.

The Rochefort squadron, which had sailed out under Rear-admiral Burgues-Missiessy on the 11th of January, returned to port on the 20th of May. For some reason, not unconnected, perhaps, with the proceedings of that squadron at the island of Dominique, and which we shall by and by have to relate, the French emperor dispossessed M. Missiessy of his command, and appointed M. Allemand, late of the *Magnanime* and the senior captain of the squadron, in his stead. As soon as the ships had refitted, M. Allemand received directions to take the earliest opportunity of putting to sea. He was first to proceed off the Lizard; there to wait awhile for Vice-admiral Ganteaume: if the Brest fleet did not make its appearance, the rear-admiral was to steer for the bay of Biscay, and endeavour to join the combined fleet on its return from the Antilles: if foiled here also, M. Allemand was to proceed straight to Vigo, to await his further instructions. On the 12th of July, as has already been stated, Rear-admiral Stirling, with his squadron of five sail of the line, by orders from Admiral Lord Gardner, raised the blockade of the road of Aix;* and on the 16th M. Allemand weighed and put to sea, with his squadron, consisting of the

Gun-ship

120	Majestueux†	...	{	Rear-adm. Zach.-J.-Théodore Allemand.
			{	Captain Etienne-Joseph Willaumez.
	{	Magnanime	"	Pierre-François Violette.
74	{	Jemmappes	"	Jean-Nicolas Petit.
	{	Suffren	"	Amable-Gilles Troude.
	{	Lion	"	Eléonore-Jean-Nicolas Soleil.

Frigates, *Armide*, *Gloire*, and *Thétis*.

Brig-corvettes, *Sylphe* and *Palinure*.

On the next day, the 17th, the squadron captured the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Ranger*, Captain Charles Coote;‡ but the crew, on seeing that their fate was inevitable, had so damaged the ship, that M. Allemand was obliged to set her on fire. While waiting at his first point of rendezvous, with the additional object in view of intercepting the *Illustrious* and her convoy, of whose expected arrival two or three captured stragglers had already apprized him, the French commodore fell in with the

* See p. 1.

† In the English translations of the old French navy-lists this ship rates as a 110. Either there was a mistake in this, or the ship had since been lengthened; for, to a certainty, the force of the *Majestueux* in 1805 was precisely that of the 120-gun ship in the small table at p. 54 of the first volume, except that four of her 8-pounders had been withdrawn from the cabin and two brass carronades added to the four on the poop, making her guns in all 122.

‡ The French say, "of 24 guns," and that, in reality, was the number, including carronades, which the *Ranger* mounted.

Calcutta and her convoy; and to what extent he succeeded there we will now proceed to show.

Having taken the steps already noticed for the security of her convoy, the *Calcutta* made sail to intercept a French frigate, the *Armide*, of 40 guns, which lay upon her starboard bow, and was drawing up fast with the merchantmen. At 3 P. M., having passed ahead clear of the *Calcutta*'s broadside, the *Armide* began firing her stern-chasers, and received, in return, the bow-guns of the British ship. After a while, however, the French frigate shortened sail and allowed the British 50 to get abreast of her; when both ships opened their fire, but without any material effect, owing to the distance preserved by the *Armide*, and to the *Calcutta*'s leading off to the southward, to favour the escape of her convoy, then in the east-north-east. At the end of an hour, the *Armide* having hauled out of gun-shot, disabled in her rigging, the firing ceased.

This partial cannonade had brought down the whole French squadron, except the *Sylphe* brig, which had been detached after, and very soon captured, the creeping *Brothers*. At 5 P. M. the headmost line-of-battle ship, the *Magnanime*, began firing her bow-chasers at the *Calcutta*; who still running under all sail to the southward with a light northerly breeze, discharged her stern guns at the former. Finding that the *Magnanime* was alone and unsupported upon his starboard quarter, and the 40-gun frigate *Thétis* at a somewhat greater distance on the larboard quarter, Captain Woodriff resolved, as the only chance of escape left, to attack and endeavour to disable the 74. With this intent, the *Calcutta* put her helm a-port, and, as soon as she got within pistol-shot, commenced an action with the *Magnanime*. The latter promptly returned the fire, and the cannonade continued, without intermission, for three quarters of an hour. By the end of that time, having of necessity begun the engagement with all sail set, the *Calcutta* found herself completely unrigged and unmanageable. Her escape being rendered impracticable, as well by her disabled state, as by the near approach of the remaining ships of the French squadron, the *Calcutta* hauled down her colours.

The *Calcutta* had been an Indiaman, and, ever since her purchase in 1795, had been employed as a transport, until September, 1804, when she was fitted for sea as a cruiser, and armed with 28 long 18-pounders on the lower deck, and 26 caronades, 32-pounders, and two long 9-pounders on the upper deck. The *Calcutta* was a flush ship, and therefore had no detached quarterdeck.* Her established complement was 343 men and boys: of these she had six killed and the same number wounded. That the loss on board the *Calcutta* was not greater may be attributed to the high firing of the French ships, whose

* See this explained, vol. i., p. 16.

object evidently was to disable her rigging. In this they so completely succeeded, that the French were obliged to keep the *Calcutta* in tow two days, before they could refit her sufficiently to enable her to carry sail. This delay, combined with the course which Captain Woodriff had led the squadron in pursuit of him, enabled the *Illustrious* and her valuable fleet to pass unmolested into the Channel.

It is almost superfluous to state, that the sentence of the court-martial, subsequently assembled to try the officers and crew of the *Calcutta* for the loss of their ship, contained an honourable acquittal of all on board of her, as well as a high encomium upon Captain Woodriff for the skill and bravery he had displayed. The circumstances under which the *Calcutta* was captured do, indeed, reflect very great credit upon her officers and crew. Captain Woodriff's judgment was as conspicuous as his gallantry; and both united saved all his convoy from capture, except one slug of a vessel which endangered the others, and occasioned, beyond a doubt, the loss of the *Calcutta* herself.

The Rochefort squadron proceeded straight to Teneriffe, to repair the damages of the *Calcutta* and *Magnanime*, and to take on board a supply of water and provisions. On the 17th it again sailed, and although sought for in every sea, continued cruising until the 23d of December. On that day *M. Allemand*, with his prize the *Calcutta*, and about 1200 prisoners, the crews of the latter, and of the *Ranger* sloop, *Dove* hired cutter, and 43 merchant vessels, which he had destroyed during his 161 days' cruise, anchored in safety in the road of the Isle of Aix.

Having hitherto paid particular attention to *M. Linois* and his squadron, we shall continue, as far as our limited means will permit to trace him through the remainder of his long sojourn in a distant, but to him not un lucrative, quarter of the world. We left the French admiral at rather an inglorious moment; just as the *Marengo* and her two attendant frigates had been foiled in a combined attack upon the 50-gun ship *Centurion*, in *Vizagapatam* road.* After this, the squadron and merchant prize (thus making it not quite a bootless enterprise) quitted the *Coromandel* coast, and steered straight for the Isle of France. Bringing in with him a rich prize which he captured on the passage, *M. Linois*, on the 1st of November, arrived at *Port-Louis*, and found lying there the *Belle-Poule*, in company also with a prize of some value. One or more of the *Centurion's* shot having struck the 74's hull under water, and the ship in other respects, wanting repair, the *Marengo* was here hove down.

On the 22d of May, 1805, after a stay of nearly six months, during which she had undergone a thorough refit, the *Marengo* sailed on her third cruise, accompanied by the *Belle-Poule* only,

* See vol. iii., p. 260.

the *Atalante* having previously quitted port on a cruise off the Cape of Good Hope, and the *Sémillante*, since the 6th of March, having been detached to the Philippine islands, with the intelligence of the war between England and Spain.

On the 11th of July, off the coast of Ceylon, having cruised unsuccessfully near the entrance of the Red Sea, M. Linois fell in with the Brunswick Indiaman, Captain James Ludovic Grant, in company with the country-ship *Sarah*. The latter, being considerably to windward, made for the land, and although pursued by the *Belle-Poule*, ran on the breakers. The *Sarah* was totally lost, but her crew fortunately escaped sharing her fate. The Brunswick, after a slight and ineffectual resistance, was taken by the *Marengo*.

Receiving intelligence that a superior British force was in this quarter, the French admiral steered towards the Cape of Good Hope. On the 6th of August, in latitude $19^{\circ} 9'$ south, longitude $81^{\circ} 22'$ east, at 4 P.M., in thick hazy weather, the French squadron, then close upon a wind on the larboard tack, standing to the southward and westward, discovered, at about four miles distance on the lee bow, a fleet of 10 Indiamen, under convoy of a two-decked ship-of-war, steering to the northward. This was the British 74-gun ship *Blenheim*, Captain Austen Bissell, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Troubridge, Baronet, bound with a convoy to Madras; where, on his arrival, Sir Thomas was to supersede Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew as commander-in-chief to the eastward of Ceylon.

As the *Marengo* and *Belle-Poule*, with French colours hoisted, wore astern of the fleet, the Brunswick, by signal, kept her wind, and soon lost sight of her two companions and the enemy. At about 5 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Marengo*, ranging up, opened a distant fire upon the lee quarter of the Cumberland Indiaman, Captain William Ward Farrer (a participator in Commodore Dance's gallant affair), and, followed by the frigate, engaged, in passing, several others of the Indiamen. Observing that the *Blenheim* was lying by for them, the two French ships then reserved their fire until they came abreast of her, when a smart cannonade ensued. Owing, however, to the great swell that prevailed, the *Blenheim* could not open her lowerdeck ports: * hence the British 74 had only a battery of 18-pounders, with a few nines and carronades, to oppose to the whole united broadsides of the French 74 and frigate. Notwithstanding this inferiority, M. Linois did not remain long within gun-shot, but passed on under all sail; interchanging broadsides occasionally with the remaining ships of the convoy, until, at about 6 P.M., he had run ahead of them all.

* And yet a contemporary dwells upon the effect produced upon M. Linois by the *Blenheim*'s "lowerdeck guns." See Brenton, vol. iii., p. 352. The same writer adds the *Atalante* frigate to the French admiral's force.

The *Blenheim* sustained no injury in materiel except a few shot-holes in her topsails ; but, unfortunately, a Mr. Cook, a passenger and a fine young man, was killed by a piece of langridge, while standing upon the quarterdeck. The *Ganges*, also one of the *Marengo's* acquaintances of the 15th of February, 1804, but now commanded by Captain Thomas Talbot Harrington, had one man killed by an 8-pound shot. In the half-hour's action that occurred, no other ship of the convoy appears to have sustained any damage or loss.

The *Marengo* received a shot through the fish of her mainmast. Another shot struck her fore yard ; a third passed through the poop ; and several perforated her sails. Her loss, according to the French official account, consisted of only eight men slightly wounded. The *Belle-Poule* had her cross-jack yard carried away in the slings, and her foresail so much cut that she was obliged to shift it : the frigate was also twice hulled under the chess-trees, and had two men wounded.

About midnight the French 74 and frigate crossed the hawse of the *Blenheim*, and at daylight lay to about four miles on the weather bow of the convoy ; the ships of which also lay to, in line of battle, expecting a renewal of the attack. At 7 A. M. the *Marengo* and frigate filled and bore down to reconnoitre, but, when about two miles off, again hauled to the wind. At 2 P. M. the *Blenheim* filled and set topgallantsails, and the *Indiamen* also made more sail, still preserving their line. This steady front probably decided the intention of M. Linois, who at 9 P. M. tacked to the southward ; while the British convoy pursued its course in an opposite direction, and on the 23d of the month arrived in safety at Madras.

On the 2d of August, at 1 h. 30 m. P. M., as the British 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain John Wood, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Harrier*, Captain Edward Ratsey, were entering the Straits of St.-Bernadino, Philippine islands, a strange frigate was discovered lying at an anchor in the road of St.-Jacinta. We left the French 36-gun frigate *Sémillante*, Captain Léonard-Bernard Motard, on her way to apprise the governor-general of these islands of the war between Spain and England. The frigate arrived in time to frustrate any attempt at surprise on the part of the British ; and, as a further benefit to the settlement, Captain Motard undertook to proceed to Mexico, and bring back a cargo of specie, the want of which was most severely felt at the Philippines, it being two years since the last galleon had arrived. Scarcely had the *Sémillante* quitted Manilla on her voyage, than intelligence that two British cruisers were then among the islands induced Captain Motard to anchor in the road of St.-Jacinta ; where, he knew, there were batteries to protect him.

Immediately on discovering the British vessels, the *Sémillante* began warping in-shore, between a battery on the south point of St.-Jacinta and a reef of rocks ; in which operation the French

frigate was assisted by several boats, and subsequently by her sails, which she loosed in order to take advantage of a light air that sprang up from the north-east. At 2 h. 40 m. P. M., hoisting French colours and a broad pendant, the *Sémillante* commenced firing her stern-chasers at the *Harrier*; from whom the *Phaëton* was then distant about three miles in the north-west. The battery began firing also; and in two minutes afterwards the *Harrier*, being off the north point of the bay, opened her starboard broadside at the frigate. Finding the water to shoal from ten to seven, and then to five and four fathoms, the brig hove to; but still continued a smart fire, receiving a fire in return from the battery and frigate.

At a few minutes past 3 P. M. the *Phaëton* got up and joined in the cannonade; and a round-tower now added its fire to that of the battery at the south point. The British frigate and sloop, although, from the difficulty of the navigation and the lightness of the breeze, unable to close as they wished, continued to engage. At 4 P. M. the brig wore and fought her larboard guns, and at 4 h. 30 m. P. M. caught fire in her larboard-waist hammock-cloths, supposed to have been caused by red-hot shot fired from the battery. The fire, however, was soon extinguished. The weather now became nearly calm, and the brig, in consequence, began driving towards the reef. At 5 P. M., finding that the *Phaëton* could not get alongside of the French frigate without warping, and that his boats would, in such a case, run the risk of being cut to pieces by the shot from the battery, Captain Wood ceased firing and hauled off, and signalled Captain Ratsey to do the same. The *Harrier*, by means of her boats, towed her head round; and, in a minute or two afterwards, the action ended.

The *Phaëton* had her sails, rigging, and some of her masts, particularly her mizen topmast, damaged by the enemy's fire. Three of her boats were also injured, and she received nine shot in her hull; but, fortunately, the frigate had only two men wounded. The *Harrier* having, from her nearness to the shore at its commencement, bore the brunt of the action, suffered rather more than her consort. Her rigging and sails were much cut, and all her boats more or less damaged. Her masts were also injured, particularly her mainmast, which she was obliged to fish to prevent it from falling. The fire from the *Sémillante* and batteries had been aimed chiefly at the rigging of the two British vessels; and that it was which occasioned the *Harrier's* loss to be no greater than the *Phaëton's*, two men wounded.

The British stood off for the night, and at daylight on the 3d, having a fine breeze off shore, tacked and stood in to reconnoitre. They found that, during the night, the *Sémillante* had warped herself close to the beach; and that, for her further protection, a six-gun battery had been erected on the north point. The *Phaëton* and *Harrier* waited off the road until the morning

of the 4th; when, finding the French frigate still in the same place, they made sail, and ran through the Straits of St.-Bernadino.

What loss the *Sémillante* sustained, in this two hours and a half's engagement, is not recorded in any French account; but it was afterwards understood at Calcutta, that she had 13 men killed and 36 wounded. With respect to the damage done to her hull and masts, all we know is, that she suffered so much as to prevent her from proceeding on her voyage to Mexico. "*La Sémillante avait été très-maltraitée dans ce combat; elle fut forcée de renoncer au voyage du Mexique,*"* is an admission that places that fact beyond a doubt.

On the 20th of July, in compliance with the repeated request of Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, cruising off Cape Finisterre, to be furnished with a few additional frigates, Admiral Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, detached to join the former the 38-gun frigate *Niobe*, Captain Matthew Henry Scott. On the 29th the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Æolus*, Captain Lord William Fitz-Roy, parted company from the Channel fleet upon the same destination; and Lord William was directed, in his way across the bay of Biscay, "to be very careful to obtain intelligence of the enemy's squadrons, if either of them should have put to sea from Rochefort or Ferrol;" and, on falling in with any such squadron, his lordship was to continue, if possible, in sight," until he had ascertained its route, &c.

Scarcely had the *Æolus* made sail upon her mission when the *Niobe* lugger, with despatches from Sir Robert Calder, joined the fleet. These despatches, besides indicating the exact spot at which Sir Robert would be found, requiring to have their contents acknowledged, the admiral threw out to the *Æolus* the signal of recall. The frigate accordingly put back. Having received, with Sir Robert Calder's rendezvous (38 leagues north-west from Cape Finisterre), a letter from Admiral Cornwallis to Sir Robert, acknowledging the receipt of the latter's despatches, apprizing the vice-admiral that they had been forwarded to England, and that he had, some days since, sent the *Niobe*, and was now sending the *Æolus*, to join him, Lord William sailed again to the westward.

On the 5th of August, very early in the morning, latitude 45° 55' north, longitude 9° 28' west, the *Æolus*, standing to the westward with the wind at north by west, discovered and bore up for seven strange sail in the south-south-east. At 6 h. 15 m. A. M. one of the seven strangers, evidently a frigate and detached from her consorts, boarded a merchant ship in the south-east, and shortly afterward set her on fire. At 8 A. M., perceiving that the strangers were an enemy's squadron of five sail of the line, one frigate, and one brig, the *Æolus* hauled to the wind on

* Dictionnaire des Batailles, &c., tome iv., p. 5.

the larboard tack, with her head about north-east by east, for the purpose apparently of watching their movements. These vessels, with a frigate or two not then in company, were really the French squadron from Rochefort, so particularly adverted to by the orders under which Lord William had been detached from the Channel fleet. "If," says Admiral Cornwallis, "you should fall in with a squadron of the enemy's ships, continue, if possible, in sight until you can ascertain their route, and then push on before them to make it known to me, or the officer commanding on that station, to which they seem to point their course."

At 10 A.M. the French squadron, which appears to have been lying to, was joined by a frigate and a brig from to-leeward. At 3 h. 30 m. P.M., being then distant from the *Æolus* about 12 miles in nearly the same direction as when first discovered, the French squadron bore up and steered east-south-east. At 5 P.M. the *Æolus*, still with her head to the north-east, lost sight of the French squadron. Shortly afterwards the frigate bore away to south; but at 6 h. 40 m. hauled up on the starboard tack, and made all sail in search of the vice-admiral.

On the 7th, in the forenoon, the *Æolus* brought to an American ship from Bordeaux to Charlestown, and learnt that, two days before, she had been boarded, off Cape Prior, by the British 74-gun ship *Dragon*, Captain Edward Griffith, cruising in company with eight other sail of the line. As this was undoubtedly the squadron of Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, the *Æolus*, then only 38 leagues distant from Ferrol, crowded sail in the direction of that port.

At 4 P.M., latitude at noon 43° 41' north, longitude 10° 11' west, being close hauled on the larboard tack with a light breeze from the north-north-east, the *Æolus* discovered and chased a strange sail in the south quarter, standing under easy sail to the north-west. This was the French 40-gun frigate *Didon*, Captain Pierre-Bernard Milius, two days from Corunna, in search of the squadron from Rochefort under Rear-admiral Allemand, for whom she had important despatches.* At 4 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Didon* tacked towards the *Æolus*; but shortly afterwards, on ascertaining that the latter had no connexion with M. Allemand's squadron, the French frigate bore up south-west. The *Æolus* bore up also, and continued in chase until 7 h. 30 m. P.M.: when, having approached near enough to discover that the ship was an enemy's frigate, "with yellow sides, and royal yards rigged aloft," the *Æolus* shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack: that is, while the French frigate continued running from the British frigate in the direction of south-west, the British frigate altered her course from south by west to north-west by west. These diverging courses soon

* See p. 16.

shut out each frigate from the other's view; and at about 8 h. 30 m. P.M. the *Æolus* wore round on the larboard tack and resumed the course she was steering when the *Didon* first hove in sight.

While, with light and variable winds, the *Æolus* is slowly making her way to the eastward, we will submit a few remarks upon the very extraordinary circumstance of two frigates, each belonging to a nation at war with the other, voluntarily parting without a contest.

Let us first see how far, on the score of relative force, either of these ships might feel justified in declining to engage the other. Could any circumstance connected with the old rating system of the British navy excite surprise, we should find it in the admiralty-order which classed the *Narcissus* of 894, *Tartar* of 895, *Amphion*, of 914, *Æolus* of 919, and *Medusa*, of 920 tons, all, except the first, built in the year 1801, as 32-gun frigates, while, by another admiralty-order, the four frigates of the same year, the *Meleager*, of 875, *Iphigenia*, of 876, *Shannon*, of 881, and *Tribune*, of 884 tons, were registered as 36-gun frigates. Each class mounted 26 long 18-pounders on the main deck; but the 36s were established with twelve 32, the 32s with ten 24, pounder carronades: making, with four long nines, the total number of guns of the one class 42, and of the other 40. All five of these 32-gun frigates were, however, constructed to carry, and some of them subsequently mounted, 42 guns. In point of complement the difference was 10 men; giving to the 36-gun frigate 264, and to the 32-gun frigate 254, men and boys, including the three widow's men. At the time of her meeting the *Didon*, the *Æolus*, according to an entry in her log, mounted the 40 guns established upon her class; but she appears to have mustered at quarters, having probably manned one or two prizes, no more than 233 men and boys.

The *Didon* was a very fine frigate of 1091 tons, and mounted two more guns than the establishment of her class, as given at p. 54 of the first volume, or 46 guns in all; of which 10 were iron (similar to those of the *Topaze**), and four the usual brass, 36-pounder carronades. The crew of the *Didon*, according to the deposition of her officers in reference to an action fought by her three days after she had parted from the *Æolus*, amounted to 330 men and boys. These minute but important particulars established, we may present the following as the

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE TWO FRIGATES.

		ÆOLUS.	DIDON.
Broadside-guns.....	{ No.	20	23
	{ lbs.	372	563
Crew.....	No.	233	330
Size	tons	919	1091

* See p. 141.

This figure-statement, compared with that in which appears the name of the Loire, a ship of the same numerical force as the Didon,* shows the effect produced in the broadside weight of metal of French frigates by the substitution, to so great an extent, of 36-pounder carronades for long 8-pounders. In the present instance it gives a superiority of nearly three to two; whereas, in long guns only, the Didon is not superior to the Æolus by much above an eighth. But, according to that rigid law, the custom of the service, the larger of these differences, important as it is, does not excuse a British ship, even if aware that the odds are in that proportion against her, from bringing, or endeavouring to bring, an enemy to action.

Respecting the cause, whatever it may have been, which prevented the Æolus from continuing in pursuit of the Didon, we shall postpone any further inquiry, until we have brought down the proceeding of the Æolus to a somewhat later period, and have dipped a little deeper into a new and very important source of information, which the account of Lord William's rencounter with the Didon, as it stood in the first edition of this work, has recently opened to our view. We may here explain how it happens that the case of the Æolus and Didon, instead of being, as in the old edition, mixed up with the affair between the latter and another British frigate, ranks in the present under a distinct sub-head. It will be sufficient to remind the reader that, when first introducing the head of "Light squadrons and single ships," we stated our intention to notice under it, among others, every case wherein vessels met, "between which, from the relative situations of the parties as to force and other circumstances, an action might reasonably have been expected."†

Pursuing her route towards the north-west coast of Spain, the Æolus, on the 9th, at 6 h. 40 m. P.M., Cape Prior bearing south-east half-east distant five or six leagues, fell in with the Dragon, hastening to Sir Robert Calder with the important information that the Franco-Spanish fleet had got into Ferrol and Corunna.‡ At 6 h. 50 m. the Æolus asked, by signal, the situation of the admiral and communicated in the same manner, that she had been "chased" (No. 406) by an enemy's squadron of five sail of the line. The Dragon acquainted the Æolus by signal, that the British admiral was in the north-east by east; and in that direction the frigate immediately accompanied the 74. At day-break on the following day, the 10th, the 98-gun ship Neptune was fallen in with; and in an hour or two afterwards, the remainder of the Vice-admiral's squadron. Captain Griffith now communicated to Sir Robert the important result of his second reconnoitring visit to Ferrol, and Lord William delivered to the Vice-admiral the letter or letters (for we believe there was a

* See vol. ii., p. 141.

† See vol. i., p. 88.

‡ See p. 15; but the date is misprinted 10 instead of 9.

private one) with which he had been intrusted. Shortly afterwards, taking his measures from the Dragon's information, Sir Robert ordered the latter ship to cruise for a certain period, and then, with the remainder of the squadron, proceed to join the commander-in-chief off Ushant. This the vice-admiral effected, as already mentioned, on the 14th;* but the *Æolus*, having for some cause or other parted company, did not join Admiral Cornwallis until the forenoon of the 20th.

To view the case of the *Æolus* in the most favourable light, we must suppose that Lord William, as in reply to our former remarks on his conduct he has since stated, did really imagine that he was the bearer, not of a letter which, comparatively, was of no consequence at all, but, of secret despatches of the utmost importance to the nation. We can readily conceive why a document, containing the rendezvous of a particular squadron, is inscribed on the envelope "Secret." It is that the captain may not communicate the contents to any of his officers, nor they to the crew. Otherwise, in case of capture, should even the despatch itself be thrown overboard, the enemy might gain oral intelligence of the exact spot at which he could pounce upon an inferior force. Why not "Rendezvous," with an understanding that it is to be kept within the captain's breast, substituted for the awfully mysterious word "Secret"? And why should a common letter from one admiral to another, with one or more of which almost every vessel is charged that travels from station to station, be dignified with the name of "despatch"?

It is not improbable that the *Niobe* had one of those "despatches" in her letter-bag; and yet, what does her captain do? Why, according to the frigate's log (for we have had no communication with a single officer belonging to her), on the 5th of August, in latitude 47° 6' north, longitude 14° 24' west, the *Niobe* fell in with a strange ship, which Captain Scott pursued for three days and nights. At length the strange frigate, or whatever she was, escaped from the *Niobe*; and Captain Scott, instead of joining Sir Robert Calder agreeably to the express tenour of his orders, joined Lord Nelson, and returned with the latter to the Channel fleet. With whatever private censure the *Niobe*'s captain may have been visited for this deviation from his orders, a few months only elapsed ere Captain Scott received a public approval of his conduct in being appointed, as the lists inform us, to the *Goliath* 74.

Since the publication by Lord William Fitz-Roy, with so much seeming triumph, of the orders under which he sailed, we are still more surprised that he should have considered his junction with Sir Robert Calder as the only object worthy of his serious attention. Was he not directed to watch, and attend

* See p. 15.

till he ascertained its route, any enemy's squadron he might fall in with, particularly one expected to be at sea from Rochefort, and another from Ferrol? Well, the *Æolus* falls in with the Rochefort squadron early in the morning, hovers to windward of it till 5 P.M., then permits it to go its way. In a few days afterwards the *Æolus* falls in with a French frigate detached from the Ferrol squadron, also named in Lord William's orders.* The *Æolus* approaches near enough to make out the stranger to be an enemy's frigate; then abandons her, for the sake, as alleged, of delivering in safety the letters with which she is charged.

But the most extraordinary circumstance of all, is the delusion under which Lord William laboured as to the supposed effect produced by the due delivery of the packet he was carrying. "The *Secret* nature of my orders," he states, "none but myself on board were acquainted with, and the immense importance of the despatches in question, which by recalling Sir Robert Calder's whole squadron, and his being afterwards detached by Admiral Cornwallis with a larger one, subsequently led to the important victory obtained by Lord Nelson on the 21st of October of that year, sufficiently proves that in making them my first object I was attending more to the honour and interest of my country than if I had *disobeyed* instructions so plainly marked out, merely for the *chance* of personal profit or distinction. It is, indeed, evident that the responsibility which would have attached to me, had such despatches failed of reaching their destination, involved consequences of greater magnitude than the censure of Mr. James, or of any ill-judging individual."†

To attempt a serious refutation of the statement thus (we will only say) unadvisedly put forth, would be wasting our own and the reader's time. What else but some such motive imposes silence upon the Dragon's captain, the present Vice-admiral Edward Griffith Colpoys? Was, may we ask, "the chance of personal profit or distinction" the only chance that Captain Lord William Fitz-Roy would have had to look to, had the *Æolus* succeeded in bringing the Didon to action? Of "personal distinction" there would have been an excellent chance; but, then, it must be the distinction that is founded, in a great degree, upon the personal danger, which is the never-failing attendant of a struggle for mastery between two fighting ships.

But the captain of the *Æolus* has recently found a champion, who, and he is of the naval profession too, will insist that "the character of Lord William Fitz-Roy remains as pure and unblemished as that of any of his most distinguished brother officers."‡ After a few preliminary observations, among which

* As upon these orders much of the gist of this case depends, we have inserted them in the Appendix. See Nos. 10 and 11.

† A Brief Statement arising out of a passage contained in the 3d volume of James's Naval History of Great Britain, on the conduct and character of Lord William Fitz-Roy, in the year 1805.

‡ Brenton, vol. iii., p. 388.

is the following : " It is sometimes the duty of an officer not to fight ; and the sacrifice of reputation, though painful, is indispensable," Captain Brenton inserts at length the second order given to Lord William Fitz-Roy, and then proceeds thus : " Let us next see what steps were taken by Lord William in execution of these orders, for which purpose we turn to his log-book ; where every transaction, in which his ship was concerned, is minutely related ; and, above all, that transaction which it is asserted should have covered him with disgrace, so clearly exposed, and so openly stated, as to leave us nothing to desire. His lordship explicitly declares, that the strange ship *was* a frigate ; and he inserts in the public record of his ship every step which was taken while she was present." The writer then gives, as an extract from Lord William's log, the following words, italicised and punctuated in the manner here shown : " At four o'clock, stood for a suspicious ship, in the S. S. E. which at *six bore up and made all sail*—the *Æolus* did the same—at half past seven, the stranger, still running away, shortened sail and hauled to the wind ; the *ship a frigate with yellow sides and royal yards ; rigged aloft.*"*

What will Captain Brenton say when he finds, that he has either made use, by mistake, of an extract from some other ship's log, or that he has had palmed upon him, for the captain's log of the *Æolus* (and certainly the description given of the *Didon* is a tolerably just one), a spurious production ? The readiest way to prove this will be to subjoin an extract from that which bears the signature of Lord William Fitz-Roy, and is deposited at the navy-office as the genuine log kept by his lordship when captain of the *Æolus*. Here, then, follow the proceedings of the day on which the *Didon* was fallen in with, precisely as they are minuted in the log last referred to : " 4, 5 saw a strange sail S^e. made sail in chace, 4, 30 the chace tacked & immediately bore up. 7, 30 shortened sail & came to the wind on the st^d. tack. A. M. &c." Signed " William Fitz-Roy."

The log of the master of the *Æolus*, Mr. Francis Prior, chiefly differs from the log of her captain, just quoted, by containing, after the entry of " shortened sail," the following words, as the reason for having done so : " The chase apparently an enemy's ship of war."

Although Captain Brenton's third volume issued from the press within little more than three, and the part devoted to the subject in question must have been written within less than two, months from the publication of Lord William's pamphlet, which was to remove the imputation cast upon his lordship's character by the facts disclosed in the first edition of this work, we find an abandonment of that line of defence upon which, to all appearance, Lord William so confidently rested. For instance, by his pamphlet, Lord William declares, in effect, that the secret nature

* Brenton, vol. iii., p. 386.

of his orders, and the importance of the despatches of which he was the bearer, induced him to forego the pleasure of attacking the Didon; but, having since undeceived himself, apparently, as to his having been sent to recal Sir Robert Calder, and thereby been in any way instrumental "to the important victory obtained by Lord Nelson on the 21st of October,"* Lord William instructs Captain Brenton to dwell upon the necessity which he was under, to hasten to Sir Robert Calder with the intelligence of his having fallen in with the Rochefort squadron. Accordingly his lordship's apologist says: "On his way to join the vice-admiral, he fell in with the Rochefort squadron, with whose movements it became a serious part of his duty to make himself acquainted; seeing them burn a merchant vessel in the morning of the 6th, he watched them narrowly during the whole of that day, and having lost sight of them in the evening, Lord William proceeded in search of the vice-admiral."

Passing by the (we will not say studied, but) highly advantageous obscurity thrown over the time when the French squadron was first discovered by the *Æolus*, as well as the error in the date of burning the merchantman, we will merely advert to what might have been the consequences to Ireland, had Captain Countess, of the *Ethalion*, in September, 1798, been contented with such a "narrow watching" of the *Hoche* and her consorts.† An overweening zeal generally defeats its object. Why need Captain Brenton have laid so much stress upon the necessity that Lord William Fitz-Roy was under of acquainting himself with the movements of a French squadron, which he suffered to make sail from him without an effort to follow it, unless can be called so, the bearing up of the *Æolus*, for a short time, after the enemy had disappeared?

In reference to the Didon, Captain Brenton proceeds: "That Lord William did not pursue her, was an exemplary act of obedience to his orders. A night's chase would have led him entirely off the station on which he was so urgently directed by his admiral to seek for Sir Robert Calder, and on which he had, within 24 hours, seen an enemy's squadron, and gained intelligence of a British squadron being very near him." "On the following morning, at daylight, he fell in with Sir Robert Calder, delivered his despatches, and gave him all the important intelligence of which, by his lordship's log, he appears to have been in possession."‡

Well, what did Sir Robert Calder do, on receiving this intelligence, for which, according to Captain Brenton, the captain of the *Æolus* had "sacrificed his reputation?" Did he not immediately make sail in search of the Rochefort squadron? On the contrary Sir Robert Calder bent his course towards the

* See p. 159.

† See vol. ii., p. 124.

‡ Brenton, vol. iii., p. 387.

Channel; detaching the Dragon to ascertain, we rather think, the probable route of that squadron, and allowing the *Æolus* also to part company, for the purpose, not improbably, of affording to Lord William a chance, unshackled by any orders or despatches, of again meeting the *Didon*.

As a further means of showing the unfounded nature of the charge, that "Lord William Fitz-Roy had run away," Captain Brenton sneeringly says of Captain Milius, of the *Didon*, "The very reverse is the fact. The French captain thought proper to run, and on the 10th fell in with the *Phoenix*." Fortunately for his reputation, Captain Milius, on that very 10th of August, gave a decided proof that, if he had "run away" on the 7th, it was not from any lack of bravery. Enough has already appeared in these pages, to show the immense importance which Napoléon attached, and not without reason, to the concentration of his fleets; and the *Didon* was expressly detached from Corunna, to seek the Rochefort squadron, and conduct it to the Franco-Spanish fleet under M. Villeneuve. We have, also, on more than one occasion shown, and shall again and again have to show, that French admirals and captains are frequently restricted by their orders from fighting, unless in the way of defence, or that the odds are so great in their favour as almost to ensure success.

Before we dismiss the case of the *Æolus* and *Didon*, we feel bound to mention, as some excuse for any deficiency which may be complained of in the account, that we have been debarred from our usual sources of information by a knowledge of the peculiar situation in which Lord William Fitz-Roy has generally stood with respect to the officers under his command. It is on this account that we have refrained from applying to the officers belonging to the *Æolus* in August, 1805, could we, indeed, from the rapid manner in which, about the same period, the lieutenants of that frigate succeeded each other, have ascertained which of them was on board when the *Æolus* fell in with the *Didon*.

Although some years intervened between this occurrence and the dismissal of Lord William Fitz-Roy from the navy, for having ill-treated one of his officers,* and although his lordship, for some reason with which we are unacquainted, was restored to his rank in five months after he had been thus solemnly degraded, and at present actually stands in the list among the officers rewarded for meritorious services,† we shall not, we find,

* Court-martial held April 6 and 7, 1811. See the *Naval Chronicle*, vol. xxv., p. 349, and vol. xxvi., p. 397.

† The participation of Lord William Fitz-Roy in the victory obtained by Sir Richard Strachan (see p. 115), and, above all, the baronet's rather extraordinary selection of the *Æolus* to carry home his despatches, appear to have been the grounds upon which Lord William obtained his companionship of the Bath.

have occasion again to introduce his lordship's name. For that reason we take this opportunity of disclaiming all "malevolence of intention"* towards Lord William Fitz-Roy. On the other hand, we should indeed be unfit for the office we have undertaken, did we allow the adventitious circumstances of high birth and extensive patronage to sway us in our remarks upon the conduct of individuals. Had the *Æolus* engaged the *Didon*, and, after a well-fought action, been compelled to yield to superior force, we do not believe that Lord William Fitz-Roy would have been tried for disobedience of orders. But, had he been so, and a condemnation been the result, we would have strained every nerve to show the injustice of the sentence, and doubt not that we should have succeeded in satisfying every unprejudiced mind, that the captain of the *Æolus* had acted in the noblest manner.

As to the supposed evil consequence, which would ensue to the public from the protracted, or even the non, delivery of despatches,† we think, with submission, that it has been much overrated. At all events, let the order to the commanding officer of the despatch vessel signify, in the plainest terms, that he is not to deviate from his course to chase any suspicious vessel. And, should he then discover an enemy's ship of his own class in a situation to be pursued or attacked, let the captain muster his officers and men, and read to them the peremptory clause in his orders. But, where an officer, from the obscure wording of his orders, is in doubt on the subject, or where, like Lord William Fitz-Roy, he is directed to do that which is incompatible with a continuance in the course he is directed to steer, he will find that, on the score of character, to which, notwithstanding the light manner in which a contemporary treats "the sacrifice of reputation," some attention is due, the safer alternative is always to fight.‡

On the 10th of August, at 5 A. M., latitude 43° 16' north, longitude 12° 14' west, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phoenix*, Captain Thomas Baker, standing on the starboard tack with the wind at north-east by east, discovered a sail in the south-west, and immediately bore up in chase. The weather being hazy and the wind light, it was not until 7 A. M. that the stranger, then on the larboard tack with foresail and royals set,

* A Brief Statement, &c.

† Brenton, vol. iii., p. 388.

‡ The Editor begs distinctly to disclaim any participation in the personalities in which *all* parties on this occasion seem to have indulged. Lord William was the best judge as to the importance of his orders. Every remark tending to throw any slur upon his character would have been erased, had not the pamphlet of his lordship rendered it requisite that Mr. James should have substantiated his charges or withdrawn his assertions. It would therefore be very unfair to Mr. James had this answer to Lord William been withheld; and it would be treating Captain Brenton with too much disrespect not to notice his elaborate defence of his brother officer.

but with her mizen topsail aback and main topsail shivering, was made out to be an enemy's frigate, "with yellow sides, and royal yards rigged aloft." The ship was, in fact, the French frigate *Didon*; who, since the evening of the 7th, had stood leisurely to the west-south-west, and was now only 32 leagues, or thereabouts, from the spot at which the *Æolus* had fallen in with her.

Why the French captain, having so important a service intrusted to him, should wait to engage an enemy's frigate of the apparent force of the one bearing down, may require to be explained. The fact is, that on the day previous the *Phoenix* had fallen in with an American vessel from Bordeaux bound to the United States. The master came on board with his papers, and was evidently not very sober. After selling some cases of claret, he requested to be allowed to view the quarters of the *Phoenix*. No objection was made; and he went round the ship, saw as much as he could see, and departed on board his vessel. On the next morning early he fell in with the *Didon*; and, in return for the hospitable treatment he had received on board the *Phoenix*, told Captain Milius, that the ship whose topgallant-sails were then just rising out of the water to windward, was an English 20-gun ship, and that her captain and his officers thought so much of their vessel, that, in all probability, they would venture to engage the *Didon*. The French frigate then lay to in the manner related, and the American merchant ship pursued her way.

It so happened that the *Phoenix*, a very small frigate at best, had been disguised to resemble, at a distance, a large sloop of war, and the position in which, for a long time, she was viewed by the *Didon*, coupled with the assertions of the American, prevented Captain Milius and his officers from discovering the mistake until the action, which we shall proceed to relate, had actually commenced.

At 8 A. M., being still on the larboard tack waiting for the *Phoenix* to close, the *Didon* hoisted her colours and fired a gun to windward, and at 8 h. 45 m. opened a smart fire upon the former; who, to frustrate any attempt of the *Didon* to escape, resolved to engage to leeward. To attain this object, and to avoid as much as possible her opponent's line of fire, already doing damage to her rigging and sails, the *Phoenix* steered a bow and quarter course, and reserved her fire until she could bestow it with effect. On the other hand, having in view to cripple the *Phoenix* that she might not escape, and to maintain a position so destructive to the latter and safe to herself, the *Didon* filled, wore, and came to again on the opposite tack, bringing a fresh broadside to bear upon the bows of the *Phoenix*. The manœuvre was repeated three times, to the increased annoyance of the latter; who, impatient at being so foiled, eager to take an active part in the combat, and hopeless, from her inferior sailing, of

being able to pass ahead or astern of the Didon, ran right at her to windward.

This bold measure succeeded, and at 9 h. 15 m. P. M. the two frigates, both standing on the larboard tack, brought their broadsides mutually to bear at a pistol-shot distance, each pouring into the other an animated fire of round, grape, and musketry. See the diagram at p. 167. Owing to the press of sail under which the Phœnix had approached, and the nearly motionless state in which the Didon lay, the former ranged considerably ahead: whereupon the Didon, having, as well as her opponent, fallen off from the wind while the broadsides were exchanging, filled, hauled up, and stood on, discharging into the Phœnix, as she diagonally crossed the latter's stern (diagram, No. 1*) a few distant and ineffectual shot. Profiting by her new position and the damaged state of her opponent's rigging, the Didon bore up, and, passing athwart the stern of the Phœnix, raked her (No. 2), but, owing to the precaution taken by the British crew in lying down, without any serious effect. The Didon then hauled up again on the larboard tack, and endeavoured to bestow her starboard broadside in a similar manner; but the Phœnix had by this time repaired her rigging sufficiently to enable her, worked as she was by one of the best disciplined crews in the service, promptly to throw her sails aback, and prevent the Didon from again taking a position so likely to give an unfavourable turn to the combat.

This manœuvre brought the Didon, with her larboard bow, or stem rather, pressing against the starboard quarter of the Phœnix (No. 3); both ships lying nearly in a parallel direction, and one only having a gun that, in the regular way of mounting, would bear upon her antagonist. This gun was a brass 36-pounder carronade upon the forecastle of the Didon; who might also, but for some of which we are not aware, have brought an 18-pounder long-gun to bear through the maindeck bowport. The instant the two ships came in contact, each prepared to board the other; but the immense superiority of numbers, that advanced to the assault in the Didon, obliged the Phœnix to defend her own decks with all the strength she could muster. Having repulsed the French boarders, chiefly with her excellent marines, the Phœnix hastened to take advantage of the means which she exclusively possessed of bringing a maindeck gun to bear upon an antagonist in the position of the Didon.

Having, in his zeal for the good of the service, ventured to overstep one of its rules, Captain Baker had caused the timber or sill of the cabin-window on each side next the quarter to be cut down, so as to serve for a port, in case a gun would not bear from the regular stern-port next to the rudder-head. Unfor-

* Having no dates to guide us in the details, we are obliged to adopt this mode of referring to the different positions.

unately, the gunner had neglected to prepare tackles sufficiently long for transporting the aftermost maindeck gun to the new port. The omission was of serious consequence; for, during the whole time occupied in substituting other means to place the gun in the port, the *Didon*, by her powerful body of marines, stationed along the whole length of the larboard gangway, kept up an incessant fire into the stern-windows of the *Phoenix*, strewing the cabin-deck with killed and wounded.

At length the exertions of Captain Baker, and of the few officers and men that remained of those assisting him in this perilous but necessary duty, were crowned with success. The gun was run out, and the direction in which it pointed showed, at once, that its importance had not been overrated. It was fired, and by its first discharge, as subsequently acknowledged on the part of the enemy, laid low 24 of the *Didon's* crew: it swept the ship from her larboard bow to her starboard quarter, and was truly awful in its effects. Meanwhile the marines and musketry-men on the quarter-deck were exerting themselves in the most gallant and efficacious manner: one party, posted at the stern, kept up a spirited fire at the *Didon's* marines on the gangway; while another party (the men of both parties on account of their exposed station stooping to load and rising to fire), directing their fire at the carronade upon the *Didon's* fore-castle, prevented the French sailors from discharging it.

After the two frigates had remained on board of each other for upwards of half an hour, the *Didon* began to fore-reach. In an instant the *Phoenix* brought her second aftermost gun to bear, and by its first discharge cut away the head rails of the *Didon*, and, what was far more important, the gammoning of her bowsprit. The *Didon* as she continued to forge ahead, also brought her guns successively to bear, and a mutual cannonade recommenced between the frigates yard-arm and yard-arm (No. 4), to the evident advantage of the *Phoenix*, whose crew had been constantly trained at the guns, and that, as much as possible, and far more than the regulation of powder and shot allowed, by practising the real, not the dumb motions of firing. In consequence of that, and of her lighter guns, the *Phoenix* fired nearly half as quick again as the *Didon*; and the shattered hull and disabled state of the latter, as, with her main topmast gone and foremast tottering, she passed out of gun-shot ahead, proved that quickness of firing was not the only proficiency which the crew of the *Phoenix* had attained.


Although not materially injured in hull or lower masts, the *Phoenix* was so damaged in rigging and sails as to be nearly unmanageable (No. 6), her main royal-mast, maintopsail yard and her gaff were shot away. The gaff had fallen just as the two ships got foul; and the fly of the British white ensign, at the gaff-end having dropped upon the *Didon's* fore-castle the Frenchmen tore it off, and carried the fragment aft as a trophy.

As a substitute for their ship's mutilated colours, the seamen of the *Phœnix* immediately lashed a boat's ensign to the larboard, and a union jack to the starboard cross-jack yard-arm.

Taking advantage of the suspension of firing, each frigate now began repairing her damaged rigging, that she might be ready to renew the engagement the instant a return of the breeze would admit of manœuvring. Although the main topmast of the *Didon*, and the main royal-mast, topsail yard, and gaff of the *Phœnix*, were the only deficient spars, both frigates exhibited a woful appearance, on account chiefly of the quantity of sail under which they had engaged. Instead of a cloud of canvass swelling proudly to the breeze, rope-ends and riddled sails hung drooping down from every mast and yard.

One of the characteristics of a well-disciplined crew is the promptitude they display in refitting their ship after an action; and, if any thing could animate the men of the *Phœnix* to additional exertions, it was the sight of their opponent's foremast falling over the side. This happened at about noon, and was caused by the motion of the ship acting upon the mast in its terribly shattered state. Very soon afterwards, such had been the diligence of her crew, the *Phœnix* had knotted and spliced her rigging, rove fresh braces, and trimmed her sails, so as to profit by the air of wind which had just sprung up. In this refitted state, the *Phœnix* made sail on the larboard tack towards the *Didon*, then with her head the same way, upon the former's weather bow. Having arrived within gun-shot, the British frigate was in the act of opening her fire, when, being from the fall of her foremast and other previous damage in a defenceless state, the French frigate, at about 15 minutes past noon, hauled down her colours.

The following diagram has been prepared to elucidate the evolutions of these frigates, after the commencement of the close action.



Of her 260 men and boys, the *Phoenix*, when she commenced the action, had on board, including 10 or 12 who were too sick to attend to their quarters, only 245. Of these she had her second lieutenant (John Bounton), one master's mate (George Donalan), and 10 seamen killed, her first lieutenant of marines (Henry Steele, dangerously in the head), two midshipmen (Aaron Tozer, dangerously, and Edward B. Curling*) 13 seamen, and 12 marines wounded, several of them badly; total 12 killed and 28 wounded. The loss on board the *Didon*, according to the report of Captain Milius, amounted to 27 officers (including her second captain), seamen, and marines killed, and 44 badly wounded, out of a crew, as stated in the British official account and sworn to by the French officers, numbering 330.

Until Captain Baker's appointment to her, the *Phoenix* had been armed precisely according to the establishment of her class, as described a few pages back;† but, being of opinion that the complement allowed to an 18-pounder 36-gun frigate, was not sufficient for fighting her to advantage, Captain Baker applied for and obtained the exchange of his 26 long 18-pounders for an equal number of medium guns of the same caliber; which, requiring a less number of men than the former, left so many more for attending to the other duties of the ship. The guns of the *Didon* having already appeared,‡ we may present the following as the

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		PHŒNIX.	DIDON.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	21	23
	{ lbs.	444	563
Crew	No.	245	330
Size	tons	884	1091

Here is a statement which, in every branch of it, exhibits, on the French side, a decided superiority of force. Few cases occur wherein we have not to offer some remarks, tending to increase or diminish the effect which the figures alone are calculated to produce. But, the shorter range of the *Phoenix*'s 18-pounders, at the distance at which the action was fought, being compensated by the increased facility of working them, the above statement conveys a clear idea of the disparity of force in guns that existed between the parties. So it does in respect to crew; for, although a numerical does not always imply a physical superiority, the *Didon*'s was one of the finest crews out of France. Her men consisted of healthy, strong, and active fellows,

* This youth, not quite 17, was wounded in an extraordinary manner. While with jaws extended he was sucking an orange, a musket-ball, which had passed through the head of a seaman, entered one of his cheeks and escaped from the other, without injuring even a tooth. When the wound in each cheek healed, a pair of not unseemly dimples were all that remained.

† See p. 156.

‡ See p. 156.

who had been picked for Captain Jérôme Buonaparte's frigate, the *Pomone*, and had been in service since the commencement of the war; and they were commanded by officers remarkable for their professional skill and gallant demeanour. Captain Milius himself possessed these qualities in an eminent degree. His personal valour during the heat of the battle excited the admiration of his enemy; and the high sense of honour, of which he subsequently, on an occasion quite unconnected with this action,* gave unequivocal proofs, established the greatness of his character.

A contest between two frigates, manned and appointed like the *Phœnix* and *Didon*, would naturally afford the display of much individual heroism. Our means of information are of course restricted to occurrences on board the former; and even there we cannot do more than recite one or two of the more prominent instances. The purser's station in action is in the cockpit; but Mr. John Collman, the acting purser of the *Phœnix*, scorned to remain in safety below, while the lives of his brother officers and comrades were exposed to danger on deck. With a brace of pistols in his belt and a broadsword in his hand, did this young man, in the hottest of the fire, take post on the quarterdeck: there, by his gesture and language, he animated the crew to do their duty as British seamen. "Give it her, my lads!" was an exhortation, as well understood as it was obeyed, and the guns of the *Phœnix* dealt increased destruction upon the decks of the *Didon*. As the action proceeded, the loss by death or wounds of officers from the quarterdeck, and the temporary absence of the captain to assist in fixing the gun in his cabin, gave additional importance to the noble part which the acting purser had chosen. And what could have been the summit of Mr. Collman's expectations, in a professional way, for being thus prodigal of his person?—A purser's warrant.

There were two or three youngsters among the midshipmen, who also distinguished themselves. One, named Edward Phillips, saved the life of Captain Baker. On that occasion, while the ships were foul, a man upon the *Didon's* bowsprit-end was taking a deliberate aim at him, when young Phillips, who, armed with a musket, stood close to his captain, unceremoniously thrust him on one side and fired. The discharge of the piece was instantly followed by the splash of the Frenchman's body in the water; and the ball from the musket of the latter, instead of passing through the captain's head, did but tear off the rim of his hat. Several of the sick seamen also left their cots, and assisted in filling and carrying powder for the use of their more efficient comrades. Instances of this kind would frequently occur, did every naval captain understand the difficult art, to maintain the rules of discipline, and yet win and preserve the affections of his crew.

* See parliamentary proceedings on the abolition of the slave trade.

The name of no officer appearing in the letter of Captain Baker published in the London Gazette, the very recital of the above acts of good conduct on the part of his officers may raise a charge of unfairness against him, until it is known, that the services of every officer belonging to the *Phoenix* were properly set forth in the letter which Captain Baker transmitted to the admiralty. If, for reasons not very clear, it becomes requisite to suppress more than half an officer's letter, the mutilated portions laid before the public, and which in this instance is very short, should not be called "Copy of," but, "Extract from, a letter." Then, neither will the public have grounds for supposing that the writer wishes it to be inferred that his valour alone achieved the victory, nor the officers who served under him, and who contributed so mainly to the consummation of that victory, have a right to complain, that their captain has neglected to mention them.

The action of the *Phoenix* and *Didon* was one in which, even after its decision, the victorious party had both a difficult and a perilous duty to perform. The prisoners greatly outnumbered the captors: the latter, therefore, had not only to separate and secure the former, but to watch over them with unremitting attention. They had also to refit the ships, particularly the prize, whose mainmast was in so tottering a state, that the British were obliged to cut it away. The wreck cleared, the *Phoenix*, taking the *Didon* in tow, steered for a British port. On the 14th, at 8 p. m., Captain Baker spoke the *Dragon 74*, and in company with her, the next day at 4 p. m., fell in with M. Villeneuve's fleet. The *Phoenix*, with the *Didon* in tow, immediately bore up and made all sail to the southward. A division of the fleet chased the two crippled frigates, and had nearly arrived within gun-shot, when, at sunset, the French ships tacked and stood back to their main body. Having passed Lisbon, the British frigate and her prize were steering to enter Gibraltar, when, in a thick fog, the ringing of bells and the occasional firing of guns were heard in every direction. Shortly afterwards Captain Baker became apprized by the *Euryalus* frigate, whom he spoke, that the sounds proceeded from the Franco-Spanish fleet, then on its way to Cadiz. The *Phoenix* and *Didon* immediately changed their course to the westward, and soon got clear of all danger from the ships of M. Villeneuve.

But this was not the only danger from which Captain Baker and his officers and crew had the good fortune to escape. The French pilot of the *Phoenix* overheard a conversation among the prisoners, the subject of which was, a plan to get possession of the *Phoenix*, and by her means of the *Didon*. The discovery of this plot called for increased vigilance on the part of the British on board of both ships; and, scarcely had means been taken to overawe the prisoners in the hold of the *Phoenix*, than the

French pilot seized and carried aft, as the ringleader of the mutiny, the late cockswain of Captain Milius, and who had been in a similar capacity under Captain Jérôme Buonaparte. Captain Milius behaved upon the occasion in the noblest manner. He inquired of the man if he had any complaints to allege. The fellow said he had not. "I know it," said Captain Milius, "for I have, every morning and night, a report that assures me of the good treatment of you all: were it otherwise, I myself would head you in the attempt to obtain redress. As it is, you are a disgrace to the name of Frenchman; and," turning to Captain Baker, "I beseech you, sir, put him in irons." Captain Baker expressing a disinclination to resort to so harsh a measure, Captain Milius urged him more forcibly to do as he requested; and Jérôme's cockswain was accordingly committed, for a short time, to the custody of the master at arms. After this firebrand had been removed, quietness, and even cheerfulness, reigned among the prisoners; and the two frigates, having by standing well to the westward got a fair wind, anchored on the 3d of September in Plymouth Sound.

Having thus brought his frigate and her prize safe to a British port, Captain Baker, it is natural to suppose, looked forward to the speedy acquisition of those honours which, in all similar cases, had been conferred upon the captain of the victorious ship. We trust that, by this time, our impartiality is so well established, that any opinion we may submit respecting the merits of an action recorded in these pages, will be received as the result of, at the least, an unbiassed judgment. Having premised this, we venture to pronounce the capture of the *Didon* by the *Phoenix*, considered in reference as well to the force, the skill, and the spirit, mutually opposed, as to the perseverance and good management of the conqueror in securing and bringing home his prize, to be one of the most brilliant and exemplary cases of the kind in the annals of the British navy.

Unfortunately for the captain of the *Phoenix*, Mr. Pitt resolved to grant no more ribands of the Bath to naval and military officers, meaning to reserve them for ministers abroad. Still more unfortunately for Captain Baker, that illustrious statesman, before he could accomplish his intention of instituting a new military order of merit, died. The early retirement of Lord Barham from office (February 9, 1806) must have been an additional misfortune to Captain Baker. Not less so, probably, was the successive appointment, within about five years, of five new first-lords of the admiralty: Lord Grey, Honourable Thomas Grenville, Lord Mulgrave, Right Honourable Charles Yorke, and Lord Melville. With each of whom it is customary, in reply to complaints such as the captain of the *Phoenix* might reasonably urge, to express regret that merit should have been overlooked by his predecessor, but to decline entering into any retrospective view of the circumstances which may have guided

that predecessor's conduct. Thus it has happened, that, to this hour, Captain Baker has received no reward for his meritorious services in capturing the *Didon*. It is true that, in 10 years afterwards, when the new order was instituted, he was made a companion of the Bath; but, as every one of the three remaining captains of frigates in Sir Richard Strachan's action was honoured with a similar mark of approbation, there cannot be a doubt that Captain Baker would have received the same, even had he, if we may judge from an analogous case, run away from, instead of fought and captured, a superior French frigate.

The *Didon* was built in the year 1797 at St.-Malo, and, just before she sailed for the West Indies in the spring of 1805, underwent a thorough repair. Her sailing qualities were so extraordinary, that, although jury-rigged, she beat the *Phoenix* on every point. The *Didon* was purchased for the use of the British navy, but, for some reason with which we are unacquainted, was suffered to lie in ordinary in Hamoaze until taken to pieces in the year 1811. We had almost forgotten to mention, that Mr. Samuel Brown was the first lieutenant of the *Phoenix*. We wish it was in our power to add, that he became rewarded with the promotion customary upon less important occasions. He was not made a commander until August 1, 1811.

While the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Swift*, Captain John Wright, was cruising in the bay of Honduras, information reached him of a *garda-costa* which had taken several vessels trading to that settlement. For the purpose, if possible, of putting a stop to the depredations of this Spanish schooner, Captain Wright detached his second lieutenant, Mr. James Smith, with a party of men, on board a prize schooner in company, the *Marianne*.

On the 13th of August, having received intelligence, when cruising off the island of Bonacca, that the *garda-costa* was lying at an anchor under the batteries of Truxillo, Lieutenant Smith proposed to his people a plan to cut her out. This being cheerfully acquiesced in, the *Marianne*, under cover of the night, stood over for the harbour, and got well into the bay without being discovered. Lieutenant Smith then despatched two small boats with six men in each, one under the command of Mr. Walker, the *Swift's* boatswain, and the other, of Mr. William Pitt Bowler, one of her midshipmen, with directions to ascertain if the *garda-costa* was really in the situation described. The *Marianne* at the same time stood in to cover, if necessary, her two boats.

Shortly afterwards the *Marianne* obtained a sight of the *garda-costa* at her moorings. Almost at the same moment Mr. Bowler's boat (Mr. Walker's, from pulling heavy, not being able to get up) gallantly boarded, and after some resistance carried, the Spanish *garda-costa* *Caridad-Perfecta*, of 12 (pierced

for 16) guns; but, the chief part of her crew being on shore, with only her captain and 14 men present when the attack commenced, and these jumped overboard at its conclusion and escaped to the shore. The noise of the struggle alarmed the forts, which immediately opened a very heavy fire. The gardacosta's cables were, however, quickly cut, and sail made upon her. After a fire continued for some time between the Swift and Marianne and the Truxillo batteries, the prize was brought safely out without the loss of a man. To the additional credit of Mr. Bowler, he had been only two years at sea.

On the 9th of October the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Princess-Charlotte, Captain George Tobin, cruising near the island of Tobago, discovered at a great distance to windward a suspicious ship and brig. Seeing no chance of overtaking these vessels if he went in chase, Captain Tobin disguised his vessel as much as possible. This had the desired effect; and the French brig-corvette *Naiade* of 16 long 12-pounders, four 2-pounder brass swivels, and 170 men, commanded by Lieutenant Joseph-Pierre-Marie Hamon, and ship-corvette, late British sloop, *Cyane*, of 26 guns (18 long 6-pounders* on the main deck, and two fours and six 12-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, all English caliber), and 190 men commanded by Lieutenant Charles Léonard Menard, bore down to capture the supposed merchant ship.

The two French vessels did not discover their mistake, until the *Cyane* at least was within gun-shot of the frigate. That ship made a very gallant defence, and did not surrender until, besides being greatly damaged, she had her first lieutenant and two seamen killed, and an enseigne de vaisseau and eight seamen wounded, some of them severely. The French commodore, M. Hamon, by taking a more prudent, if not so honourable a course, and by superior sailing, effected his escape without any apparent injury. In a week afterwards, however, after a nine hours' chase to windward, and a partial firing of 15 minutes' duration, in which she had one man killed, the *Naiade* was captured, in latitude 14° 5' north, longitude 55° 48' west, by the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Jason*, Captain William Champain.

On the 14th of November the French 38-gun frigates *Libre* and *Furieuse* sailed from Flushing, bound on a cruise, first off the coast of Ireland to capture British merchantmen, and then off the mole of St.-Nicolas, island of St.-Domingo, to destroy the vessels and harass the commerce of the black inhabitants. The two frigates were next to proceed to the city of Santo-Domingo, and, if there or elsewhere they could get a sufficient supply of provisions, were to extend their cruise to October, 1806.

* The gazette-letter says "twenty;" but the ship had ports for only 18, which was the number she carried in the British service.

This plan was defeated, at a very early stage of the cruise, by a gale of wind off the coast of Scotland, which caused the separation of the two frigates. One of them, the *Libre*, on the morning of the 24th of December, when off the port of Rochefort, fell in with, and was chased by, the British 44-gun frigate *Egyptienne*, acting commander (in the absence of Captain the Honourable Charles Elphinstone Fleeming, who was attending Sir Robert Calder's court-martial) Lieutenant Philip Cosby Handfield. At noon the 38-gun frigate *Loire*, Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland, joined in the chase, and at 3 p. m. brought the *Libre* to action. At 3 h. 10 m. the *Egyptienne* opened her fire; receiving from the French frigate, as did also the *Loire*, an animated fire in return. In a very short time the *Egyptienne* ran the *Libre* on board, carrying away by the shock the latter ship's bowsprit and doing some injury to her own larboard fore-channel. Close quarters with such an antagonist as the *Egyptienne*, whose maindeck guns were 24-pounders, soon put an end to the contest; and at 3 h. 30 m. p. m., after a brave defence, the *Libre*, mounting 24 long 18-pounders on the main deck, and 10 long 8-pounders and six (brass, we believe) 36-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 40 guns, with a crew of 280 men and boys, commanded by Captain Henri Descorches, hauled down her colours to the two frigates opposed to her.

The loss on board the *Egyptienne*, out of a crew of 330 men and boys, amounted to one man killed and nine wounded. The *Loire* does not appear to have sustained any loss; and her damages were also very trifling. The *Egyptienne*, on the contrary, had the head of her main topmast shot away, her mainmast and bowsprit much wounded, and her rigging and sails injured, particularly her fore topsail, which was entirely destroyed. The *Libre*, according to the representation of her officers, had 20 men killed and wounded; and so badly wounded were the French frigate's three masts, that towards midnight, when the sea was high, they all fell over her side. In this state, with her hull a good deal damaged, the prize was taken in tow by the *Loire*, and arrived on the 4th of January at Plymouth.

The *Libre* measured 1009 tons, and was pierced to carry 26 guns upon the main deck; but, having been built since the year 1772, the prize was old and worn out, and therefore not purchased for the use of the British navy. The *Libre*'s late consort, the *Furieuse*, was more fortunate than herself, having succeeded in entering the port of Lorient.

On the 28th of November, at 5 p. m., the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Serpent*, Captain John Waller, cruising off the island of Bonacca in the bay of Honduras, discovered two suspicious sail in the north-east or windward quarter. Considering it impracticable by chasing to close them before dark, and believing their destination to be the port of Truxillo, Captain Waller

made no movement till dusk ; when he bore up for the bay, and before 11 P. M. reached the entrance of it. On the 29th at 2 A. M., two fore-and-aft rigged vessels, doubtless the same, were seen rounding the east point forming Truxillo bay, but they soon hauled so close to the land as to be scarcely discernible. Conceiving the best means of attacking them would be by the boats, Captain Waller despatched two of them under the command of his second lieutenant, William Patfull, assisted by Charles Trace master's mate, with him in the launch, and Samuel Nisbett midshipman, and Thomas Scriven purser, in the cutter.

The two boats hastened towards the objects of attack, and, on approaching the sternmost vessel, they received from her a heavy discharge from great guns and small-arms. In spite of every opposition, however, Lieutenant Patfull and his party boarded, and without the slightest loss carried, the catholic king's schooner *garda-costa* San-Christovel Pano, mounting one long traversing 18-pounder, two iron 4-pounders, and four brass 3-pounders, with abundance of small-arms and a crew of 40 men ; of whom her commander, Don Juan-Christovel Tierro, and 25 men escaped by jumping overboard and swimming to the shore. Leaving the cutter's crew in charge of the prize, Lieutenant Patfull, with the launch alone, went in pursuit of the other vessel, which proved to be a Spanish felucca-privateer, of one 4-pounder and 40 men ; but, by lowering down her sails and sweeping round the opposite side of the bay, close to Luke's keys, this vessel, by daylight, was nearly under the fort of Truxillo, and consequently effected her escape.

COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—WEST INDIES.

In our account of the proceedings of M. Villeneuve's fleet in the year 1804* has already appeared the plan of operations which Napoléon, on the 29th of September in that year, marked out for the squadron of five sail of the line and four frigates, under the command of Rear-admiral Missiessy, then lying in the road of the isle of Aix, watching an opportunity to escape the vigilance of the British blockading squadron, under Vice-admiral Collingwood in the *Dreadnought* 98. The French squadron had been ready for sea since May or June, 1804 ; and on the 2d of August the *Jemmappes* and *Suffren* 74s, accompanied by the *Armide* and *Gloire* frigates, attempted to sail out ; but, finding Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder, who then commanded the blockading squadron, close off the port, the French ships returned to their anchorage in Aix road ; where, moored in two lines, the squadron lay free from molestation, defended on one

* See vol. iii., p. 240.

side by the batteries upon the isle of Aix, and on the other by a large floating battery, mounting 12 heavy mortars of an extraordinary size, and 32-long 36 and 24 pounders, with a furnace for heating shot.

The expedition of M. Missiessy, it will be remembered, had for its principal object the capture of the island of Dominique, with power to the rear-admiral, if he deemed the thing practicable, to attempt Sainte-Lucie; and he was particularly directed to garrison, and endeavour to retain possession of, his conquests. On the 11th of January in the present year, owing to the temporary absence of Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Graves, who then commanded on the Rochefort station, Rear-admiral Missiessy was enabled to put to sea. On the following morning, the 12th, the British 12-gun schooner *Felix*, Lieutenant Richard Bourne, discovered the French squadron, and proceeded with the intelligence in search of Sir Thomas Graves, but whom Lieutenant Bourne was not able to join until the 16th; and even then, owing to a strong gale at south-west, the British squadron was compelled to put into Quiberon bay.

After being detained on the coast by a succession of similar gales, M. Missiessy, on the 25th, proceeded on his mission. His force consisted of the *Majestueux* three-decker, the four 74-gun ships *Jemmappes*, *Lion*, *Magnanime*, and *Suffren*, the three 40-gun frigates *Armide*, *Gloire*, and *Infatigable*, and the two 16-gun brig-corvettes *Actéon* and *Lynx*, having on board 3500 troops, under the command of General Lagrange, besides a great quantity of military stores, including a considerable train of artillery.

The interruption, already complained of, in the correspondence of Napoléon with his minister of marine,* renders uncertain the nature of the modifications of the original plan. The probability is, that the additional instructions received by Rear-admiral Missiessy were, chiefly, that he was to disembark the military stores, in stated quantities, at Martinique and Guadaloupe; that he was to capture and possess Dominique, and, without any particular reference to Sainte-Lucie, was to depredate, as far as he was able, the weaker of the neighbouring British colonies; and that if, in 35 days from his arrival in the Antilles, Admiral Villeneuve, with the Toulon fleet, did not make his appearance, M. Missiessy was to commence his return home, calling on his way at the city of Santo-Domingo, and leaving with General Ferrand as many troops as he might have remaining on board.

On the 20th of February Rear-admiral Missiessy, with his squadron, entered the channel of Sainte-Lucie, there fell in with and chased an English convoy, but succeeded in capturing one vessel only, the *Prince-of-Asturias* transport; and, on the same

* See vol. iii., p. 335.

afternoon, cast anchor in the road of Fort-de-France, or Fort-Royal, Martinique. During the evening the squadron landed 2500 muskets and 50,000 weight (French) of powder. The rear-admiral and general also disembarked, and, on a consultation with Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, the governor-general of the island, came to the determination to make an immediate attack upon the British island of Dominique. The plan was this. The squadron was to appear before the island at daybreak on the 22d, and to effect a disembarkation at three different points; for which purpose the troops were divided into three columns. The first column, consisting of 900 men, and commanded by General Lagrange in person, was to land between the south-east point of the island and the town of Roseau, possess itself of a battery situated on the point, and then march rapidly towards the fort which defends the town on its east side. The second column, composed of 500 men, under Adjutant Barbot, having disembarked at the foot of Morne-Daniel, distant a full mile and a half to the north-west of Roseau, was to turn a fort that commanded the town, and cut off the retreat of the garrison. The third column, composed of about 900 men, and commanded by General Claparède, was to land within two gun-shots of a mountain situated at the north-west extremity of the island, and carry that position at the point of the bayonet.

On the 21st, in the afternoon, the French squadron, preceded by an armed schooner as a look-out, set sail towards Dominique, and at midnight arrived abreast of the south-east point of the island. On the 22d, at about 3 A. M., the fort of Scotshead, a post not far from this spot, discharged the alarm-gun; and shortly afterwards the signal was answered by fires in different parts of the island. The French admiral continued to stand on under easy sail, and, just as the day dawned, appeared before the town of Roseau. The ships of the squadron immediately hoisted English ensigns and pendants, and prepared for disembarking the troops. Meanwhile Brigadier-general George Prevost, the commander-in-chief or governor of Dominique, deceived by the colours of the ships, had sent the captain of the fort on board the *Majestueux*, to conduct the supposed British admiral and his squadron to a safe anchorage. This appears in General Lagrange, but not in General Prevost's letter. Shortly afterwards the boats pushed off with the troops, and the squadron changed its colours to French.

The column of General Lagrange, 900 strong, was the first that landed, effecting its disembarkation, under cover, at first of the *Actéon* and the schooner, and subsequently of the *Majestueux*, *Jemmappes*, and *Lion*, at a spot not far distant from that originally fixed upon. A gallant resistance was made by the British regulars and colonial militia, under the command of Major Nunn of the 46th regiment, and, on his being severely wounded, of

Captain O'Connell, of the first West-India regiment; but, against an enemy so comparatively numerous, every effort was unavailing, and the important post of Cachecrow was carried. The second column, under Adjutant Barbot, 500 strong, landed near Morne-Daniel, and, after a slight skirmish with a body of militia "under Brigadier-general Prevost,"* assaulted and carried the redoubt; in which, according to the French accounts, 16 militia artillerymen were taken. The remainder of the colonial forces, with the brigadier-general at their head, retired to the heights of Woodbridge-estate, a defile of difficult approach.

While all this was going on, a spirited cannonade was maintained between the *Magnanime*, *Suffren*, and three frigates, joined afterwards by the remainder of the French squadron, on the one part, and the guns of Fort Young and Fort Melville on the other. The latter fort mounting five long 24-pounders, and the former five long 24 and three 18 pounders with a furnace for heating shot, several of which in their red-hot state were discharged at the shipping.

The calm, which usually prevails at this early hour of the day, prevented the covering vessels from lending a prompt aid to General Claparède and his column of 900 men. Consequently, the latter did not accomplish a landing until past noon, and then not on the spot originally intended. The general, however, succeeded at last in disembarking his men, and soon effected a junction with General Lagrange. The united columns then attacked, and at 4 P. M. entered Fort Young: where they found about 300 militiamen, who laid down their arms. Meanwhile the town of Roseau had been set on fire, not by the shot of the ships that lay off, but by the wadding of one of the guns mounted upon Fort Young. The French soldiers, it is related, did their utmost to extinguish the flames; but the only part of the town saved were a few small houses occupied by free negroes.

Brigadier-general Prevost, as soon as he found the case was desperate, retreated across the island, accompanied by Brigademajor Prevost and a quartermaster of militia, and arrived, in 24 hours afterwards, at the strong hold of Prince-Rupert. This place of safety the general and his two friends, it appears, would scarcely have reached, so difficult is the country to traverse, had it not been for the assistance of the inhabitants and the exertions of the Caribs. No sooner did the British commander-in-chief of the island reach the fort, than he directed all the cattle to be driven in, and took measures for getting a supply of water from

* The official letter is not very clear on this point. A private letter from St.-Kitts is rather more explicit. "General Prevost, having observed from the government-house the ineffectual resistance," &c. &c.

the river in the bay. He had previously given orders for all the regulars in the island to follow him; leaving the militia and the president of the council to make the best terms they could with the enemy, for what remained of the town of Roseau, the capital of the island.

The loss sustained by the British regulars, in resisting the invaders and defending the various posts, amounted to one sergeant, one drummer, and 19 rank and file killed, one field-officer, two captains, and 18 rank and file wounded, and one captain, one sergeant, and six rank and file taken by the enemy; total 21 killed, 21 wounded, and eight prisoners. There were also three sailors wounded, assisting at the batteries; and the loss on the part of the militia, although not known at the date of the official return, is declared to have been considerable. The French state the British loss at 200 in killed, wounded, and prisoners: they, of course, include the militia, and may not be far from the truth. Their own loss the French report at three officers and 32 soldiers killed, and five officers and 77 soldiers wounded; an amount which, without reckoning the loss, if any, on board the squadron, sufficiently proves, that the few British opposed to them had made a good use of their powder and ball.

The British official account is so loosely worded, that it is impossible to get at the exact number of regulars engaged. They probably did not exceed 220 men; nor, taking the French account, does the whole force, regular and irregular, upon the island, appear to have been more than 650 or 700 men; whereas the French force that landed is acknowledged to have consisted of 2300 men, all veteran soldiers; exclusive of a reserve on board the squadron of about 1200 men, of an equal good quality. The squadron itself, without the troops, was of sufficient strength to have created considerable annoyance.

The governor of Dominica, who had reached his post of safety on the 23d, was, on the 25th, summoned by General Lagrange to surrender the fortress of Prince-Rupert. On the same day Brigadier-general Prevost returned a reply, which, if he had not annexed a copy of it to his official letter, might be considered as a private communication, sent purposely to thank the French general for his humanity towards, and kind treatment of, his wife and children; of whom, by the by, no mention whatever is made in General Lagrange's letter. Although, by inference, a passage in General Prevost's letter may be taken to refer to the summons which had been sent to surrender Fort Rupert, there is no direct allusion to it. For instance: "I have had the honour to receive your letter. My duty to my king and country is so superior to every other consideration, that I have only to thank you for the observations you have been pleased to make on the often inevitable consequences of war. Give me leave, individually, to express the greatest gratitude for your humanity

and kind treatment of my wife and children, and at the same time to request a continuance thereof, not only to her and them, but towards every other object you may meet with."

General Lagrange, however, either did receive some letter putting a negative upon his demand, or so construed the one which has been published; for, although General Ernouf from Guadaloupe had just arrived at Roseau, and offered to add a corps of grenadiers to the force under General Lagrange to enable him the more easily to reduce the fort, the latter decided, in preference, to evacuate the island. After dilapidating the batteries, embarking some guns, and spiking others, destroying the carriages, the ammunition, and the warehouses containing provisions, taking away such prisoners as were regulars, disarming the militia and putting them on their parole, and not omitting to levy a contribution, at first of 6000*l.* but at length of 5500*l.* sterling, upon the inhabitants, the general and his troops, on the 27th, at about 10 A. M., reembarked on board the squadron. At noon the latter set sail for Guadaloupe; whither the *Lynx* had already convoyed the 22 English and colonial merchant vessels (nine or ten only square-rigged), which it had been her business, while the engagement was pending, to carry off from the road of Roseau; but of which, or of the dismantlement of the batteries, not a word is there in the brigadier's letter to Sir William Myers.

Other good fortune, than that of escaping to the fort of Prince-Rupert without scratch or bruise, attended Brigadier-general Prevost. He contrived to, what, in homely but intelligible language, is called, bamboozle the folks at home. The *Annual Register*, making no distinction between doing a thing and ordering it to be done, declares that the governor, not Major Nunn, "opposed with the small force under his command, the landing of the French inch by inch."* "Throughout the whole of this transaction," proceeds the writer, "the highest praise is due to the conduct of the governor, and the British troops under his command." The conduct of the latter was, indeed, entitled to every praise. But praise was not all that he or that they received. The committee of the Patriotic Fund, unable to make the proper discrimination, presented the governor of Dominique with a 100*l.* sword and a piece of plate, and gave a 50*l.* sword to each of the two officers, Major Nunn and Captain O'Connell, as well as sums of money to the wounded privates. With respect to General Lagrange, our decided opinion is, that he did not do his duty in so soon evacuating the island of Dominique. He should at least have made an attempt upon Prince-Rupert. So Napoléon thought, but, from some unexplained cause, included the admiral in the censure which he passed upon the general. However, as is too often the case in the minor concerns of life,

* *Annual Register*, for 1805, p. 220.

what marred the fortune of one man made the fortune of the other; and General Prevost rose to fame upon the forbearance of General Lagrange to push his success to a point, which, in all probability, would have made the former his prisoner, instead of, in the language of undue panegyric, his conqueror.

On anchoring with his squadron at Basse-Terre, Guadaloupe, Rear-admiral Missiessy disembarked the proportion of troops and military stores allotted for the island, took in a supply of water, sold his prizes, divided the proceeds among his crews and the troops; and, on the evening of the 2d of March, scarcely 60 hours from his entering the road, weighed and stood out. On the 5th, at daybreak, the squadron passed Nevis point, and appeared off the island of St.-Kitts; the frigates and smaller vessels anchoring, about noon, in the road of Basse-Terre, the capital of the island. Shortly afterwards a column of 500 men, commanded by Adjutant Barbot, effected a landing without opposition, and, entering the town, demanded of the inhabitants the sum of 40,000*l.* sterling, threatening, in case of failure, to set it on fire. The militia having previously joined the few British regulars, forming a total of about 500 men, in the almost impregnable fortress of Brimstone-hill, a committee from the principal inhabitants succeeded in persuading the French general and admiral to be contented with 18,000*l.*; which sum, with great difficulty, was collected and paid over to them. Having destroyed the guns and stores at the two batteries of Basse-Terre, and disarmed a part of the militia, the French troops re-embarked; but, previously to its departure, the squadron committed a gross breach of faith in pillaging the road of Basse-Terre, from which the frigates took six merchantmen, all it contained. Four of these the French afterwards burnt. The remaining two, one laden with sugar, the other with coffee and cotton, they carried off as prizes.

After this predatory exploit, the French ships proceeded off the island of Nevis. There they levied a contribution of about 4000*l.* sterling, disarmed the batteries, and destroyed five merchant vessels, all they could find. The island of Montserrat received a similar visit. Thus enriched, Rear-admiral Missiessy and General Lagrange, in a few days afterwards reanchored in Fort-Royal, Martinique. Here the admiral found the French brig *Palinure*, recently arrived from France with despatches, which announced the return of M. Villeneuve to Toulon in consequence of a storm, and ordered M. Missiessy to return forthwith to Europe. After disembarking at Martinique nearly the whole of the troops remaining on board the squadron, the French admiral set sail for France. Calling on his way off the city of Santo-Domingo, he found General Ferrand, with a handful of men, reduced to the greatest extremity by the persevering attacks of the negroes; against whom the general had sustained

a siege of 24 days, and from whom he had little chance of escape, as the port was generally blockaded by one or more British frigates. General Lagrange promptly disembarked his remaining battalion; and a quantity of money and provisions was also supplied to General Ferrand. After this the squadron again set sail; and, although two or three British squadrons, under enterprising officers, had been despatched to look after him, being as little annoyed by hostile squadrons on his return as he had been on his way out, Rear-admiral Missiessy re-anchored, on the 20th of May, in the road of the Isle of Aix.

BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

IN the abstract which we have now to introduce,* is to be found the greatest number of British ships of war that ever was, or that perhaps ever will be ordered to be built within a single year. Considering what gigantic efforts, until the close of the year 1805, had been making by Buonaparte for the invasion of Great Britain, no surprise need be created, that efforts, corresponding in magnitude, should be made by the latter to frustrate the attempt. The extraordinary increase of 21 ships in the commissioned line-of-battle column, while the total of the sea-service ships of the same rank exhibits an increase of only four, proves that effectual means had been taken for a present, as well as for a future, augmentation of force.

A reference to No. 13 abstract shows that, at the commencement of the year 1805, there were 33 ships of the line in ordinary, either repairing or to be repaired for sea-service. The greater part of these ships were in want of what is termed a thorough repair; that is, a repair that would have cost nearly as much money, and have occupied nearly as much time, as a rebuild. To obviate this, a measure was resorted to, which, since the year 1797, had been recommended to the admiralty by Mr. Gabriel Snodgrass, surveyor to the East India company. It was that of strengthening some ships by diagonal braces, doubling or sheathing others with plank, and, where the ships were in a still worse state, both bracing and doubling them. By this method 22 sail of the line, five 18-pounder frigates, and seven of a smaller class, were brought forward into active service. Every one of these ships, except the *Ganges*, was at sea in the year 1805; several of the line-of-battle ships took an active part in the different engagements which occurred in that eventful year;

* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 14.

and, while none of the ships returned to port to be laid up in ordinary or repaired within two years, two remained out of nine, and several for six or seven years, after they had been thus expeditiously and economically converted from useless hulks to effective cruisers.*

Among the newly-built vessels of the year 1805, is the first regular ship of war belonging to the British navy constructed of teak, the *Salsette*, and at the top of the column of ordered ships stands a first-rate, the *Nelson*, similar in size and force to the *Caledonia*, and whose tonnage is about double that of the 18 "cruisers" grouped together at the bottom of the same column. Nothing further occurring in Abstract No. 14 worthy of notice in this place, it will suffice to refer to the customary lists of prizes made, and losses sustained, during the year 1805.†

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1806, was,

Admirals	.	.	.	.	.	55
Vice-admirals	.	.	.	.	.	50
Rear-admirals	.	.	.	.	.	56
"					superannuated 22	
Captains	.	.	.	.	.	617
"					26	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	.	.	.	.	.	416
"					superannuated 46	
Lieutenants	.	.	.	.	.	2437
Masters	.	.	.	.	.	541

And the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the same year was 120,000.‡

In our last year's account of the proceedings of the Brest fleet, we stated that, on the 13th of December, a strong division of it, consisting of 11 sail of the line, four frigates, and a ship-corvette, had escaped from the anchorage outside of the goulet; and that, in consequence of the severity of the weather, Admiral Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, was not apprized of the circumstance.§

On the 14th these 11 line-of-battle ships, which were the élite of the Brest fleet, separated into two squadrons; one of which consisted of the

Gun-ship

120	Impérial	{	Vice-adm. Corentin-Urbain Leissegues.
80	Alexandre	{	Captain Julien-Gabriel Bigot.
			" Pierre-Elie Garreau.
	{ Brave		Commod. Louis-Marie Coudé.
74	{ Diomède		Captain Jean-Baptiste Henry.
	{ Jupiter		" Gaspard Laignel.
<i>Frigates, Cornète and Félicité; ship-corvette Diligente.</i>			

* A list of the ships, down to 18-pounder frigates inclusive, which were so doubled and braced, will be found in the Appendix. See No. 12.

† See Appendix, Nos. 13, 14, 15, and 16.

‡ Ibid., No. 17.

§ See vol. iii., p. 305.

This squadron, provisioned for six months, and having on board about 1000 troops, was to proceed direct to Santo-Domingo, and there disembark the troops as a reinforcement to General Ferrand. M. Leissegues was then to cruise two months before the island of Jamaica ; and, if the British were too strong in that quarter, he was to proceed off the bank of Newfoundland ; there “manger jusqu'à son dernier biscuit,” and then steer straight for Rochefort or Lorient.

The other squadron was under the command of Rear-admiral Willaumez, and consisted of the

Gun-ship

80	Foudroyant	{ Rear-adm. Jean-Bapt.-Phillibert Willaumez.
		{ Captain Antoine Henri.
	{ Cassard	Commod. Gilbert-Amable Faure.
	{ Impétueux	Alain-Joseph Le Veyer-Belair.
74	{ Patriote	Jos.-Hyacinthe-Isidore Khrom.
	{ Eole	Captain Louis-Gilles Prévost-de-Lacroix.
	{ Vétéran	„ Jérôme Buonaparte.

Frigates, Valeureuse and Volontaire ; also two brig-corvettes, or avisos.

This squadron, provisioned also for six months, was to proceed off St.-Helena or the Cape of Good Hope, at the rear-admiral's option ; then to steer for Martinique or Guadeloupe to get supplies. M. Willaumez was then to touch at Cayenne for information, cruise off Barbadoes for a few months, and, having done all the mischief possible to British commerce in that quarter, was to return, by the way of Saint-Helena, to Europe. This cruise, it was supposed, would occupy a period of about 14 months.

It was not until the 24th of December, 1805, that intelligence reached the admiralty, and that was by a cartel from Gibraltar, of the escape from Brest of a French squadron, stated to consist of seven, instead of 11, sail of the line and four frigates. Immediately two British squadrons were ordered to put to sea : one, of seven sail of the line, under Vice-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, as follows :

Gun-ship

98	London	Captain Sir Harry Neale, Bart.
80	Foudroyant	{ Vice-adm. (b.) Sir John Borlase Warren, Bart.
		{ Captain John Chambers White.
	{ Ramillies	„ Francis Pickmore.
	{ Hero	„ Hon. Alan Hyde Gardner.
74	{ Namur	„ Lawrence William Halsted.
	{ Repulse	„ Hon. Arthur Kaye Legge.
	{ Courageux	„ James Bissett.

The other, of the following six sail, under Rear-admiral Sir Richard Strachan :

Gun-ship

98	St.-George	Captain Thomas Bertie.
80	Cæsar	{ Rear-ad. (b.) Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart.
		{ Captain Charles Richardson.

Gun-ship

74	Centaur	Captain Sir Samuel Hood.
	Terrible	" Lord Henry Paulet.
	Triumph	" Henry Inman.
	Bellona	" John Erskine Douglas.

About the middle or latter end of January, after having been detained several days by foul winds, these squadrons sailed; Sir John Warren's from St.-Helen's, Sir Richard Strachan's from Cawsand bay. Sir John's instructions were to proceed to the island of Madeira, and there endeavour to gain intelligence of the route of the French squadron: if that intelligence did not substantially controvert the supposition of its having gone to the West Indies, the British admiral was then to hasten to Barbadoes; whence, if no tidings could be heard, he was, after leaving a portion of his force with Rear-admiral Cochrane, to run down to Jamaica. There he was to consult with Vice-admiral Dacres, and, if the latter should have nothing to communicate respecting the route of the French, he was to augment the force on the Jamaica station to four sail of the line, and, with the remaining ships of his squadron, return to Spithead. Sir Richard Strachan, with his six sail of the line, was to proceed straight to the island of St.-Helena, in search also of the above French squadron. Not finding it there, he was to make the best of his way to the Cape of Good Hope, to reinforce the expedition which had been sent to effect the capture of that important settlement. Let us now return to the two French admirals.

On the 15th, in the afternoon, latitude $46^{\circ} 8'$ north, longitude $12^{\circ} 14'$ west, a British convoy of 23 sail, from Cork to the West Indies, under the protection of the 38-gun frigates *Arethusa*, Captain Charles Brisbane, and *Boadicea*, Captain John Maitland, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Wasp*, Captain Buckland Stirling Bluett, fell in with both French squadrons to leeward; the nearest of which, being that of M. Leissegues, was steering to the westward, with a north-north-east wind, and the other, which was only visible from the mast-head, appeared to be steering to the southward. The squadron under M. Willaumez was, in fact, then in pursuit of a convoy from Gibraltar, in charge of the *Polyphemus* 64 and *Sirius* frigate, and the French succeeded in capturing one or two transports; with which the *Volontaire* was immediately detached to Teneriffe. Four of the French ships, of which the *Vétéran* was one, chased the *Sirius* for nearly two hours, and compelled her to part company.

Early on the morning of the 16th, when the character of the only squadron now seen by Captain Brisbane and his companions became clearly ascertained, 17 of the convoy, by signal from the *Arethusa*, steered south-west, and the remaining six sail, with the three men of war, tacked and stood to the north-west. The French squadron immediately did the same, and

continued the chase throughout the day ; but, towards evening, Rear-admiral Leissegues tacked, and again stood to the south-west. Since morning Captain Brisbane had detached the *Wasp* to Rochefort, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, to inform the admirals commanding upon those stations, of the situation of the French when last seen ; and at 2 P. M. the *Boadicea* had been sent to Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant with similar intelligence.

At midnight, with the six vessels of the convoy then in her company, the *Arethusa* made sail to the westward. With daylight on the 16th, again appeared M. Leissegues and his squadron, in full pursuit, but at a very great distance. In a few hours the French admiral gave over the chase, and left the *Arethusa* and her small charge to pursue their course unmolested. On the 23d, at 4 h. 30 m. P. M., when about midway between Madeira and the Canary isles, the *Arethusa* fell in with the following squadron under Vice-admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth :

Gun-ship

80	Canopus	{ Rear-adm. (w.) Thomas Louis.
		{ Captain Francis William Austen.
	{ Superb.....	{ Vice-adm. (w.) Sir J. T. Duckworth, K.G.
		{ Captain Richard Goodwin Keats.
74	{ Spencer	{ " Hon. Robert Stopford.
	{ Donegal	{ " Pulteney Malcolm.
	{ Powerful	{ " Robert Plampin.
64	Agamemnon.....	" Sir Edward Berry.

Gun-frigate

40	Acasta	" Richard Dalling Dunn.
36	Amethyst.....	" James William Spranger.

On the 15th of November Rear-admiral Louis, with five ships of this squadron, by the orders of Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, was blockading the few French and Spanish ships which the battle of Trafalgar had left in the port of Cadiz, when Sir John Duckworth, in the *Superb*, joined from Plymouth and assumed the command. On the 26th, in the evening, the 18-gun ship-sloop *Lark*, Captain Frederick Langford, informed the *Agamemnon*, that on the 20th, off the Salvages, a cluster of rocks between Madeira and Teneriffe, a French squadron of five sail of the line, a *rasée*, three frigates, and two brig-corvettes, had dispersed a convoy of six sail, which she was conducting to Gorée.

Raising the blockade, Sir John, with his six ships of the line, made all sail towards Madeira, in quest of the above five French ships of the line, which were, as conjectured at the time, the Rochefort squadron under M. Allemand, with the captured *Calcutta* in company.* On the 5th Sir John made and communicated with Madeira, and on the 15th arrived off Teneriffe.

* See p. 150.

The vice-admiral then stood on to the southward as far as the Cape de Verds, and was on his return to resume the blockade of Cadiz, when fallen in with, as already related, by the *Arethusa* and her convoy.

As the British squadron was now working back to the northward, the direction in which the French squadron was when seen by the *Arethusa*, no immediate alteration became necessary in the course of the former. On the 25th, at 6 h. 45 m. A. M., latitude $30^{\circ} 52'$ north, longitude $20^{\circ} 16'$ west, when standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with the wind about east half north, the British descried, in the south-east quarter, which was a little abaft the weather beam, nine strange sail standing to the southward. At 7 A. M. the squadron tacked in the same direction; and every rag of canvass was presently upon Sir John's six sail of the line and two frigates, in chase of the still supposed Rochefort squadron, of five sail of the line and smaller vessels.

During the whole day and night of the 25th the chase continued, both squadrons still on the larboard tack with a moderate breeze from the eastward. On the 26th, at 8 A. M., it was evident that the *Superb*, *Spencer*, and *Agamemnon*, with the *Amethyst* frigate, were gaining upon the sternmost French ship. It was also discovered, in the course of this forenoon, that, instead of five, the enemy had six sail of the line. These, as may be conjectured, composed the squadron of Rear-admiral *Willaumez*, numbering, with the absence of the *Volontaire*, just nine sail, on its way to St. Helena. The chase continued with increased advantage to the British, until 1 P. M.; when the relative distances of the ships, according to the mean calculations of the two headmost British ships, were as follows: French sternmost ship from *superb* about seven miles;* *Spencer* astern of *Superb* about four miles, and *Amethyst* frigate rather nearer; *Agamemnon* about five miles astern of *Spencer*, and hull down to *Superb*; *Acasta* frigate and *Powerful* 74 about 22 miles from *Spencer*, and out of sight from *Superb*; and *Canopus* and *Donegal* out of sight of both *Spencer* and *Superb*. According to the statement of a contemporary, the computed distance between the *Superb* and the sternmost ship of her squadron, which we take to have been the *Donegal*, was, by meridian observation, about 45 miles.†

At the time stated, 1 P. M., to the joy of M. *Willaumez*, and to the surprise, and of course the regret, of such of the British ships as could see it, Sir John directed to be hoisted a signal annulling the chase; and the *Superb*, with more awkwardness than she ever betrayed, before or since, shortened sail and hove to. This

* *Superb's* log says "nine or ten miles," *Spencer's* "five or six, ahead of *Superb*." We have taken the mean of the two.

† *Brenton*, vol. iii., p. 522.

unfortunate signal was run up in latitude $28^{\circ} 35'$ north, and longitude $19^{\circ} 10'$ west, after a chase, reckoning until 1 h. 15 m. P. M., of 30 hours and a half, during which the leading ships had run about 149 miles in a south-south-east direction.

In July, 1801, without waiting for friends, the *Superb* dashed alone among the rearmost ships (two of them three-deckers) of an enemy's fleet;* but Captain Keats was then the first, not the second, officer in command of her. The alleged motive for Sir John's discontinuing the chase was the divided state of the British ships; owing to which the *Superb* might have got herself surrounded and captured before any assistance could reach her. It appears, however, that the French squadron itself, during the latter part of the chase, was by no means concentrated; and that, had the *Superb* brought to action, as in the course of a few hours she might, the sternmost French ship, the *Spencer* and *Agamemnon* were sufficiently advanced to keep in check any other French ships that might have shortened sail to cover their rear. As it is not likely that the French admiral would have abandoned his rearmost ship, a general action would in all probability have ensued; and, as the ships of the two squadrons were equal in number, and all of them two-deckers (there being but one French frigate, the second British frigate would have compensated for the *Agamemnon's* inferiority), the issue, in all reasonable calculation, would have been favourable to the British.

Having by standing for a short time to the north-north-west, collected his scattered ships, Sir John despatched the *Amethyst* to England with intelligence of the strength of the French squadron and of its supposed destination to the East Indies; and then, at about 6 h. 10 m. P. M., bore away west-south-west, to get a supply of water at the Leeward islands, the stock on board not being likely to last until the squadron could work back to its station. On the 2d of January, 1806, the island of St.-Antonio, bearing north-west half-west distant 10 or 12 miles, Sir John detached the *Powerful*, first to victual herself among the Cape de Verds, and then to proceed on to the East Indies, to reinforce the squadron under Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew.

On the 12th of January, with his remaining five sail of the line and one frigate, Sir John anchored in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes, and immediately sent the *Acasta* to the island of St.-Christopher, or St.-Kitts, to expedite the preparations for watering the squadron. On the 14th the squadron weighed from Carlisle bay; and steering to the westward across Fort-Royal bay, Martinique, the vice-admiral anchored, on the evening of the 19th, in Basse-Terre road, St. Christopher's. On the 21st the 74-gun ship *Northumberland*, Captain John Morrison, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral the Honourable Alexander Cochrane

* See vol. iii, p. 127.

and the *Atlas* of the same force, Captain Samuel Pym, joined company, but without communicating a word of intelligence respecting any French squadron.

Sir John here commenced watering and refitting his ships for their homeward passage; when, on the 1st of February, the 16-gun ship-sloop *Kingfisher*, Captain Nathaniel Day Cochrane joined, with intelligence, that a French squadron of three sail of the line had been seen steering towards the city of Santo-Domingo. Immediately the British squadron, now consisting of seven sail of the line, one frigate, and one sloop, weighed and made sail in quest of the enemy. On the 3d the ships lay to off the island of Saint-Thomas, and were joined by the 14-gun brig *Epervier*, Lieutenant James Higginson. The squadron then ran through the Corvel passage, and at noon on the 4th passed the island of Zacheo in the Mona passage. On the 5th, at 8 A. M., the east end of the island of Saint-Domingo bore north-west eight or nine leagues; and shortly afterwards the 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Magicienne*, Captain Adam Mackenzie, with a Danish schooner which she had detained, joined company, bringing a joyful confirmation of the previous intelligence. This schooner had sailed from Santo-Domingo road, while the French squadron was lying there. The French officers, it seems, wished to have her burnt; but the admiral, to his subsequent regret, would not consent.

On the 6th of February, at daybreak, the British squadron, having been under easy sail all night, arrived in sight and nearly abreast of the road and city of Santo-Domingo. At 6 A. M. the *Acasta*, who, with the *Magicienne*, had been ordered ahead, signalled two frigates, one of which was the *Diligente*, under way; and at 6 h. 45 m., nine sail at anchor. Five of these composed the line-of-battle ships, and a sixth the remaining frigate, of the squadron of Rear-admiral Leissegues. The rest were merchantmen. The voyage hither of the former may be related in a few words. On the ninth day after chasing the *Arethusa* and her convoy, having been directed, inconsiderately at this season of the year, to pass to the north-west of the Azores in order to avoid British cruisers, the French squadron encountered a heavy gale of wind, in which the *Jupiter* lost her main topmast, and the *Diomède* sprang a leak. On the next day, the 25th of December, a still more violent storm came on, in which the *Alexandre* and *Brave* parted company. Finding he could not, without additional risk to the squadron, obey his instructions, the rear-admiral, with his remaining three sail of the line, two frigates, and one corvette, bore up and passed to leeward of the Azores. On the 20th of January M. Leissegues anchored in the road of Santo-Domingo, and on the next day disembarked the troops that were on board his ships, along with a quantity of ammunition and other military stores. On the 29th the *Alexandre* and *Brave* joined the *Imperial*, and landed their

troops. The ships then set about repairing their damages, and, by the 6th of February, had so far completed them, as to be nearly ready to get under way and proceed upon their voyage.

At 7 h. 30 m. A. M., observing the force that was approaching them, the French ships slipped their cables and made sail to the westward, in the direction of Cape-Nisao, having a light breeze at about north-north-west. They soon formed in line of battle in the following order: *Alexandre*, *Impérial*, *Diomède*, *Jupiter*, and *Brave*, with the *Félicité* and *Cornète* frigates, and *Diligente* corvette, in a second line in-shore of the line-of-battle ships. The course of the British was immediately shaped so as to cross the leading French ships; and Sir John telegraphed, that the principal object of attack would be the admiral and his two seconds. At 8 A. M. the British squadron, in two divisions, was in tolerably compact order. The starboard and weather line consisted of the *Superb*, *Northumberland*, *Spencer*, and *Agamemnon*; the larboard or lee one, of the *Canopus* (just a-beam of the *Spencer*), *Donegal*, and *Atlas*. The *Acasta* and *Magicienne* frigates, *Kingfisher* sloop, and *Epervier* brig, in the mean while, had taken their stations to windward of the line-of-battle ships.

Soon after 8 A. M. the inequality of sailing among the British ships began plainly to show itself. By 10 A. M. the *Agamemnon* had dropt considerably astern, and the *Canopus*, the leading ship of the lee line, was now no further advanced than the former. The three leading ships of the weather line were in close order, and gaining fast upon the French squadron; the ships of which, at about 9 h. 45 m. A. M., hoisted their colours, and, owing to the wind having shifted to north-east by east, were now steering with it about a point upon the starboard quarter. At 10 h. 10 m. A. M. the *Superb*, having shortened sail, opened a fire from her starboard guns upon the *Alexandre*; as, in three minutes afterwards, did the *Northumberland* upon the three-decker, the *Impérial*. In another five minutes the *Spencer*, who was close on the *Northumberland*'s starboard quarter, joined in the cannonade, taking the *Diomède* as her more immediate opponent, but firing occasionally at the three-decker ahead of her; and all the engaged ships kept running nearly before the wind, at the rate of about eight knots an hour.

Either by accident or design, the *Alexandre*, after the exchange of three broadsides, suddenly hauled up on the larboard tack, and passed astern of the *Superb* and *Northumberland* in quick succession; leaving the *Impérial* in close action with the latter, and at a somewhat greater distance with the *Superb*, who, about this time, signalled her friends in the rear to engage more closely. At 10 h. 25 m. the *Alexandre* attempted to cut through the narrow interval between the *Northumberland* and *Spencer*; but the latter, after pouring in a raking fire, crossed

the French ship's bow, wore, and brought her to action on the larboard tack. Owing to the smoke, this change of sides had been unperceived by the Superb and Northumberland; who, the one on the starboard beam, the other on the starboard bow, of the Spencer, gave her some occasional shots. In a very little time, however, the Northumberland gallantly pushed in between the Superb and Impérial, and received from the latter a tremendous broadside; some of the shots of which passed through both sides of the Northumberland and struck the Superb, for whom the broadside had been intended.

While the Spencer and Alexandre were closely engaged with their heads to the southward, the remaining ships of both squadrons continued their course to the westward. At about 10 h. 35 m. A. M. the Canopus, leading the lee division, crossed and fired into the bows of the Alexandre, whose masts, already tottering with the Spencer's heavy fire, fell by the board. The Donegal and Atlas, in passing, fired also at the Alexandre, the latter's dismasted state being scarcely perceivable in the smoke. The Canopus standing on towards the three-decker and her second astern, and the Donegal and Atlas attaching themselves to the Brave and Jupiter, the action, except on the part of the Agamemnon, who still appeared unable to get up, became general. Finding that her antagonist, besides being wholly dismasted, was on fire, the Spencer, as soon as her disabled state would permit, filled, and at about 11 A. M. bore up towards the remaining combatants in the west.

After having, as above related, fired into the bows of the Alexandre, the Donegal passed on, and with her starboard guns engaged the Brave. Captain Malcolm then wore under the latter ship's stern, and engaged her closely with his larboard guns, until, being much cut up and disabled, and having sustained a heavy loss in officers and men (partly, no doubt, from the fire of some of the other British ships in passing), the Brave struck her colours; as, about 10 minutes before, had the dismasted Alexandre, after a defence equally creditable. Having silenced the Brave, the Donegal stood on; and after firing a few broadsides from her larboard guns into the Jupiter, who, as well as the Brave, had been partially engaged with the Atlas and one or two other British ships as they passed to the westward, ranged ahead, and ran her opponent on board, receiving the Jupiter's bowsprit over her larboard quarter, and securing it there by a hawser from her own lowerdeck port to the French ship's foremast. After this prompt measure, the Jupiter, without much further resistance, surrendered; and the Donegal, having sent on board a lieutenant, two midshipmen, and 100 men, took her prize in tow. Shortly afterwards the Donegal directed the Acasta, by signal, to take possession of the Brave, then in the north by west quarter; and who had been pre-

viously hailed by the *Agamemnon*, as the latter stood on, in obedience to Sir John's signal, to assist in overpowering the three-decker and her second astern.

At about 11 A. M. the *Atlas*, [who, after quitting the *Jupiter*, had followed the *Canopus*, in fulfilment of the admiral's orders, to aid him in subduing the French admiral and his two seconds, poured two broadsides into the *Impérial*, and then, bearing up under the latter's stern, raked her. At this instant the tiller of the *Atlas*, by the breaking of the braces, got jammed upon the transom; and at the same critical moment the ship received into her starboard quarter a heavy fire from the *Diomède*. Her whole attention being thus taken up, the *Atlas* failed to observe the *Canopus*, who was close ahead, time enough to shift her helm with effect, and which, in its crippled state, could make only one turn a-port. The consequence was, that the *Atlas* fell on board the *Canopus*, and, without doing any essential damage to the latter, carried away her own bowsprit. The *Atlas* quickly hove her after-sails aback, and, on clearing the *Canopus*, dropped alongside of the *Diomède*; whom she continued to engage with her starboard guns for about 12 minutes, when the *Spencer* came up and joined in the action. What now ensued will best appear after the fate of the French three-decker has been brought to a close.

With such a multitude of foes gathering round her, the latter ship, powerful as she was, had enough upon her hands. The chief antagonist of the *Impérial* had been the *Northumberland*, whose shattered state gave decided proofs of the heavy broadsides and well-directed fire to which her gallantry had exposed her. The fire of this ship, aided by that of the *Superb*, and subsequently of the *Canopus*, had also produced its effect upon the French three-decker; who, at 11 h. 30 m. A. M., with the loss of her main and mizen masts, hauled towards the land, then not more than a mile distant. Having had her masts badly wounded and rigging cut to pieces, the *Northumberland* could only send after the *Impérial* a few distant shot; and the *Superb*, deeming it unsafe, apparently, to be in less than 17 fathoms' water, hauled off to the southward. The *Canopus*, however, continued to fire at the three-decker, until the latter, at 11 h. 40 m. A. M., struck the ground, and by the shock lost her only remaining stick, the foremast. The *Impérial* shortly afterwards fired a gun to leeward, and her people flocked to the upper part of the ship in the utmost apparent distress: whereupon the firing at her ceased, and the nearest British ships hastened to join the *Superb*. About this time the mainmast of the *Northumberland* came down by the board, and, falling forward on the booms, broke to pieces all the boats, and carried away three or four skid-beams, besides doing other material damage.

After having bore up from engaging the *Alexandre*, the *Spencer* had passed, and, not seeing any colours, had fired at,

the *Brave*; had passed, next, the *Donegal* as she was boarding the *Jupiter*, and was approaching to aid the *Canopus* in her attack upon the *Impérial*, when, owing to the latter's proximity to the shore, the *Spencer* had no choice but to join the *Atlas* in engaging the *Diomède*. It was Captain Stopford's intention to pass under the latter's stern; but in this he was foiled by the position of the *Atlas*, who, it will be recollected, had dropped, and was engaging, upon the larboard beam of the *Diomède*. The *Spencer* then steered to pass ahead of the *Diomède*, and received her fire, without the power of returning it, until closing she crossed the French ship's bows. Meanwhile, the *Atlas*, in her still ungovernable state, having shifted her position, the stern of the *Spencer* now became exposed to the guns of the *Diomède*. The *Spencer* at length came to the wind on the larboard tack, and the *Atlas* hauled out of her way, but too late to prevent the *Diomède* from running on shore. The moment the French ship struck the ground, her three masts went by the board; but the *Diomède* still continued to fire occasionally at the *Atlas* and *Canopus*, until they quitted her to rejoin the admiral. Thus, in less than two hours, had the five ships composing this French squadron been either captured or driven on shore. The two frigates and the corvette, having got well to leeward during the action, hauled to the southward; and, as the *Acasta* and *Magicienne*, at the commencement of the battle, were not ordered to go in chase, and, at its close, were busily employed in attending to the captured ships, all three of the former effected their escape.

For the actual force of the British ships, in guns and men, it may suffice, in this case, to refer to their respective establishments, as set forth in various parts of this work. For the guns mounted on the first and second decks, except in the case of the *Canopus*, which ship, from the weakness of her topsides, had been fitted with 18 instead of 24 pounders, reference may be had to the alphabetical letters K, N or O, and P, in *Annual Abstract* No. 1. The quarterdeck and forecastle guns of all seven ships were chiefly 32-pounder carronades, agreeably to the establishment of 1797,* and the six carronades on the poop, except those of the *Superb* which were 24s, were 18-pounders.

The force of the French ships may also be stated with tolerable accuracy. The *Impérial* is acknowledged to have been "*le plus fort et le plus beau vaisseau qui eut jamais été construit dans aucun pays du monde*,"† and to have mounted in this action 130 guns, 36, 24, and 18 pounders, namely 34 on each of her principal decks, besides 10 long 12-pounders and 12 iron 36-pounder carronades on her quarterdeck and forecastle, and six brass ones of the same caliber on the poop; making her broadside weight of

* See vol. ii., p. 106.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 268.

metal reach the enormous amount of 1852 lbs. English. The *Impérial* is described to have had thin sides, and to have been constructed, throughout, of very light scantling for so large a ship. She must have measured at least 3000 tons. Admiral Ekins, but upon what authority we are not informed, says it was 3300.* That the tonnage of the *Impérial* could not have been much below that amount may be inferred from the fact, that the *Commerce-de-Marseille*, a ship mounting when captured but 118 guns, with only 12-pounders on the third deck, measured 2747 tons.

The long-gun force of the *Alexandre* may be seen in that of her class-mate, the *Formidable*, taken by Sir Richard Strachan;† and a reference to the force of the *Scipion*, captured on the same occasion, may suffice for that of either of the three 74s. It is believed, however, that each of the four two-deckers carried eight iron 36-pounder carronades, in lieu of an equal number of her quarterdeck long guns. In the account of the enemy's force, as given in Sir John Duckworth's gazette-letter, the *Diomède* appears to have been of "84 guns." No writer on the subject, except ourselves, has been so sceptical as to doubt that authority; and accordingly each of our contemporaries, disregarding the statement in the first edition of this work, that the *Diomède* was a 74, have felt themselves, if not quite correct, quite safe (with many writers a paramount consideration), in averring that the ship was an 84.‡ We knew the contrary, not only from having seen the name of the *Diomède* as a 74 in several French accounts published previously to the action, but from the smallness of her sworn complement, which was actually 40 men fewer than that of either of the other French 74s, and from the positive assertion of a British officer of distinction, who took a very active part in the battle. Nor is the difference between a French 84 and a French 74 merely that of 10 guns. The caliber of all the guns, except those upon the lower deck, is larger, the scantling stouter, and the complement of men much greater.

The number of men composing the crew of any one of the French ships is not even hinted at in the official letter. The following are the respective numbers that were certified by the French officers, except in the case of the *Impérial*, which we shall revert to presently; and for which head-money was paid to the captors: *Impérial* (doubtful), 1500 men; *Alexandre*, 820; *Brave* and *Jupiter*, 660 each; and *Diomède* 620; total, 4260. With respect to the *Impérial*, the three deponents were common men. They swore that their ship mounted 136 guns, and went into action with a crew of 1500 men. It may have been so, certainly, but the probability is that these illiterate

* Ekin's *Naval Battles*, p. 294.

† See p. 114.

‡ Brenton, vol. iii., p. 524; who also makes the *Canopus* but a 74, Marshall, vol. i., p. 262, and vol. ii., p. 281, and Ekins, p. 293.

fellows (for not more than one of them, it appears, could write) meant, that their ship had 1500 men on board before she disembarked the troops. That the *Impérial* was rather under than over manned, may be inferred from the fact, that all the other ships were so. Let us say that her crew amounted to 1200 men; and that is allowing her 100 more than the establishment of a French 120-gun ship.*

The loss sustained by the British ships was officially reported as follows: *Superb*, three seamen and three marines killed, one lieutenant (Charles Patriarch) and the master (William Pickering) badly, and four midshipmen (Charles Wallington, Thomas Jackson, Joseph Bullen, and James Willcox), 41 seamen, and nine marines slightly wounded; *Northumberland*, one midshipman (David Ridgeway), 18 seamen and one marine, and the admiral's cook killed, one lieutenant (George Francis Seymour), three midshipmen (William Millard, Charles William Selwyn, and Jeremiah Lawrence), one secretary's clerk, one boatswain's mate, the French pilot, 27 seamen, and 12 marines badly, and three midshipmen (Henry Stokes, Charles Comer, and Philip Peacock), one secretary's clerk, one quartermaster, two boatswain's mates, 20 seamen, and six marines slightly wounded; *Canopus*, eight officers (names not reported), seamen, and marines killed, 15 badly, and seven slightly wounded; *Spencer*, her boatswain (Martin Oates) 14, seamen, and three marines killed, and her captain, one lieutenant (James Harris, both slightly), one lieutenant of marines (James Cuthbertson, badly), one midshipman (William Neame, slightly), 40 seamen and six marines wounded; *Donegal*, one midshipman (Charles H. Kynaston), seven seamen, and four marines killed, the master (John Airey), three midshipmen (William Rudall, Henry Ogilvie, and Edward Acton), and 12 seamen and marines badly, and 17 slightly wounded; *Atlas*, seven seamen and one marine killed, the master (William Mowbray), boatswain (Stephen Spargo), and nine seamen wounded; *Agamemnon*, one seaman killed, and one boatswain's mate, four seamen, and eight marines wounded; making the aggregate loss 74 killed, and 264 wounded, and the total numerical loss of each ship as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	First Lieutenants.
<i>Superb</i>	6	56	{ Richard Gill. Richard Couch, <i>sec.</i> Uncertain.
<i>Northumberland</i>	21	79	{ Richard Harward, <i>sec.</i> Uncertain.
<i>Canopus</i>	8	22	Uncertain.
<i>Spencer</i>	18	50	George Ravenshaw.
<i>Donegal</i>	12	33	William Sanders.
<i>Atlas</i>	8	11	Lord Jas. Townshend.
<i>Agamemnon</i>	1	13	Uncertain.



* See vol. i., p. 54.

We may remark that, in respect to the relative proportions of killed and wounded, the returns of the *Superb* and *Atlas* form a surprising contrast. But the log of the *Superb* says: six killed and 30 wounded. The return of the *Northumberland*, on the other hand, corresponds exactly with the entry in her log.

No British ship, except the *Northumberland*, appears to have had any mast shot away. The *Donegal* lost her fore yard, and the *Atlas*, by an accident as has been shown, her bowsprit. The masts and rigging of most of the other ships were much wounded and cut up, and some of their hulls not a little damaged, by the shot of their opponents. One account indeed states, that the *Spencer* received 60 shot in her hull, on the side on which she engaged the *Alexandre*. The *Northumberland's* hull, no doubt, was in quite as shattered a state.

The loss sustained by the captured French ships, for the want of a little pains on the part of the writer of the British official account, cannot be stated otherwise than in a general way. According to Sir John Duckworth's letter, the *Alexandre* had 300 men killed and wounded, the *Brave* 260, and the *Jupiter* 200. With respect to the *Impérial* and *Diomède*, all that appears is, that their killed and wounded were "not known, but were certainly many." The *Impérial* according to the French accounts, had 500 men killed and wounded, including among the former two of the admiral's aide-de-camps, and among the badly wounded, the first and second captains and five other officers. The loss sustained by the *Diomède* has not been enumerated, but must have been, in proportion, equally severe. According to information derived from the masters of some American vessels at anchor in the road pending the engagement, that ship had 250 men killed and wounded. The loss on the part of the *Jupiter*, if not of the *Brave*, appears to have been rather overrated in Sir John Duckworth's letter. Neither of these ships had any of their masts shot away, nor was the *Jupiter* materially damaged in her hull; but the captains of both the *Brave* and the *Jupiter* appear to have been either mortally or very severely wounded, neither having been present to sign the head-money certificates. The hull of the *Brave* was tolerably cut up, and the *Alexandre's* hull completely shattered from stem to stern; so that, what with her numerous shot-holes and her entirely dismasted state, this fine 80-gun ship could with difficulty be kept afloat.

The spot, where the two French ships had run on shore, was about midway between Point Nisao and Point Catalana. The ~~very day, viz. August 10, the *Diomède* about 200 yards astern of the *Impérial*~~; and such was the rocky state of the coast, that the bottoms of both were stove in very soon after the vessels had struck. The French immediately proceeded to get, first their wounded, and then the remainder of their crews on shore, it

being the avowed intention of M. Leissegues, as soon as that was effected, to set the two ships on fire. On the 8th, when, as it appears by the French accounts, all, or nearly all, of the crew of the three-decker had been saved, and all of the *Diomède's*, except her captain and his surviving officers, and about 100 of the men, the British frigates advanced towards that part of the coast. The *Acasta* and consort, by means of their boats, brought away Captain Henry and his people, and afterwards set fire to and destroyed both French ships. In his third letter, Sir John states that Captain Dunn, to whom this service had been intrusted, "rescued all the prisoners (number not stated) from perishing through a tremendous sea." The fact is that, although Captain Henry and about 150 of the surviving officers and men of the *Diomède* were made prisoners, scarcely half a dozen persons, and none above a fore-castle man, were taken, who had belonged to the *Impérial*.

Considered as a naval combat, the action off the road of Santo-Domingo displays nothing very remarkable. It was simply that seven British two-decked ships, including one 64, after a running fight of two hours with one three, and four two, decked French ships, captured three of the latter, and drove on shore the remainder. It is as true that the *Impérial* was nearly a match for any two ships in the British, as that the *Agamemnon* was unable to cope with the weakest ship in the opposite line. But the French were totally unprepared, and, if some accounts dated from the city of Santo-Domingo are to be depended upon, had actually left on shore several of their officers and men, including their very admiral. The latter, however, according to his letter in the *Moniteur*, was on board his ship before the action became general. One of the private letters from the city of Santo-Domingo states that, when the British squadron made its appearance, the French sailors were calking the sides of their ships: a circumstance which explains the half-finished and dirty appearance of the three prizes, of the *Jupiter* and *Brave* especially, when they anchored in the harbour of Port-Royal Jamaica.

On the other hand, the British had been, for weeks, anticipating this or a similar rencounter; and, so far from being deficient in general officers, three of the ships displayed admirals' flags at their mast-heads. With the exception of the noble manner in which the *Northumberland* closed with the three-decker, and the spirited conduct of the *Spencer* and *Donegal*, the British ships neither did, nor had the opportunity of doing, any thing to distinguish themselves. As to the French they certainly displayed more than their usual gallantry in 1806, but there is no saying that this falling off may not have arisen, in some degree, from the absence of Rear-admiral Leissegues at the commencement, and his apparently shy conduct at the close of the action. The *Alexandre* did all that a ship could

do ; and the *Brave*, if not the *Jupiter*, went far to emulate the former.

As soon as the two most disabled of his three prizes were refitted, Sir John proceeded with them to Jamaica ; and Rear-admiral Cochrane, as soon as he had got a jury mainmast rigged on the *Northumberland* and other matters done to her, made sail back to his station, accompanied by the *Agamemnon*, as the least disabled ship, in case the *Northumberland*, owing to her crippled state, should require any assistance.

The *Alexandre* was formerly the *Indivisible*, launched at Brest in the summer of 1799.* The two remaining prizes were from 10 to 12 years old. The *Alexandre* measured 2231 tons, the *Jupiter* 1899, and the *Brave* (which ship, having foundered on her way to England, was not measured) about the same. The first was too much injured by shot, to be worth repairing for a sea-going ship ; but the second, under the name of *Maida* (a *Jupiter* 50 being already in the service), became for a year or two a cruising ship, and was fitted on her first and second decks, with Gover's 24-pounders, a medium gun of which we shall hereafter say more.

To judge by the solicitude which the vice-admiral, when a captain, expressed to be made a baronet, for his comparatively small services at the capture of *Minorca*,† we can readily conceive that Sir John, upon the present occasion, expected at the least to be created a peer. But Sir John received no addition to his honours. In about two months after the action, however, Rear-admiral Cochrane was invested with the order of the Bath, and Rear-admiral Louis was created a baronet. Captain Cochrane, who, to the credit of Sir John Duckworth, had been allowed to carry home the despatches, was made a post-captain. We believe the first-lieutenant of each flag-ship was also promoted to post-rank, and the second made a commander ; and that a commander's rank was bestowed upon the first lieutenant of each of the four remaining ships.

Considering the panic that usually prevails in the British West-India islands, when a French fleet or squadron makes its appearance in that quarter of the globe, the inhabitants of Jamaica may well be excused for having received Sir John and his prizes with "rapturous acknowledgments." Nor was it strange that the patriotism of the mercantile interest (peculiarly sensitive when large risks are at sea) should prompt the body of London merchants, and the committee of underwriters at Lloyd's, to vote vases and swords and sums of money to those who, by cutting short the career of a French squadron, had probably saved from capture so much valuable property. But who could imagine that the British parliament, a court, from its very nature, so well calculated to take an unbiassed view of the

* See vol. ii., p. 270.

† Ibid., p. 198.

subject, would have voted its thanks to the officers and men who, with seven sail of the line, had defeated five; thus virtually declaring, with the noble mover, Lord Grenville, that superiority of force does not, in the least, take from the brilliancy of a victory, or from the merit of those by whom it was achieved.

It would seem by this, as if Sir John's own vivid description of his exploit had captivated the minister's understanding. The admiral very adroitly begins by stating, that his information on the subject led him to believe that the enemy's force in the West Indies consisted of "ten sail of the line, with as many frigates and corvettes." Now, all the information obtained on the subject came, it is admitted, from two Danish schooners; one that saw the French ships steering for the road of Santo-Domingo, and another that had actually lain at anchor with them. Is it possible, that the master of either of these vessels, of the last especially, could have been so blind or so stupid, as to mistake five ships of the line for 10, and two frigates and one corvette for 10 sail of that class? In another part of his letter, Sir John says: "I cannot, though bound to pay every tribute to the noble and gallant efforts of the Honourable Rear-admiral Cochrane, &c. &c., be vain enough to suppose that, without the aiding hand of Providence, such a result could have been effected."

The same sentiment, as that expressed by Lord Grenville in the House of Peers, was delivered by Mr. Grey in the House of Commons. The latter went even further than his coadjutor in the upper house. The honourable mover adverted to the "promptitude with which he (Sir John) left his station off Cadiz, when he heard of the enemy's fleet being at sea." According to our view of the subject, it was no extraordinary promptitude for a British admiral, with six sail of the line, to go in quest of a French admiral with five; but if we are not mistaken, Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, the commander-in-chief, greatly blamed Sir John Duckworth for quitting his station, and leaving the port of Cadiz unblockaded by a single ship. Surprised as we are at the verbal inaccuracy of a lord of the admiralty, in designating a squadron of five enemy's ships a "fleet," we are still more so that Mr. Grey should laud the "skill that Sir John displayed, in taking a position to intercept them at the time they owed their escape entirely to the superiority of their sailing." Can this refer to the Christmas-day chase? It certainly does. So that an act, for which, had he not fallen in with M. Leissegues, Sir John would probably have been brought to a court-martial, is held up as a pattern to imitate, and that by the first lord of the admiralty.

If Englishmen in general, who, blessed with a free press, could know at least how many ships had been engaged on each side (for he must be a bold panegyrist, indeed, who would mistake

that fact), felt that the victory of Sir John Duckworth off the city of Santo-Domingo had been greatly overrated, what must the French have thought, who had no other statement placed before them than an official letter, positively declaring, that the victory was obtained, and with great difficulty obtained, by nine British ships of the line and several frigates over four French ships of the line, two frigates, and a corvette. No sooner did Captain Raymond Cocault, commanding the *Diligente* corvette, reach a safe anchorage in Port-Louis road, in the river that leads to Lorient, than he gave the minister of marine an account of the misfortunes of the squadron he had belonged to; misfortunes, indeed, considering the glory which had been won on the occasion, they could scarcely be called. After describing his first discovery of the British squadron off the road of Santo-Domingo, M. Cocault states, or rather, after what has appeared respecting the forgeries in the *Moniteur*, we may say, is made to state, thus: "At six o'clock I distinguished in this squadron nine ships of the line and several frigates." "A six heures, je distinguai dans cette escadre neuf vaisseaux de guerre et plusieurs frégates."* Now, it is customary to express "ship of the line" by "*vaisseau*" singly, but it is not uncommon for a line-of-battle ship to be called, as distinguished from a frigate or sloop, "a man of war; and that this is the sense in which M. Cocault uses the term, "*vaisseaux de guerre*," is evident from his following it up with "*plusieurs frégates*."

M. Cocault goes on to state what signals he made, and how they were answered by his friends in the road, and adds: "At seven o'clock the four ships of the line and two frigates got under sail, with a very light wind; while the enemy's nine ships of the line and frigates were favoured by a shift of wind from north to east." "A sept heures, les quatre vaisseaux et les deux frégates étaient sous voile, mais avec un vent très-faible, tandis que les neuf vaisseaux de guerre et les frégates de l'ennemi étaient favorisés par la variété de la brise qui du nord avait passé à l'est."

But the most amusing part of M. Cocault's letter is his account of the result of the engagement: "Three of our ships," says he "appeared to us to have grounded near the batteries;† three" (meaning those three) "were dismasted; the fourth was in the possession of the enemy: two English ships were aground near our own, and were as bare as sheer-hulks; they had fired guns of distress, and the frigates appeared to be occupied in saving the crews. Two other English ships were in the offing, dismasted and in a very bad state, and the remainder of the enemy's squadron appeared to have suffered considerably." "Trois de nos vaisseaux nous avaient paru échoués près des fortifications de la place; trois étaient dématés; le quatrième

* *Moniteur*, March 30, 1806.

† It does not appear that there were any near the spot.

était au pouvoir de l'ennemi: deux vaisseaux anglais étaient échoués auprès de nôtres et rasés comme des pontons; ils avaient tiré le canon de détresse, et les frégates paraissaient occupées à sauver les équipages. Deux autres vaisseaux anglais étaient au large dématés en très-mauvais état, et le reste de l'escadre ennemie paraissait avoir beaucoup souffert." Yet, according to the official letter of the French admiral (but which was not suffered to appear in the *Moniteur*), M. Cocault had fled entirely out of sight when the action closed. Thus: "La *Félicité* et la *Diligente* n'étaient point en vue alors (à la fin de l'action), et j'ignore quelle route elles ont faite."* And, considering that the action lasted only two hours, Captain Cocault and his companion must have made sail at a very early stage of it.

No doubt M. Cocault felt highly indignant, when he discovered the use that had been made of his name; but, had he remonstrated, he probably would not have attained the rank and honours which he now appears to enjoy. For instance, at the date of his letter, M. Cocault was a "capitaine de frégate" about two thirds down the list, and simply a "legionnaire de la légion d'honneur." On the 12th of July, 1808, he was appointed "capitaine de vaisseau," and, on January 1, 1822, the date of the latest list in our possession, was within 11 of being an admiral, with an increase of orders to, "chevalier de l'ordre royal et militaire de St.-Louis," and "officier de l'ordre royal de la légion d'honneur."

After the frequent occasions we have had to correct the mistatements of a contemporary, who boasted, and, we think, with reason, of "the great opportunities he had enjoyed for obtaining the most correct information,"† but who has since shown, in a very marked manner, the little profit that may be derived from the possession of such advantages, we shall abstain from taking any lengthened or serious notice of his account of the victory off Santo-Domingo roads. The squadron which chased the *Lark*, that chased by Sir John Duckworth and abandoned in so extraordinary a manner, and that afterwards met and defeated by him, are all, as far as we can gather, considered to be the same.‡ He says that, closely supported by the *Northumberland*, *Spencer*, and "*Sir Edward Berry*," Sir John "boldly laid the *Superb* alongside the *Impérial*;" and that the main and "mizen" masts of the *Northumberland* were shot away as she lay alongside the same ship. After approving of Sir John's discontinuance of the chase of M. Willaumez, the writer may well laud the "brilliant victory" obtained over M. Leissegues. Perhaps some panegyric of this kind was necessary, in order that the engraved portrait, intended for the

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 269.

† *Brenton*, vol. iii., Preface.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 520, 521, 529.

frontispiece to the account, might not be considered undeservedly placed there.

Having brought to its disastrous close the cruise of Rear-admiral Leissegues, we must now return to M. Willaumez, whom it will be recollected, just as an unexpected turn of good fortune had released him from the, in all probability, fatal consequences of a meeting with an equal British force.* Left by Sir John Duckworth to pursue his course, the French admiral reached, without further molestation, the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope. Here he captured an English merchant vessel, but not "une corvette anglaise,"† for none was lost, and from the former learnt, to his regret, into whose hands the Cape had recently fallen. In this port he was to have refitted, preparatory to a cruise off the bank of Anguillas, where he had hoped to have intercepted the China fleet. Thus disappointed, M. Willaumez contented himself with cruising between the continents of Africa and South America, until the want of provisions, in the beginning of April, sent him to the port of St. Salvador. After a stay here of 16 days, the French squadron weighed and set sail for Cayenne. There M. Willaumez separated his squadron into three divisions, and cruised between the last-named port and the ninth degree of south latitude. He, it appears, contemplated the destruction of the shipping in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes; but declares he was prevented by currents, contrary winds, and bad weather. Perhaps, had M. Willaumez made the attempt, he would have found more formidable obstacles than these.

On the 9th of June the *Vétéran* arrived at Fort-Royal, Martinique; having narrowly escaped an encounter with the 74-gun ship *Northumberland*, Captain John Spear, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, who arrived a few hours afterwards from Barbadoes, in consequence of information that Prince Jérôme's ship had been seen off the north end of that island. On the 14th, early in the morning, the 74-gun ship *Elephant*, Captain George Dundas, without a fore topmast, joined the *Northumberland* in Fort-Royal bay; and, on the same afternoon, the *Canada* 74, Captain John Harvey. On the 15th at 3 A. M. the *Northumberland*, in a heavy squall, carried away her fore yard and fore topmast, and, towed by the *Canada*, was obliged to bear away for Gros-islet bay, Sainte-Lucie, to refit. On the same afternoon the *Eole* and *Impétueux* arrived in Fort-Royal bay. On the 20th the *Foudroyant* and *Valeuruse* succeeded in reaching the same anchorage, although chased by Sir Alexander's squadron; and on the 24th the like good fortune attended the *Cassard* and *Patriote*. During the chase of the two latter ships, the *Northumberland*, a second time, carried away her fore mast.

On the 1st of July Rear-admiral Willaumez quitted Mar-

* See p. 21.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 300.

tinique, and steered for the island of Montserrat, to windward of which he found himself on the following day. The squadron having here separated, two of the ships appeared before the harbour, and demanded and took three English merchant vessels which were at anchor within it. Meanwhile information had been sent to the islands of Nevis and St.-Christopher, time enough for a part of the homeward-bound convoy, amounting to 65 sail, collected off Sandy Point at the latter island, to put to sea, under the protection of the 28-gun frigate Carysfort, Captain Kenneth M'Kenzie, and Dolphin armed store-ship, Lieutenant William Hodge; who, with their charge, stood away to leeward; unseen by the enemy. Nine sail, however, from Nevis, and from Basse-Terre, St.-Christopher's, which had missed the convoy, were obliged to take refuge under the batteries of Brimstone-hill, on the last-named island. These nine sail of merchantmen, about sunset on the 3d, were attacked by the remaining four French sail of the line, on their return from Nevis, where they had captured three ships and a brig. Owing, however, to the heavy cannonade opened by the fort on Brimstone-hill and by a battery near the beach, the French ships, one of them with some damage to her rigging, were compelled to retire without effecting their object. All this occupies a very small space in the French narrative of the proceedings of M. Willaumez's squadron. "*Elle se dirigea vers Mont-Serrat, et rançonna (rather a strong word for all that was done) cette colonie. L'amiral Willaumez visita encore plusieurs rades ennemies, où il fit des prises.*"

On the 4th, early in the morning, the two ships that had been at Montserrat joined the four which had been foiled at St.-Christopher's, and the squadron stood towards the island of Tortola, in high glee at the prospect of capturing the greater part of the immense fleet of deeply-laden English ships there assembled, ready to proceed on their homeward-bound voyage. It so happened, however, that, at daybreak on the 6th, at a short distance to the south-east of the west point of the island of St.-Thomas, and at about nine miles to windward of the French squadron, was cruising a British squadron, under Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, consisting of the three 74s named in the preceding page, the 64-gun ship *Agamemnon*, Captain Jonas Rose, and the frigates *Ethalion*, *Seine*, *Galatea*, and *Circe*, together with some sloops and schooners.

Since the 4th Sir Alexander had heard of the arrival of M. Willaumez off Montserrat, and, with a laudable zeal, was proceeding to endeavour to rescue the convoy from his grasp. Almost immediately on perceiving the British squadron, the French squadron, as if determined to fight a battle, wore up and ran through the Channel between St.-Thomas and Passage island, followed, until 2 p.m., by Sir Alexander; who then steered for Drake's bay, Tortola, and anchored there on the

morning of the 8th, in company with about 280 sail of West-Indiamen.

The French account of this meeting is as follows : " On the 6th of July, under the island of St.-Thomas, he (Willaumez) fell in with the English squadron of Admiral Cochrane, composed of four sail of the line and of several frigates and large corvettes, forming a total of 12 or 13 three-masted vessels. This squadron was to windward. Willaumez shortened sail to wait for it, and cleared for action. The English admiral did not think proper to engage, and kept his wind. The position of the two squadrons prevented the French admiral from closing the enemy, who had Tortola and St.-Thomas to shelter himself in, and after having in vain offered him battle, he (Willaumez) resumed his route."

Deeming it, as he himself admits, no longer safe to remain in the Antilles, and having taken on board his squadron at Martinique a sufficient quantity of provisions to last until October, M. Willaumez steered towards the latitude of the Great Bahama bank. It is clear from this, that, notwithstanding the bounce in the account just quoted, the instructions of M. Willaumez forbade him to fight without very considerable odds in his favour; for, no other squadron than that of Rear-admiral Cochrane was then in the Antilles. The French admiral's object in proceeding to the Bahama bank, was to intercept the Jamaica homeward-bound fleet, of whose day of departure, number, and escort, he had received the fullest information. Arrived on his station, the French admiral looked anxiously for the convoy. Day after day passed, without the appearance of a fleet, or even of a sail, except now and then an American vessel, worth only the intelligence she brought. For M. Willaumez made no scruple to seize and detain every neutral vessel he fell in with, in order that his cruising ground might be kept a secret. "*Ayant, lui, la précaution d'arrêter et de retenir tous les bâtimens neutres, pour qu'on ne pût savoir d'avis sur sa position.*"* This is worthy the attention of those citizens of the United States of America, who have been wont to charge the English fleets and cruisers with being the sole offenders in thus harassing neutral commerce.

We formerly mentioned that Napoléon, out of regard to the naval profession, had made his younger brother Jérôme a member of it.† Royalty concentrating in itself all possible claims for promotion, the young prince was raised to the rank of lieutenant de vaisseau on the 14th of January, 1803, not quite a twelvemonth after his initiation into the service. On the 1st of November, 1804, Jérôme was made a capitaine de frégate, and appointed to the Pomone;‡ in which frigate, accompanied by

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 302.

† See vol. iii., p. 175.

‡ See p. 21.

some other vessels, he cruised a short time in the Mediterranean. One would suppose that this promotion was sufficiently rapid to satisfy even a royal mind. Before, however, he had been a capitaine de frégate seven months, Jérôme wanted to *make himself* a capitaine de vaisseau. About this time his vagaries, and his total disregard of the rules of the service, notwithstanding all the allowances made to him as the brother of the emperor, created so much disgust in the French navy, that complaints were forwarded to Napoléon; who, in a letter of June 16, 1805, says to his minister of marine: "M. Jérôme Buonaparte cannot be a capitaine de vaisseau: it would be a fatal innovation to suffer him to give himself rank. In this point of view, his conduct betrays an unexampled levity, and his justification has no reason in it. Not only has Jérôme not the right to make an enseigne a lieutenant, but I annul the appointment: this conduct is altogether ridiculous. When he shall have fought and captured an English line-of-battle ship, he will not have the right of giving rank, but simply of recommending those who may have distinguished themselves."*

It may easily be conceived what a plague this, in court language, illustrious personage was to an enterprising officer like M. Willaumez. Doubtless the admiral had received from the emperor the most solemn charge to avoid every risk of placing his headstrong brother in the hands of his enemies. If so, there is less difficulty in accounting for the apparently shy conduct of Rear-admiral Willaumez in retreating, as well from Sir John Duckworth with an equal, as from Sir Alexander Cochrane with an inferior force. In short, the cruise of M. Willaumez, like the generality of those planned by the French emperor, had for its object an attack upon the defenceless commerce, rather than upon the armed ships and batteries, of his enemy.

After the squadron had cruised for some days longer upon the Bahama bank, in the listless and unprofitable manner already mentioned, the impatience of the admiral's protégé could hold out no longer; and accordingly, on the night of the 31st of July, the Vétéran contrived to part company. With the aid of his first lieutenant, and of the other able officers that were no doubt placed around him, Captain Jérôme bent his course towards Europe. On the 10th of August, in latitude 46° 31' north, longitude 35° 15' west, he was fortunate enough to fall in with a homeward-bound Quebec fleet of 16 sail, under the protection of the 22-gun ship *Champion*, Captain Robert Howe Bromley. After a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to draw the French 74 in chase of herself, the *Champion* saw six of her convoy captured and burnt. According to Jérôme's account, three others shared the same fate; but the "two frigates",

* For the original of this letter, see Appendix, No. 18.

effected their escape. By which designation was meant the *Champion*, and, we suppose, the *Osborne* transport, the pendant ship of the convoy.

On the 26th, at daybreak, having reached the latitude of Belleisle, on her way to Lorient, the *Vétéran* fell in with, and was chased by, a British squadron composed of the 80-gun ship *Gibraltar*, Captain Willoughby Thomas Lake, and the 18-pounder 36-gun frigates *Penelope* and *Tribune*, Captain William Robert Broughton and Thomas Baker. The prince had reason to be alarmed; but, by the local experience of the officers intrusted with the care of Jérôme and with the management of the ship, the *Vétéran* succeeded in reaching the little port of Concarneau, situated about three leagues to the north-north-east of the Glénan isles; and into which, on account of its rocky approach, narrow entrance, and small depth of water, no ship of the line had ever before attempted to take shelter.

For his dereliction of duty in quitting his commanding officer without leave, [Prince Jérôme did not, as far as we can discover, receive any rebuke from his brother. On the contrary, Napoléon pleased perhaps at the partial destruction of the Quebec convoy, received him in a very flattering manner; and the editor of the *Moniteur* was commanded to dress up Jérôme's "cruise" in the first style of court-panegyric. No inducement, however, could prevail upon the young naval hero to trust himself again at sea in a fighting ship; and he very soon afterwards, we believe, quitted the profession. M. Willaumez now demands our attention.

Daylight on the 1st of August discovered to the French admiral the absence of the *Vétéran*; and, fully sensible of the danger to which the fugitive prince would be exposed, M. Willaumez cruised in every direction to find him. Meanwhile the Jamaica fleet, consisting of 109 vessels, under convoy of a 64, two frigates, and a sloop or two, had sailed from the west end of that island on the 28th of July, to go by the gulf, instead of the windward, passage, and was then rounding Cape Antonio. Having returned from his unsuccessful search, M. Willaumez continued to cruise for the Jamaica fleet, until, at the expiration of some days, a neutral assured him that his hopes were at an end.

This delay on the part of M. Willaumez, in all probability, would have led to a rencounter between him and Sir John Borlase Warren, had not the latter, on quitting Barbadoes, where he had arrived on the 12th of July, kept too much to the eastward. After having returned to Spithead from his first cruise off Madeira, Sir John had sailed, on the 4th of June, with the *Foudroyant* and four of his five 74s,* with an additional 74, the *Fame*,

Captain Richard Henry Alexander Bennett, in lieu of the *Repulse*, of the same force. The vice-admiral took with him, on the same occasion, but one frigate, the *Amazon*. So that Sir John had under his command one 80, five 74s, and one frigate; and, before Jérôme parted, M. Willaumez had also one 80, five 74s, and one frigate. By a singular coincidence, too, both 80-gun ships bore the same name.

The French admiral now prepared to execute the remaining objects of his cruise. These were, to proceed to the coast of Newfoundland, there to capture the fishing-vessels and destroy the fisheries; then to take up a favourable station for intercepting the English trade from Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland, and to be ready, by the middle of October, to enter a port of France.* Scarcely had the French ships turned their heads to the northward, when M. Willaumez encountered a greater misfortune than any he had experienced since his departure from home. On the night of the 18th of August, in latitude 22° north, longitude 63° west, a gale or hurricane overtook the squadron, scattering the ships in every direction, and dismasting and damaging the whole of them.

When the gale subsided, the French admiral found himself entirely alone. Having contrived a substitute for her lost rudder, and erected jury-masts in lieu of those which had been carried away, the *Foudroyant* steered straight for Havana. On the 15th of September, at daylight, when within three leagues of his destined port, M. Willaumez fell in with the British 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Charles Lydiard, then about six miles distant, running along-shore from the Matanzas, and standing directly for the *Foudroyant*. At 7 h. 30 m. A.M. the latter hoisted the French ensign and a rear-admiral's flag, Havana at this time bearing from the *Anson* west-south-west distant between three and four leagues. At 8 h. 15 m., then nearly calm, the French 80 shortened sail, and despatched a boat into the harbour. At 10 h. 15 m. A.M., a light air springing up from the south by east, each ship crowded all the sail she could set. At noon Point Moro bore from the *Anson* west by south four or five miles. At 1 P.M. the *Foudroyant* fired a gun to windward, and at 1 h. 10 m. the *Anson* shortened sail. In a minute or two afterwards the *Foudroyant* did the same, and hove to, as if awaiting the frigate's approach. At 1 h. 15 m. P.M. the *Foudroyant* opened her fire, and received in return the fire of the *Anson*; both ships standing on the starboard tack, the *Anson* to windward. The cannonade continued until about 1 h. 45 m. P.M.; when, finding she was not able to cope with her antagonist, the *Anson* tacked, ceased firing, and made sail, with the loss of two seamen killed and seven seamen and one marine wounded,

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 302.

besides having the starboard leech of her fore topsail and the slings of the main yard shot away, and her standing and running rigging and sails much cut. The Anson had also received several shot in the hull. What damage or loss the Foudroyant sustained has not been recorded: all we know is, that in a very short time after the action had ceased, she was at an anchor in Havana.

A French 80-gun ship, in weight of metal, number of men, and size, is, be it remembered, a full match for a British 98; and, although the Foudroyant was disabled in her masts, she was not (for, if she had been, the French themselves would quickly have made it known) in her guns. Hence a tolerable idea may be formed of what chance the Anson would have stood, had she persevered in the contest. The French were so sensible of the disparity between the combatants, and of the little honour which had been gained by the larger vessel, that they not only described the British frigate as a "cut down line-of-battle ship, carrying two whole batteries," but stated her to have been in company with other British men of war; and this, although it was well known at Havana that the Anson was cruising alone, "*Dans les environs de ce port,*" says the French account, "*le Foudroyant fut attaqué par une division anglaise, à la tête de laquelle se trouvait le vaisseau rasé l'Anson.*"* Now, the Anson's captain, with more propriety, might have stated, that he was "attacked by a Franco-Spanish division, at the head of which was the Foudroyant;" for the Spanish 74 San-Lorenzo and several gun-boats, just as the Anson had ceased firing, were seen coming out of Havana to assist the French ship. Resolved, for this gasconade, to pay the French in their own coin, Captain Brenton declares, that the Anson, "after a severe action, drove him (M. Willaumez) for protection under the guns of the Moro castle."†

Of the two British squadrons despatched in different directions in pursuit of the supposed single squadron which had put to sea from Brest, that under Sir John Warren has already had its proceedings in part detailed. The squadron of Sir Richard Strachan had returned to Plymouth equally unsuccessful. From certain information that M. Willaumez, after quitting St.-Salvador in April, had steered to the north-west, Sir Richard was again ordered in pursuit. It had by this time been found that a 98-gun ship was no acquisition to a flying squadron. The St.-George was therefore to be left at home; as was also the Centaur, on account of Sir Samuel Hood's appointment to the command off Rochefort. In lieu of those two ships, three others were added, which made Sir Richard's squadron as follows:

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 303.

† Brenton, vol. iv., p. 59.

Gun-ships

80	Cæsar	{ Rear-adm. (h.) Sir Richard John Strachan, Bt.
		{ Captain Charles Richardson.
	{ Belleisle	" William Hargood.
	{ Terrible	" Lord Henry Paulet.
74	{ Bellona	" John Erskine Douglas.
	{ Audacious	" Thomas Le Marchant Gosselyn.
	{ Montagu	" Robert Waller Otway.
	{ Triumph	" Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, Bt.

Gun-frigs.

36	{ Melampus	" Stephen Poyntz.
	{ Décade	" John Stuart.

On the 19th of May this squadron sailed from Plymouth, and on the 8th of August, after having cruised some time off Madeira and the Canary islands, Sir Richard anchored in Carlisle bay, Barbadoes. On the 13th that persevering officer again set sail in search of M. Willaumez; of whose cruising ground he had received so good information, that the night of the 18th of August fell upon both squadrons nearly in the same latitude, and within a degree of the same longitude, the British experiencing the gale in latitude $21^{\circ} 25'$ north, longitude 62° west, the French, as has already been stated, in latitude 22° north, longitude 63° west. The accidental circumstance of a day's earlier departure from Barbadoes might have enabled Sir Richard to have crossed the path of M. Willaumez, as the latter was returning to his cruising ground from the eastward, where he had been seeking Prince Jérôme, who had so unceremoniously quitted his protection.

On the 14th of September, at daybreak, Cape Henry in the United States of America bearing west-north-west distant 12 leagues, the British 74-gun ships Belleisle and Bellona, and frigate Melampus, being on the appointed rendezvous, in search of the Cæsar and the other ships of their squadron, which had been separated by the gale, discovered to leeward of them, and immediately chased, a strange sail under jury-masts, steering straight for the Chesapeake. This was the French 74-gun ship Impétueux, next to the Foudroyant, the most disabled ship of M. Willaumez's squadron. In the crippled state of his ship, M. Le Veyer had no alternative but to bear up towards the land. Accordingly, at 8 h. 15 m. A. M., the Impétueux hoisted French colours, and ran herself on shore. Soon afterwards the Melampus shortened sail, and, having heve to on the larboard tack, fired a broadside at the French ship, who thereupon hauled down her ensign and pendant. At 10 A. M. the British ships anchored about a mile from the shore, in five fathoms' water, and with their boats took possession of the Impétueux. At noon two suspicious sail in the offing induced Captain Hargood to get under way with the Belleisle and Bellona, leaving the Melampus to remove the French prisoners and set fire to the prize. By

8 P. M. that service was accomplished, and the frigate weighed and stood after her consorts.

The capture and destruction of the *Impétueux* was certainly a breach of neutrality; and the French consul at Norfolk so considered it, by refusing to acknowledge her late crew as prisoners of war. However, the affair happily passed off in the United States with very little notice.

About a fortnight previously to the destruction of the *Impétueux*, the *Patriote* and *Eole*, each on a different day, arrived in the Chesapeake in a very disabled state, particularly the former. These ships afterwards proceeded to Annapolis; where, in a little while, they were blockaded by some British ships of war from Halifax. Eventually, as will be seen, the *Patriote* reached France; but the *Eole*, we believe, was taken to pieces in America. The same fate attended the *Valeureuse* frigate, who, partially dismasted, had put into the Delaware, and had subsequently removed, for greater security, as high up the river as Philadelphia. The *Foudroyant*, after undergoing a refit at Havana, set sail on her return to France, and arrived in the road of Brest. The *Cassard*, the only remaining ship of the French squadron, as soon as the gale had abated, bent her course towards Europe, and reached in safety the port of Rochefort.

A third British squadron had been despatched from the Channel, for the purpose of intercepting M. Willaumez on his return to France. This squadron was placed under the command of Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis, Bart., in the 80-gun ship *Canopus*, with orders to cruise about 50 leagues to the westward of Belle-Isle. The news of the dispersion of the French squadron, and of the disasters that had subsequently attended it, reached the rear-admiral in the early part of his cruise, and Sir Thomas and his squadron forthwith removed to the station off Cadiz. We must now pay a short visit to the port of Brest; the fleet cruising off which, since the 22d of February, when Admiral Cornwallis struck his flag, had been under the chief command of the Earl of St.-Vincent.

Not only had the best of the ships and the bulk of the seamen been taken from the Brest fleet to form the two expeditions that had sailed from the road in December, 1805, and of whose respective fates we have already given so full an account, but a serious deficit had been caused in the stock of stores and provisions at the port. Hence the seven or eight line-of-battle ships, that still remained afloat, were not in a condition to go to sea; nor, during the whole of this year, did one of them make even a show of sailing out. However, on the 5th of October, during the temporary absence of the British squadron stationed off the port, the French 74-gun ship *Régulus*, after nearly a twelve-month's successful cruise, the principal events of which we shall hereafter relate, got safe in.

Heavy as had been the loss to the French navy at the battle of Trafalgar, it was by no means in so desperate a state as some of the English periodical writers would have the public believe. Steel, in his monthly Navy-list for March in the present year, enumerates the number of line-of-battle ships then belonging to France at 19 : while, with an air of triumph, he states the British line-force, including 50s, at 243 sail. This appears in a small table, entitled "Naval Force of Europe;" and in which France, as a naval power, ranks below Sweden, Denmark, and even Turkey. So far from the statement being correct as relates to France and England, the one possessed, in a state for sea-service and building, more than 53 sail of the line, thus :

Brest	afloat ...	10	building ...	3
Orient	" ...	0	" ...	2
Rochefort	" ...	6	" ...	2
In the Scheldt	" ...	0	" ...	10
Vigo	" ...	1		
Cadiz	" ...	5		
Toulon	" ...	3	" ...	2
Genoa	" ...	0	" ...	2
With Willaumez	" ...	6	" ...	21
" L'Hermitte	" ...	1	Afloat ...	32
		32	Total	53

Several of the ships here marked down as building were ready to be launched, and some were actually afloat. Among the ships of the line which Napoléon at the commencement of the war had ordered to be built, were two at Nantes, one at Bordeaux, one at Marseilles, one at Ostende, and one at Saint-Malo. These have been excluded from the statement, because it is doubtful whether or not they were proceeded upon. In the course of two or three years, every one of the above 21 building ships was actually in commission ; and it is believed that, before the close of the year 1806, several other line-of-battle ships, including two or three three-deckers of the class of the Impérial, were laid down in the different ports of the French empire.

Out of the above 53 ships, not one mounted, or was intended to mount, fewer than 74 guns ; whereas England, if her 64-gun ships be excluded, possessed, in a state for service and building, but 102 sail of the line.* Nor, with the addition of the 64s, would the number exceed 123. The absurdity of including stationary harbour-ships, hulks, and 50-gun ships, when the total on the opposite side contains no vessels of that description, has already been exposed.† Even admitting that, in the year 1806, Russia or Spain had about the same number of line-of-battle

* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 14.

† See vol. i., p. 57.

ships as France, will any one say that, in point of maritime enterprise, physical strength, and means of annoyance, the latter did not rank far above them? Hence, so far from the British navy, in March, 1806, being to the French navy, in ships of the line, as 12 to one, the difference in reality, was but as two to one; and, so far from France being, at the time referred to, the seventh naval power in Europe, she was, as she long had been, the second.

The command of the British naval forces, on the extensive station of the Mediterranean, was still in the able hands in which we last year left it.* Early in the month of February Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, while cruising off Cadiz, received information that five of the four frigates which, with other ships of the late discomfited Franco-Spanish fleet, had sought refuge in the port after the battle of Trafalgar, were ready for sea, and intended to sail the first opportunity. By way of inducing the French frigates to do so, in the hope to intercept them soon after they quitted port, Lord Collingwood with his squadron, retired to a station about 10 leagues distant from the harbour; where he lay out of sight, leaving the 38-gun frigate *Hydra*, Captain George Mundy, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Moselle*, Captain John Surman Carden, close off the port, with orders to keep a watchful eye upon any vessels sailing from it.

On the 23d of February a strong easterly wind began to blow, and by the 26th had driven the British squadron as far to the westward as Cape Sta.-Maria. Informed of this by the signal posts along the coast, M. La Marre-la-Meillerie, on the same evening, put to sea with the *Hortense*, *Hermione*, *Rhin*, and *Thémis*, and brig-corvette *Furet*, the frigates with six months' provisions and a number of troops on board. At 9 h. 15 m. P.M. the *Hydra* and *Moselle*, then about three miles west of Cadiz lighthouse, standing in-shore, discovered and chased the French squadron, which, with a wind so strong and favourable, had already got outside of them. The British frigate and brig immediately bore up after the four French frigates and brig, Captain Mundy intending to steer a parallel course, to watch their manœuvres. At 11 P.M., observing that the French squadron continued a steady course, Captain Mundy detached the *Moselle* in search of the commander-in-chief, and, with the *Hydra* alone, gallantly continued the pursuit.

On the 27th, at 2 h. 30 m. A.M., in consequence of the French commodore having altered his course a point to the westward, the British captain found that he had considerably neared the squadron, particularly the brig, which was at some distance astern of the frigates. The object now was, to cut off this brig; and at length, after a two hours' further chase, the *Hydra* overtook her. The *Furet*, mounting 18 long 8-pounders, with a

* See p. 107.

complement of 130 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Pierre-Antoine-Toussaint Demai, and victualled for a five months' cruise, fired a broadside "pour l'honneur de pavillon," and hauled down her colours. Apparently unmoved by this circumstance, M. La Marre-la-Meillerie permitted the British frigate to carry off her prize, and with his four French frigates, continued his route to the westward.

In the course of the summer the whole of the five French two-deckers, that had escaped from the battle of Trafalgar, appear to have got themselves repaired and in readiness to put to sea, under Vice-admiral Rosily. The Spaniards also succeeded in getting ready one three-decker and five or six two-deckers; making a total of 11 or 12 sail of the line in Cadiz alone. In Carthagea lay ready for sea eight Spanish sail of the line, including two three-deckers. In Toulon there were three French two-deckers, and two or three frigates also ready; besides one or two sail of the line in ports of Venice, fitting. Whether it was that a want of concert existed among the allies, that Napoléon was too much occupied with his army to draw out a plan of operations, or that the scenes of the 21st of October, 1805, had made too deep an impression to be so soon obliterated, the year 1806, in respect to the movements of the enemy's fleets within the limits of Lord Collingwood's command, was one of comparative repose.

Although the waters of the Mediterranean had been cleared of the fleets of the French emperor, his armies were still tyrannizing over the inhabitants of her shores, and the corrupt court of Naples was compelled again, as in the former war, to claim the protection of the British navy. Restricted as we are in our subject, a general view of the state of French power and influence in the Mediterranean states is all that will be required from us.

As the great battle of Marengo in the former war led to the peace of Luneville, so the still greater battle of Austerlitz in the present led to the peace of Presburg. But the terms granted to Austria, were much less favourable in the latter, than in the former case. There the acquisition of the Venetian states was considered to be no inadequate compensation for the loss of the Low Countries; but, by the treaty of Presburg, Austria renounced her share of those states, and consented that they should be annexed to the kingdom of Italy; taking, as her only possession on the shores of the Mediterranean, the comparatively insignificant port of Triest, at the head of the Adriatic. About the same time (December 26, 1806) that the treaty of Presburg was concluded with Austria, a treaty between Buonaparte and Prussia was signed at Vienna.

Peace with these two powers, and the withdrawal of the Russian army from Austria, left Napoléon to wreak his vengeance upon Ferdinand of Naples; who, in the direct violation of

the treaty of neutrality which he had concluded with the French emperor, on the 8th of October, 1805, had suffered an Anglo-Russian squadron to land a body of troops in the bay of Naples. This took place so shortly after the ratification of the treaty of Portici as on the 20th of November. The Russian troops were about 14,000 in number, and commanded by General Lassey. These were quartered in Naples and its environs. The British troops, amounting to about 10,000 men, were commanded by General Sir James Craig, and were cantoned at Castel-à-mare, Torre-del-Greco, and the vicinity. Nor was this all. The king of Naples began levying an army, and providing horses and waggons for its conveyance, and magazines of stores and ammunition for its use.

With his accustomed promptitude in carrying his measures into execution, Napoléon, on the 28th of December, the very day after the treaty of Presburg had been signed, issued from his head-quarters at Vienna a proclamation, declaring that the Neapolitan dynasty had ceased to reign. The denouncement of this threat was the signal for the two allies of Naples to consult their own safety. The Russian troops re-embarked and retired to Corfu; and the English troops, being far too few for so extensive a line of defence as it would have been necessary to maintain, re-embarked also, and posted themselves at Messina in Sicily.

Hearing of the advance of a French army, the King of Naples quitted his capital on the 23d of January: and, embarking on board the British 74-gun ship *Excellent*, Captain Frank Sotheron, took refuge, a second time, at Palermo.* The queen and a part of the court accompanied or quickly followed the king in his retreat; but the Duke of Calabria, the king's eldest son and the heir apparent to the throne, remained as regent of the kingdom until the 7th of February, when he also quitted Naples and retired to his dukedom. The French army, in the mean time, with Joseph Buonaparte for its nominal head, but really under the command of General Massena, assisted by General Reignier and other officers of reputation, had reached the frontiers, and on the 9th took post at Ferentino. From this place Joseph Buonaparte issued a proclamation, vowing vengeance upon the court of Naples, but promising protection to the people. Shortly afterwards the French army advanced in three divisions. The right division, under General Reignier, marched to Gaeta, a strong port situated upon a rocky promontory, three sides of which are washed by the sea, and the fourth connected with the continent by a narrow and well-fortified isthmus. The governor of this fortress, the Prince of Hesse-Philipsthardt, was summoned to surrender on favourable terms, but refused. An immediate attack by the French gave them,

* See vol. ii., p. 190.

with some loss, the possession of a redoubt; but, for the present, they gained no other advantage. The centre division, under General Massena, marched straight to Naples; and on the 12th and 15th of February Joseph Buonaparte entered successively, by capitulation with the garrisons, Capua and Naples. In short, before the end of March, the French had placed garrisons in Scylla and Tarento, and were in possession of the whole kingdom of Naples, except Gaeta, and Civitella del Tranto in the further Abruzzo.

On the 21st of April, while matters were in this state, Rear-admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, having been detached by Lord Collingwood for the purpose, arrived in the *Pompée* 74 at Palermo, to take the command of the squadron assembled there for the defence of Sicily. That squadron then consisted, besides the *Pompée* and *Excellent*, of the two 64-gun ships *Athénien*, Captain John Giffard, and *Intrepid*, Captain the Honourable Philip Wodehouse, a Neapolitan frigate, one or two British frigates, and a few Neapolitan gun and mortar boats. The British army still occupied Messina, but, owing to the retirement of Sir James Craig from ill-health, was now under the command of Sir John Stuart.

The first step taken by Sir Sidney was to throw supplies into Gaeta, which he accomplished, under a heavy fire from the besiegers, landing, with a considerable quantity of ammunition, four of the *Excellent*'s lowerdeck guns. Shortly afterwards, considering that the best means of co-operating with the Prince of Hesse in defending the fort, which he had hitherto with so much gallantry maintained, would be to draw off a part of the attacking force for the defence of Naples, Sir Sidney proceeded thither with the *Pompée*, *Excellent*, *Athénien*, and *Intrepid*; leaving in command off Gaeta Captain Henry Richardson, with the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Juno*, Neapolitan frigate *Minerva*, Captain Vieugna, and 12 Neapolitan gun-boats.

The French having erected a battery of four guns on the point of La Madonna della Catterra, the Prince of Hesse ordered 60 men from the garrison to be embarked in four fishing-boats; and on the night of the 12th Captain Richardson, with the armed boats of the two frigates, landed the troops undiscovered in a small bay in the rear of the enemy's works. The French abandoned the fort as the boats reached the shore; and the guns were spiked, the carriages destroyed, and the troops re-embarked, without any loss. On the 15th the garrison of Gaeta made another tolerably successful sortie, supported in the attack and retreat by two divisions of gun-boats, one of them under the command of Captain Richardson, and by the armed boats of the *Juno* under the direction of Lieutenant Thomas Wells, assisted by Lieutenant of marines Robert M. Mant. The only loss on the part of the allies was sustained by the *Juno*'s boats, and consisted of four seamen killed and five wounded. ■

Upon Sir Sidney's arrival in the bay of Naples with his squadron, now, by the junction of the 74-gun ship *Eagle*, Captain Charles Rowley, augmented to five sail of the line, he found the city illuminated in honour of Joseph Buonaparte; who, since the 30th of March, had caused himself to be proclaimed, and was now being crowned, King of the Two Sicilies. Although the fire of his squadron would soon have interrupted the ceremony, Sir Sidney humanely and politically refrained from hostilities against the inhabitants, and directed his attention to a more legitimate object, the dislodgment of the French garrison from the island of Capri.

To the French commandant, Captain Chervet, a summons was sent on the 11th; and, upon the refusal of the latter to capitulate, the *Eagle* was detached to take up a position for the purpose of covering the troops intended to be landed. Captain Rowley placed his ship in the most judicious manner; and the *Eagle* did not open her fire until near enough to feel the effects of the enemy's musketry upon her quarterdeck, where a seaman was killed and her first lieutenant, Mr. James Crawley, wounded. After a fire from both decks of the *Eagle*, and from two Neapolitan mortar-boats, continued from 9 till 10 A. M., the French were driven from the vineyards within their walls. Immediate advantage of this was taken by the disembarkation of the storming party, consisting of seamen and marines, the latter under the command of Captain Richard Bunce, assisted by Captain John Stannus and Lieutenant George P. Carroll, and the former of Lieutenants John Arthur Morell, of the *Eagle*, and Edward Reding of the *Pompée*. Thus led, the British seamen and marines gallantly mounted the steps that led to the heights; and Captain Stannus, pressing forward, killed the French commandant. On this event being known, the garrison beat a parley, and were allowed to capitulate upon honourable terms. This success was fortunately obtained with no greater additional loss to the British, than one marine killed and four seamen and six marines wounded; total, with the *Eagle's* loss on first anchoring, two killed and 10 wounded.

Having placed an English garrison in Capri, Sir Sidney steered along the coast to the southward, obstructing by land, and cutting off by sea, the enemy's communications, in order to retard his operations against Gaeta. The rear-admiral then returned to Palermo, and, falling into the views of Ferdinand, joined the latter in persuading General Stuart to invade Calabria. Reluctantly consenting, Sir John, on the 1st of July, landed about 4800 effective men, all infantry, without opposition, in a bay in the gulf of St.-Eufemia. On the afternoon of the 3d intelligence was brought to him, that General Reignier, with an immediate force of 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and an hourly expected force of 3000 more troops, was encamped on the sloping side of a woody hill below the village of Maida, which was distant about 10 miles from the position of the British. Hoping

to be able to attack the French general before his reinforcement arrived, Sir John Stuart, on the morning of the 4th, commenced his march. But General Reignier had been joined the evening before, by the expected division, and now had under him at the least 7000 men. Desirous of bringing his cavalry into action, and, perhaps, underrating the military prowess of his enemy, General Reignier descended into the plain in front of his position. Here was fought the famous battle of Maida, in which the British bayonet, almost before a thrust had been made by it, won the day; and that with so trifling a loss to the British as one officer, three sergeants, and 41 rank and file killed, and eleven officers, eight sergeants, two drummers, and 261 rank and file wounded: whereas the loss of the French, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was estimated at nearly 4000 men.

The consequence of this victory was the possession by the conquerors of all the forts along the coasts, and of all the dépôts of arms and ammunition prepared for the attack of Sicily. By the end of July the whole of the British army was withdrawn from Calabria, except the garrison of Scylla, and a detachment of the 78th regiment under Lieutenant-colonel M'Leod, which had been detached in the 32-gun frigate *Amphion*, Captain William Hoste, to the coast near Catanzaro, in order to encourage and assist the insurgents in that quarter. By these two officers an attack was made, on the 30th of July, upon the important port of Cotrone; and, owing greatly to the judicious manner in which Captain Hoste placed the *Amphion* and some Neapolitan gun-boats that were under his command, was attributed the surrender of that fortress, with all its stores and magazines, and upwards of 600 French troops.

Shortly after this the French evacuated both Calabrias; but neither the victory of Maida, nor the subsequent successes of the British, could save the fortress of Gaeta. The gallant Prince of Hesse, having received a severe splinter wound, retired to Palermo for his recovery, leaving the command of the post to the lieutenant-governor, Colonel Hotz. Against that officer the French, having brought their artillery to act, eventually succeeded; and on the 12th of July the fortress of Gaeta surrendered by capitulation. The reaction that followed this success restored to the French, before the end of the year, nearly every important post in the two Calabrias, except Scylla; which was still in the possession of the British, and, united with their occupation of Messina, on the opposite site of the Faro, gave them the entire command of the strait.

Among the places which Austria ceded to France by the treaty of Presburg was the province and noble harbour of Cattaro in Dalmatia, situated about 24 miles to the southward of Ragusa. By the terms of the treaty, the French were to take possession in six weeks after the ratification. The time expiring without the arrival of any officer from France, an agent of the court of Russia succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who

were chiefly Greeks, that, as France had neglected to take possession of the province within the time limited, Austria was released from the obligation of maintaining it. This reasoning, although it convinced the inhabitants, produced no effect upon the Austrian officer, who had 1500 men under his command. Just, however, as the Austrian commissary arrived, who was to deliver up the province to the French, a band of Montenegrins from the mountains entered the town, and a Russian ship of the line from Corfu anchored in the harbour. Intimidated by this, or, as is thought, bribed by the Russian agent, General Ghislieri consented to evacuate the place, which was immediately occupied by the natives, and by them transferred to the Russians.

Disappointed in gaining possession of Cattaro, the French seized upon Ragusa, under the pretence of securing it against the incursion of the Montenegrins, who had not even threatened to violate its territory; but the occupation of the place by the French produced the very evil which they had pretended to avert. At length, after several skirmishes, the barbarians were driven to the mountains, and the French, who had been greatly reinforced, remained, at the close of the year, in quiet possession of Ragusa; as did the Russians of Cattaro and the adjacent town of Castel-Nuovo.

LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 2d of January, early in the morning, while the British 54-gun ship *Malabar*, Captain Robert Hall, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Wolf*, Captain George Charles Mackenzie, were cruising off the south coast of the island of Cuba, two large schooner privateers were descried by the *Wolf* running into Azeraderos, a small harbour the entrance to which was protected by a double reef of rocks. On arriving off the port, Captain Hall sent the master of the *Malabar*, Mr. Thomas Fotheringham, to sound for anchorage; and, in a little while, the latter found a passage over the reef through which the *Wolf* might be conducted.

The *Wolf*, accordingly, under the able pilotage of Mr. Fotheringham, and assisted by the boats of the *Malabar*, stood into the harbour in six fathoms, and came to an anchor within a quarter of a mile of the two privateers, who had moored themselves in an advantageous position and confidently awaited the attack. The *Wolf* then opened her fire, and continued it for one hour and three quarters; when, perceiving that the privateersmen were abandoning their vessels, Captain Mackenzie despatched the boats to take possession.

This was quickly done; and the vessels were found to be, the *Régulateur*, mounting one long 18-pounder on a traversing carriage, and four long 6-pounders, all brass, with a complement of 80 men, and the *Napoléon*, mounting one long 9-pounder, two

long 4-pounders, and two 12-pounder carronades, with a complement of 66 men. Of the crews four only were taken prisoners, all wounded, one of them mortally: the remainder had fled to the woods. The two schooners were towed without the reefs, when, from the number of shot-holes in her, the *Régulateur* sank, with two wounded Frenchmen and one of the Malabar's marines on board. The previous loss on the British side amounted to two seamen killed and four wounded.

On the 6th of January, in the evening, the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Franchise*, Captain Charles Dashwood, having anchored abreast the town of Campeachy, in a quarter less than four fathoms, so shallow was the water upon that coast, at the distance of five leagues off shore, despatched her launch, barge, and pinnace, containing 64 officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant John Fleming, first of the ship, assisted by Lieutenant Peter John Douglas, third of the ship, Lieutenant Mends of the marines, and Messieurs Cuthbert Daly, John Lamb, Charles William Chalmers, and William Hamilton, midshipmen, with orders to scour the bay, and bring off such of the enemy's vessels as they might fall in with. The second lieutenant, Thomas John Peschell, was as anxious as any to be one of the party; but, requiring his presence on board, Captain Dashwood could not indulge him.

Owing to the distance they had to row, the darkness of the night, and the uncertainty of their position, the boats did not arrive at the spot in which the vessels lay until 4 A. M. on the 7th. Unfortunately for the British, this was long after the moon had risen. Consequently their approach had been discovered, and ample time given to the Spaniards for preparation, even to the tricing-up of the boarding-nettings and the projecting of sweeps from the sides of the vessels, to obstruct the boats in their approach.

Although the alarm had thus spread from one end of the bay to the other, and had even extended itself to the castle on shore, nothing could damp the ardour of the British. They pushed rapidly on, and presently saw approaching them two Spanish brigs of war, an armed schooner, and seven gun-boats; all of which had slipped their cables, and now opened a heavy fire upon the three boats; such a fire as would soon have annihilated them, had not Lieutenant Fleming, with as much judgment as intrepidity, dashed forward, and with the launch, laid the nearest brig on board. Being quickly supported by Lieutenant Douglas in the barge, and Mr. Lamb in the pinnace, Lieutenant Fleming, after an obstinate conflict of 10 minutes duration, carried the Spanish brig-corvette *Raposa*, mounting 12 carriage-guns (pierced for 16), with swivels and cohorns, and having on board 75 men, out of a complement of 90, her captain, Don Joaquin de la Cheva, with some other officers and a boat's crew, being absent on shore.

This exploit was achieved with a loss to the British of only seven men slightly wounded; whereas the Raposa had one officer and four men killed, and her acting commander and 25 men wounded, many of them mortally; several of the crew had also leaped overboard and were drowned. The remaining brig, represented to have mounted 20 guns, with a crew of 180 men, the schooner eight guns, and the seven gun-boats, two each, now opened a fire of cannon and musketry upon the Raposa; but the latter and the boats so smartly returned the fire, that the flotilla soon retired to their former position, and left Lieutenant Fleming in quiet possession of his prize.

It is always a pleasant part of our task, after recording a well-executed enterprise of the desperate character of that which we have just narrated, to be able to state, that the officer who, as is not invariably the case, was both the appointed and the real leader of the party, has received that promotion, which is so justly his due. The preparatory step to this is the official testimony of the captain of the ship whose boats were detached on the service. Let us see what Captain Dashwood, in his letter to Vice-admiral Dacres, says upon the subject of this action: "To an officer of your discriminating judgment, I trust I shall stand excused if I take the liberty of recommending Lieutenant Fleming to your notice for his meritorious conduct on this occasion. He appears to me to be an officer of distinguished merit and bravery; and I understood he was highly respected by his late captain, the good, the amiable, and my gallant predecessor, the Honourable John Murray." Can any thing be stronger? And yet Lieutenant Fleming was not promoted, but Lieutenant Douglas was. The latter, at the date of the enterprise, was third lieutenant of the ship; the former first: the one was a lieutenant of about two years' standing, the other of nearly six. What was the consequence? Why that Lieutenant Fleming was not made a commander until November, 1814, just three years to a month after Lieutenant Douglas had been made a post-captain. That Lieutenant Douglas was a brave officer, and a most deserving young man, no one can deny; but Lieutenant Fleming possessed the prior right of promotion, from his seniority of rank, from his responsibility as the commanding officer of the enterprise, and from his acknowledged skill and gallantry in bringing that enterprise to a successful issue.

On the 8th of March, in the evening, the British 44-gun frigate *Egyptienne*, Captain the Honourable Charles Paget, anchored off the port of Muros in Spain, and detached her boats, under the command of Captain Philip Cosby Handfield (still acting as first lieutenant of the frigate, on account of not having received an official account of his promotion), assisted by Lieutenant Richard Israel Alleyne, and Lieutenant of marines Edward Hancock Garthwaite, to endeavour to cut out from the harbour a large frigate-built French privateer known to be lying there.

In this enterprise, the British fully succeeded, although the vessel, which was the *Alcide*, of Bordeaux, pierced for 34 guns, and carrying, when at sea, a complement of 240 men, was moored close to the beach, under the protection of two batteries, that kept up an incessant fire until the ship was towed clear of their range. The British had the additional good fortune to execute the service without a casualty. We wish Captain Paget had entered a little more into the details, and acquainted us how many, and what nature of, guns the *Alcide* mounted, and how many men were on board of her, when thus, with such entire impunity, boarded, carried, and brought out of an enemy's harbour.

On the 13th of March, at 3 A. M., in latitude $26^{\circ} 16'$ north, longitude $29^{\circ} 25'$ west, as a British squadron, consisting of the 98-gun ship *London*, Captain Sir Harry Neale, 80-gun ship *Foudroyant*, Captain John Chambers White, bearing the flag of Vice-admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, and 38-gun frigate *Amazon*, Captain William Parker, was steering to the south-east, with the wind at west-south-west, two sail at a short distance in the north-east were discovered by the *London*, then astern and to windward of her companions. The *London* immediately wore in chase, and made signals to the admiral with false fires and blue lights. In a short time Sir Harry got near enough to open his fire upon the strangers, then on the larboard tack, under all sail, and who were no other than our old friends, the *Marengo* and *Belle-Poule*, returning to France from their long eastern cruise; and from whom, it will be recollected, we parted in the preceding August, at the close of a third rather inglorious encounter with an enemy.*

We must be permitted to digress a little, to bring *M. Linois* to the point at which we now find him. After quitting the *Blenheim* and convoy, the French admiral repaired to Simon's bay, where he arrived on the 13th of September, and found the *Bato Dutch* 64, but quite in a dismantled state, and without a crew. While waiting at this anchorage repairing his damages, he was joined by the *Atalante*; but which frigate soon afterwards perished on the coast. Quitting their anchorage on the 10th of November, the *Marengo* and *Belle-Poule* proceeded off Cape Negro; thence towards Cape Lopez; and, although he reconnoitred all the bays and anchorages along the African coast, *M. Linois* captured but one ship and one brig of trifling value. The two ships then steered for Prince's island, where they took in water, and afterwards cruised to leeward of Saint-Helena. Here on the 29th of January, 1806, *M. Linois* fell in with an American, who informed him of the capture of the *Cape* by the English. Learning, also, that the Indian seas were filling with British men of war, in search of himself and compa-

* See p. 152.

nion, the French admiral decided to return home, and on the 17th of February crossed the equinoctial line for the twelfth time since his departure from Brest in March, 1803. In less than four weeks more he reached the spot which, as we will now proceed to show, proved the bane of his hopes.

At 5 h. 30 m. A. M. the London got alongside of the Marengo; and the two ships commenced the action, yard-arm and yard-arm. At 6 A. M. the Marengo, unable longer to withstand the London's heavy and well-directed fire, hauled off, and made sail ahead. At 6 h. 15 m. A. M. the Belle-Poule opened her fire upon the lee bow of the London, and received a fire in return, until out of gun-shot ahead. At 7 A. M. the Amazon came up; and, passing the London, overtook, and at 8 h. 30 m. A. M. began engaging, the Belle-Poule. All this while the London had been keeping up a running fight with the Marengo, and she continued it until 10 h. 25 m. A. M.; when, seeing the Foudroyant coming fast up, the Marengo struck her colours to the London; as, about the same time, did the Belle-Poule to the Amazon.

The London, out of her 740 men and boys, sustained a loss of one midshipman (William Rooke) and nine seamen and marines killed, and one lieutenant (William Faddy, dangerously), one midshipman (J. W. Watson), and 20 seamen and marines wounded. Her sails, rigging, and masts were also a good deal damaged by shot. The loss on board the Amazon amounted to her first lieutenant (Richard Seymour), one lieutenant of marines (Edward Prior), one seaman, and one marine killed, and five seamen wounded.

The gun-force of the Marengo and Belle-Poule was precisely that of their respective classes, as particularized at Nos. 4 and 5 of the small table at p. 54 of the first volume. The former, when she commenced the action, had a crew, as certified by the captain and his two senior lieutenants, of 740 men and boys; of whom the Marengo had two officers and 61 men killed, and eight officers and 74 men wounded, including among the latter the admiral and his son, severely, and Captain Vrignaud, with the loss of his right arm; total 63 killed, and 82 wounded. The Belle-Poule, out of a crew of 330, similarly certified, lost six men killed and 24 wounded. It may seem singular that these two ships should be so well manned at the end of a three years' cruise, especially when the Marengo, if not the frigate, had sent away two or three prizes. But it is believed that they each had on board a proportion of the crew of the Atalante, the loss of whose ship near the Cape of Good Hope has already been noticed.

Between a British 12-pounder 98, and a French 74-gun ship, the relative broadside weight of metal is not so unequal as might be supposed to exist between a three and a two decked ship, the one, in long guns only, being 958, the other 907 lbs.; but the

carronades of the London increased the preponderance in her favour. In point of complement, the two ships were equal; but in tonnage, the French ship had slightly the advantage, the *Marengo* measuring 1926, the *London* 1894 tons. The two frigates, if we overlook a superiority of 40 or 50 men in the French one, were well matched; and Captain Parker and his officers no doubt regretted that the *Amazon* had not met the *Belle-Poule* single-handed.

The determined resistance of the French ships was creditable to them; and that on the part of the *Marengo* tended much to remove any ill impression, which Commodore Dance's, the *Centurion's*, or the *Blenheim's* affair might have cast upon Rear-admiral Linois. The only ship of the latter's late Indian squadron, left cruising at the date of his capture, was the *Sémillante*; and we shall soon have occasion to recur to the proceedings of that fortunate frigate.

On the 21st of March the British hired armed brig *Colpoys*, of 16 guns (14 carronades, 12-pounders, and two long fours), and 21 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas Usher, chased into the port of Avillas, under the protection of a battery of six long 24-pounders, three Spanish luggers. Having a fine commanding breeze, the *Colpoys* stood in after them; when, just as she got within range of the battery, and before her carronades could be worked with effect, the wind died away.

Lieutenant Ussher immediately manned two boats, and, stepping into one himself, dashed through a heavy fire of grape from the battery and of musketry from a party of soldiers that had been sent on board the vessels to defend them. His boat, containing, besides himself, only six men, soon outpulled the other boat. Without waiting for the latter, Lieutenant Ussher gallantly boarded and carried the three luggers, the captains and crews, all but 13 men, leaping over on one side, as the lieutenant and his little party entered on the other.

The second boat then came up, and assisted in getting off the prizes; one, named *Santa Buena-Ventura*, of two guns, laden with flax and steel; the second, named *San-Antonio*, of the same force and lading; and the third, the *San-Real* in ballast. The latter was given up to the enemy, with 11 of the prisoners. Notwithstanding the heavy fire of the battery, this truly gallant exploit was effected with the loss of only two men wounded, one of them severely.

On the 19th of April, as the *Colpoys*, commanded by the same enterprising officer, was standing along-shore between the *Glénans* and *Isle Groix*, in company with the gun-brig *Attack*, Lieutenant Thomas Swaine, two *chasse-marées* were perceived at anchor at the entrance of the river *Douillan*; but which, on the approach of the two brigs, got under way and stood up the river.

Finding it necessary to silence a two-gun battery before the

boats could get to the *chasse-marées*, Lieutenant Ussher, with 12 men from each brig, landed, and, after a short skirmish, got possession of, and spiked, the two guns, which were long 12-pounders. Lieutenant Ussher afterwards brought the vessels down the river, and destroyed the signal-post of Douillan; accomplishing the whole of this daring and important service without the slightest loss, or any greater damage to the two brigs than that done to their standing and running rigging, while engaged with the battery previously to its destruction by the two boats' crews. For his gallantry upon this and several previous occasions, Lieutenant Ussher, on the 18th of the following October, was promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 24th of March, at 1 p. m., Cape Roxo, in the island of Porto-Rico, bearing north by west distant 16 leagues, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Reindeer* (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long sixes), Captain John Fyffe, standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at south-south-east, discovered two men-of-war brigs speaking each other in the south-east quarter. The *Reindeer* immediately stood towards them, and at 1 h. 40 m. p. m. showed her colours, and made the strangers out to be enemy's cruisers. They were the French brig-corvettes *Phaëton*, Lieutenant Louis-Henri Freycinet-Saulce, and *Voltigeur*, Lieutenant Jacques Saint-Cricq, of 16 long 6-pounders, and 115 men each.

At 2 p. m. the *Voltigeur*, hoisting her colours, passed to leeward of, and fired her broadside at, the *Reindeer*; while the *Phaëton*, having also hoisted her colours, together with a commodore's pendant, kept her wind. For the latter the *Reindeer* immediately tacked; and, in crossing her on the opposite board, poured in a heavy fire, which was promptly returned by the *Phaëton*. The British brig continued tacking, and alternately exchanging broadsides with the two French brigs until dark; when, having the leech of her foresail and the clew of her fore topsail shot away, and the jib-canvass and most of the running rigging much cut, and the weather becoming thick and squally, the *Reindeer* was unable to go about for nearly a quarter of an hour. Meanwhile, having doubtless felt the effects of the latter's 32-pound shot, and being, as it afterwards appeared, on their way to the squadron of M. Leissegues supposed to be still in Santo-Domingo roads, the *Phaëton* and *Voltigeur* had made sail. So that at 7 p. m., when the *Reindeer* tacked in pursuit, the two French brigs were no longer visible.

With the exception of a few shot-holes in her hull, the *Reindeer's* damages were confined to her rigging and sails, and she escaped without any loss on the part of her crew. What damage or loss was sustained by her two opponents could not of course be ascertained; but it was afterwards understood, that the *Phaëton* had suffered from it, as well in men, as in masts, rigging, and hull.

On the 26th, in the forenoon, the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Pique*, Captain Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, crossing over from St.-Domingo to Curaçoa, fell in with and chased the two French brig-corvettes named in the last action; and which were then upon the starboard tack, with a fresh trade or south-east wind, standing in for the land. At 1 P. M., having got within long range, the *Pique* commenced firing at, and at 2 P. M. by her superior sailing closed with, the two brigs. When the firing had continued about 20 minutes, the sternmost brig, the *Phaëton*, having had her peak and gaff halliards shot away, and being otherwise crippled, fell on board the starboard beam of the frigate; who, to promote so desirable an object, had taken advantage of a favourable flaw of wind and put her helm down.

In an instant Lieutenants William Ward and Philip Henry Baker, Mr. John Thompson, the master, and Lieutenant William Henry Craig, of the marines, with about 25 petty officers, seamen, and marines, sprang on board the *Phaëton*; and the *Pique*, clearing herself, stood for the *Voltigeur*, whose commander, M. Saint-Cricq, although he had, as it appears, agreed to co-operate with the commodore in an attempt to board the frigate, when escape should be found impracticable, and had since been directed to close for the purpose of putting the manœuvre into execution, was crowding sail to get away.

No sooner had the boarding party stepped upon the decks of the *Phaëton*, than a great proportion of her crew, headed by the officers, rushed from under the fore-and-aft mainsail, where they had lain concealed, and, using the boom and the fallen sail both as a rest for their pieces and a shelter for their persons, opened, with comparative impunity, a most destructive fire upon the British; destructive, indeed, for it killed Mr. Thompson, the master, and eight seamen, and wounded Lieutenants Ward, Baker, and Craig, and 11 seamen and marines.

The *Pique*, the instant she was aware of what had happened, backed her sails, and sent a boat with a fresh supply of men. These, indignant at the sight of their slaughtered comrades, in a very few minutes compelled the French crew, although greatly superior in numbers, to call for quarter. As, when the *Phaëton* fell on board the *Pique*, the brig's colours, with part of the mainsail, hung over the taffrail in the water, and her crew could neither be seen, nor (a very unusual thing on board a French ship) heard, it was considered that she would surrender quietly. A resistance, therefore, so sudden and fierce, did certainly bear the appearance of treachery.

Having again filled, the *Pique* crowded after the *Voltigeur*; who, profiting by all this delay, had advanced considerably ahead, with the intention of running on shore. Before, however, she could effect that object, the French brig was overtaken, and, without further opposition, captured.

During the cannonade the frigate had only one seaman wounded, and that by a grape-shot ; making her total loss nine killed and 14 wounded. The death of Mr. Thompson was a great loss to the service. He had been a most active and enterprising officer, and had left in Jamaica a young and amiable wife to whom he had very recently been united. Lieutenants Ward and Baker were both wounded severely by musketry, the one having a ball through his thigh, the other through his right arm.

The loss on board the *Phaëton*, although admitted to be very severe, could not be exactly ascertained. Among her wounded was Lieutenant Freycinet, with the loss of his right arm. The loss on board the *Voltigeur*, who, from her position on the Pique's weather bow, received very little of her fire, was wholly immaterial. Indeed the frigate, being very light, lay over so much with the strong breeze, that her fire upon either brig was comparatively ineffective. The *Phaëton* and *Voltigeur* were new vessels, of about 320 tons each, and were afterwards commissioned as British cruisers, under the names of *Mignonne* and *Musette*.

Nine days previous to the capture of these two French brigs, Lieutenant Ward, with the gig of the Pique, and Mr. John Eveleigh, midshipman, with the yawl, gallantly boarded, and after a very smart resistance, but fortunately without any loss, succeeded in capturing, off Ocoe bay, St.-Domingo, the Spanish armed schooner *Santa-Clara*, of one long 9-pounder and 28 men, completely equipped for war.

On the 1st of November Captain Ross sent the barge and two other boats of the Pique, under the direction of Lieutenant Christopher Bell, assisted by lieutenant of marines Edward Bailie, to intercept a schooner coming round Cape Roxo, Porto Rico. Owing, however, to a heavy squall from the shore, attended with rain, the boats lost sight of her in the night. Determined not to return to the ship emptyhanded, these two enterprising officers pushed in for Carabet bay, where lay a fine Spanish copper-bottomed brig pierced for 12 guns. This vessel they not only brought safe out, but they destroyed a three-gun battery on shore, spiking the cannon and breaking the carriages ; and all without the loss of a man.

On the next day, the 2d, Lieutenant Philip Henry Baker, in the Pique's launch, chased, and, after some smart skirmishing but no loss, drove on shore upon the reef of Cape Roxo, a French felucca-rigged privateer, of two carriage-guns, four swivels, and 26 men, where she was completely wrecked. On his return to the ship, Lieutenant Baker chased and captured another very fast-sailing French privateer, of one gun and 20 men.

On the 3d of April a Spanish squadron, consisting of two ships of the line, a frigate, and a brig, having under their pro-

tection a few coasters, sailed out of Carthagena; and, while the three former chased to the southward the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Renommée*, Captain Sir Thomas Livingstone, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Nautilus*, Captain Edward Palmer, who had been stationed to watch the port, the brig, accompanied by the convoy, and favoured by a fresh north-easterly wind, steered along-shore to the westward.

Finding, as evening came on, that the *Renommée* had left the Spanish ships at a great distance astern, Sir Thomas despatched the *Nautilus* to Lord Collingwood off Cadiz with the intelligence of their escape, and after dark made sail for Cape de Gata, in the hope of cutting off the Spanish brig. On the 4th, at 2 A. M., the brig was discovered at anchor under Fort Callartes, and not more than 500 yards from it. Baffling winds delayed the *Renommée* in her approach for three quarters of an hour; but, on getting up, the frigate's fire soon silenced the brig, and cut asunder the warp by which she was hauling herself on shore. Thus foiled in her purpose, at 3 h. 30 m. A. M., the Spanish brig of war *Vigilante*, mounting 12 long "12" (or rather, we think, 8) pounders on the main deck, and six "24" (or more probably 18) pounder carronades on the quarterdeck, total 18 guns, with a crew of 109 men, commanded by Lieutenant Don Joseph Julian, struck her colours and was brought safe off. Two Spanish gun-boats had co-operated with the brig for a short time, until silenced and driven, as was believed, upon the beach, and the batteries had fired at the frigate during the whole time that she continued within range of their guns; but still the *Renommée* sustained little or no damage, and had only two men wounded. The loss on board the *Vigilante* was one killed and three wounded; and the brig's mainmast was so damaged that it fell soon after her surrender. The prize was a similar class of vessel to the *Port-Mahon* and *Vincejo*, and, under the name of *Spider*, continued for many years to be a useful brig-cruiser in the British navy.

On the 3d of May, late in the evening, Captain Livingstone, cruising to the north-east of Cape Palos, despatched the boats of the *Renommée* and *Nautilus*, under the command of Lieutenant Sir William Parker, assisted by Lieutenants Charles Adams and Alexander Nesbett, Lieutenant of marines Henry Meerton, Mr. Timothy Murray, boatswain of the *Renommée*, and Mr. Dawson, carpenter of the *Nautilus*, and several midshipmen, to cut out from the port of Vieja, the catholic king's schooner *Giganta*, of two long 24-pounders in the bow, three long 4-pounder carriage-guns and four 2-pounder swivels, and 28 men, commanded by Captain Don Juan de Moire.

On the 4th, at 1 A. M., the service was executed in a very gallant manner, although the schooner having suspected the attack, had her boarding-nettings triced up, was chain-moored within pistol-shot of the batteries, and defended by more than

100 musketeers stationed on the beach. Notwithstanding the formidable opposition they experienced, the British brought out their prize, a remarkably fine vessel, with no other loss than one midshipman (Charles Forbes) and three men badly, and three slightly wounded. Nor did the loss on the part of the *Giganta* amount to more than nine wounded, including one mortally.

On the night of the 21st of October the four cutters of the *Renommée*, under the direction of Lieutenant Sir William Parker, entered the port of Colon in the island of Majorca, and, in the face of a fire from the vessels in the harbour and from the tower of Falconara, gallantly boarded and carried a Spanish tartan, mounting four guns, and two settees, one of them mounting three guns, and both deeply laden with grain. The two settees were with great difficulty brought out of the port; but the tartan, having got on shore, was set fire to and destroyed. This bold enterprise was effected with the loss of only one British seaman wounded.

On the next night three of the frigate's cutters, under the command of the same officer, brought off, from under the guns of the *Falconara*, one Spanish settee, mounting two guns. On this occasion the British were much annoyed by musketry from behind the bushes, which wounded one seaman. To put a stop to this, Sir William landed with a few marines and seamen, and having killed one Spaniard and driven off the remainder, rejoined the ship without any further loss.

On the 5th of April, as the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Pallas*, Captain Lord Cochrane, was lying at an anchor close to the Cordovan shoal, his lordship received such information as determined him to attempt cutting out two French brig-corvettes lying in the river Gironde leading to Bordeaux. Accordingly, on the same evening, a little after dark, the boats of the frigate, under the command of Lieutenant John Hansell, assisted by Mr. James Sutherland the master, and by midshipmen Edward Perkyns, John Charles Crawford, and William A. Thompson, proceeded on the service. The vessels lay 20 miles above the shoals and within two heavy batteries. The British, nevertheless, at 3 A.M. on the 6th, boarded, carried, and cut out, in spite of every resistance, the French brig-corvette *Tapageuse*, of 14 long 8-pounders and 95 men; which vessel, having the guard, was perfectly prepared. The strength of the flood-tide prevented the boats or the prize-brig from ascending the river after the remaining brig; and therefore at daybreak the *Tapageuse* made sail. The alarm was immediately given, and the other brig followed and attacked the *Tapageuse*, but after an hour's firing, was compelled to sheer off. All this was effected with the loss of only three seamen wounded, and some trifling damage to the rigging of the prize.

On the same morning, while the *Pallas* lay at an anchor awaiting the return of her boats, two armed ships and a brig,

making many signals, were observed coming down towards the former. The British frigate was soon under way, and notwithstanding her reduced complement, chased and drove on shore the two French 20-gun ship-corvettes Garonne and Gloire, and the 16-gun brig-corvette Malicieuse. The masts of all three vessels shortly afterwards went by the board, and their hulls were involved in a sheet of spray.

On the 25th the Pallas was detached by Vice-admiral Thornborough, cruising with a small squadron off the Tour des Baleines, to reconnoitre the French squadron at anchor in the road of the Isle of Aix. The Pallas accordingly stood in, and counted five sail of the line (one a three-decker), five frigates, one ship-corvette, and three brig-corvettes. Shortly afterwards the French 40-gun frigate Minerve, Captain Joseph Collet, accompanied by the three brig-corvettes, Lynx, Sylphe, and Palinure, got under way by signal from the admiral, and with the wind from the north-east stood out to drive away the Pallas; but the latter continued her station, and, as the French frigate and brigs approached, fired at them several broadsides. The Minerve and her three consorts, discovering about this time the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Iris, Captain George Argles, 16-gun ship-sloop Hazard, Captain Charles Dilkes, and a cutter, cruising off Chasseron, stretched in under cover of the batteries at the Isle of Aix. Observing this, as well as that the French captain had no intention to stand out beyond the reach of the forts, Lord Cochrane made sail towards the offing.

There being, as this indefatigable officer himself states, "nothing better in view," and finding that the French trade was kept in port, in a great measure, by the knowledge of the exact situation of the British cruisers constantly announced by the signal-posts upon the coast, Lord Cochrane resolved to attempt the destruction of some of them. Accordingly, detachments of the crew of the Pallas demolished, in succession, the two posts at Pointe de la Roche, the post at Caliola, and the two in Anse de Répos, on the coast of La Vandée; bringing away all the flags, and burning the houses built by the government. One of the two posts in Anse de Répos was taken by Lieutenant Haswell and Mr. Hillier, the gunner, at the head of their division of men, from upwards of 100 French militia.

Lord Cochrane subsequently landed, and attacked a battery of three long 36-pounders, with a garrison of 50 men, situated on Pointe d'Eguillon, in the Pertuis Breton. In this attack he was greatly assisted by the flanking fire of the Frisk cutter, Lieutenant John Norton, and Contest gun-brig, Lieutenant John Gregory. The British then laid the fort in ruins, spiked the guns, burnt the carriages, blew up the barrack and magazine, and threw all the shells into the sea. The signal-post of Eguillon, together with the house, shared the fate of the gun-carriages; but a French convoy that had lain under the pro-

tection of the battery, succeeded in getting into a river beyond the reach of the enterprising chief and his men. In all these exploits, Lieutenant David Mapleton, and Mr. Sutherland, the master, and Mr. Robert Hillier, the gunner, are mentioned as having greatly distinguished themselves.

On the 12th of May the *Pallas*, accompanied by the 44-gun frigate *Indefatigable*, Captain John Tremayne Rodd, and 16-gun ship-sloop *Fingfisher*, Captain George Francis Seymour, again stood in to reconnoitre the French squadron in the road of the Isle of Aix. The French admiral immediately ordered out two frigates, one of which was known to be the *Minerve*, attended by the three brigs. At 2 P. M. the two British frigates and sloop passed the lighthouse battery on the Isle of Aix, which fired several shot at them. Shortly afterwards a few distant broadsides were exchanged between one of the French frigates and the *Kingfisher*. At 3 P. M., being close under the batteries, the *Pallas*, *Indefatigable*, and *Kingfisher* tacked and stood out.

On the 14th, early in the morning, the *Pallas* worked in alone against a fresh breeze from the south by west; and at 10 h. 30 m. A. M., having arrived nearly within gun-shot of the battery on the Isle of Aix, shortened sail to her topsails to reconnoitre the French squadron in the road. In a little while the *Minerve*, accompanied by the three brig-corvettes already named, was seen upon the beam of the *Pallas* running down with studding-sails and royals set, to capture or drive off the intruder. Knowing how to profit by the heedless manner in which the French captain was making his approach, Lord Cochrane kept the main topsail of the *Pallas* shivering, and got all ready to assist M. Collet in taking in his flying kites.

At about 11 h. 15 m. A. M., the *Minerve* and her three consorts having arrived within point-blank shot, the *Pallas* opened her fire, and very soon shortened the frigate's sail for her, and brought down the maintopsail yard of one of the brigs. The *Pallas* now filled her main topsail, hauled on board her tacks, and endeavoured to get to windward of her principal opponent; who, assisted by the batteries, opened a smart fire upon the British frigate.

The mutual cannonade continued, with such interruptions only as were occasioned by the frequent tacking of the *Pallas* to avoid the shoals, until 1 P. M.; when, having succeeded in gaining the wind of the *Minerve*, and in getting between her and the batteries, the *Pallas* poured into her, at tolerably close quarters, one or two heavy broadsides. The *Minerve* slackened her fire. Seeing this, the *Pallas* ceased hers, and, with the view of preventing her opponent's retreat, ran her on board. The French frigate's side thrust back into their ports the British frigate's guns; but that did not prevent the latter from discharging their contents, with destructive effect, into the hull of the former. The

decks of the *Minerve* appeared to be deserted by all except Captain Collet and a few of his officers, and three pistol-shot was the only return she made. Such, however, was the quantity of headway in the ships, and such the unequal collision between two bodies so disproportionate in size, that the *Pallas* had her fore topmast, jib-boom, fore and main topsail yards, spritsail yard, bumpkin, cat-head, chain-plates, fore rigging, foresail and even the bower anchor, by which Lord Cochrane had hoped to hook on, torn away. Yet even this accident, by which the two frigates so unexpectedly separated, would probably not have saved the *Minerve*, if M. Allemand, seeing that the latter's fore yard was gone, and that her rigging was entirely disabled, had not sent two other frigates to her assistance. Upon this the *Pallas*, being nearly a wreck, bore up towards the offing with what little sail she could set, until, meeting the *Kingfisher*, the latter took her in tow.

The loss on board the *Pallas*, whose complement was 214 men and boys, amounted, notwithstanding the closeness of the action, to only one marine killed and one midshipman (William Andrews, very badly) and four seamen wounded; while the loss sustained by the *Minerve*, whose crew amounted to 330 men and boys, was, by the acknowledgment of her officers, seven men killed and 14 wounded. With respect to the damages of the French frigate, all that appears in the French official account is, that her fore yard was cut in two, and a few other injuries done to her. Another account states, that the stopper of her anchor was broken in the concussion of the two ships, and that it was in consequence of its falling to the bottom and bringing the frigate up, that the latter was prevented from pursuing the *Pallas*. As iron cables were not then in use, we are to conclude from this, that there was no axe on board the French frigate to cut away a hempen one.

The *Pallas*, a frigate of 667 tons, built of fir in the year 1804, was armed on the main deck with the 26 long 12-pounders of her class, and upon her quarterdeck and forecastle with 12 carronades, 24-pounders, total 38 guns. The *Minerve*, a fine new frigate of 1101 tons, when afterwards captured by the British, was found to mount, besides her 28 long 18-pounders on the main deck, four long 8-pounders and 12 iron 36-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 44 guns.

The relative force of these two frigates, unequal as it here appears, does not offer quite so great a disparity as distinguished the case of the *Speedy* and *Gamo*;* but taking into the account the difference in the quality of those with whom the British had to contend, and the hazardous position in which they fought the action, it does not fall far short of it. Lord Cochrane seems to

* See vol. iii., p. 145.

have viewed his opponent through a diminishing medium: they were never, in appearance, too ample for his grasp, or too powerful to be subdued by his skill and intrepidity.

We have had occasion, more than once, to complain of the (for such it is) criminality of naval writers, in garbling official accounts, with the view of enhancing the exploits of their countrymen. It is a contemptible practice, and deserves exposure, as well for the cause of truth generally, as in justice to the party whose statements have been misrepresented. M. Allemand, in his letter to the French minister of marine, and without which we should probably never have known who, as Lord Cochrane calls her, "our late opponent the black frigate" was, states, that he ordered the *Minerve* and the avisos, or brigs, attached to the advanced squadron, to weigh and attack the enemy's frigate; and that he subsequently sent two other frigates to chase away the latter. "*Alors je fis appareiller la Minerve, Capitaine Collet, avec les avisos de l'avant-garde.*" "*Je fis signal à deux frégates d'appareiller pour la poursuivre:*" whereas, according to the account in a voluminous French work of acknowledged respectability, the *Minerve* alone was ordered out by M. Allemand, and alone, as we are left to infer, compelled the British frigate to seek her safety in flight. "*Cet officier-général donna ordre à la frégate la Minerve, de mettre sous voiles pour aller repousser la frégate ennemie.*"*

On the 17th of April, at 2 P. M., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Sirius*, Captain William Prowse, while cruising six or seven leagues to the eastward of Civita-Vecchia, gained intelligence that a flotilla of French armed vessels was to have sailed thence that morning, bound to Naples. The *Sirius* immediately crowded sail in that direction, and at 4 h. 15 m. P. M. discovered the object of her pursuit, near the shore. The flotilla consisted of the ship-corvette *Bergère*, of 18 long 12-pounders and one brass 36-pounder carronade, with 189 men, Commodore Charles-Jacques-César Chaunay-Duclos, brig-corvettes *Abeille*, of 18 long 8-pounders and two brass 36-pounder carronades, with 160 men, *Legère* and *Janus*, of 12 long 8-pounders each, bombard *Victoire*, of 12 long 18-pounders and two heavy mortars, cutter *Gauloise*, and gun-ketches *Jalouse*, *Gentille*, and *Provençale*, each of four long 4-pounders and one brass 36-pounder carronade; making altogether 97 guns.

Soon after sunset the *Sirius* closed with the flotilla, which, formed in compact order within two leagues of the mouth of the Tiber, and near a dangerous shoal, was lying to, with that confidence which its strength naturally inspired, to await the attack. At 7 P. M., being within pistol-shot, the *Sirius* opened both her broadsides, and continued closely engaged during two hours, at the end of which the *Bergère* hailed that she surrendered.

* *Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvii., p. 290.

The determined resistance of this corvette, the dangers of the shore, and the crippled condition of the *Sirius*, owing to the facility with which the smoothness of the water had enabled the French to use their guns, prevented the frigate from pursuing the remainder of the flotilla; although several of the vessels appeared much disabled, and had been compelled, before the *Bergère* struck, to cease firing and make off.

The loss sustained by the *Sirius* amounted to one master's mate (William Adair), five seamen, and three marines killed, and one acting master (James Brett), one master's mate (John Robinson), one midshipman (Meyricke Lloyd), 12 seamen, and five marines wounded, nine of them dangerously. The loss on the part of the *Bergère*, which must have been severe, has been accidentally omitted in the official account.

Although the execution done to the *Sirius* shows the advantages under which these heavily-armed small-craft act in smooth water, yet, had it been daylight, the probability is, that more than one would have become prize to the British frigate. The gallantry of Captain Prowse in the affair derives additional merit, from the handsome manner in which he notices the good behaviour of M. Chaunay-Duclos, the commodore of the flotilla.

On the 21st of April, at daybreak, latitude $30^{\circ} 45'$ south, and longitude $30^{\circ} 5'$ east, as the British 74-gun ship *Tremendous*, Captain John Osborn, and 50-gun ship *Hindostan*, Captain Alexander Fraser, with a light wind at east-north-east, were escorting a homeward-bound fleet of Indiamen, numbering 11 sail, the French 40-gun frigate *Canonnière* (late British frigate *Minerve**), Captain César-Joseph Bourayne, was discovered to leeward steering south-south-west. Ordering the *Hindostan* by signal to lead the fleet, the *Tremendous* made sail in chase of the frigate; who, having hauled her wind on the starboard tack, bore from the former at noon west by south, and the convoy south-east. Favoured by the lightness of the breeze, the *Canonnière* outsailed the 74, and would have weathered her, had not M. Bourayne, by the appearance of land ahead and to windward, been obliged to bear up. This, with an increase of the breeze at about 2 P.M., enabled the *Tremendous* to gain so upon the frigate, that at 3 h. 30 m. P.M. the latter, hoisting her colours, opened a fire from her stern-chasers, and received a return fire from the bow-guns of the 74.

At 4 P.M., finding herself closely pressed, the *Canonnière* gradually hauled up on the larboard tack; as did also the *Tremendous*, keeping upon her opponent's larboard quarter, and firing her guns as they could be brought to bear. By occasionally luffing up, the frigate got her whole broadside to bear, and thereby considerably damaged the rigging and sails of the 74. The latter, notwithstanding, rather fore-reached upon the *Canon-*

* See vol. iii., p. 190.]

nière, and was meditating to cross her bows and end the contest by a raking fire, when, at about 4 h. 45 m. P. M., a well-directed broadside from the frigate shot away the jib-stay and foretopsail ties and slings of the 74, and brought her foretopsail yard down upon the cap.

In consequence of this accident the Tremendous dropped astern fast, and, having no immediate alternative, bore up and poured a raking fire into her opponent's stern and quarter, but at too great a distance to produce any effect. As soon as she had repaired her damaged rigging, the 74 again hauled up; but the frigate had now got to windward, and was making so good a use of the advantage, that the few shot afterwards fired by the Tremendous could not reach her. At the time that the latter hauled up, the Charlton Indiaman, Captain George Wood, being ahead of the fleet, hove to and fired her broadside, but at so great a distance, that the Canonnière did not deign a reply. Captain Osborn continued the pursuit until 7 h. 30 m. P. M.; when, the frigate having disappeared since sunset, the Tremendous hove to, in order to await the coming up of the Hindostan and convoy.

Except a few shots in her masts, the damages of the Tremendous did not exceed those already mentioned; and, owing to the high fire of her opponent, she had not a man hurt. The injuries done to the Canonnière were of a more serious description. A shot had penetrated 16 inches into her mainmast, and cut the heart of it; and her fore yard and mizenmast were also badly wounded. One of her iron 36-pounder carronades (of which the frigate had 14, with six long eights, making her guns the same in number as when recaptured from the British, 48) and two of her anchors were broken by shot; she likewise received about 21 in the hull. Her loss, out of a crew of 330 men and boys, amounted to seven men killed and 25 wounded, including among the latter two or three officers. It is related of two "enseignes," or midshipmen, named Prenet and Duplantos, that, after being severely wounded, they went below only to get the blood stanchied, and then returned to their quarters.

If any thing can add to the credit of M. Bourayne, for the able management of his ship, and his persevering and successful defence of her against a force so superior, it is the modesty of the account which he transmitted to the minister of marine. Norodomontade; all is plainly, yet minutely told, and, in every material point, agrees with the entry in the British ship's log. Fortunately for the cause of truth and the character of a brave officer, the imperial supervisor of official correspondence either overlooked Captain Bourayne's letter, or, having no immediate purpose to answer by altering the statements it contained, suffered the Moniteur to insert the letter in its original form.

Captain Bourayne's account, however, was too insipid to be

served up, in its simple state, to the French readers of the "Victoires et Conquêtes." The writer has accordingly seasoned it in a way which, he knew, would render it palatable. Not only is the Tremendous made to fly from the field of battle, but the crew of the Canonnière are eager to board her. "Il ne s'agissait plus alors, pour ces braves matelots, de soustraire leur frégate au vaisseau ennemi, ni même de la forcer à une retraite honteuse; ils aspiraient à le prendre, et les cris, à l'abordage! à l'abordage! se firent entendre à plusieurs reprises."*

The action of the Tremendous and Canonnière affords a lesson to officers, who find themselves suddenly assailed by a decidedly superior force. It teaches them that, by a judicious and protracted defence, their ship may escape, even when, in a manner, close under the guns of an opponent, whose single broadside, well directed (the chief point wherein the Tremendous appears to have failed), must either sink or disable her.

The Canonnière had sailed from Cherbourg on the 14th of November, 1805, as a reinforcement to Rear-admiral Linois, whom Captain Bourayne, agreeably to his orders, proceeded to join at the Isle of France. Not finding the admiral there, the frigate was seeking him off the Cape of Good Hope, when fallen in with by the Tremendous and her convoy. After repairing, as well as could be done at sea, the damage she had sustained in this encounter, the Canonnière steered for Simon's bay, and on the 30th anchored near Penguin island. Deceived by the Dutch colours at all the forts, and on board the merchant ships at anchor within him, M. Bourayne sent on shore a boat under the command of a lieutenant. No sooner had the party disembarked, than the forts, changing their colours, opened a heavy fire of shot and shells upon the frigate. The Canonnière immediately cut her cable and stood out. Several shells broke over, but none did any important injury to her; and not a single shot struck her hull. The French lieutenant and his men were of course made prisoners.

On the 25th of April a British squadron, composed of the 50-gun ship Leander, Captain Henry Whitby, 18-pounder 40-gun frigate Cambrian, Captain John Nairne, and 18-gun ship-sloop Driver, Captain Slingsby Simpson, cruised off the port of New York, to search American vessels coming from foreign ports for enemy's property and for goods contraband of war, also to gain information respecting the routes of two or three French squadrons then known to be at sea. At about 2 p. m. on that day Captain Whitby went on board the Cambrian, to dine with Captain Nairne, leaving the Leander in charge of her first lieutenant Mr. John Smith Cowan. At 3 p. m., when standing in upon the larboard tack, Sandy-Hook lighthouse bearing west-north-west

* Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xvii., p. 289.

distant about five leagues, the squadron discovered several-sail in the south-west by south, apparently about four leagues from the Jersey shore, steering towards the Hook.

Soon after 4 P. M. the Cambrian, at that time the leading ship of the three, and distant about three miles and a half from the land, fired at some of the nearest vessels, and, heaving to, sent her boats on board three or four of them. The Leander then passed astern of the former, and stood on, to endeavour to bring down several brigs, one or two schooners, and a ship that had brought to at the distance of two or three miles from the squadron, with their heads in shore and their foresails set. After firing two guns at two brigs, that lay close together, and were more advanced than their companions, the Leander, being within about three miles of the shore, tacked, and continued occasionally firing single guns ahead and astern of the brigs, until the latter wore and stood towards her. The brigs were then boarded by her boats, and suffered to proceed; as were all the other vessels boarded by the squadron on that afternoon, except the ship, which, being detected in an illicit trade from Havana, was detained and sent to Halifax, where the greater portion of her cargo was legally condemned. Among the brigs not boarded was one from the West Indies, laden with a full cargo of contraband, and commanded by the nephew of the celebrated Paul Jones.

No sooner had the two first-mentioned American brigs altered their course to approach the Leander, than a small sloop discovered herself at a short distance in shore of them. Little did the Leander's captain imagine what a powerful instrument of persecution against him this apparently insignificant object was to be made: insignificant, indeed, for who, beyond some half a dozen citizens of New-York, had ever heard of the "American coasting-sloop Richard, Jesse Pierce, master?" It appears (for there is no positive evidence of the fact) that a shot from the Leander killed John Pierce, the brother of Jesse, as the former was standing at the helm. A splinter was said to have struck him under the jaw, and to have caused instant death. The man never moved after he fell, but his brother acknowledges that he neither saw John Pierce fall, nor the splinter strike him. The sloop was presently in New-York, and alongside of one of the wharfs. An election was at this time going on in the city. The body of the man was carried on shore, and the scenes that followed were a disgrace to the citizens.

In mockery of all justice, a grand jury collected among the citizens found a bill for wilful murder against Captain Whitby. The impulse, once given, extended all over the United States. Even the president was induced to issue a proclamation, declaring the captain of the Leander to be a murderer, and calling upon the citizens to seize him, Captain Whitby, that he might be proceeded against according to law. By the same procla-

mation, the *Leander*, and the two ships (in her company at the time the unfortunate occurrence happened, as well as all other vessels commanded by the same three captains, were prohibited from entering the harbours and waters of the United States. At a subsequent period Captain Whitby, at the instance of the British admiralty, was tried by a court-martial for the murder of John Pierce, and, there not being a particle of evidence to prove the charge, was acquitted.

On the 25th of May, in the afternoon, the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Renard* (sixteen 18-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain Jeremiah Coghlan, being about 10 miles north-north-east of the island of Mona, standing to the northward, with a light wind at east-south-east, saw and chased a strange sail under the island of Zacheo, bearing south-east. The pursuit continued all night; and daylight on the 26th discovered the stranger to be a brig, and apparently a cruiser. All this day and night passed in chase, each vessel still on the starboard tack, the *Renard* gaining. On the 27th, at 8 A. M., owing to the calm state of the weather, the *Renard* took to her sweeps, and continued plying them until 8 P. M., when a light breeze sprang up. That night passed, and at noon on the 28th the *Renard*, being in latitude $20^{\circ} 30'$ north, longitude 68° west, and having got almost near enough to the stranger to open her fire, was saved that trouble by the French brig-corvette *Diligent*, Lieutenant Vincent Thevenard, hauling down her colours; and this, notwithstanding the brig mounted 14 long 6-pounders and two brass 36-pounder carronades, and had on board a crew of 125 men. The *Diligent* had sailed from Pointe-à-Pitre seven days before, and was bound to Lorient.

What could have possessed M. Thevenard, that he should have so disgraced the flag under which he served as to haul it down without making the slightest resistance? As the bearer of despatches from Guadaloupe to France, he was justified in speaking no one. That excused his flight, but not his surrender. The moment he saw that he could not escape, and that the ship approaching him was of about equal size to his own (the *Renard* was of 348, the *Diligent* of 317 tons), he should have fought her. Not a 10-gun schooner-privateer from the island he had quitted, but would have done so. What had he to fear, with the weathergage and a battery of seven French 6-pounders and one 36-pounder carronade, opposed to eight 18-pounder carronades and one 6-pounder? The only difference in force between the *Renard* and a common English gun-brig, or one of the large armed schooners, was in number, not in caliber of guns. On coming to close quarters, and beginning to feel the weight of his opponent's heavier shot, what was to hinder the French captain from boarding?

To call the conduct of M. Thevenard by any softer name than cowardice, would be acting more leniently towards a Frenchman

than we are accustomed to act towards an Englishman. To the honour of both navies, cases of the kind are rare, very rare; and if M. Thevenard continued to belong to the French navy, as it appears he did, until the reduction that took place in the year 1817, it must have been because he misrepresented the circumstances under which he had been captured in 1806. What would Napoléon have done, had he known that the commander of one of his brig-corvettes had struck to a vessel of equal force without firing a shot?

On the 17th of February, 1805, the honourable East India company's ship *Warren-Hastings*, Captain Thomas Larkins, mounting 44 guns, with a complement of 196 men and boys, sailed from Portsmouth on a voyage to China. As extraordinary pains had been taken in the equipment of this ship, to enable her to defend herself against a French frigate should she chance to fall in with one, we will give a more particular account of her armament.

The *Warren-Hastings* mounted 26 medium 18-pounders on her main or lower deck, 14 carronades, 18-pounders, on her upper deck, and four carronades, 12-pounders, on her poop. The medium gun was six feet long, and weighed about 26½ cwt.; whereas the common 18-pounder of the British navy is nine feet long, and weighs about 42½ cwt. The former, when run out, did not reach above a foot beyond the ship's side, and, in traversing, *wooded*, or touched the side of the port, at an angle of less than three points from the beam. The 18-pounder carronade was five feet long, and weighed about 15½ cwt.; the 12-pounder was three feet and a quarter long, and weighed about 8½ cwt. A navy carronade of each caliber is in length and weight as follows: the 18-pounder, three feet four inches, and about 10½ cwt.; the 12-pounder, two feet eight inches, and about 6½ cwt. The carronades of the *Warren-Hastings* were mounted upon a carriage resembling Gover's in every particular but the only essential one, the having of rollers adapted to a groove in the slide. The consequence of this silly evasion of an ingenious man's patent was, that the whole of the ship's quarterdeck and poop guns became utterly useless, after only a few rounds had been fired from them. The first discovery of any imperfection in the new carriage occurred at exercise; but a plentiful supply of black lead upon the upper surface of the slide lessened the friction, and, with the aid of an additional hand, enabled the gun to be run out. On account, however, of the rain, and the salt water in washing the deck, the application of black lead was obliged to be repeated every time of exercise.

The *Warren-Hastings* arrived out without meeting any opponent to try her powers upon, and sailed again on her return, but not quite so strongly armed. Four of her maindeck ports had been calked up, to afford space for a store-room, and the four guns transferred to the hold; and, on account of a reduc-

tion in her crew, occasioned by her 40 Chinamen remaining at Canton and a British ship of war pressing 18 of her English seamen, four of the 18-pounder carronades were also removed below. Consequently the ship now mounted but 36 guns, with a crew of only 138 men and boys.

On the 21st of June, at 7 h. 30 m. A. M., in latitude $26^{\circ} 13'$ south, longitude $56^{\circ} 45'$ east, the Warren-Hastings, steering west by south under a press of sail, with a strong breeze from north-east by east, descried in the south-west quarter a strange ship standing to the south-east under treble-reefed topsails and courses. This was the French 40-gun frigate *Piémontaise*, Captain Jacques Epron. As this ship was armed somewhat differently from her class, we will here state her force. Her maindeck guns were the customary 28 long 18-pounders; and on the quarterdeck and forecastle she mounted 10 iron, and two brass, 36-pounder carronades, two long French 8-pounders, and four long English 9-pounders. These had belonged to the British frigate *Jason*, having been thrown overboard by her when she grounded off *Pointe de la Trenche* at the capture of the *Seine* in June, 1798.*

Exclusive of her 46 carriage-guns, the *Piémontaise* carried swivels and musketoons in her tops and along her gunwales. In other respects, also, this French frigate was equipped in an extraordinary manner. On each fore and main yard-arm was fixed a tripod, calculated to contain a shell weighing 5 cwt. In the event of the ships getting close alongside each other, the shell, having been previously placed on the tripod, was to have its fusee lighted by a man lying out on the yard with a match in his hand: it was then to be thrown from the tripod, and, falling upon the other ship's deck, would, from its weight, pass through to the deck below. Here its explosion would scatter destruction all around; and, in the midst of the confusion, the Frenchmen were to rush on board. These, again, were armed more like assassins than men-of-war's men; each having, besides the usual boarding weapons, a poniard stuck through the button-holes of his jacket.

At 9 A. M., having brought the Warren-Hastings to bear well on her weather quarter, the *Piémontaise*, shaking the reefs out of her topsails, stood towards the former, who still continued upon her course. At 9 h. 30 m., although gaining fast on the Indianman, the frigate set her topgallantsails and fore and main topmast studding-sails, and at 10 A. M. showed an English blue ensign and pendant. Notwithstanding these friendly demonstrations, the Warren-Hastings suspected the character of her pursuer, hoisted her colours, and made the private signal. Of this the *Piémontaise* took no notice, but continued rapidly to approach. At 11 A. M. the Indianman shortened sail, hauled up a

* See vol. ii., p. 220.

point, and cleared for action. At noon the frigate took in her studding-sails, stay-sails, and mainsail; and soon afterwards, having approached within a mile, hauled down the English and hoisted French colours.

At 10 h. 20 m., choosing a leeward station, on account, says Captain Epron, of the heel caused by the high wind, the *Piémontaise* opened her fire upon the larboard quarter of the *Warren-Hastings* within musket-shot distance; and which fire the latter, as soon as she could bring her guns to bear, returned. The action, thus commenced, continued for about a quarter of an hour, when the frigate filled and passed ahead, having done no other damage to the Indiaman than disabling a part of her rigging. On getting about a mile and a half ahead of her antagonist, the *Piémontaise* tacked, and, passing close to leeward of the *Warren-Hastings*, gave and received a smart fire. In this the *Piémontaise*, besides killing and wounding several of the Indiaman's crew, badly wounded her foremast, cut away the whole of her larboard fore-shrouds, foretopsail tie, and principal running rigging and stays, also the ensign, but which was quickly rehoisted at the main topgallantmast head.

Scarcely had the *Warren-Hastings* stoppered her damaged shrouds, and reeved preventer braces, ere she was compelled to receive the third attack of the *Piémontaise*; who, having put about in her opponent's wake, recommenced the action, but with little additional effect, beyond irrecoverably crippling the Indiaman's foremast. Owing to this circumstance, and to the prevailing high wind and rough sea, the *Warren-Hastings* was reduced to such sails only as she could carry on her main and mizen masts. Having a second time tacked ahead of her antagonist, the *Piémontaise* was advancing to make the fourth assault, when the *Warren-Hastings* reopened her fire. The cannonade then became mutual and spirited; but it was to the increased disadvantage of the *Warren-Hastings*, who had already had her main, as well as her fore mast, shot through, her standing and running rigging much cut, and two quarterdeck guns disabled, and had sustained a loss of five men killed and about as many wounded.

In this crippled state, with only the main topsail set, the *Warren-Hastings* sustained the fifth attack of the *Piémontaise*; who, backing on the former's larboard quarter, poured in a heavy and destructive fire, which knocked the driver-boom into splinters, and presently carried away the mizenmast nearly by the board. The mast, falling forward, disabled every effective gun on the upper deck. In addition to all this, the lower deck was on fire from shot that had entered the counter; and, in consequence of the nail of the tiller-rope on the barrel of the wheel having drawn, the rudder was rendered temporarily useless. The surgeon, also, had the whole of his instruments destroyed by a shot which came into the place where he was amputating

and dressing the wounded. This, in a merchant vessel, is a more exposed spot than in a ship of war, the space analogous to the cockpit in the latter being usually filled with a portion of the cargo. Thus circumstanced, the Warren-Hastings, at about 4 h. 50 m. P. M., hauled down her colours.

The loss sustained by the Warren-Hastings amounted to her purser (John Edwick) and six men killed, and 13, including her chief, third, and sixth officers (James Cockwell, Edward Davies, and William Hope), and her surgeon's mate (James Greville), wounded. The loss on the part of the *Piémontaise*, as stated by Captain Epron himself, amounted, out of a complement, in crew and supernumeraries, of 385 men and boys, to seven men killed, and five badly wounded; nor, considering that the frigate's principal damages were confined to her rigging and sails, could the loss well have been greater.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		WARREN-HASTINGS.	PIÉMONTAISE.
Broadside-guns	{ No.	18	23
	{ lbs.	312	533
Crew	No.	136	385
Size	tons	1356	1093

An action between a merchant vessel and a ship of war requires, in order fairly to show the relative force of the parties, some further explanation than a mere statement of figures can afford. The chief purpose of the one ship being to carry a cargo, her armament is made a secondary consideration; whereas, the sole object of the other is to fight: accordingly, no pains are spared to render the former, both in *matériel* and *personnel*, fully adequate to the duties of her station. This comparison of the man of war with the merchantman applies to common cases. But, by some mismanagement on the part of her equippers, the Warren-Hastings could make very little use of her upperdeck and poop batteries, after the second or third round of shot, and, for want of hands, could man only eight, out of the 11 guns on her lowerdeck battery; while the *Piémontaise*, as has already been shown, was armed in a manner every way calculated for causing destruction to an adversary, and for bringing the combat, even with a regular frigate like herself, to a favourable issue.

Under these circumstances, the defence made by the Warren-Hastings, protracted as it was to four hours and a half, displayed a highly commendable zeal and perseverance on the part of Captain Larkins, his officers, and ship's company; but, with all their gallant efforts, the latter could never have succeeded in capturing, although, had the ship's guns been in an effective state, they might, in beating off, an antagonist so well armed, manned, and appointed as the *Piémontaise*.

Some scenes that now ensued would have better become an

Algerine cruiser, or a Malay pirate, than a French national ship of war. The dismasted state of the Warren-Hastings at her surrender, assisted by the force of the heavy sea then running, caused the ship to fall off; and the Piémontaise, lying close to leeward, under her three topsails, with the mizen one aback and the main one shivering, bore up, to avoid being run foul of. Having by this evolution filled her main topsail, and being unattended to at the helm, the frigate again came to, and ran foul of the larboard bow of the prize. The two ships then dropped close alongside of each other, producing, in the disturbed state of the sea, a crash that rendered the situation of both extremely hazardous.

A party of Frenchmen, headed by the first lieutenant, Charles Moreau, now rushed on the decks of the Warren-Hastings, and, with uplifted daggers and horrid imprecations, threatened the lives of all on board. After one ruffian had dragged Captain Larkins about the ship, charging him with an attempt to run the frigate on board, in order to cripple her masts, and calling him by every opprobrious epithet, another, in the person of M. Moreau himself, stabbed the captain with a poniard in the right side. The instrument passed through the right lobe of the liver, and occasioned so great a flow of blood that Captain Larkins fainted. Even this did not save him from the savage fury of his persecutor, who ordered him, in his weak state, to jump on board the Piémontaise, and, but for the humanity of a M. Baudin, an acting lieutenant of the frigate, would have driven him into the sea. The man afterwards admitted that he had stabbed Captain Larkins, but attempted to extenuate the base act, by charging the latter with having purposely run the ship on board the Piémontaise.* The simple fact that M. Moreau, as well as many of his followers, was highly intoxicated, may account for the oblivious state of his memory as to the origin of the accident.

With such an example set them by their chief officer, the prize-crew were comparatively merciful in not absolutely slaying their victims: they merely stabbed three of the officers, John Wood, second officer, John Barnes, surgeon, and John Ball, boatswain's mate. So that, including the captain and a midshipman, Mr. James Bayton, who was pierced in seven different places in his two arms by the monster Moreau, five persons were wounded in cold blood, after the honourable surrender of their ship. Pillage of every description of course followed these tyrannical proceedings; but, after a while, the furious passions of the captors subsided, and Captain Epron, and some of his officers, did their best to conciliate and render comfortable Captain Larkins and the survivors of his crew.

* See a translation of Lieutenant Moreau's letter to the editor of the "Isle-of-France Gazette," in the *Naval Chronicle*, vol xx., p. 193.

Taking her prize in tow, the *Piémontaise* steered for the Isle of France, where the two ships arrived on the 4th of July. As a proof of her extraordinary fast sailing, the frigate, in a moderate breeze, carrying three single reefed topsails, foresail, and mizen staysail, towed her prize, a deeply-laden ship, admeasuring nearly a fourth more tonnage than herself, and having very small jury-sails set, at the rate of seven and a half knots an hour.

On the 22d of June, in the evening, Captain George Ralph Collier, of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Minerva*, lying becalmed in Finisterre bay, despatched two boats, under the command of Lieutenant William Howe Mulcaster, first of the frigate, assisted in the cutter by Lieutenant of marines Charles Menzies, and in the barge by Lieutenant Ogle Moore, to scour the neighbouring coast, and, in particular, to make an attempt upon some luggers of which information had been received.

The boats pushed off, and, on arriving where the luggers lay, found they must carry a fort. This, although it mounted eight brass guns, 24 and 12 pounders, was carried in a very neat and masterly manner by the bayonet and pike, before the guard had time either to raise the drawbridge, or to discharge a 12-pounder, which (a fishing-boat having apprized the garrison of the approach of the British) had been brought to face the gate. Four of the Spanish guard laid down their arms and were made prisoners: the remainder escaped.

As the day began to dawn and the men were much fatigued by their long row to the shore and their subsequent march over a heavy sand, Lieutenant Mulcaster and his party were obliged to restrict themselves to spiking the guns and throwing some of them into the sea. They then took quiet possession of five luggers laden with wine, bound to Ferrol and Corunna; and, although exposed, for nearly two hours, to a fire from a two-gun battery to the southward of the town, the British brought out their prizes without injury to a single man on either side.

On the 9th of July, while the *Minerva* was lying in the road of Oporto, Captain Collier despatched her barge, under the command of Lieutenant Mulcaster, to cruise a few leagues to the northward, in the hope to intercept some of the Spanish privateers and row-boats, lurking in the creeks and rivers of Portugal, to be ready to commit depredations upon the Lisbon trade as soon as it appeared off the coast. On the 11th, after a fatiguing row of nearly 40 miles, the barge fell in with the Spanish lugger-privateer *Buena-Dicha*, of one long 8-pounder, besides blunderbusses and musketry, and manned with 26 of the *Guarda desperadoes*. The barge advanced under a discharge of grape-shot from the lugger's prow-gun; but nothing could withstand the impetuosity of Lieutenant Mulcaster and his men. They quickly boarded and carried the privateer; killing one of her crew, and wounding badly her captain, two other officers,

and two seamen, without sustaining, on their own part, the slightest casualty.

On the 2d of October, while the *Minerva* was at anchor off Oro island, near the entrance of Porto-Novo, Captain Collier himself, attended by Lieutenant Menzies with him in the cutter, and followed by the barge in charge of Lieutenant Peter Paumier James and midshipman William Holt, with a select party of marines, proceeded to reconnoitre the bay of Rocks, in the hope of falling in with one or more of the six Spanish gun-boats known to be at Carril. After a pull of seven hours, the cutter was hailed by a gun-boat, lying at an anchor within pistol-shot of the shore, attended by a small gun-launch with a brass 4-pounder. The gun-boat was immediately boarded on the quarter, and carried, as well as her attendant, without the loss of a man. She was the Spanish gun-boat No. 2, mounting one long 24-pounder in the bow, and two short brass fours, with a complement of 30 men, commanded by Lieutenant Don Jesse Lopez.

On the 25th of June the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Port-Mahon*, Captain Samuel Chambers, chased a Spanish armed brig into the intricate harbour of Banas in the island of Cuba. At 9 P.M. the boats of the sloop, under the command of Lieutenant John Marshall, assisted by Lieutenant Luke Henry Wray, and Mr. John Robson, gunner, were despatched to endeavour to cut the vessel out.

On the 26th, at 1 A.M., the Spanish letter of marque brig *San-Josef*, armed with one long 18-pounder on a pivot amidships, four 12-pounder carronades and two long 4-pounders on her sides, with swivels, pikes, and muskets, and 30 men, was gallantly boarded and carried by Lieutenant Marshall and his party; and this, although the vessel was protected by the fire from, and moored by a line to, a tower mounting two heavy guns. The next difficulty was to get the prize out of the harbour. This also was accomplished, although the brig grounded within pistol-shot of the battery, and was struck by several shot from it; and, notwithstanding that the boats had been damaged by shot, and several of the oars broken, while rowing to make the attack, the whole service was executed without the loss of a man.

On the 9th of July, at 3 h. 15 m. P.M., the British 74-gun ship *Powerful*, Captain Robert Plampin, being about seven miles to the northward of the Little Basses, island of Ceylon, standing north-west by west, with a light air from the south-west, discovered a strange ship upon her weather beam, steering free with studding-sails set, and shortly afterwards, broad on the latter's weather quarter, and in full pursuit of her, a second ship, soon recognised as the 16-gun ship-sloop *Rattlesnake*, Captain John Bastard. The stranger, which was the celebrated French frigate-privateer *Bellone*, Captain Jacques Perroud, not being able to haul up without coming to action with the *Rattlesnake*, and observing that the *Powerful* lay nearly becalmed while she

herself was running before a strong wind, resolved to continue her course and endeavour to cross between the 74 and the shore. In this, however, the *Bellone* was foiled; for at about 5 P. M. the *Powerful* got within gun-shot, and, hoisting her colours, opened a fire, which the former instantly returned. A running fight was maintained until 6 h. 45 m. P. M.; when, finding there was no possibility of escape, the *Bellone* hauled down her colours and hove to.

Extraordinary as it may appear, the *Powerful* had two seamen killed and 11 wounded by the fire of the *Bellone*; and, what is still more extraordinary in an hour and a half's running fight between two ships so disproportionate in point of force, the *Bellone* herself had only one man killed and six or seven wounded.

This is the second instance that has occurred in these seas, within less than four months, of a marked deficiency in gunnery on the part of a British 74. If the *Tremendous* did more execution than the *Powerful*, it was because the former was enabled occasionally to bring her broadside, or a great part of it, to bear upon her antagonist;* while the *Powerful* appears to have been confined to a head and stern cannonade. Still the *Powerful* had two long 32s, two long 18s, and two long 12s, to oppose to four long French 8s; and surely she might have made a better use of them.

Had the well-directed fire of the *Bellone* done more injury to the 74's masts, rigging, and sails, and less to her crew, the former would probably have escaped; for what could the *Rattlesnake*, with her 16 long 6-pounders and 120 men, have effected against the *Bellone*, with her 34 guns, composed of long 8-pounders and 36-pounder carronades, with a crew at this time on board of 194 men? The *Bellone* was afterwards purchased for the use of the British navy, and under the name of *Blanche*, became classed as a 28-gun frigate.

On the 14th of July the following British squadron of six sail of the line and one frigate, under Commodore Sir Samuel Hood in the *Centaur*, cruised off Rochefort, to watch the motions of a French squadron of five sail of the line and several frigates, at anchor in the road of the isle of Aix:

Gun-ship

98	Prince-of-Wales	Captain	William Bedford.
	Centaur	Commod.	Sir Samuel Hood.
74	Conqueror	Captain	Israel Pellew.
	Monarch	"	Richard Lee.
	Revenge	"	Sir John Gore.
64	Polyphemus.....	"	Robert Redmill.

Gun-frig.

32	Iris	"	John Tower.
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* See p. 234.

The receipt of intelligence that a French convoy of 50 sail, laden with stores for Brest, lay in Verdon road, at the entrance of the river Gironde, waiting an opportunity to put to sea, under the escort of two brig-corvettes, determined the British commodore to attempt cutting them out. Accordingly a boat from each line-of-battle ship was despatched to the Iris frigate; who immediately proceeded with them to the 44-gun frigate *Indefatigable*, Captain John Tremayne Rodd, then cruising off the Gironde, to prevent the convoy's escape. To the six boats from the line-of-battle ships, commanded as follows: *Centaur*, Lieutenant Edward Reynolds Sibly, the commanding officer of the whole; *Conqueror*, Lieutenant George Fitzmaurice; *Prince-of-Wales*, Lieutenant John Francis; *Revenge*, Lieutenant Charles Manners; *Polyphemus*, unknown; and *Monarch*, Lieutenant Dalhousie Tait, were now added three from the *Indefatigable* commanded by Lieutenants Thomas Parker, Thomas Arscott, and Ralph Shepperdson, and three from the Iris, the commanding officers of which do not appear to have been named in the official letter.

On the evening of the 15th, the time appearing favourable, the 12 boats pushed off from the *Indefatigable*, and proceeded towards the mouth of the Gironde. Shortly afterwards the wind shifted to the westward, and blew strong. But the persevering ardour of the British overcame all obstacles, and at the dead of the night the boats entered Verdon road. Lieutenant Sibly and his party instantly attacked the French 16-gun brig-corvette *César*, having on board 86 men, under the command of Lieutenant Louis-François-Hector Fourré, all perfectly prepared. While in the act of cutting away the brig's boarding netting, Lieutenant Sibly was badly wounded by pike and sabre, in the side, arm, and face. The British, however, soon boarded the *César*; and, after a few minutes' severe conflict, in which M. Fourré fought most heroically until he fell covered with wounds, they carried the French brig.

Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, and the strength of the wind and tide, the other French brig, which was the *Teazer* (late British) of 14 guns, moored higher up the river, escaped by slipping her cables, and running before the wind still further up the Gironde. The convoy managed to do the same. Meanwhile the prize, having cut her cables, was standing out, exposed, for some time, to a heavy fire from the *Teazer* and the batteries on both sides of the river. Notwithstanding this opposition, the *César*, under the able direction of Lieutenant Parker of the *Indefatigable*, worked out, and joined the two frigates at anchor off the mouth of the Gironde.

The loss on this occasion was tolerably severe. The British had one lieutenant (Charles Manners), one master's mate (Thomas Helpman), two boatswain's mates, and five seamen killed, four lieutenants (Sibly, Tait, both badly, Parker, and Shep-

perdson), one master's mate (Thomas Mullins), and 34 seamen and marines wounded, and one midshipman (Thomas Blackstone) and 19 seamen and marines prisoners; total, nine killed and 39 wounded. The 20 prisoners, with the deceased lieutenant, had belonged to the *Revenge's* boat; which was struck by a large shot, and would have sunk but for the proximity of the shore. The survivors, on landing, were of course made prisoners. The *César* is represented to have lost, exclusive of her brave commander, 13 of her crew killed or wounded. With a proper appreciation of lieutenant Sibly's gallantry and wounds, the rank of commander was conferred upon him soon after his return to port.

On the 28th of March, early in the morning, a French squadron composed of the two 40-gun frigates *Revanche*, *Commodore Amand Leduc*, and *Guerrière*, Captain Paul-Mathieu Hubert, 36-gun frigate *Syrène*, Captain Alexandre Lambert, and 16-gun brig corvette *Néarque*, sailed from Lorient, on a cruise off the coast of Iceland, Greenland, and Spitzbergen, for the purpose of destroying British and Russian whale-ships; a service intrusted to M. Leduc, because, having himself been a Dunkerque whaler, he was considered to be well acquainted, both with the navigation of the Arctic sea and with the haunts of those who usually resorted thither.

Scarcely had the French commodore got well to sea, ere a fine chance was afforded him of returning to port with a valuable prize. At about 1 p.m. the British 38-gun frigate *Niobe*, Captain John Wentworth Loring, cruising between the *Glénans* and the isle of *Grox*, discovered, and, hoping to cut off one of them, chased M. Leduc's three frigates and brig. The latter, however, far from evincing any intention to molest the *Niobe*, continued their course to the southward, under all sail. The British frigate gained in the pursuit. At 9 p.m. the *Néarque*, who was at some distance astern of her companions, seeing her danger, fired a gun, let off several rockets, and hoisted five lights, one over the other, in the hope to induce the commodore to put about and save her. But the voyage to Greenland presented, in the eyes of M. Leduc, fewer dangers, perhaps, than an action between one English and three French frigates. At 10 p.m. the *Niobe* got alongside the *Néarque*, and, after firing a volley of small arms into her, which fortunately injured no one, carried her off as a prize. The French brig mounted 16 guns, with a crew of 97 men, and was victualled for five months.

The winter being unusually long, M. Leduc, as a proof that he need not have been in such haste to run from the *Niobe*, found himself stopped by the ice: he, in consequence, bent his course to a temperate latitude, and, after cruising some weeks off the Azores and Cape Clear, stood again to the northward. On the 21st of May the squadron made the south-east point of Iceland, and, standing on to the northward, met with the ice on

the 30th, in latitude 72°. From the 2d to the 8th of June the frigates tried in vain to penetrate the ice in the direction of Spitzbergen. On the 12th they came in sight of the island, but, with all their endeavours, could not get beyond 76° 10'. About this time the *Guerrière* parted company in a fog.

It was on the 9th of July that the admiralty received intelligence of the havoc which these three French frigates had been committing upon the fisheries. Immediately the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phœbe*, Captain James Oswald, and 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Thames*, Captain Brydges Watkinson Taylor, lying in Leith roads, were directed to proceed off the Shetland isles; and the 38-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Thomas Lavie, then at anchor in the Downs, was ordered, by telegraph, to hasten to Yarmouth roads. When here, Captain Lavie received orders to follow and take' under his command the *Phœbe* and *Thames*, and with them endeavour to discover and capture *M. Leduc* and his squadron.

On the 10th, in the afternoon, the *Blanche* sailed from Yarmouth roads, and, on the 13th, was at the rendezvous; but the *Phœbe* and *Thames*, having ascertained that one of the frigates had parted from her two consorts, had since proceeded in search of the latter. After remaining three days off the Shetland isles, the *Blanche* received intelligence, that the *Guerrière* had been seen alone off the Faro isles, where she had captured and burnt several English ships. The *Blanche* immediately made sail towards the spot, and on the 18th, at 10 h. 30 m. A. M., saw from her mast-head, in the east-north-east quarter, the object of her search, standing upon a wind in a direction towards herself. The *Guerrière* had intended to go into Drontheim in Norway, to land her prisoners and procure a supply of water; but, when off the port, a pilot-boat communicated some intelligence that induced her to put about and steer for the island of North-Faro, of which she was within a few hours' sail when fallen in with by the *Blanche*. The mounted force of the two frigates may here be introduced. The quarter-deck and forecastle guns of the *Blanche* were 16 carronades, 32-pounders, fitted upon the non-recoil principle, and two long 12-pounders; making her total of guns 46. The *Guerrière*, in addition to the main-deck force of her class, mounted two brass 36-pounder carronades in the bridle ports, and two others, and eight iron ones of the same caliber, with 10 long 8-pounders, on her quarterdeck and forecastle; total 50 guns.

At noon the *Blanche* bore up under all sail, with a light breeze from the south-west; but the *Guerrière*, as if mistaking the *Blanche* for one of her consorts, continued to stand on until 3 P. M., when she also bore up, spreading all her canvass. The superior sailing of the *Blanche* enabled her to gain rapidly in the chase, and at about 45 minutes past midnight, the British

frigate opened her fire, pouring into her antagonist two whole broadsides before the latter returned a shot. A warm action now commenced, one ship pointing her guns chiefly at the hull, the other at the rigging. Still the *Blanche* maintained her position in the chase, and at 1 h. 30 m. A.M. on the 19th compelled the *Guerrière*, whose mizen topmast had previously fallen, to haul down her colours.

The loss on board the *Blanche*, whose damages were of the most trifling description, amounted, out of her 265 men and boys (being 16 men short), to only one lieutenant (Robert Bastin) and three marines wounded; while that sustained by the *Guerrière*, whose lower masts were all badly wounded, and hull shattered above and below water, amounted, out of the 317 men and boys, which the scurvy had left out of a complement on quitting port of 350, to 20 officers, seamen, and marines killed, and 30 wounded, 10 of them dangerously.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		BLANCHE.	GUERRIERE.
Broadside-guns.....	{ No. 23		24*
	{ lbs. 520		516
Crew.....	No. 265		317
Size.....	tons 1036		1092

According to this statement, the *Blanche* and *Guerrière* were tolerably well matched. But it was only in appearance; for a great proportion of the latter's crew were ill in their cots, and the remainder, to judge by the impunity with which the British frigate escaped, seemed to have been very indifferent marksmen. During this running fight of 45 minutes' duration, not one round shot struck the hull of the *Blanche*. The three marines were wounded by a single discharge of grape, while standing on the fore part of the gangway near the forecastle; and the second lieutenant, M. Bastin, was wounded through both thighs with a musket-ball at his quarters on the main deck. The chief object of the French frigate appears to have been to cripple her antagonist, in order that she herself might escape. Failing in this, the *Guerrière* protracted the defence, until she could no longer withstand the vigorous and well-directed fire of the *Blanche*. We must suppose, in justice to M. Hubert, who, at this very time, was a member of the legion of honour, that his men were really in a deplorable state, or he would not, from the first, have fled from a frigate, not superior in size, as he might see, nor in force, as he might conjecture, to the one he commanded.

The *Blanche*, with her prize, arrived on the 26th in Yarmouth roads; and the *Guerrière*, on being transferred to the British

* Carronade in the bow-port not included.

navy, became a valuable acquisition to the class of large 38s. Shortly after his return, Captain Lavie received the honour of knighthood, and Mr. Henry Thomas Davies, the first lieutenant of the *Blanche*, the promotion which was due to him.

With his two remaining frigates, M. Leduc continued to harass the fisheries, unseen, though diligently sought, by the *Phœbe* and her consort. On the 13th of July the two French frigates put into Patris-Feorden, a port in Iceland, and, on their departure a few days afterwards, were chased, it appears, by two English frigates (whose names we cannot learn), but escaped by concealing themselves within the small island of Rodesand. M. Leduc then cruised off Cape Farewell, for ships coming out of Davis's Straits, and afterwards proceeded to the northern extremity of Ireland. Here he remained till chased off on the 28th of August. He then made sail for Cape Clear, and, after cruising there till the 17th of September, steered for a French port. On the 22d M. Leduc reanchored in Lorient; having taken and sunk, during his six months' cruise, one Russian and 28 English merchantmen, chiefly whalers, and having lost, by capture, one 40-gun frigate and one 16-gun brig, almost half his original squadron.

On the 25th of July, in the evening, as the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Greyhound*, Captain Edward Elphinstone, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Harrier* (16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two sixes), Captain Edward Thomas Troubridge, were cruising in the Java sea, four sail of ships were descried, passing through the Straits of Salayer. Chase was immediately given; and at 9 P. M. the strangers hove to, at about seven miles distant from the shore that lies between the small Dutch ports of Borthean and Balacomba. One of the ships was easily made out to be a frigate, and another a corvette, but a third had so much the appearance of a line-of-battle ship, that the two British commanders thought it prudent to wait until daylight before they bore down to examine the strange squadron. The *Greyhound* and *Harrier* accordingly lay to during the night, at the distance of about two miles to windward of the strange squadron.

The break of day discovered that the ship, which had led to the cautionary measures of the preceding evening, was a large two-decked armed merchant vessel, similar in size and appearance to an English Indiaman. Shortly afterwards the squadron, which consisted of the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Pallas*, Captain N. S. Aalbers, the Dutch company's ships *Vittoria* (the two-decker above-mentioned), Captain Klaas Kenkin, and *Batavia*, Captain William De Val, both officers in the Dutch company's service, and the 14-gun ship-corvette *William*, Captain Feteris, drew out in the order named, and formed a line of battle on the larboard tack, under their topsails.

At a few minutes past 5 A. M. the *Greyhound* bore up under French colours, as if to speak the *Pallas*, who was then at some

distance ahead of her second astern, the *Vittoria*; and, when within hail, all further disguise being unnecessary, the British frigate shifted her colours, and commenced a cannonade. This was at 5 h. 30 m.; and the fire was returned with a smartness and spirit, which evinced that the Dutch were fully prepared for the contest. The *Harrier*, who had kept close astern of the *Greyhound*, seeing the latter engaged, bore round up; and, passing between the *Pallas* and *Vittoria*, opened a fire of musketry at the latter, and discharged her larboard guns into the starboard quarter of the former. The *Vittoria* and her second astern, the *Batavia*, then bore up in succession, to return the *Harrier's* fire.

In the mean time the *Greyhound*, resolving to lose no time in taking advantage of the confusion thus caused by the *Harrier's* promptitude, wore close round her opponent's bows, raking her severely in passing. On reaching the starboard bow of the *Pallas*, the *Greyhound*, then on the starboard tack, threw her sails aback, and maintained a position which, while it comparatively secured herself, was of destructive effect to her antagonist. The cannonade of the latter, with an equal opponent upon her bow and one by no means to be despised upon her quarter, gradually slackened, and at the end of 40 minutes ceased. On being hailed by the *Greyhound*, the *Pallas* replied that she had struck, and was soon in possession of the former.

The *Harrier* now hauled towards the *Vittoria*, and, after firing several broadsides at her, compelled this formidable looking ship, at 6 h. 30 m. A. M., to haul down her colours. Sending an officer to take possession, Captain Troubridge hauled towards the *Batavia*. The *Greyhound* had by this time made sail for the latter. Being wholly unable to cope with the new antagonist that was now advancing to the assistance of the *Harrier*, the *Batavia*, at 6 h. 40 m., followed the example of the *Vittoria*. Meanwhile the *William*, who, from her position in the rear, had taken no part in the action, was making off towards the shore. The *Harrier* immediately proceeded in chase; but, the state of her sails and rigging leaving her little chance of overtaking the fugitive, Captain Elphinstone threw out the signal to join. The *Harrier* did so, and the *William* effected her escape.

Out of her complement of 212 men and boys, the *Greyhound* had one seaman killed and eight wounded; and the *Harrier*, out of her 110 men and boys on board, had only three wounded. The *Pallas* mounted 40 guns, 12 and 6 pounders, with 24-pounder brass carronades, and had a complement of 250 men, including about 50 Malays. Of these the Dutch frigate lost eight killed, her captain (mortally), second and fifth lieutenants, three pilots, one midshipman, and 25 seamen wounded, four of them and one of the pilots mortally. The *Vittoria* and *Batavia*, represented in Captain Elphinstone's letter merely as "armed for the purpose of war," had, the one two men killed, the other

the same, besides a lieutenant and six men wounded, the lieutenant and one of the latter mortally.

With such incomplete materials for comparing the force of the parties, it is difficult to do justice to the merits of the case. The affair was undoubtedly conducted with great skill and bravery on the part of the British, and they reaped no inconsiderable advantage from the prizes they made; two of which, the *Vittoria*, of 800, and the *Batavia*, of 500 tons, were richly laden with the produce of the Moluccas.

In the month of February, as already has been stated, four of the French frigates, which after the battle of Trafalgar had got into Cadiz, succeeded in putting to sea, under the command of Commodore La Marre-la-Meillerie, and were as follows :

Gun-frig.

	Hortense.....	Commod. Louis.-C.-Aug. La Marre-la-Meillerie.
40	Rhin.....	Captain Michel-Jean-André Chesneau.
	Hermione.....	„ Jean-Michel Mahé.
36	Thémis.....	„ Nicolas Jugan.

These frigates, after the disgraceful loss of the brig that was in their company,* proceeded to Sénégal, and thence to Cayenne; at which latter port they arrived on the 27th of March. Quitting Cayenne on the 7th of April, they steered for the West Indies, cruised to windward of Barbadoes 15 days; then proceeded to Porto-Rico, and, after revictualling there, set sail on the 18th of May on their return to France. On the 27th of July, at 6 P. M., when in about latitude 47° north, longitude 7° west, steering south-east by east, which was a direct course for Rochefort, the *Hortense* and her three companions were discovered by the 74-gun ship *Mars*, Captain Robert Dudley Oliver, the look-out ship of a British squadron of five sail of the line, under the command of Commodore Richard Goodwin Keats, in the *Superb*.

The *Mars*, making the necessary signals, which the *Africa* 64 repeated to the commodore, then far astern, wore, and, with the squadron, crowded sail in chase. The French frigates immediately set all the additional sail they could, and continued their course to the south-east. Soon after dark the *Mars* lost sight, as well of them as of all the ships of her own squadron, except the *Africa*, who was seen on her lee quarter till 11 P. M., when she also disappeared. The *Mars* now shaped her course so as to prevent the enemy from getting to leeward; and, as a proof with what judgment she was steered, daylight on the 28th discovered the four frigates on the same bearing as on the preceding evening, but, except one, at a greater distance. Upon that one, which was the *Rhin*, the *Mars* evidently gained.

Observing this, and that the British 74 was entirely alone, the French commodore, with what appeared a proper spirit, put about, and, on joining the *Rhin*, formed his four frigates in line

of battle on the larboard tack. Finding, however, that the *Mars* was not in the least intimidated by the approach of four heavy French frigates, but was hastening on to engage them, M. La Marre-la-Meillerie failed in his resolution, and at 3 p. m. made off with three of his frigates, leaving the fourth to her fate. Having already run a distance of 150 miles, and the day being far spent, the *Mars* continued in pursuit of the nearest frigate; when at 6 p. m., in the midst of a heavy squall of wind and rain, and just as the *Mars*, having gained a position on the frigate's lee quarter, had fired a shot and was preparing to open her broadside, the *Rhin* hauled down her colours.

Soon after the *Mars* had taken possession of the *Rhin*, the squall cleared up, and the *Hortense*, *Hermione*, and *Thémis* were seen standing to the south-east; but the approach of night, the proximity of the French coast, and the stormy state of the weather, owing to which not more than a third of the prisoners could be removed, rendered any further pursuit impracticable. Captain Oliver, thereupon, accompanied by his prize, steered in the direction of his squadron; and which, so far had he outrun it in 24 hours' chase, the *Mars* did not rejoin it until the forenoon of the 31st. Great credit was due to Captain Oliver for having persevered in the chase so long after he had got out of reach of support from any ship of his squadron; and, had the four frigates been commanded by a Bergeret, a Bourayne, or one of many other French captains whom we could name, an opportunity would doubtless have been afforded to the officers and crew of the *Mars*, to show what could be effected, under such circumstances, by a well-appointed, well-manned British 74.

The *Hortense* and *Hermione* succeeded in reaching Bordeaux, and the *Thémis* appears to have entered Rochefort. What account of this transaction M. La Marre-la-Meillerie gave to the French minister of marine has not transpired. We may conjecture, however, that the force which put the French commodore to flight was described, not as "*un seul vaisseau anglais*," but, as "*une escadre de plusieurs vaisseaux anglais*." Who will say, that four French frigates, three, if not all of them, carrying long 18-pounders and 36-pounder carronades, with, between them, upwards of 1300 men, were not an overmatch for a single British 74? What, then, but a misrepresentation of the facts could have saved this French commodore from being cashiered? And yet according to the "*Etat Général de la Marine*," for January, 1822, M. La Marre-la-Meillerie is a peer of France and a chevalier of the order of St.-Louis.

Had a British officer in the command of four, or even of two, such frigates, run away from a French 74-gun ship, particularly when a comrade was likely to be cut off, our duty would have compelled us to expose him. But even a single British frigate, of the large class, would have felt half-reluctant to fly from one French 74; and, if overtaken and attacked, would not have

surrendered until she had made a few shot-holes in her opponent's hull, and had herself become in a considerable degree disabled.

On the 14th of August, at daybreak, the Isle of Wight bearing north eight leagues, the British fire-brig Phosphorus, commanded by Lieutenant William James Hughes, perceived approaching her a large French lugger, pierced for 16, and apparently mounting 12 guns. At 5 h. 10 m. A. M. the Phosphorus hailed the lugger, and was ordered in reply to strike, or that the latter would sink her. At 5 h. 20 m. the lugger laid the Phosphorus alongside, and, with three cheers, attempted to carry her by boarding; but, notwithstanding about 70 or 80 men advanced to the assault, they were repulsed by the 24 officers, men, and boys, belonging to the British vessel. After lying alongside 45 minutes, and engaging altogether an hour and 10 minutes, the lugger made sail, and sheered off. As soon as the state of her sails and rigging would permit her to wear, the Phosphorus stood after her opponent; but, losing ground in the chase, and having had her commander (middle finger off and severely wounded in the left hand), acting master (Thomas Esther), and six seamen wounded, one mortally and the remainder severely, with no surgeon or even assistant on board to attend to them, the brig bore up and made sail for the Downs.

Although brig-rigged, the Phosphorus measured only 115 tons, and mounted but four 12-pounder carronades; one of which, soon after the action commenced, had its breeching and gooseneck broken. To have beaten off a vessel, so decidedly superior in every respect, was a matter of just triumph on the part of the officers and crew of the Phosphorus; and, for his very conspicuous gallantry upon the occasion, Lieutenant Hughes was promoted to the rank of commander. He also, we believe, received a handsome sword from the Patriotic Fund.

On the 22d of August, in the evening, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Alexandria, Captain the Honourable Edward King, lying at an anchor off the port of Rio de la Plata on the Spanish main, despatched her boats to cut from under the forts in that harbour a Spanish polacre brig and garda-costa, which had for some time past materially injured the Jamaica trade. The boats were, the barge under Lieutenant Joseph Lewis, first of the frigate, the launch under Lieutenant Edmund Nagle, one of the cutters under master's mate Alfred Smith, and the jolly-boat. Unfortunately, owing to the prevailing darkness, the boats rowed all night without being able to discover the place in which the vessels lay, and in the morning returned on board their ship.

Seeing a frigate at anchor off their port, the Spaniards expected an attack and prepared to meet it. The 10-gun schooner Gracieuse, acting Lieutenant William Smith, joining company, Captain King, on the evening of the 23d, again despatched

Lieutenant Lewis and the boats, which were now taken in tow by the *Gracieuse*.

After the schooner had cast them off, the boats pulled for the harbour, then about six miles distant; and, in the face of a heavy but ill-directed fire of grape-shot from three batteries, and of musketry from the shore and from the brig and *garda-costa* at anchor, Lieutenant Lewis and his party boarded and carried both vessels without the slightest loss, their crews abandoning them as the British approached. The Spaniards, in the course of their preparations, had hauled the brig and schooner aground, stripped them of their sails and running rigging, and lashed them to the shore. Hence no exertions on the part of the British, although continued for ten hours and a half, could remove them. As the men were now falling fast under the incessant fire to which they had so long been exposed, Lieutenant Lewis quickly destroyed the two vessels and retreated to the offing. This he at length accomplished, but with so serious a loss, as one master's mate (Alfred Smith) and five seamen and marines killed, and himself (slightly), Lieutenant Nagle, the gunner, one midshipman (Samuel Marshall), and eight seamen and marines wounded.

On the 18th of August Lieutenant Andrew M'Culloch, with the barge of the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Galatea*, Captain George Sayer, cruising off the Spanish main, pursued some miles up a river near Puerto-Caballo a Spanish schooner privateer, of three long 6 and 4 pounders, with swivels and musketoons on stocks; and which, after an able resistance, in which her commander and one man fell, was carried. Finding it impracticable to bring away the schooner without danger of his retreat being cut off, Lieutenant M'Culloch removed the prisoners into his boat and blew her up. This gallant little enterprise was executed with so small a loss on the British side as one man slightly wounded.

On the 21st Lieutenant Harry Walker in the barge, without any loss whatever, drove on shore and completely destroyed, in the vicinity of the last exploit, another fine privateer-schooner, armed with swivels and small-arms.

On the 9th of October, cruising off Barcelona, Captain Sayer despatched three boats under the direction of Lieutenant Richard Gittins, first of the frigate, assisted by master's mate John Green and James Scanlan the boatswain, to cut out some vessels at anchor in the above port. As the boats approached the harbour, a heavy fire of round and grape was simultaneously opened upon them from three batteries, accompanied by musketry from them and the beach, to which the three schooners to be carried were moored head and stern. In spite of these obstacles, the British succeeded in boarding and bringing out the vessels; and, although exposed for an hour and a half to the fire above noticed,

of the good direction of which the injury done to the *matériel* of the boats and prizes afforded proof, did not have a man hurt.

On the 12th of November, in the morning, the *Galatea*, cruising off the island of Guadaloupe, gave chase to a suspicious schooner in the north-west. After a few hours' chase, and when she was getting near to the schooner, the *Galatea* became becalmed. Captain Sayer now despatched in pursuit of the vessel the boats of the frigate, under the orders of Lieutenants Gittins and Walker. Just as the boats had got near enough to return the schooner's fire with their musketry, and were on the point of boarding her, the French colours came down. The prize proved to be the *Réunion*, a fine copper-bottomed schooner of 10 guns, from La Guayra bound to Martinique; and not a man in the boats received the slightest injury.

On the 23d of August, in the morning, the British 38-gun frigate *Arethusa*, Captain Charles Brisbane, and 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Charles Lydiard, cruising off Havana, discovered to leeward of them, and within two miles of the Mona-castle, the Spanish 34-gun frigate *Pomona*, from Vera-Cruz, with specie and merchandise, using her utmost efforts, against a scant wind and a strong north-east current, to enter the harbour. Finding herself closely pushed by the frigates and driven to leeward of her port by the current, the *Pomona* bore up, and anchored in three and a half fathoms' water, within pistol-shot of a castle, mounting 11 long 36-pounders;* and situated about two leagues to the eastward of the Moro. Here she was presently reinforced by 10 gun-boats† from Havana, each mounting a long 24-pounder, with 60 or 70 men; and which immediately formed in line ahead of the frigate.

Observing, as they bore up in chase, that the *Pomona* had anchored, each of the two British frigates passed a cable through the stern-port, to be ready to do the same in a position for cannonading with effect. At 10 A.M., the *Anson* and *Arethusa* came to anchor, the first abreast of the line of Spanish gun-boats, the other on her consort's starboard quarter, in only one foot water more than she drew, and close alongside of the *Pomona*. A warm action now commenced between the two British frigates on the one part, and, on the other, the Spanish frigate, the 10 gun-boats, and the battery on shore. In 35 minutes the *Pomona* struck her colours, and was taken possession of; and all the gun-boats had previously been blown up, sunk, or driven on shore. The castle continued the cannonade a short time longer, firing red-hot shot occasionally, until the explosion of a part of the battery put an entire stop to the action.

The fire of the gun-boats had been so ill-directed, that the

* The official account says 16; but the number in the text is from an Havana account, in this instance more likely to be correct.

† The official account says 12. One Havana account says 10, another seven.

Anson had not a man hurt. The *Arethusa*, however, did not escape so fortunately, having had two seamen killed, the captain (but who did not quit the deck), one lieutenant (Henry Higman), one lieutenant of marines (John Fennell), 27 seamen, and two marines wounded. The hot shot from the castle had also set the frigate on fire; but the exertions of her officers and men soon extinguished the flames. The *Pomona* mounted 38 long guns and carronades (long twelves on the main deck), with a complement of 347 men; of whom it appears, her captain and 20 men were killed, two lieutenants and 30 men wounded.

The money, belonging to the King of Spain, had been landed at the castle by the governor of Havana and the Spanish admiral; both of whom had come out purposely to anchor the *Pomona* in a place of safety, and had only quitted her 10 minutes before the action commenced. There was, however, a considerable quantity of plate and merchandise still on board, which fell to the share of the captors. The *Pomona*, under the name of *Cuba*, was afterwards added to the British navy, and the first lieutenants of the *Arethusa* and *Anson*, John Parish and Thomas Ball Sullivan, deserved the reward of promotion for their gallantry in this action, which they shortly afterwards obtained for the capture of *Curaçoa*.

On the 29th of August, in the evening, the British 20-gun ship *Bacchante*, Captain James Richard Dacres, cruising off *Santa-Martha* on the Spanish main, sent her boats, under the command of Lieutenant George Norton, assisted by John Howard the gunner, master's mates Henry Overend and Joseph Birch, lieutenant of marines John M. Pilcher, William Leriche purser, and Robert Burnett the carpenter, to attempt the capture or destruction of some Spanish vessels at anchor in the harbour. On the 30th, at 1 A. M., the boats arrived at the entrance of the harbour, and immediately dashed for the vessels, under a tremendous fire from them, the batteries, and the beach, where several field-pieces had been stationed. Notwithstanding this heavy fire, Lieutenant Norton and his party, without incurring any loss, succeeded in bringing out one armed brig and two armed feluccas.

Having received information that several privateers were in the habit of resorting to the small ports of Batabano and Trinidad in the island of Cuba, Vice-admiral Dacres, the commander-in-chief at Jamaica, detached Captain George Le Geyt, with the 18-gun ship-sloop *Stork*, the 14-gun schooner-sloop *Supérieure*, Captain Edward Rushworth, and schooners *Flying-Fish*, of 12 guns, Lieutenant James Glassford Gooding, and *Pike*, of four guns, Lieutenant John Ottley, to endeavour to capture or destroy the marauders.

With this purpose in view, the four British vessels, on the 25th of August, set sail from Port-Royal, and on the 30th at daylight made the Isle of Pines. At noon, when abreast of the

south-west point, a schooner was discovered at an anchor high up the bight. Captain Le Geyt immediately sent a lieutenant and eight men to assist the 19 or 20 composing the crew of the Pike, and directed Lieutenant Ottley to make sail in chase. As soon as the Pike hauled her wind for that purpose, the schooner, which was a Spanish garda-costa of 10 guns and 45 men, got under way. In a short time the Pike arrived within gun-shot; and, after the exchange of two broadsides her opponent made sail. Pursuing her closely, however, the Pike compelled the garda-costa to haul down her colours, and returned with her to the Stork, then with the remaining two schooners riding at anchor.

It now appearing that, owing to the shallowness of the water, the Stork could not proceed any further towards Batabano, which was 30 leagues distant, Captain Le Geyt sent an officer and a party of men to the Supérieure, and directed Captain Rushworth, after lightening as much as possible his own vessel and the Flying-Fish, to take the three schooners and endeavour to execute the service. The Supérieure, Flying Fish, and Pike accordingly made sail; but, owing to the intricacy of the navigation, they did not arrive off Point Gonda, 22 miles from Batabano, until the 2d of September. Here they anchored, and at midnight weighed and stood over to the harbour, intending to be abreast of it before daydawn, but were prevented by baffling winds from reaching it until broad daylight.

Taking with him 18 men belonging to the Stork, 35 from the Supérieure, and 10 from the Flying-Fish, Captain Rushworth then landed about two miles to windward of the battery at Batabano. Leaving the men of the Flying-Fish in charge of the boats, Captain Rushworth proceeded with the remaining 53 to attack the battery; but the marshy irregular ground so impeded the progress of the British, that the enemy was enabled to send a party of soldiers to waylay them in the thick bushes. The advanced division of Captain Rushworth's party, however, charged and completely routed the Spanish soldiers, leaving two dead and one wounded of their number. By this time a general alarm had spread, and the militia and the men from the shipping had joined the stationary regulars in front. Finding his retreat thus cut off, Captain Rushworth pushed forward to gain the fort. This he and his men carried in the short space of three minutes, the Spaniards retreating after firing two guns and a volley of small-arms. The battery thus gallantly taken mounted six long 18-pounders on travelling carriages. These the British immediately spiked, and then proceeded to take possession of the vessels in the harbour, which consisted of one felucca pierced for 14 guns, but having only one long 18-pounder mounted, a schooner pierced for 12 guns, a French privateer of four guns, and three Spanish privateers of one gun each. Besides these armed vessels, there were six carrying cargoes. Entire possession

was taken of all the above vessels, and the British got back to their schooners with so slight a loss as one man badly wounded. The names of the officers, who accompanied Captain Rushworth in this very gallant and successful enterprise, he thus alludes to: "I also feel it my duty to state the great assistance I received from Lieutenants Russell and Murray, and Sub-lieutenants Blake and Brown." Unfortunately we cannot, in this instance, give the names with greater precision.

On the 9th of September, at noon, as the British 22-gun ship *Constance*, Captain Alexander Saunderson Burrowes, and gun-brigs *Strenuous*, Lieutenant John Nugent, and *Sharpshooter*, Lieutenant John Goldie, were beating to the westward from their anchorage off Saint-Malo, they discovered a French frigate-built ship endeavouring to pass between them and Cape Fréhel. The latter was the flûte or store-ship *Salamandre*, of 26 guns (22 long 8-pounders and four 24-pounder carronades), and a crew of at least 80 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Victor-Amédée Salomon, from Saint-Malo, bound to Brest, with a cargo of ship-timber. Finding herself closely pursued, with no chance of escape by dint of sailing, the *Salamandre* ran on shore among some rocks, and close under a battery. The *Strenuous* had so advanced in the pursuit as to be in danger of sharing the same fate; and it was only by great exertions that the brig got clear. The British squadron anchored for the night. On the following morning the wind greatly increased; and, the French ship, the battery on the hill, and the troops on shore, appearing too formidable to be attacked by boats, under such unfavourable circumstances, Captain Burrowes, who, indeed, believed the *Salamandre* to be irretrievably lost, weighed and steered for the island of Jersey.

As soon as the coast was clear and the tide served, the *Salamandre*, with the assistance afforded her from the shore, got off, and, being too much damaged to proceed on her voyage, returned to Saint-Malo. Here, after repairing her damages, the *Salamandre* remained, watching an opportunity to escape, until the morning of the 12th of October; when, the wind being fair and no enemy to be seen in the offing, she put to sea. It so happened, that at 6 A. M. the *Constance* and *Strenuous*, accompanied now, instead of the *Sharpshooter*, by the 16-gun brig-sloop *Sheldrake*, Captain John Thicknesse, and the hired armed cutter *Britannia*, had weighed from off the island of Chausey, with a light breeze at south-east, purposely to reconnoitre the port of St.-Malo. At about 8 A. M. the *Salamandre* was discovered off Cape Fréhel, and was immediately chased, the British vessels having to employ their sweeps on account of the lightness of the breeze. At about noon the *Salamandre* succeeded in getting into the bay of Erqui, close in with the rocks. She there carried out bow and quarter springs, and made every preparation for an obstinate defence, having the aid of a two-gun

battery on an adjacent hill, and of one or two field-pieces and a few troops stationed on the beach.

The Sheldrake, outsailing the Strenuous, led into the bay on the starboard tack, and the Constance whose greater draught of water would have obliged her to be cautious in her advance, even could she, with so little wind, have headed her consorts, followed the Strenuous. At about 1 h. 45 m. P. M. the Sheldrake opened her fire on the Salamandre; as did the Strenuous and Constance, in succession, as they advanced. At a few minutes past 2 P. M., when the Constance, by sweeping, had arrived within pistol-shot on the enemy's beam, the signal was made to anchor; and, as soon as all three British vessels had done so, a spirited cannonade was maintained between them, the Salamandre, and the shore. At about the height of the action Captain Burrows was killed by a grape-shot, and at 3 P. M. the Salamandre, having hauled down her colours, was taken possession of by the master of the Constance. Soon afterwards the wind, which blew right on the shore, began to freshen; and at 5 P. M. the Constance, having had her cables cut by the fire of the battery, took the ground. In this helpless state the Constance remained exposed to a heavy fire of round-shot, grape, and musketry.

The surviving officers and crew of the Constance had now no alternative but to endeavour to save themselves. Accordingly, at 5 h. 30 m. P. M., all that were able quitted the ship in the boats, leaving the wounded to the care of the enemy. These amounted to her first lieutenant (George Spencer Richards, slightly), her boatswain (Daniel M'Cawley, badly), and 14 seamen and marines, including four of the latter wounded mortally; the killed, to eight besides the captain. The Sheldrake had one seaman killed and two wounded, and the Strenuous, who had her fore topmast shot away, one midshipman (Robert Bond) and four seamen and marines wounded; making the total of the British loss 10 killed and 23 wounded, exclusive of 38 officers and men that were made prisoners in an unsuccessful attempt to save the Constance, on her again floating at the rising of the tide.

The Salamandre, mounting, as already stated, 26 guns with a crew, as admitted, of 80 men,* lost her captain, M. Salomon, and it was supposed about 29 men killed. Of her loss in wounded, all that can be stated is that nine, of whom two afterwards died, were received on board the Sheldrake. The Salamandre went on shore almost immediately after she had surrendered; and the British not being able to get her off, set fire to and destroyed her.

Between the above account, and that given by Captain Thickenesse in his letter to the admiralty, there are some, as respects

* The British official account says 150 men.

the part performed by the *Constance*, not unimportant variations. The official letter states, that the surrender of the *Salamandre* occurred at 4 P. M., and that the first lieutenant of the *Sheldrake* took possession of the prize. As it nowhere appears, in that letter, at what time the *Constance* struck the ground, the inference may be that she did so pending the action with the French ship; whereas, according to the testimony of an officer of the *Constance*, the latter did not touch the ground until two hours after the *Salamandre* had hauled down her colours and the master been sent to take possession. It was the shot from the French battery that, by cutting her cables, drove the *Constance* on shore. According to the official letter, the force of the *Salamandre* was "26 long 12 and 18 pounders;" but we still believe our account to be correct. The *Constance* is also represented as "a perfect wreck:" whereas the French, on the third day, as we understand, got the *Constance* into St.-Malo and afterwards repaired her for sea.

In the month of September Commodore Sir Samuel Hood cruised off Rochefort with the following squadron:

Gun-ship		
98	<i>Windsor-Castle</i>	Captain Charles Boyles.
74	{ <i>Centaur</i>	Commod. Sir Samuel Hood.
	{ <i>Achille</i>	Captain Richard King.
	{ <i>Monarch</i>	" Richard Lee.
	{ <i>Revenge</i>	" Sir John Gore.
	{ <i>Mars</i>	" William Lukin.
Gun-brig-sloop		
16	<i>Atalante</i>	" Joseph Ore Masefield.

On the 25th, at 1 A. M., as the above squadron, with the wind at north by east, was stretching in upon the larboard tack for Chasseron lighthouse, then distant six or seven leagues, seven sail were discovered to leeward. At this time the *Revenge* was to windward of the *Centaur*, the *Monarch*, who had first made the signal for an enemy, to leeward and a mile and a half ahead of her, and the *Mars* on her starboard bow. The remaining ships of the British squadron were considerably in the rear. In expectation that the strangers or a part of them, were line-of-battle ships, a signal was made to form the line; but the almost immediate discovery that they were frigates, caused the signal for a general chase to be substituted. The strangers were a French squadron which had escaped the preceding evening from Rochefort, bound to the West Indies, and consisted of the

Gun-frig.		
40	{ <i>Gloire</i>	Commod. Eléon.-Jean-Nicolas Soleil.
	{ <i>Infatigable</i>	Captain Joseph-Maurice Girardias.
	{ <i>Minerve</i>	" Joseph Collet.
	{ <i>Armide</i>	" Jean-Jacques-Jude Langlois.
	{ <i>Thémis</i>	" Nicolas Jugan.
36	<i>Brig-corvettes, Lynx and Sypha.</i>	

Nearly as soon as seen, the French squadron bore up, and steered south-south-west under all sail. The British ships bore away also; whereby the *Revenge*, who lay well to windward, was thrown very far astern. At 4 A. M., when the French squadron was about eight miles ahead of the *Centaur*, the *Monarch* had arrived nearly within gun-shot of the rearmost frigate, the *Armide*. At 5 A. M. the *Monarch* began firing her bow-chasers at the latter; who returned the fire with her stern-guns, the frigates having previously hoisted French colours, and the commodore his broad pendant. At 6 A. M. the *Infatigable*, which was the weathermost frigate, hauled to the northward, and was pursued by the *Mars*; while the leewardmost frigate, the *Thémis*, accompanied by the two brigs, bore up to the southward, and, no unengaged ship being near enough to pursue them, effected their escape.

The three remaining French frigates, the *Gloire*, *Armide*, and *Minerve*, now kept in close order for mutual support. At about 10 A. M. the *Monarch* opened her starboard guns upon the two rearmost frigates, and a very heavy cannonade ensued between her and them: so much to the disadvantage of the *Monarch*, chiefly because the heavy swell prevented her, during a great part of the time, from opening her lowerdeck ports, that, in about 20 minutes, she was much disabled, and scarcely manageable. At 11 A. M., the *Centaur* got up, and commenced a heavy fire from her larboard guns upon the *Gloire* and *Armide*; while the *Monarch* continued engaging the *Minerve*. All three frigates kept up a smart and harassing fire in return. At 11 h. 45 m. A. M. the *Armide* struck to the *Centaur*; and soon after noon, the *Minerve* struck to the *Monarch*. By this time the *Mars* had also overtaken and captured the *Infatigable*. Thus left to herself, in the midst of foes so numerous and powerful, the *Gloire*, as a last resource, hauled up, and made sail to the westward. The *Centaur*, carrying all the canvass she was enabled to set, pursued her. At 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Mars*, who had joined in the chase, and who, from the entire state of her rigging and sails, was at this time the most effective ship, opened her fire upon the *Gloire*, and at 3 P. M. compelled the latter to haul down her colours.

So determined a resistance on the part of the French frigates, of the three, at least, that kept together, was not without its effect. The *Centaur* had eight of her fore, and five of her main shrouds shot away; also the main spring-stay, slings of the main yard, the chief part of the topmast and topgallant rigging and bob-stays, together with her jib-boom. Her bowsprit, foremast, fore yard, mainmast, and main yard, were each shot through in several places; and her running rigging and sails cut to pieces. As a proof that the Frenchmen had chiefly this object in view, the *Centaur's* loss amounted to only one seaman and two marines killed, her captain and three seamen wounded. Sir Samuel's

wound was a very serious one. While leaning with his right hand on the railing of the quarterdeck, giving orders, a musket-ball entered and passed through between the wrist and the elbow, lodging below the shoulder. The shattered condition of the arm rendered amputation necessary.

The damages of the *Monarch* were of a similar description to those of the *Centaur*, except that the former had her main top-gallantmast shot away, and was more hit in the hull. The *Monarch's* loss amounted to one midshipman (William Buddin) and three seamen killed, one lieutenant (John Anderson), her boatswain (Peter Duffy), one midshipman (John Geary), 15 seamen, and seven marines wounded; total, on board the two ships, nine killed and 29 wounded. The *Mars*, the only ship besides these, that took, or could take, any part in the engagement, sustained a slight injury in her sails and rigging, but, although hulled eight or ten times, escaped without any loss.

The *Gloire* mounted 46 guns, and each of the other French frigates 44; long 18s on the main deck, and long eights, with iron 36-pounder carronades, on the quarterdeck and forecastle. They each had on board, including troops, about 650 men, and were full of stores, arms, ammunition, and provisions. No doubt it was owing to their being so deeply laden, that these frigates were not able, in the first instance, to escape from the line-of-battle ships.

Sir Samuel, in his official letter, promises to make a return, as soon as possible, of the loss sustained by the captured frigates; merely stating, that the result of their "obstinate resistance was attended with much slaughter." No doubt the *Gloire*, *Armide*, and *Minerve* severally suffered a very heavy loss, and were proportionably cut up in rigging, masts and hull. Such gallant conduct on the part of the French ships merited a circumstantial account of the state, in point of damage and loss, in which they were at their surrender; and, admitting that the promised return was transmitted to the admiralty, it ought to have been published in the *Gazette*, if only as an act of justice towards a brave enemy.

These captured frigates were of very large dimensions. The *Minerve* measured 1101, the *Armide* 1104, the *Gloire* 1153, and the *Infatigable* 1157 tons. They were all added to the British navy; the first under the name of *Alceste*, the last, of *Immortalité*, and the other two under their French names.

On the 31st of October, 1805, a French squadron, composed of the new 74-gun ship *Régulus*, 40-gun frigates *Présidente* and *Cybèle*, and brig-corvette *Surveillant*, under the orders of commodore Jean-Marthe-Adrien L'Hermitte, sailed out of the port of Lorient, on a predatory cruise, first along the western coast of Africa, and subsequently in the Antilles. It had been Napoleon's intention to have embarked on board this squadron, to which another frigate or two were to have been added, 1000.

men, for the purpose of taking one of the British African settlements, thereby to have drawn off a division of the Channel fleet. The command, both afloat and on shore, was to have been given to the emperor's brother Jérôme; but the latter was to have been attended by two intelligent officers, one belonging to each service, to prevent him from committing blunders.

On his first cruising ground M. L'Hermite took and destroyed several British slave-ships and merchant vessels, and was fortunate enough, on the 6th of January, to capture the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Favourite*, Captain John Davie. The French commodore manned the latter as a cruiser, and, it is believed, sent home the *Surveillant*. According to a loose statement in the French newspapers, this brig afterwards attacked a large English letter-of-marque ship, and was sunk by her.

After committing sad depredations on the African coast, the squadron proceeded to the Brazils to refit. M. L'Hermite again put to sea, and cruised a short time in the West Indies; when, on the 20th of August, being in latitude $22^{\circ} 26'$ north, and longitude 55° west, on his return to Europe, he was overtaken, and his ships dispersed by, the hurricane which proved so destructive in all parts of the Atlantic. The frigate *Cybèle*, having lost her topmasts, steered for the United States, and on the 1st of September anchored in Hampton roads; but the *Régulus* and *Présidente*, being so fortunate as to retain their masts, were enabled to steer for France.

On the 27th of September, at 3 h. 30 m. A. M., having separated from her companion, and got as near home as latitude $47^{\circ} 17'$ north, longitude $6^{\circ} 52'$ west, the *Présidente* fell in with a British squadron of six sail of the line, under Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis, in the *Canopus*. Chase was immediately given by the squadron; and the 18-gun brig-sloop *Despatch* (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long sixes), Captain Edward Hawkins, soon became the leading vessel in the pursuit. By 4 P. M. the *Despatch* had got within three miles of the *Présidente*, and was gaining fast upon her. At 5 h. 30 m. P. M. the brig shortened sail, and at 6 h. 45 m. commenced firing her bow guns at the frigate; who returned the fire with her stern-chasers. A running fight between the *Despatch* and *Présidente* was thus maintained until about 7 h. 45 m. P. M.; when the latter bore up and stood towards the British squadron, the nearest ship of which, the 38-gun frigate *Blanche*, Captain Sir Thomas Lavie, was about three miles astern of the brig. The *Canopus* shortly afterwards fired a distant shot at the French frigate, who thereupon hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the brig. So says the log of the *Despatch*; also that the *Présidente* had previously struck to her. The letter of Rear-admiral Louis contains no particulars; although it would have been but fair to have given the brig the credit

which was due to her, that of having, when no ship was at hand to assist her, so boldly engaged a heavy French frigate.

The Despatch had her rigging much cut by the fire of the *Présidente*, and received one shot in her larboard bow between wind and water, but fortunately had not a man hurt. The French frigate mounted 44 guns, long 18 and 8 pounders, with 36-pounder carronades, and had a crew of 330 men. She did not, as far as appears, sustain any damage or loss from the fire of her tiny antagonist. The *Présidente* measured 1148 tons, was a remarkably fine frigate, and became a great acquisition to the British navy. The *Seringapatam*, and several of the large class of 18-pounder frigates still building, are from the draught of this French frigate, which, in the year 1815, was named *Piémontaise*.

The two remaining ships of M. L'Hermitte's squadron subsequently arrived safe in France; the *Régulus*, on the 5th of October, at Brest, and the *Cybèle*, in the course of the following year, at Rochefort or Lorient.

On the 18th of October, in the morning, as the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Caroline*, Captain Peter Rainier, was taking possession of the Dutch 14-gun brig *Zeerop*, Captain Groot, at anchor between Middleby and Amsterdam islands, off the coast of Java, the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Phoenix* was seen to slip from Onroost, and run for Batavia road; where also was lying, as communicated by the officers of the *Zeerop*, the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Maria-Riggersbergen*, Captain Jager. The *Caroline* instantly proceeded in chase, and soon discovered the *Maria-Riggersbergen*, in company with the 14-gun ship-corvette *William* and brig *Zee-Ploeg*, and the Dutch Company's armed ship *Patriot* of 18 guns. Not at all dismayed by a force apparently so formidable, Captain Rainier, placing springs on both his cables, ran straight for the *Maria*; who, on the arrival of the *Caroline* within gun-shot, opened her fire. No return, however, was made, until the *Caroline* had got as close as the wind would permit her, which was within half pistol-shot. The latter then opened her fire, and, in half an hour, compelled the *Maria*, although partially assisted by the three vessels already named and some gun-boats, to strike her colours. Thirty other gun-boats lay in-shore, but did not attempt to come out.

The *Caroline* mounted altogether 42 guns, with a complement, deducting 57 men that were absent, of 204 men and boys. Of these she had three seamen, and four Dutch prisoners who were in the hold, killed, a lieutenant of marines (Zachary Williams, mortally), 16 seamen, and one marine wounded. Not a spar was shot away, and very little damage done either to masts, rigging, or hull. The *Maria-Riggersbergen* was a frigate similar in size and force to the *Pallas*,* and therefore mounted 12, and not "18

* See p. 252.

pounders," as stated by mistake in the official account. The Dutch frigate had commenced the action with 270 men and boys; of whom she lost, as represented by her officers, 50 in killed and wounded. Her foretopsail yard was shot in two, and her rigging, masts, and hull, more or less injured by the Caroline's heavy broadsides.

It is reasonable to suppose that, had the Maria-Riggersbergen's consorts, admitting them to have been in a situation to do so, co-operated more effectually, the Caroline would have found greater difficulty in capturing the Dutch frigate. This by no means detracts from the merit of Captain Rainier, his officers, and men; who deserve every credit for having ventured to attack a force of such apparent superiority, as well as for bringing the combat, by the vigorous means they employed, to so speedy a termination.

The Maria-Riggersbergen was purchased into the service by Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, the British commander-in-chief on the East-India station, and named the Java, but, in a very few months afterwards, became the grave of her officers and crew.

On the 27th of November Rear-admiral Pellew arrived off the road of Batavia with the following squadron :

Gun-ship

74	Culloden.....	{ Rear-ad. (r.) Sir Edward Pellew, Bart.
		{ Captain Christopher Cole.
	Powerful.....	" Robert Plampin.
	Russel	" Thomas Gordon Caulfield.
64	Belliqueux.....	" George Byng.

Frigates, Sir-Francis-Drake and Terpsichore, *brig* Seaflower.

Directing the two frigates and brig to enter the road between the island of Onroost and Java, Sir Edward, with the line-of-battle ships, on account of the shoalness of the water, took a circuitous route. As soon as they observed the approach of the British squadron, the Dutch frigate Phoenix, the two brig-corvettes Aventurier and Zee-Ploeg, two armed ships and two armed brigs belonging to the Dutch India-company, and several merchant vessels ran themselves on shore. The William corvette would have done the same, but had hauled down her colours to the Terpsichore as the latter passed Onroost.

The shoal water preventing the British ships from anchoring near enough to fire with effect upon the batteries or ships lying on shore, the rear-admiral detached, for the purpose of destroying the latter, the boats of the squadron under the orders of Captain Fleetwood Pellew, assisted by Lieutenant William Fitzwilliam Owen, of the Sea-flower, and Lieutenant Thomas Groule, first of the Culloden. The Sir-Francis-Drake and Terpsichore, meanwhile, had stationed themselves in the best manner to support the boats in their advance. On seeing the boats approach, the crew of the Phoenix scuttled and abandoned their ship; and all the British could do on boarding her was to turn

her guns upon the remaining vessels. These at length, together with the *Phoenix* herself, were set on fire and destroyed; and the boats got back to their ships with so slight a loss, notwithstanding the heavy fire opened upon them by the batteries, as one marine killed, and one marine and three seamen wounded.

The *William* corvette was found to be in so unseaworthy a state, that she also was destroyed. The two Dutch 68-gun ships *Pluto* and *Revolutie*, which Sir Edward had expected to find in Batavia road, had previously retired, for greater safety, to the fortified harbour of Gressie at the eastern extremity of the island.

On the 23d of October, in the evening, as the British 12-gun schooner *Pitt* (ten 18-pounder carronades and two sixes), Lieutenant Michael Fitton, was lying at an anchor in the mole of Cape St.-Nicolas, island of St.-Domingo, the man looking out at the mast-head reported two sail in the offing, over the neck of land to the northward, one apparently in chase of the other. The *Pitt* instantly got under way, and, it being a stark calm, swept herself out of the mole. In the course of the night she was occasionally assisted by a light land wind, and on the 24th, at daybreak, descried three schooners, the largest evidently a privateer of force. Towards the latter the *Pitt* now steered; and the stranger, as if confident in her strength, hove to. At 7 A. M. a distant firing commenced between the two schooners; but, in less than half an hour, the *Pitt*'s opponent, which was no other than the celebrated French privateer *Superbe*, of 14 guns (12 long 6 and two long 8 pounders), Captain Dominique Diron, bore up, under easy sail, after her two prizes, whom she was conducting to the port of Baracoa in Cuba. The chase continued throughout the day and night, the greater part of the time in calm weather, during which the crew of the *Pitt* plied their sweeps with unremitting vigour.

On the morning of the 25th, a breeze springing up favourable to the *Pitt*, the latter was enabled, in the course of the day, again to get within gun-shot of the *Superbe*; who, having seen her two prizes safe into Baracoa, lay to off the port, as if determined to give battle to the British schooner, *M. Dominique* being well aware that, in case of discomfiture, he could run into Baracoa, where already lay four or five freebooters like himself. Aware, in some degree, of the Frenchman's intention, the *Pitt* contrived to get between the *Superbe* and her port, and at 4 P. M. recommenced the action. After a tolerably close cannonade of 30 or 35 minutes, the privateer again made sail; and the *Pitt*, who, in passing near Baracoa at sunset, had observed five privateers lying there, so manœuvred as to keep her opponent in the offing. In this way the two schooners passed the third night, the British crew having again to labour occasionally at the sweeps, with the additional duty of repairing their damaged

rigging, and of remounting and securing several of the carronades, which, having been improperly fitted, had upset in the afternoon's engagement.

Early on the morning of the 26th the *Superbe* rounded Cape Maize; and, having to make Ochoa bay, where he knew there was a detachment of Spanish troops, M. Dominique was obliged to haul across the Pitt. In so doing the *Superbe* brought her starboard broadside to bear upon the Pitt's larboard bow, and, as soon as she had succeeded in crossing her, ran herself on shore among the rocks. The *Superbe*, with her colours still flying, then commenced landing her crew; and the Pitt continued the cannonade to induce the privateer to surrender. Finding that the Frenchmen were quitting the *Superbe* in great numbers, the Pitt sent her boats, manned and armed, and took possession.

When just abreast of Ochoa bay, the Pitt had observed to leeward the three topgallantsails of a ship; and which, by the time the schooner had got a hawser on board her prize to attempt to heave her off, made herself known, by signal, as the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Drake*, Captain Robert Nicolas. Having been a merchant vessel purchased into the service, the *Drake* made very slow progress in working to windward. The sloop at length joined company, and Captain Nicolas sent his boats to assist in getting the prize afloat; which, after considerable exertion, was accomplished.

Out of her complement of 54 men and boys, the Pitt had two men badly and six slightly wounded. On board the *Superbe*, whose alleged complement was 94 men, four were found dead in her hold, and three mortally wounded. The remainder, including M. Dominique himself, had escaped to the shore. The whole loss in killed sustained by the privateer was understood to have been 14, with a proportionate number of wounded; most of whom, by the aid of their companions, landed along with them.

Thus, after a 67 hours' arduous chase, including several intervals of close and spirited action, had a stop been put to the career of one of the most formidable French privateers, coupling her force with the notorious character of her commander, that, for a long time, had infested the commerce of the West Indies. Dominique was not only a daring and experienced privateersman, but he was a perfect freebooter. He detained American as well as English vessels (the two schooners which he had sent into Baracoa were Americans); and, where he wanted a cause to capture, was never without one to pillage. Few neutrals that crossed his path, but left him with a serious defalcation in their sails, rigging, or stores. Among the papers found on board the *Superbe*, was a list of captures, English, Spanish, and American, made by Dominique, to the amount of 147,000*l.* sterling.

It was therefore some merit to have captured a privateer, so capable of doing further mischief as the *Superbe*. It was a

still greater merit to have performed the act by a vessel decidedly inferior in force ; in men nearly double, in guns at least equal. If any thing can be said in addition, it is that the chase was persevered in during three nights, and until the afternoon of the third day, and that it was maintained, for the greater part of the time, by sweeping ; a service fatiguing to the men and harassing to the officers, the latter being obliged to be perpetually animating the former, lest they should relax in their exertions: it was also a mode of progression in which the privateer, from the increased number of her crew, possessed an immense advantage.

Unfortunately for Lieutenant Fitton, having been on deck during the whole three nights, he was too wearied to undertake the task of writing the official letter, although kindly requested to do so by Captain Nicolas. The following extract from the letter of Rear-admiral Dacres to the secretary of the admiralty, enclosing the one received from Captain Nicolas, will show what, even from the latter's report, the former thought of the action between the Pitt and Superbe. "The zeal and perseverance manifested on this occasion, during so long a chase (being upwards of 50 hours at their sweeps with only two thirds the number of men the privateer had), the very gallant conduct of, and superior professional abilities displayed by, Mr. Fitton, will, I trust, recommend him to the protection of their lordships."

M. Dominique afterwards equipped a brig, which he named "la Revanche de la Superbe," and actually sent, by a Spanish licensed trader, an invitation to Lieutenant Fitton, to meet him at an appointed place ; but the latter, by the time the message reached him, had been superseded in the command of the Pitt by the élève of an admiral, not to be promoted to the rank of commander, but to be turned adrift as an unemployed lieutenant.

On the 20th of November the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Success, Captain John Ayscough, standing in for the land to the eastward of Cumberland harbour, island of Cuba, observed a small felucca running into Hidden Port, and immediately despatched in pursuit of her the yawl and barge, under the command of Lieutenant William Duke, assisted by Lieutenant Charles Spence, acting Lieutenant Dowell O'Reilly, and master's mate William Rand Hughes.

On the approach of the boats it was discovered that the crew of the felucca, about 50 in number, had landed with their small arms and their only long gun, and, having lashed their vessel to the trees, had taken post upon a neighbouring hill. From this eminence, the Spaniards fired with grape and musketry, in the most determined manner, upon the boats as they advanced, and at the first volley killed Lieutenant Duke. After a vain attempt, for an hour and 20 minutes, to dislodge the privateersmen from the hill, Lieutenant Spence, with the additional loss of seven wounded, including Lieutenant O'Reilly, found himself

unable to do more than take possession of the abandoned felucca, which proved to be the French privateer *Vengeur* from Santo-Domingo.

On the same night, while the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Orpheus*, Captain Thomas Briggs, was cruising in Campeachy bay, her barge, commanded by Lieutenant George Ballard Vine, very gallantly boarded and carried, without loss, the Spanish schooner *Dolores*, mounting one long 9 and two 4 pounder carriage-guns and four swivels, with 34 men; and which vessel had just been sent out from Campeachy for the express purpose of attacking the frigate's boats.

On the 13th of December, at 8 A. M., Cape San-Martin, coast of Spain, bearing south-south-west six leagues, the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Halcyon* (fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two long sixes,) Captain Henry Whitmarsh Pearse, perceived three sail standing towards her from the land. Being on contrary tacks, the two parties closed fast; and, when about four miles apart, the *Halcyon* discovered the strangers to be an armed ship, brig, and xebec. At this time, also, five settees were seen from the tops, coming from the same quarter. The object now was, to engage before the reinforcement arrived; and the *Halcyon*, accordingly, hastened to close with the three vessels already so confidently approaching her. At 10 h. 30 m. A. M., being within musket-shot, the armed ship, brig, and xebec hoisted Spanish colours, and commenced the action. As soon as she got abreast of the second vessel, the *Halcyon* tacked, and thus brought her three opponents to closer action; which lasted until noon, when their fire slackened. At half an hour after noon, it being nearly a calm, the brig and xebec, assisted by their sweeps and boats, hauled off to the southward. The ship, which was nearest to the *Halcyon*, endeavoured to do the same to the northward; but the latter swept after her, and in the course of an hour got close alongside, when the Spanish corvette *Neptuno*, of 14 long 12-pounders and 72 men, struck her colours.

Of her 94 men and boys, the *Halcyon* was short 16, but had on board four very active passengers. Having fired chiefly at the rigging of the *Halcyon*, the *Neptuno* destroyed that effectually, but did not injure a man on board of her. What loss the *Neptuno* sustained is not stated in the official account; but it was probably severe. The brig was the *Virgine-de-Solidad*, of 14 long 12 and 8 pounders, and 78 men, and the xebec, the *Vives*, of 12 long 8 and 6 pounders, and 65 men, both national vessels. The two latter escaping, their loss in the action, if any, could not be ascertained.

The five settees were about three miles off when the *Neptuno* was deserted by her two consorts. On observing the circumstance, the former returned towards the shore, and entered the port of Denia. This action between the *Halcyon* and the above three armed vessels, was one of considerable gallantry on the

part of Captain Pearse, and must have inspired the Spaniards, if further confirmation were wanted, with a very high opinion of the prowess of British seamen.

COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

In the autumn of 1805 a small British squadron, composed of three 64-gun ships, one 50-gun-ship, and four frigates and sloops, under the orders of Commodore Sir Home Popham, having in charge a fleet of transports and Indiamen, containing about 5000 troops, commanded by Major-general Sir David Baird, sailed from England, or rather, the ships of war having assembled there from different points, from the island of Madeira, for the real but concealed purpose of reducing the Cape of Good Hope. That squadron consisted of the

Gun-ship			
64	{ Diadem	{ Commodore Sir Home Popham.	
	{ Reasonable	{ Captain Hugh Downman.	
	{ Belliqueux	{ " Josias Rowley.	
50	Diomede	" George Byng.	
		" Joseph Edmonds.	
Gun-frig.			
38	Leda	" Robert Honyman.	
32	Narcissus	" Ross Donnelly.	
Brig-sloop Espoir, and gun-brig Encounter.			

Having touched at St.-Salvador for refreshments, the expedition sailed again on the 26th of November, and on the 4th of January, in the evening, reached the preconcerted anchorage, to the westward of Robben island. It was now too late to do more than take a superficial view of Blaw-berg bay, where it was proposed to land the main body of the army, and, by means of the Leda frigate and a part of the transports, make a demonstration off Green island; which latter service was ably executed by Captain Honyman.

On the 5th, at 3 A. M., the troops were put in the boats and assembled alongside the brig-sloop Espoir, Captain William King; but the surf ran so high that a landing was deemed impracticable, and the troops returned to their ships. Sir Home Popham, accompanied by Sir David Baird, then embarked in the Espoir, and closely examined the whole coast from Craig's tower to Lospard's bay, but could not discover any part where a boat could land without extreme danger. The probability that some of the French squadrons, known to be at sea, would arrive with reinforcements rendered it highly important that the disembarkation should be effected as speedily as possible. It was therefore resolved, notwithstanding the difficulty which the troops would experience in advancing, to land them at Saldanha bay. With this object in view, the transports containing the

38th regiment, the cavalry ships, and a proportion of artillery, under the orders of Brigadier-general Beresford, preceded by the *Espoir* and escorted by the *Diomedé*, sailed for that destination.

Just as the *Diomedé* had weighed the westerly wind began to abate; and on the morning of the 6th, it appearing that the surf during the night had considerably subsided, measures were taken to land the remainder of the troops at the spot originally fixed upon. The *Diadem*, *Leda*, and *Encounter*, then stationed themselves in a situation to render the most effectual assistance, and the boats of the *Raisonné* and *Belliqueux*, containing two regiments and some field-pieces, rendezvoused alongside the two first-named ships. At that moment the gun-brig *Protector*, Lieutenant Sir George Morat Keith, Bart., joined the squadron, and was placed by Captain Rowley, an officer of great local experience, to the northward, so as to cross the fire of the *Encounter*, and more effectually cover the landing of the troops. Captain Downman, at the same time, stood in with a light transport brig, drawing only six feet, to run her on shore as a breakwater.

Owing to these excellent arrangements, and the absence of any obstruction on the part of the enemy, the greater part of the troops effected their landing in the course of the afternoon; but unfortunately not without a serious casualty, 35 men of the 93d regiment being lost owing to the upsetting of a boat, occasioned by the eagerness of the troops to get on shore, whereby the line of beach became extended further than was prudent. The surf increasing considerably as the day shut in, the remainder of the troops were not landed until the morning of the 7th.

The commodore, with the *Leda*, *Encounter*, and *Protector*, and a division of transports containing the battering train, then proceeded to the head of Blaw-berg bay, and, by firing over the bank towards the Salt Pans, drove the enemy from an eligible position in that neighbourhood. On the morning of the 8th the British army, about 4000 strong, and formed into two brigades, with two howitzers and six light field-pieces, moved off towards the road that leads to Cape-town, and, having ascended the summit of the Blaw berg, or Blue mountain, and dislodged a party of the enemy's light troops there stationed, discovered the Dutch main body, supposed to consist of about 5000 men, chiefly cavalry, with 23 pieces of cannon, under the command of Lieutenant-general Janssens. These, after giving and returning a few rounds of cannon and musketry, retired from before the British bayonet; suffering a loss in killed and wounded, as represented, of 700 men, while the loss on the part of the British amounted to no more than 15 killed, 189 wounded, and eight missing.

On the 9th General Baird reached Salt river, where he proposed encamping to await the arrival of his battering train; but, afraid of truce arriving from the commanding officer of the town

with offers to capitulate, the British troops, as agreed upon, took possession of Fort Knocke. On the following morning, the 10th, articles of capitulation were signed, in due form, by Lieutenant-colonel Van-Prophalow on the part of the Dutch, and by the general and commodore on the part of the British; and on the 12th the latter took possession of Cape-town and its dependencies, on the several batteries of which were mounted 113 pieces of brass, and 343 pieces of iron ordnance. General Janssens, who after the battle of the 8th had retired to Hottentot Holland's Kloof, a pass leading to the district of Zwelendani, was at length induced to surrender upon terms, by which the conquest of the colony was completed, and its internal tranquillity secured; the British agreeing that the Dutch general and his army should not be considered as prisoners of war, and should be conveyed to Holland at the former's expense.

As is customary in combined operations of the army and navy, a detachment of seamen and marines, under the appropriate designation of marine battalion, served on shore. The hardy seamen rendered themselves particularly useful in forwarding the supplies, and would have been still more so had the battering train accompanied the troops. The whole force thus employed was commanded by Captain Byng; who had under him Captain George Nicholas Hardinge, a passenger on board the *Belliqueux*, on his way to join his ship, the new teak-built 36-gun frigate *Salsette*, and Lieutenants "Pigot, Graham, Sutherland, Mingay, and Pearce."* Among those who rendered themselves extremely useful in the operations going on, were the following captains of the honourable company's ships: William Edmeades; of the *William-Pitt*, John Cameron, of the *Duchess-of-Gordon*, Henry Christopher, of the *Sir-William-Pulteney*, and James Moring, of the *Comet*.

On the 4th of March the French 40-gun frigate *Volontaire*, Captain Bretel, whom we have already mentioned as one of the squadron of Rear-admiral Willaumez, on its way to the Cape,† deceived by the Dutch colours on the forts and shipping, entered Table bay, and was captured by the British squadron, to the great joy of the 217 men of the *Queen's* and 54th regiments, whom the frigate had on board as prisoners. The *Volontaire*, a fine frigate of 1084 tons, was immediately added to the British navy by the same name.

Having, between the 9th and 13th of April, been informed by, among others, the master of an American merchant vessel, that the inhabitants of Monte-Video and Buenos-Ayres were "so ridden by their government," that they would offer no resistance to a British army, Commodore Sir Home Popham took upon

* When to the omission of the Christian names, is added that of the ship to which the officer belongs, it is next to impossible to supply the deficiency.

† See p. 186.

himself, with the concurrence of Major-general Sir David Baird, to plan an expedition against those places. On that or the following day Sir Home, with the *Diadem*, *Raisonné*, *Diomede*, *Narcissus*, and *Encounter*, vessels of war, and five sail of transports, having on board the 71st regiment, a small detachment of artillery, and a few dismounted dragoons, under the command of Major-general Beresford, set sail from Table bay. On the 20th the squadron bore away for St.-Helena, and, upon arriving there, received on board a detachment of troops and artillery amounting to 286 officers and men; making the whole force of regulars embarked about 1200, including officers of every description. On the 2d of May the expedition quitted St.-Helena, and on the 27th, being anxious to obtain the earliest local information, Sir Home sailed for Rio de la Plata, in the *Narcissus*, leaving the squadron and transports in charge of Captain Rowley of the *Raisonné*. On the 8th of June the *Narcissus* anchored near the island of Flores, and on the 13th was joined by the *Raisonné* and squadron.

It being deemed preferable, after a consultation between the two chiefs, to make the first attempt upon Buenos-Ayres, the marine battalion, consisting, including officers, of 340 marines and 100 seamen, under the command of Captain William King, of the *Diadem* (who had succeeded Captain Downman, sent home with despatches announcing the surrender of the Cape), was placed on board the *Narcissus* and *Encounter*. On the 16th these vessels, with the transports and troops, moved up the river; while the *Diadem* blockaded the port of Monte-Video, and the *Raisonné* and *Diomede*, by way of demonstration, cruised near Maldonado and other assailable points in that vicinity. Owing to adverse winds and currents, the foggy state of the weather, and the intricacy of the navigation, it was not until the afternoon of the 25th that the *Narcissus* and transports anchored off Point Quelme à Pouichin, about 12 miles from Buenos-Ayres, and not more than 90 from the spot they had quitted nine days before. No opposition being offered, the British troops, numbering, with the marine battalion, about 1630 men, in the course of the evening and night of the 25th, effected a landing without the slightest casualty.

On the morning of the 26th a body of Spaniards, estimated at 2000 men, were discovered posted on the brow of a hill about two miles from the beach. These were attacked, and after a slight skirmish driven from their position, by the British, with a loss to the latter of only one killed, 12 wounded, and one missing. The British then hastened on to prevent the destruction of the bridge over the Rio Chuelo, a river about eight miles from the scene of action and three from Buenos-Ayres. The troops arrived too late; but, on the following day, the 27th, succeeded in passing the river by boats and rafts, prepared chiefly by the seamen, under the direction of Captain King. Major-

general Beresford then summoned Buenos-Ayres to surrender on a capitulation, and, while the articles were preparing, took quiet possession of that city, the viceroy and his troops having previously fled to Cordova. On the 2d of July the capitulation was signed, and that upon terms highly favourable to the inhabitants. The quantity of specie captured in the place, and which was afterwards embarked on board the *Narcissus* frigate to be conveyed to England, amounted to 1,086,208 dollars.

The marine battalion, whose services were highly and justly extolled by the major-general, having re-embarked on board the squadron, the troops alone remained in the town of Buenos-Ayres. For a while all seemed quiet; but at length the Spaniards, recovering from their panic, saw by what a handful of men they had been dispossessed of their town and its treasures. On the 31st of July Sir Home became apprized, by a despatch from the major-general, that an insurrection was forming in the city. On the 4th of August M. Liniers, a French colonel in the Spanish service, crossed the Rio de la Plata in a fog, unobserved by the British cruisers, and landed at Conchas, above Buenos-Ayres, bringing with him about 1000 men from Monte-Video and Lacramento. On the 10th the insurrection burst forth; and on the 12th Major-general Beresford and his troops, after an action in which they lost 48 officers and men killed, 107 wounded, and 10 missing, were compelled to surrender; but, owing to the firmness of the major-general, on terms highly favourable to the prisoners, in number about 1300. The loss on the part of the Spaniards, who are represented to have assembled in the city nearly 10,000 men, was stated at 700 in killed and wounded.

Commodore Sir Home Popham, with the squadron, remained at anchor at the entrance of the river, blockading the port, until, by the arrival of reinforcements on the 5th and 12th of October, he was enabled to recommence offensive operations. Sir Home's first attempt was upon Monte Video; but, finding the water too shallow to admit the ships to approach near enough to batter the walls with effect, the commodore, on the 28th, retired, with the intention of possessing himself of the harbour of Maldonado, formed by the island of Goretti, a strong place, defended by a battery of twenty 24-pounders. On the 29th the frigates of the squadron anchored in the harbour, and disembarked, without opposition, a detachment of troops (including sailors and marines about 1000 strong), under Brigadier-general Backhouse. Having, after a slight skirmish, obtained possession of the village of Maldonado, the commodore, on the 30th, summoned Goretti to surrender, which it immediately did; and thus matters remained in the Rio de la Plata at the close of the year 1806.

In the failure of the expedition to Buenos-Ayres, not the slightest imputation attaches to the soldiers or seamen engaged

in it: they had done full as much as could be expected from so small a number of men. The error lay in trusting to information, which, besides its glaring improbability, was derived from such a source as the master of an American vessel. Stories about disaffected inhabitants, and their readiness to receive foreign aid, ought always to be listened to with suspicion. They are generally traps to catch the credulous, and, when baited with mines of gold and silver, seldom fail in accomplishing their object. This was not the only score upon which Sir Home Popham was in fault. The lords of the admiralty tried him for quitting his station without orders; and a court-martial, which sat on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth, from the 6th to the 11th of March, 1807, pronounced upon him the following sentence: "The court has agreed that the charges have been proved against the said Captain Sir Home Popham. That the withdrawing, without orders so to do, the whole of any naval force from the place where it is directed to be employed, and the employing it in distant operations against the enemy, more especially if the success of such operations should be likely to prevent its speedy return, may be attended with the most serious inconvenience to the public service, as the success of any plan formed by his majesty's ministers for operations against the enemy, in which such naval force might be included, may by such removal be entirely prevented. And the court has further agreed, that the conduct of the said Captain Sir Home Popham, in the withdrawing the whole of the naval force under his command from the Cape of Good Hope, and the proceeding with it to Rio de la Plata, is highly censurable; but, in consideration of circumstances, doth adjudge him to be only severely reprimanded, and he is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly."

BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

THE increase of large-sized three-deckers in the navies of other powers calling for a proportionate increase in the first rates of the navy of Great Britain, two more ships of the size of the *Caledonia*, and a third, larger than any other except the *Hibernia*, appear among the ordered ships of the abstract for this year.* The paucity of vessels of the smaller classes in the same column occasions the average tonnage of the 52 vessels, summed up at the foot of it, to be more than double that of the 122 vessels, standing as the total in the corresponding column of the preceding year's abstract. As, among regular ships of war, the armament usually increases with the size, the British navy probably acquired more real strength by the lesser, than by the larger, number of vessels thus added to it.†

No one can doubt that it would greatly simplify the ordnance-establishment of a navy, if all the guns were of the same length, weight, and caliber. Similarly-sized carriages, utensils, and shot would suffice for all; and the only difference, in point of armament, between any two vessels would be in the number of guns which they respectively mounted. As, however, the law of mechanics will not, where two or more batteries are required to be placed one above another in a ship, usually admit of an equalization in the length and weight of the guns, we must be satisfied to obtain it in the caliber.

The Spanish and British navies present a few exceptions to this rule. The 80-gun ship *Phoenix*, taken from the Spaniards in 1780, mounted long 24s, of the same length and weight, upon both her first and second decks, and was similarly armed as the

* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 15.

† For the different prize and casualty lists attached to this abstract, see Appendix, Nos. 19, 20, and 21.

Gibraltar in the British service. Subsequently (March 18, 1797), 18 of the Gibraltar's 18 long 9-pounders upon the quarterdeck and forecastle were substituted for the same number of 24-pounder carronades, making the whole of her 80 guns, except two, of one caliber. The San-Ildefonso, as formerly shown,* also mounted long 24s on her first and second decks. But the most important exception is, that the *Téméraire* and her two sister ships, *Dreadnought* and *Neptune*, mounted long 18s upon their second and third decks.† By the time, however, that these three 98s had been 10 years in the service, it was found necessary to change their third-deck 18s for 12s.

An equalization of caliber in three species of guns has been obtained by the invention of a ship gun, meeting, in length and weight, about midway between the carronade and the long gun of the same caliber. Thus:

	Long 24-pdr.		Medium 24-pdr.		24-pdr. carr.	
Length.....	9	6	6	6	3	8
Weight with	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.
carriage...	58	3	39	0	19	0

Of this medium ship-gun, three varieties exist, the *Gover*, the *Congreve*, and the *Blomefield*, named after their respective inventors. The muzzle of the *Congreve* resembles that of the carronade; and the other two guns, in appearance, differ very slightly from each other. M. Dupin claims the priority of invention on behalf of his countrymen *Texier de Norbec*, *Admiral Thévenard*, and M. Bourdé.‡

In December, 1806, several English two-decked line-of-battle ships were armed throughout with guns of one caliber, 24-pounders long, 24-pounders of *Gover*, and 24-pounder carronades; whereby the ships, being old and weak, had much less weight to carry, with only a slight diminution in their broadside force. The greater part, if not the whole, of the ships had their poops cut off; and some of the 74s were rigged with 64-gun ships' masts and yards. The difference in the two modes of arming the 74s will best appear by a short table.

	No.	Pdrs.	Weight of guns and carriages.	Broadside force.
Old armament...	F. D.	28 long 32	181 cwt.	928 lbs.
	S. D.	28 " 18		
	Qd. & F.	6 " 12		
	"	12 carrs. 32		
New armament..	F. D.	28 long 24	157 "	888 "
	S. D.	28 Gov. 24		
	Qd. & F.	4 " 24		
	"	14 carrs. 24		

Had there been a medium 32-pounder, as well as a medium

* See vol. iii. p. 92.

† Ibid.

‡ Voyage dans la Grande-Bretagne, Force Navale, tome ii., p. 101.

24 and 18, any new or effective two-decker, above a 64, might, we should suppose, have carried all her guns of the former caliber: in which case the momentum of her armament would be greatly augmented, while its absolute weight would remain nearly the same. For instance, taking it for granted that a medium 32-pounder would not weigh more than 40 cwt., or two hundred weight less than the common or nine feet 18-pounder, the weight of seventy-four 32-pounders of the three descriptions, with their carriages, would not exceed that of the old armament as stated above; and yet the broadside-force would be increased from 928 to 1184 lbs., a very material consideration.

An equalization of caliber to this extent would, however, as a general establishment, be almost impracticable in a navy like that of England, on account of the great number of guns which it would be necessary to recast. A newly-formed navy, like that of the United States, would have no such difficulty to encounter. The Americans, indeed, with their accustomed ingenuity, have recently invented a medium 32-pounder gun, and, by its means, have armed their largest ships with a treble battery of that powerful caliber.

The number of commissioned officers and masters belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the year 1807, was,

Admirals	52
Vice-admirals	57
Rear-admirals	50
" superannuated 25	
Post-captains	693
" " 26	
Commanders, or Sloop-captains	502
" superannuated 50	
Lieutenants	2728
Masters	429

And the number of seamen and marines voted for the service of the same year was, 120,000 for the first, and 130,000 for the remaining twelve lunar months of it.*

Napoléon, it will be recollected, in his plan of operations against England, framed in September, 1804, intended that the Brest fleet, of 23 sail of the line and smaller vessels, should disembark from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the north of Ireland, or even in Scotland, in order to operate as a diversion while the main body of the grand army was traversing the Channel.† Some distinguished French officers, it seems, were of opinion, that Ireland solely should have been the object of the expedition, judging that, with the aid of the disaffected inhabitants of that unhappy country, a third of the army assembled for the conquest of England would suffice; that the troops in their diminished

* See Appendix, No. 22.

† See vol. iii., p. 217.

number, could be transported by a fleet of men of war, instead of having to wait for so many contingencies to concur, ere a flotilla of 2000 gun-boats could reach in safety the opposite coast; and that the loss of Ireland would inflict a deep wound on the pride of England, would weaken her resources, and greatly reduce her in the scale of national importance.

It is believed that his imperial majesty, in proportion as he grew discouraged with the immobility of his flotilla, felt the force of all this reasoning; and that, when on the last of August, 1805, he suddenly drew off his legions from the neighbourhood of Boulogne, to be in time for an autumnal campaign against the two continental powers (Austria and Russia) who had coalesced with Great Britain against him, he entertained the hope of being able, at some future and not far distant day, either as a preparatory step towards, or as a substitute for, the invasion of England, to make a French province of the land of Hibernia.

Even had the battle of Trafalgar not been fought, Napoléon would hardly have marched his soldiers from the midst of their brilliant successes in Germany back to their cantonments on the coast, again perhaps to waste their time in a long course of listless inactivity. Much less would he have done so, now that the ships of that mighty fleet, which he had hoped to assemble in the Channel to convoy his army to its destination, were all captured, destroyed, wrecked, or blockaded. He therefore, having made peace with Austria at Presburg, and since gone to war with Prussia, continued achieving victory after victory over the Prussians and Russians, until he brought them also to his terms by the double treaty of Tilsit.

A seaport town of Western Prussia having, in the course of the war waged against those powers, become the scene of active operations, a British naval force was naturally to be found co-operating with the garrison in their endeavours to repel the invaders. The fortified city of Dantzic is seated on the western branch of the Vistula, near its entrance into the Baltic; and on the 14th of March, in the present year, was invested by a powerful French army under Marshal Lefebvre.

On the 12th of April the 16-gun ship-sloops Sally (hired), Captain Edward Chetham, Falcon, Captain George Sanders, and Charles (hired), Captain Robert Clephane, arrived off the harbour of Dantzic. As General Kalkreuth, the governor of the fortress, suspected that the besiegers would be supplied with provisions by sea, Captain Chetham detached the Charles to cruise between Rose hind, or head, and Dantzic bay, to intercept any vessels having that object in view; and on the 16th he anchored with the Sally in the Fair Way, a basin formed between the two mouths of the Vistula. Here the ship was so moored, as to flank the isthmus by which alone the French could attack the works.

On the 17th, finding that, owing to the French having encamped on the Nebrung, or Holme, forming the western bank of the Vistula, the communication between the Fair Way and the garrison was completely cut off, Captain Chetham resolved upon making an attempt to reopen it. For this purpose he lightened his ship by sending all her heavy stores on board her consort, the Falcon; and on the same day, by the great exertions of her officers and crew, as well as of Captain Sanders and a portion of his officers and men, the Sally pushed through the shoal water of the sluice or mouth of the Vistula.

At 6 h. 30 m. P.M. the Sally, whose armament, we believe, consisted of 24-pounder carronades, commenced a close action with the French troops at the Great Hollands on the Nebrung, in number about 2000, assisted by three pieces of cannon, and by a small battery at Legan on the right or south-eastern bank of the river, and partially sheltered by the ruins of several houses which the garrison had found it necessary to destroy. The action continued within pistol-shot until 9 P.M.; when, having several of the gun-breechings on her larboard or engaged side shot and carried away, and being without any wind to enable her to maintain her position, the Sally attempted to bring her starboard broadside to bear. In this Captain Chetham was foiled by the strength of the current. The Sally then hauled down the stream, and resumed her position in Fair Water.

The loss on board the British ship, by this gallant though vain effort to relieve the Prussian garrison, was tolerably severe, her first lieutenant (James Edward Eastman) and "nearly half" her crew being wounded by the incessant fire of musketry poured upon them. The mizenmast of the Sally was also shot through, her rigging and sails much cut, and upwards of 1000 musket-shot lodged in her hull. The loss on the part of the French, according to information received a day or two afterwards, amounted to upwards of 400 in killed and wounded.

On the 24th, the French, having completed their works, began bombarding the city, and on the 29th attempted to carry it by storm, but were repulsed. On the 16th of May the British 18-gun ship-sloop Dauntless, Captain Christopher Strachey, made a gallant but unsuccessful attempt to supply the garrison with 600 barrels of gunpowder. Having a favourable wind, the Dauntless ran up the river with studding-sails set, firing on the enemy as she passed: but the wind, either from shifting or from an unexpected bend of the river, became unfavourable, and the ship broke round off. The Channel being too narrow for the Dauntless to work in, and the fire of the enemy under such circumstances too heavy to be resisted, Captain Strachey ran his ship upon the Holme within half musket-shot of the French batteries, and surrendered. On the 21st a capitulation was proposed: and on the 27th the garrison of Dantzic, reduced from 16,000 to 9000 men, marched out of the fortress with the

honours of war. On the 14th of June the battle of Friedland was fought ; on the 25th an armistice was agreed upon between France and Russia at Tilsit ; and on the 7th and 9th of July, at the same place, treaties were concluded between France, Russia, and Prussia.

That the French emperor had not, in the mean time, wholly neglected strengthening his marine, a glance at his naval means at the conclusion of that treaty will show. In the ports of Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Ferrol, Vigo, Cadiz, Carthagena, and Toulon, were upwards of 45 French and Spanish sail of the line ready for sea, or nearly so, exclusive of three French sail of the line in the West Indies and America. Buonaparte flattered himself that he should soon have also at his disposal nine Portuguese sail of the line in the Tagus, and five Russian in the Mediterranean. These 62 sail, even while lying in port, would occupy the attention of an equal number of British ships ; and every division that escaped to sea would, in all probability, be pursued by at least two squadrons of equal force. Moreover it was requisite to have an adequate British force in the colonies, east and west, to be ready to act, in case an enemy's fleet should suddenly make its appearance. Hence, a great portion of the British navy was fully employed in the southern, eastern, and western seas : we have still to show what force might be opposed to the remainder in the northern sea.

In the port of Flushing, and at Anvers, or Antwerp, as more usually called, were three Dutch and eight new French, sail of the line, ready for sea, or fitting with the utmost expedition. All these were 74s, built from Dutch models ; two, the *Charlemagne* and *Commerce-de-Lyon*, were launched on the 8th of April, 1807, two others, the *Anversois* and *Illustre*, on the 7th of June ; and the remaining four, the *Audacieux*, *Duguesclin*, *César*, and *Thésée*, in the latter end of that month and beginning of July. Two other 74s, the *Albanais* and *Dalmate*, were on the stocks, getting ready with the utmost expedition. In the Texel were also three Dutch sail of the line, making a total of 14.

But these ships were not all. The French emperor, who, besides his grand army in the neighbourhood of Tilsit, had one of 70,000 men on the confines of Swedish Pomerania, and meditated sending another to occupy the Danish monarch's newly acquired territory of Holstein, flattered himself with obtaining, either by fair means or by foul, the 11 sail of the line belonging to Sweden, and the 16 belonging to Denmark. There is also good ground for believing, that one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit placed at the conqueror's temporary disposal the 19 or 20 fine new ships, which the Emperor of Russia had ready for sea, or nearly so, in the ports of Revel and Constadt.

Here would have been a confederate French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and Russian fleet of 60 sail of the line in the North and Baltic seas. Admitting the plan to have been realized to only

half the extent in the alleged contemplation of Napoleon, 30 sail of the line and a proportionate number of transports could have conveyed a powerful army to Ireland; and the French emperor not only possessed a powerful army ready to act, but had reason to expect that he should soon have leisure personally to direct its energies towards the fulfilment of an oft-repeated threat, the humiliation of the most constant, the most formidable, and the most dreaded of his enemies.

In this state of things England naturally kept a watchful eye upon naval affairs in the north. A reliance upon the firmness and continued friendship of the King of Sweden induced her to send some troops, chiefly Germans, to his assistance; but, by the time the first division of these had landed in Rugen and Stralsund, the aspect of affairs in this quarter had materially changed, and the Swedish monarch was compelled at length to retire, with the remnant of his army, to the last-named fortress.

It was during the long and friendly discussion between the emperors on the Niemen, preparatory to the peace of Tilsit, that England became apprized of the confederacy that was forming against her in the north; and it was then, or soon after, that she learnt that the weakness of Denmark was a second time to operate as her excuse for favouring the views of France, by shutting up the Sound against British commerce and navigation, and lending the Copenhagen fleet to assist in the attempt to subjugate a power, whose friendship it was at all times the interest of both Denmark and Russia to cultivate.

On the 19th of July, and not before, Great Britain came to the determination to demand of Denmark the temporary possession of her fleet, and, in case of refusal, to deliver it up on a solemn pledge to restore it entire at the conclusion of a general peace, to take it by force of arms. Owing to the lateness of the season, and the necessity of fulfilling the object of the expedition before the winter months put a stop to operations in the Baltic, the utmost despatch was required. As a proof that it was used, on the 26th of July Admiral James Gambier, with the principal division of the fleet, consisting of the following 17 ships of the line, exclusive of 21 frigates, sloops, bomb-vessels, and gun-brigs, set sail from Yarmouth roads:

Gun-ship

98	Prince of Wales ...	Admiral (b) James Gambier.
		Captain Sir Home Popham.
74	Pompée	„ Adam Mackenzie.
		Vice-adm. (b) Hon. H. Edwin Stanhope.
	Centaur	Captain Richard Dacres.
		Commod. Sir Samuel Hood.
	Ganges	Captain William Henry Webley.
		Commod. Richard Goodwin Keats.
	Spencer	Captain Peter Halkett.
	Vanguard	„ Hon. Robert Stopford.
		„ Alexander Fraser.

Gun-ship			
	Maida	„	Samuel Hood Linzee.
	Brunswick	„	Thomas Graves.
	Resolution	„	George Burlton.
	Hercule	„	Hon. John Colville.
74	Orion	„	Sir Archibald Collingwood Dickson.
	Alfred	„	John Bligh.
	Goliath	„	Peter Puget.
	Captain	„	Isaac Wolley.
	Ruby	„	John Draper.
64	Dictator	„	Donald Campbell.
	Nassau	„	Robert Campbell.

On the 1st of August, in the evening, when off the Wingo-beacon, at the entrance of Gottenberg, Commodore Keats, with the Ganges, Vanguard, Orion and Nassau, also the 38-gun frigate Sibylle, Captain Clotworthy Upton, 36-gun frigates Franchise, Captain Charles Dashwood, and Nympe, Captain Conway Shipley, and 10 brigs, parted company by signal, and steered for the passage of the Great Belt, in order to cut off any supplies of Danish troops that might attempt to cross from Holstein to Zealand. On the 3d, in the forenoon, having previously ascertained that no opposition would be offered to the passage of the fleet into the Sound, the British admiral interchanged salutes with the castle of Cronberg, and shortly afterwards anchored in the road of Elsineur, where was lying the Danish 32-gun frigate Frederickscoarn. On the 5th, in the morning, the 74-gun ship Superb, Captain Daniel M'Leod, joined the expedition, and on the morning of the 6th weighed and made sail after the Vanguard and squadron, to receive the broad pendant of her old commander.

On the 7th the Inflexible and Leyden 64s, Captains Joshua Rowley Watson and William Cumberland, with a large convoy of transports, arrived; also Rear-admiral William Essington, with the 74-gun ships Minotaur, Captain Charles John Moore Mansfield, and Valiant, Captain James Young. On the 8th and 9th the Mars and Defence 74s, Captains William Lukin and Charles Ekins, joined, the first with a convoy of transports. On the 12th, in the morning, the 32-gun frigate Africaine, Captain Richard Raggett, arrived from Put bay in the island of Rugen, having on board Lieutenant-general Lord Cathcart, the commander-in-chief of the land-forces to be employed. Lord Cathcart had sailed from England in the same frigate on the 5th of July, and had anchored on the 16th in Put bay. His lordship and suite there disembarked, and proceeded to the neighbouring fortress of Stralsund.

By the time the transports from Rugen had joined, and a few others, under the 64-gun ship Agamemnon, Captain Jonas Rose, from England, the expedition consisted of 25 sail of the line, and upwards of 40 frigates, sloops, bomb-vessels, and gun-brigs; making a total of about 65 vessels of war, exclusive of

377 transports, measuring 78420 tons, and conveying about 27000 troops, more than half of them Germans in British pay.

It appears that Mr. Jackson, the British plenipotentiary to the court of Denmark, had his first interview with the crown prince at Kiel in Holstein. To the former's demand on the subject of the Danish fleet, the latter returned such a reply as might be expected,* and, despatching an estafette to Copenhagen, with orders to put the city in the best possible state of defence, proceeded thither himself. On the 10th in the evening, the courier reached Copenhagen, and early on the following morning the work of preparation began. At noon the prince arrived, and by his presence gave an additional impetus to the exertions of his subjects. On the 12th his Danish majesty quitted Copenhagen for Colding in Jutland, leaving the defence of the city to the care of Major-general Peiman. The regular force at this time in the city and suburbs of Copenhagen, of which the population, in the preceding March, was estimated at upwards of 100,000 souls, has been variously stated at from 3000 to 10,000 men; but the account that appears to be the most worthy of credit makes the number, including an organized militia-force of 2000 men, 5510. These were exclusive of sailors, and of 3600 armed citizens; so that the whole force, regular and irregular, amounted probably to 12,000 men. The main Danish army, of more than double that amount, was encamped in Holstein.

The sea-defence of the port consisted of the Trekronen pile-battery, situated at the distance of 2000 yards, in a north-east by north direction from the entrance of the harbour (which runs like a canal through the centre of the town), and mounting 68 guns besides mortars, a pile-battery in advance of the citadel, mounting 36 guns and nine mortars, the citadel itself mounting 20 guns and three or four mortars, and the holm or arsenal battery, mounting 50 guns and 12 mortars; total 174 guns and 25 mortars, the guns long 36 and 24 pounders (Danish), and the mortars the largest in use.

There were also, around the Trekronen and in front of the harbour, the blockship Mars, of 64 guns, and the prame St. Thomas, of 22, also three 20-gun prames (24-pounders), two floating batteries, and from 25 to 30 gun-boats, each of the latter mounting two heavy long-guns. The fleet in the arsenal consisted of 16 sail of the line and 21 frigates and sloops afloat, but not in a serviceable state, besides three 74-gun ships on the stocks, one nearly finished. Two sail of the line, the Prindts-Christian-Frederic 74, Captain Jessen, and Princessen-Louisa-Augusta 64, Captain Sneedorf, lay in ports of Norway; the one at Christiansand, the other at Frederickswaern.

On the night of the 12th the Frederickscoarn frigate, at anchor

* No official account was published of the result of this interview, and, of the private accounts, scarcely two agree.

as already mentioned in Elsinour road, foreseeing the turn that affairs would take, prudently slipped her cable and steered for Norway. This measure, and the knowledge of the active preparations making by the Danes, determined Admiral Gambier to detach a force in pursuit of the frigate. Accordingly, on the 13th, at 2 h. 30 m. p. m., Captain Ekins, with, besides his ship the Defence, the 22-gun ship Comus, Captain Edmund Heywood, weighed and made sail into the Cattogat, for the purpose, although no declaration of war had passed between England and Denmark, of capturing and detaining the Frederickscoarn.

Shortly after the departure of these ships on this unpleasant mission, Captain Ekins hailed Captain Heywood, and directed him, as the Comus, in the prevailing light wind, sailed better than the Defence, to proceed ahead and execute the service alone. The Comus, whose real so far exceeded her rated force, that she mounted 22 long 9-pounders on the main deck, and two of the same caliber, with eight 24-pounder carronades, on the quarter-deck and forecastle, immediately made all sail, followed by the Defence, who gradually dropped astern in the chase. On the 14th, at 6 h. 30 m. a. m., the Comus descried, bearing north, which was nearly ahead, the object of her orders, steering the same course as herself. Calms and partial airs retarded the progress of all three ships; and at noon the Frederickscoarn bore from the Comus north five miles, and the Defence south by east seven miles. At 4 p. m., the Danish frigate had increased her distance a mile. At 6 p. m., a light easterly breeze sprang up; and at 8 p. m., the Comus had advanced considerably in the chase, while the Defence was full 13 miles astern.

At a few minutes before midnight the Comus got alongside of the Frederickscoarn, whose 32 guns were Danish 12 and 6 pounders, with 6 12-pounder carronades in addition. Captain Heywood desired the Danish captain to bring to, and allow his frigate to be detained. Considering that the Frederickscoarn was not merely a national ship of war, but a vessel, in guns, men, and size, superior to the Comus, no other reply could be expected than a peremptory refusal. On this the British ship fired a musket athwart the stern of the Dane, and instantly received a shot from one of the latter's stern-chasers. All ceremony being now at an end, the Comus bore up, and, as soon as she had placed herself astern of the Frederickscoarn in a raking position, commenced the action within pistol-shot. The fire of the Comus was immediately returned, and the cannonade continued for about 45 minutes; when the Frederickscoarn, from the disabled state of her rigging and sails, fell on board her opponent. A portion of the crew of the Comus, led on by Lieutenants George Edward Watts and Hood Knight, quickly rushed on the decks of the Danish frigate, and carried her without further resistance.

Besides escaping nearly untouched in hull, and with very

slight damage in rigging or sails, the *Comus*, out of her 145 men and boys, had but one man wounded. The *Frederickscoarn*, on the other hand, suffered considerably in rigging, masts, yards, and hull, and, out of her complement of 226 men and boys, had 12 killed and 20 wounded.

Under almost any other circumstances than those which had led to this battle, the gallantry displayed by the officers and crew of the *Comus* would have been duly appreciated. As it was, very limited praise fell to the share of the British; while the Danes were less blamed for the want of prowess they had evinced, than compassionated for the heavy loss in blood, if not in fame, to which an attack so illegal and unexpected had unfortunately subjected them.

On the 14th the state of the weather prevented the British fleet from moving to a position for disembarking the troops: but, early on the 15th, the men of war and transports weighed, and by 5 p. m., worked up to the bay of Wedbeck, a village about midway between Elsinour and Copenhagen. Here the admiral and the bulk of the fleet anchored; while Rear-admiral Essington, with a small squadron, proceeded to an anchorage higher up the Sound, in order to make a diversion. On the morning of the 16th a part of the troops landed at Wedbeck, without opposition. The fleet then weighed and made sail towards Copenhagen, the two commanders in chief having previously addressed to the Danes, in the German language, a proclamation, explanatory of the object of the expedition, and couched in terms as conciliatory as the peremptory nature of the demand would admit. On the same day the Danish king, at Gluckstadt, and his general, at Copenhagen, issued a proclamation, or edict, directing all English vessels and property to be seized and detained.

On the 17th the Danish gun-boats, stationed off the entrance of Copenhagen harbour, taking advantage of a calm, seized and set fire to an English timber-laden merchant bark, in company with some transports coming from Stralsund: they also attacked, with round and grape, the pickets at the left of the British army, and, after receiving a fire from several British bomb-vessels and gun-brigs, that were towed as near to them as the depth of water would admit, retired into the harbour. On the same evening Admiral Gambier, with 16 sail of the line, besides frigates, anchored in Copenhagen road, about four miles to the north-east of the Trekronen or crown battery; and, in consequence of the attack made upon the English merchantmen in the morning, issued an order to his cruisers to detain all Danish ships.

Between the 18th and 21st some additional skirmishes took place between the Danish and English gun-vessels, but with little or no effect on either side. On the last-named day, the circumvallation of Zealand by the British ships being complete, Admiral Gambier formally declared the island to be in a state of close blockade. On this day, also, the last division of troops,

Lord Rosslyn's corps from Stralsund, disembarked in the north part of Keoge bay. To defend the left of the army from the annoyance of the Danish gun-boats, a battery of thirteen 24-pounders had been erected at a spot named Svane-Mølle.

On the 22d three Danish prames, mounting 20 guns each, and from 28 to 30 gun-vessels, placed themselves in readiness to interrupt the army in the construction of some mortar-batteries in advance of the Swan-mill battery. To prevent this, the British advanced squadron, consisting, with the three sloops, five bomb-vessels, and seven gun-brigs, hereunder named, of three armed transports, and 10 launches fitted as mortar-boats, under the command of Captain Puget, of the Goliath, took a station within the crown battery.

Gun-slp.

18	{	Hebe (hired)	Captain Edward Ellicott.
		Cruiser	Pringle Stoddart.
Bbs.	{	Mutine	Hew Steuart.
		Thunderer	George Cocks.
{		Vesuvius	Richard Arthur.
		Ætna	William Godfrey.
{		Zebra	William Bowles.

Gun-brigs, Kite, Fearless, Indignant, Urgent, Pincher, Tigress, Desperate, and Safeguard.

On the 23d, at 10 A. M., these vessels were furiously attacked by the Danish prames and gun-boats; assisted by the crown battery, floating batteries, block-ship Mars, and prame St.-Thomas. The British returned the fire with spirit until 2 P. M.; when, finding that their carronades, at the distance which the vessels had been obliged to take, were no match for the heavy long guns of the Danes, they drew off, with the loss of one lieutenant (John Woodford, of the Cruiser) and three seamen killed, and one lieutenant (John Williams, of the Fearless), seven seamen, and five marines wounded; also with some damage to the vessels, particularly the gun-brigs, which, drawing the least water, were the most advanced. The Danish gun-vessels now turned their fire on the mill battery, but were soon compelled to retire, with one prame and several gun-boats damaged, and with a loss of nine men killed and 12 wounded.

On the 24th the Danish gun-boats remained quiet; but on the 25th a division of them appeared in the channel between Omache, or Amag, and Zealand, and cannonaded the right of the British line, stationed in the suburbs, and composed of the Guards. On the 26th the gun-boats at the harbour's mouth resumed their attack upon the left, but the mill battery at length drove them in, after causing one, the Stube-Kiøbing, to blow up; whereby, out of her complement of 59 men, she had 30 killed and 12 badly wounded. Several of the other gun-boats sustained both damage and loss. On the 27th the army succeeded in opening a battery of four 24-pounders upon the

division of Danish gun-boats, which, during the two preceding days, in conjunction with a battery of 12-pounders and heavy mortars erected at a timber-yard near that extremity of the city, had greatly annoyed the Guards; all which gun-boats, in a little while, were driven away, with one gun-boat much damaged, and upwards of 30 officers and men killed and wounded, afloat and on shore.

During the 28th, 29th, and 30th, no skirmishing took place between the adverse flotillas; but on the 31st the Danish prizes, gun-boats, crown battery, and floating batteries, again attacked the British batteries at the mill and the advanced squadron: which latter, since the repair of the gun-brigs, had resumed its position off the entrance of the harbour. In this affair the Charles armed transport was blown up by a shell from the Trekronen; whereby her master (James Moyase), seven of her seamen and two of the Valiant's were killed, and one lieutenant (Henry Nathaniel Rowe), a master's mate (Philip Tomlinson, mortally), and 12 seamen of the Valiant, and seven of the Charles, wounded; total, 10 killed, and 21 wounded. No other British vessel engaged appears to have sustained any loss. The Danes acknowledged a loss of only one man killed and four wounded.

On the 1st of September, in order to frustrate any attempt to send reinforcements from Stralsund, now in the possession of the French, to Zealand, the former port was declared to be in a state of close blockade, and Commodore Keats was directed to detach a sufficient force to maintain it. On the same day, the army having nearly finished the numerous gun and mortar batteries (48 mortars and howitzers and twenty 24-pounders were mounted) around the city, the two British commanders-in-chief summoned Major-general Peiman to surrender the Danish fleet; pledging the faith of their government, that the same should be held merely as a deposit, and be restored at a general peace, and that all other captured Danish property should be restored immediately. To this summons the Danish general returned a direct negative, but requested time to send to the king on the subject.

Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart refused to consent to this; and on the 2d, at 7 h. 30 m. p. m.,* all the British batteries opened, and the town was set on fire by the first general flight of shells. The bomb-vessels also threw some shells; and the fire was returned by the Danes, who, for several days previous, had fired from the walls and outposts, both with cannon and musketry, upon the British advanced posts. The bombardment

* A singular discrepancy here occurs in the official accounts. Admiral Gambier, in his letter, states that the bombardment commenced "in the morning of that day" (see London Gazette for 1807, p. 1281); Lord Cathcart, and the Danes themselves, at half past seven in the evening.

continued until 8 A. M. of the 3d. In the evening it recommenced, and was continued throughout the night, but with much less vigour than during the preceding night, in the hope that the Danes would surrender without the necessity of further severity. This was not the case, and at 7 P. M. on the 4th the bombardment recommenced in all its fury. In a short time the wood at the timber-yard, which was nearly a quarter of a mile in length, and of great value, was set on fire by red-hot shot. The steeple of the Fruekirke, or metropolitan church, was also set on fire, and, falling, spread the flames in every direction. By this time the fire-engines, which had been so serviceable on the first night, were all destroyed, and many of the firemen killed or wounded. This dreadful work continued until the evening of the 5th; when, the conflagration having arrived at a height to threaten the speedy destruction of the whole city, Major-general Peiman sent out a flag of truce, requesting an armistice of 24 hours to afford time to treat for a capitulation. The armistice was declined, as tending to unnecessary delay; and the works on shore were continued; but the firing was countermanded, and an officer was sent by Lord Cathcart to explain, that no capitulation could be listened to unless accompanied by the surrender of the Danish fleet.

Major-general Peiman having consented that the surrender of the fleet should be the basis of the negotiation, major-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Home Popham, captain of the fleet, and Lieutenant-colonel George Murray, deputy quartermaster general of the British forces, were appointed to settle the remaining terms of the capitulation. On the 6th, in the evening, the articles were drawn up, and on the 7th, in the morning, signed and ratified by the respective parties. By the terms of the capitulation, the British were to be put in possession of the citadel, and of the ships of war and their stores; and, as soon as these were removed from the dock-yard, or within six weeks from the date of the capitulation, were to deliver up the citadel, and quit the island of Zealand; all hostilities were, in the mean time, to cease, and all property and prisoners taken on either side, to be restored.

Between the landing of the British troops and the commencement of the bombardment, one or two sorties and several skirmishes had taken place, in which the army had sustained a loss of four officers, one sergeant, and 37 rank and file killed, six officers, one sergeant, and 138 rank and file wounded, and one sergeant and 23 rank and file missing; making, with the loss incurred by the British afloat, a total of 56 killed, 179 wounded, and 25 missing.

The loss on the part of the Danes, on board the gun-vessels, and in the different skirmishes outside the city, appears, by their own accounts, to have been about 250 in killed and wounded, exclusively of a great number of prisoners. Their loss within

the city, in being stated in the gross at about 2000 men, women, and children, was probably, and it is to be hoped it was, greatly exaggerated. Much blame was attached, and apparently with justice, to Major-general Peiman, for not having, when the opportunity was afforded him, sent the women, children, and helpless men out of the city. Humanity would then have had less to deplore on this melancholy occasion. The number of houses wholly destroyed was officially stated at 305, exclusive of one church; but scarcely a house, it appears, had wholly escaped from the effects of the bombardment, and a second church, that in the citadel, was considerably injured.

The Danish ships in the arsenal, which was an enclosed part of the harbour, had only their lower masts in, but their stores were so admirably arranged in the warehouses, and such was the alacrity of the British seamen in fitting the ships out, that, in nine days, 14 sail of the line were towed from the harbour to the road; and this, although several of the ships had to undergo considerable repairs, and the scuttle-holes made in their hulls by the Danes, in order to sink them (a measure in their tardiness omitted), had to be closed. According to the Danish papers, the crown prince, while at Kiel, sent Lieutenant Von-Steffen to General Peiman, with orders, in case of being compelled to surrender the city, to burn the fleet; but, having been taken on his way by some patrols belonging to the British army, the lieutenant destroyed his despatches, and arrived at Copenhagen without them.

In the space of six weeks, the three remaining ships of the line, with the frigates and sloops, were removed to the road, and the arsenal and its store-houses cleared of masts, spars, timber, and other naval materials. Of the three 74s on the stocks, two were taken to pieces, and the most useful of their timbers brought off, and the third, being nearly planked up, was sawed in various parts and suffered to fall over. The Mars (blockship) and Dittsmarschen 64s, being old and rotten, were destroyed; as, for the same reason, were the Triton of 28, and the St. Thomas of 22 guns. This left in the possession of the British, three 80-gun ships,* fourteen 74s, one 64, two 40, six 46, and two 32 gun frigates, the names of which will appear in the list of Danish captures at the end of the volume. The remaining vessels were the two 20-gun ships Fylla and Little-Belt, the two 16-gun ship-sloops Elven and Eyderen, the seven 16-gun brig-sloops, Allart, Delphinien, Glommen, Gluckstadt, Mercurius, Ned-Elvin, and Sarpen, the two 14-gun brigs Brevdrageren and Flewende-Fisk, and the 12-gun schooner Ornen. There were also 25 gun-boats.

* In the list at the foot of Admiral Gambier's letter, the Christian VII. is tated to be of "96 guns;" but, in reality, she was pierced for no more than 84 guns, namely, 30 on the first deck, 32 on the second, and 22 on the quarterdeck and forecastle.

On the 20th of October, by which time all the ships and small-craft were out of Copenhagen harbour, the last division of the British army re-embarked, with the utmost quietness and without a casualty; and on the 21st, in the morning, the British fleet, with the prizes and transports, sailed from Copenhagen road, in three divisions, the first under admiral Gambier in the *Prince-of-Wales*, the second under Rear-admiral Essington in the *Minotaur*, and the third under Rear-admiral Sir Samuel Hood* in the *Centaur*.

In going down the Sound, the prize 80-gun ship *Neptunos* grounded on a sandbank, about six miles from Copenhagen, and near to the island of Huen. Notwithstanding every exertion, the ship could not be got off, and was ultimately destroyed. According to a previous understanding, the castle of Cronberg abstained from hostilities, and allowed the fleet, which, indeed, kept as much as possible on the Swedish side of the channel, to pass in safety. On entering the Cattegat the weather became boisterous, and led to the destruction of all the Danish gun-boats but three. After this, the fleet proceeded without further accident, and, at the close of the month, reached in safety Yarmouth and the Downs.

Many, who could not be persuaded either of the legality, or the expediency, of the attack upon Copenhagen, most readily admitted, that the conductors of the enterprise had performed their task with ability, promptitude, and, in this special case an important requisite, with moderation. Still the affair was not one from which much glory could be reaped. The attacking force, in each branch of it, was greatly superior; and the army alone, with a slight exception (the advanced squadron and the Danish batteries and gun-boats), had any contest to maintain: nor did that contest consist of a general action, but simply of a few partial skirmishes. The bombardment could scarcely be called an engagement, as all the loss, and that was most severe, fell upon the besieged; not a man, as it appears, having been hurt on the side of the British, during the three nights and one day that the bombardment lasted.

Nevertheless, the successful result of the Copenhagen expedition gained, for the army and navy employed in it, the same honorary rewards usually bestowed upon the achievers of the most brilliant victory, the thanks of the British parliament; but not with the unanimity common on such occasions. Admiral Gambier was raised to the peerage, Lieutenant-general Lord Cathcart promoted from a Scotch to an English peer, Vice-admiral Stanhope, Lieutenant-general Burrard, and Major-general Bloomfield made baronets, and Captain George Ralph Collier of the *Surveillante* frigate, the bearer of the despatches, a knight.

* This distinguished officer had hoisted his flag on the 18th, as had also, on the same day, Rear-admiral Keats.

Although it is true, that the fleet in Copenhagen road had little else to do than to look on, the squadron under Commodore Keats in the Great Belt had an arduous duty to perform; and that it was well performed may be inferred from the fact, that the island of Zealand is 230 miles in circuit, the channel between it and Holstein, where the main Danish army was encamped, extremely narrow, and its navigation, especially to line-of-battle ships, some of which touched the ground several times, extremely difficult; and yet, during the five or six weeks that the squadron lay in the Belt, no reinforcement was enabled to get across. None, at least, of any consequence; but some of the Danish papers stated, that three regiments, consisting of the 1st and 3d Jutland infantry, and of Horzen's dragoons, had landed in Zealand during the siege.

With respect to the merits of the expedition to Copenhagen, morally and politically considered, the British public was for a long time divided in opinion. At length, as affairs in the northern part of the continent began to develop themselves, the necessity of the measure became generally admitted, and both houses of parliament voted their approbation of the conduct of ministers on the occasion.*

It is not a little singular, too, that the very man, whose designs it was the object of that measure to defeat, has since declared, that the expedition showed great energy on the part of the British government. Napoléon has not, because perhaps the question was not put to him, stated, in a direct manner, that he intended to make use of the Danish fleet; but he is reported to have said: "The Danes being able to join me with 16 sail of the line was of little consequence, &c."† as if he really had contemplated some assistance of the kind. In fact, Buonaparte's confidential agent of that time, the celebrated Fouché, has since acknowledged, that one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit gave him the use of the Danish fleet.‡ Not more, however, than three or four of the ships could have been of use to the French emperor, during the little that remained of the season, as effective sail of the line, although the whole fleet might as transports. It is true that (and this was a circumstance which doubtless did not escape the proverbial acuteness of Napoléon) all the ships would have passed for what they nominally were, and would have required a corresponding force to be sent against them; nor must it be forgotten, that the Danish seamen, whom, the French emperor blames the British for having left behind,§ were brave, skilful, and, it is believed, tolerably numerous.

* House of Lords, March 3, Contents 125, Non-contents 57.

House of Commons, March 21, Ayes 216, Noes 61.

† See O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. i., p. 251.

‡ See *Memoirs of Fouché*, vol. i., p. 311.

§ See O'Meara's *Napoléon in Exile*, vol. ii., p. 20.

Although, as formally announced by Admiral Gambier to the officers and men of his fleet, the result, of the siege of Copenhagen "added the navy of Denmark to that of the United Kingdom," the latter gained a very slight accession of strength; for, of the 15 line-of-battle ships that reached an English port, four only were found to be worth the cost of repair as cruisers. These were the

Gun-ship

80	Christian VII.	measuring 2131 tons, and built in 1803.			
74	{	Dannemark	"	1836	" " 1794.
		Norge	"	1960	" " 1800.
		Princess-Carolina ..	"	1637	" " 1805.

The model of the Christian VII. was so much admired, that a ship, in every respect the same was immediately ordered to be built. That ship was the Cambridge, of 2139 tons, launched in 1815.

The most valuable part of the Copenhagen seizure were the masts, yards, timber, sails, cordage, and other naval stores. The value of these may be partly appreciated when it is known that, exclusive of the stores that were shipped on board the British and late Danish men of war, 92 transports, measuring upwards of 20,000 tons, brought away full cargoes. The guns, of course, on account of the difference in their caliber, were of no value, except perhaps as metal for recasting. According to a Danish newspaper of the year 1806, the ordnance belonging to the 20 sail of the line afloat, and to the frigates, sloops, and gun-vessels, amounted to 2041 long guns, 202 carronades, and 222 mortars. But it is believed that many of the ships did not bring away the whole of their guns. The benefit to England was not what she had acquired, but what Denmark had lost; and it is doubtful whether, all circumstances considered, the destruction of the Danish ships at their moorings would not have been quite as profitable to the former, as their capture and conveyance home.

The attack upon the Danish city and fleet naturally produced, especially when a formidable French army was near and a Russian ally in prospect, a declaration of war on the part of the crown prince; and on the 4th of November the King of England ordered reprisals to be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of Denmark. The winter was not, however, the period for active operations; and the Vanguard 74, with a few frigates and smaller vessels, was all the British force left cruising in the Belt.

On the 30th of August the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Quebec, Captain the Right Honourable Lord Falkland, arrived off the Danish island of Heligoland, situated at the mouth of the Elbe, and forming a natural barrier to the shoals of that river, the Weser, the Emms, and the Eyder. Lord Falkland immediately summoned the governor to surrender this small, but in a commercial point of view important, island to the arms

of Great Britain. The Danish officer refused; and the Quebec was preparing to use force to compel him, when, at 2 h. 30 m. P. M. on the 4th of September, Vice-admiral Thomas Macnamara Russel, with the 74-gun ship *Majestic*, Captain George Hart, arrived and anchored close off the town. At 6 P. M., while making arrangements to storm the place with the marines and seamen of the two ships, the vice-admiral received a flag of truce with an offer to capitulate. On the next day, the 5th, the treaty was signed, and the island, which was much wanted as a safe asylum for the English cruisers in these dangerous waters, became a possession of Great Britain.

BRITISH AND TURKISH FLEETS.

The unbounded influence, which in the autumn of 1806, France had acquired in the councils of the divan, threatening a rupture between Turkey and Russia, England as the ally of the latter, endeavoured to restore the amicable relations of the two countries; but her ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot, found himself completely foiled by the intrigues of the French ambassador, General Sebastiani. This artful emissary had arrived at Constantinople on the 10th of August, and in a few days succeeded in persuading the Porte to recal the reigning hospadars from Moldavia and Wallachia. On the 16th of September Sebastiani demanded, that the canal of Constantinople should be shut against Russian ships, which, by a former treaty, were allowed to pass it; threatening war in case of refusal, and pointing to the powerful French army then in Dalmatia.

On the 22d of October the British admiralty directed Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood, who still cruised off Cadiz, but, in the peaceable demeanour of the Franco-Spanish squadron, found little to occupy his attention, forthwith to detach three sail of the line, to reconnoitre the situation of the forts of the Dardanelles and fortifications adjacent, as a measure of prudence, in case circumstances should call for an attack upon them by a British force. Owing to the quick passage of the vessel bearing the despatches, Lord Collingwood was enabled, on the 2d of November, to send Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis upon the delicate and important service in view. And yet, on the 15th of February, 1808, in the House of Commons, the Honourable Thomas Grenville, the first lord of the admiralty who had given the orders, but who was then out of office, stated, that Sir Thomas Louis had not been detached until the 5th of December, and seemed to complain, as in that case well he might, that six weeks from the date of the orders had been allowed to expire before any step was taken to put them into execution. This shows how requisite it is to attend to dates.

On the 8th Sir Thomas, with the 80-gun ship *Canopus*, bear-

ing his flag, Captain Thomas George Shortland, 74-gun ship *Thunderer*, Captain John Talbot, 64-gun ship *Standard*, Captain Thomas Harvey, one frigate and one sloop, anchored in Valetta harbour, island of Malta; and, having taken in water and provisions, the squadron sailed again on the 15th. On the 21st the rear-admiral anchored off the island of Tenedos, situated about 14 miles to the southward of the entrance to the Dardanelles, for the purpose of obtaining pilots, and a change of wind to the southward. While these two indispensable articles are being waited for, we will endeavour to give a brief description of the passage which the squadron was preparing to enter. The channel is full 12 leagues long, and, between the capes Greco and Janizary at its entrance, about three miles wide. About a mile up the strait are a pair of forts, called the outer castles of Europe and Asia. Here the channel is about two miles wide. About three leagues higher is a promontory, that contracts the passage to little more than three quarters of a mile. On each side of this narrow, the proper Dardanelles, stands a castle, mounted with heavy cannon. These are called the inner castles of Europe and Asia, or the castles of Sestos and Abydos. Above these castles the passage widens, and then forms another constriction, which is hardly so wide as the former, and is also defended by forts. The passage again widens, and, after slightly approximating at Galipoli, opens into the sea of Marmora. At nearly the opposite extremity of this small sea, and at about 100 miles from the entrance to it, stands the city of Constantinople.

On the 27th, at 3 A. M., pilots being on board and the wind fair, the squadron weighed and stood towards the strait. At 9 A. M. the *Thunderer* and *Standard* anchored in Azire bay, about two miles below the castle of Abydos; and the *Canopus*, with a light west-south-west wind, proceeded alone. At 10 A. M. the rear-admiral interchanged salutes with the fort of Mydore, and, at 4 P. M. on the 28th, with Seraglio point; off which, at 5 P. M. the *Canopus* anchored, in company with the 40-gun frigate *Endymion*, Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, who had carried out Mr. Arbuthnot, and was waiting the result of his negotiation.

It would appear that, intimidated by the preparations of the Russian ambassador, Italinski, to leave the capital, the Turks had, since the 15th of October, reversed the decrees which Sebastiani had extorted from their fears, and acceded to all Italinski's demands, when, on the 23d of November, the Russian General Michelson, at the head of a powerful army, entered Moldavia, and took possession of Chotzim, Bender, and Jassi. The news of this invasion turned the tide of affairs; and Italinski, on the 25th of December, went on board Sir Thomas Louis's ship.

On the 28th, early in the morning, the rear-admiral weighed

and steered for the Dardanells, leaving the *Endymion* to attend upon Mr. Arbuthnot. On the 2d of January, 1807, the *Canopus* joined the *Thunderer* and *Standard* in Azire bay; where were also lying the 38-gun frigate *Active*, Captain Richard Hussey Moubray, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Nautilus*, Captain Edward Palmer. On the 4th the Russian ambassador removed on board the *Active*, and the latter sailed with him to Malta. On the 31st, at 10 A. M., the squadron was joined by the *Endymion*, having on board the British ambassador and suite, and the whole of the British merchants late residents of Constantinople; with whom the frigate, having cut her cables, had sailed on the 29th, at 11 P. M.

It appears that the cause of all this alarm was some private information, that the Turkish government meant to seize the *Endymion*, also the ambassador, his suite, and all the British residents, with the view of detaining them as hostages, and of "putting them to death by torture," in case a British force should commence hostilities. The merchants placed such reliance upon the intelligence, that they did not wait to carry off any part of their property. Sir Thomas Louis immediately weighed with his passengers, and, dropping down, reanchored the same evening off the entrance of the strait. On the following morning, the 1st of February, the squadron again weighed, and anchored soon afterwards off the island of Tenedos.

In anticipation of a rupture of the negotiations with the Sublime Porte, the British admiralty, on the 22d of November, 1806, had directed Vice-admiral Lord Collingwood to detach a force to the Dardanells, to be ready, in case of necessity, to act offensively against the Turks; and, proceeds the order, "as the service pointed out will require much ability and firmness in the officer who is to command it, you are to intrust the execution thereof to Vice-admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth."* Owing to these orders having been put on board a squadron, which was detained by contrary winds, it was not until the 12th of January that they reached Lord Collingwood off Cadiz. On the 15th, in the evening, Sir John parted company from the fleet, in the 100-gun ship *Royal-George*, Captain Richard Dalling Dunn, with instructions to the following purport.

After having assembled the ships he had been directed to take with him, the vice-admiral was to proceed as expeditiously as possible to the Straits of Constantinople, and there take up such a position as would enable him to bombard the town, in case of a refusal to deliver up the Turkish fleet (the paper-force of which was 12 sail of the line and nine frigates), together with a supply of naval stores from the arsenal sufficient for its equipment. This was all plain sailing; but some contingencies were tacked to the vice-admiral's instructions, which rendered

* Parliamentary papers ordered March 23, 1808.



ADMIRAL SIR THOMAS DUCKWORTH.

FROM A PICTURE BY SIR W^M BEECHEY, R.A.

London, Richard Bentley



them complicated and obscure. For instance, he was to consult Mr. Arbuthnot on the "measures proper to be pursued;" and it was only, when the British ambassador was of opinion that hostilities should commence," that the British admiral was to make the peremptory demand of the surrender of the Turkish fleet. "At this crisis," says Lord Collingwood "should any negotiation on the subject be proposed by the Turkish government, as such proposition will probably be to gain time for preparing their resistance or securing their ships, I would recommend that no negotiation should continue more than half an hour; and, in the event of an absolute refusal, you are either to cannonade the town, or attack the fleet wherever it may be, holding it in mind, that the getting the possession, and next to that the destruction, of the Turkish fleet, is the object of the first consideration." Lord Collingwood added, that the force appointed for the service was greater than had originally been intended, on a belief that the Russian squadron would not be in a situation to co-operate; but that his lordship had, by letter, requested Vice-admiral Seniavin, then cruising in the Archipelago, with a Russian squadron of eight or 10 sail of the line, to detach four of his ships to serve under Sir John Duckworth in the expedition.

On the 17th the Royal-George arrived at Gibraltar, and on the 18th sailed again, accompanied by the 98-gun ship Windsor-Castle, Captain Charles Boyles, and Repulse 74, Captain the Honourable Arthur Kaye Legge, all three ships, as ordered by Lord Collingwood, having completed their provisions for four months. On the 30th the squadron anchored in Valetta harbour, island of Malta; and on the 1st of February Sir John despatched the Active, which had arrived the preceding day with the Russian ambassador, to Sir Thomas Louis, to apprise him of the intended junction, and of the plan that was to follow. On the same day the 74-gun ship Ajax, Captain the Honourable Henry Blackwood, and on the 2d of February the Pompée, of the same force, Captain Richard Dacres, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, arrived from the coast of Sicily. On the 4th, in the afternoon, Sir John, thus reinforced, sailed for the Archipelago, and on the 10th anchored off the island of Tenedos, in company with the Canopus and her companions; making the squadron under the vice-admiral amount to eight sail of the line, two frigates (the Active having rejoined on the 6th), and two bomb-vessels, the Lucifer and Meteor, Captains Robert Elliot and James Collins.

Sir John had now the satisfaction to learn, that the strait of the Dardanelles was not quite so formidable a passage as had been represented; that the batteries were, some of them dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned; and that the bulk of the Turkish fleet lay moored in the port of Constantinople, in an unequipped but preparing state, except one 64-gun ship, four frigates, and several smaller vessels, at

anchor just below Point Pesquies, which is nearly half-way up the channel to the Marmora.

Every moment's delay augmenting the danger, Sir John, on the 11th, at 11 A.M., weighed with the squadron, and stood towards the mouth of the Dardanells; but at 1 P.M., the wind, which was from the south-east, not being fair for passing up the channel, the ships came to an anchor off Cape Janizary. Whether Vice-admiral Duckworth had received any other information than that afforded him by Sir Thomas Louis, or that a few days' reflection had enabled him to discover, in the latter's communication, some cause of alarm which he had at first overlooked, certain it is, that, on or about the 14th of February, Sir John began stuffing a cushion for his fall. In a letter to Lord Collingwood of that date, he says: "Having explained our intentions thus far, I think it a duty I owe to his majesty, and my own honour, to observe to your lordship, that our minister having left Constantinople 16 days since, and the Turks employed French engineers to erect batteries to flank every turn in our passage through the Dardanells, I conceive the service pointed out in my instructions as completely altered; and, viewed in whatever light it may be, has become the most arduous and doubtful that ever has been undertaken, for, as I am instructed by your lordship to communicate and consult with his majesty's ambassador, and to be guided in my proceedings by such communication, it is on that principle that the resolution has been adopted, for the honour and character of the nation appear pledged, and in our hands they never can be tarnished. Of the hazard which attends such an enterprise I am fully aware. We are to enter a sea environed with enemies, without a possible resource but in our ourselves; and when we are to return there cannot remain a doubt but that the passage will be rendered as formidable as the efforts of the Turkish empire, directed and assisted by their allies the French, can make it. I entreat your lordship, however, to believe, that, as I am aware of the difficulties we have to encounter, so I am resolved that nothing on my part (shall) be left undone that can ensure the means of surmounting them."*

On the evening of the same day on which this preparative letter bears date, a melancholy accident befel the Ajax, one of the ships of Sir John Duckworth's squadron. At 9 P.M., just as Captain Blackwood had retired to rest, the officer of the watch ran into the cabin and acquainted him that there was a great alarm of fire in the after part of the ship. Signals of distress were immediately made and enforced by guns. The fire had broken out in the after cockpit, and in the course of 10 minutes, notwithstanding every attempt to stifle it, the smoke became so dense, that, although the moon shone bright, the officers and



* Parliamentary papers ordered March 23 1808.

men on the upper deck could only distinguish each other by speaking or feeling: all attempts, therefore, to hoist out the boats, except the jollyboat, were ineffectual. The flames then burst up the main hatchway, thereby dividing the fore from the after part of the ship; and with the greatest difficulty, the captain, and about 381 of the officers, seamen, and marines of the ship, effected their escape, chiefly by jumping overboard from the bowsprit, or dropping into the few boats that were enabled to approach in time to be useful. Captain Blackwood leaped from the spritsail yard, and, after being about half an hour in the water, was picked up much exhausted, by one of the boats of the *Canopus*.

The *Ajax* burnt during the whole night, and, the wind blowing fresh from the north-east, drifted on the island of Tenedos; where, at 5 A. M. on the following day, the 15th, the ship blew up with an awful explosion. Her net complement of men and boys was about 633; therefore, admitting all to have been on board at the commencement of the disaster, 250 souls must have perished. Among the sufferers were two merchants of Constantinople, and two women: a third saved herself by following her husband with a child in his arms down a rope from the jib-boom end.

A court-martial sat on Captain Blackwood and his surviving officers and crew for the loss of their ship, and pronounced upon them a sentence of honourable acquittal. Nothing of a decisive nature appears to have transpired relative to the origin of the accident, but rumour attributed it to a light falling among some hay which had been incautiously stowed away in the after cockpit or bread-room. Mr. Parke, the chemist, seems, however, to think it highly probable, that the fire which destroyed the *Ajax* was occasioned by the spontaneous combustion of some coals having a quantity of martial pyrites mixed with them.*

At length the wind shifted to south-south-west, and on the 19th, at 7 A. M., the squadron weighed, and steered for the entrance of the Dardanelles. Sir Sidney Smith of the *Pompée* had previously been directed to take under his orders the *Thunderer*, *Standard*, and *Active*, and, in case any opposition should be offered by the Turkish squadron, to destroy it. The British ships then formed themselves in line of battle in the following order: *Canopus*, *Repulse*, *Royal-George*, *Windsor-Castle*, *Standard*, having in tow the *Meteor*, *Pompée*, *Thunderer*, having in tow the *Lucifer*, *Endymion*, *Active*. At 8 A. M., the *Canopus* arrived abreast of the outer castles, both of which opened a fire upon her, and, in succession upon the ships in her wake; but, at the suggestion of Mr. Arbuthnot none of the British ships returned the fire, except the two bomb-vessels, who threw a few shells. This appears to have been rather an inconsistent pro-

* See Parke's Chemical Catechism, p. 265, note.

ceeding; but the bombs were actually signalled by the commander-in-chief to open their fire. What effect that fire produced we cannot positively say; but we believe it amounted to no more than the squadron suffered in passing these castles, and that was too slight to be noticed. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the leading ship of the British squadron arrived abreast of the inner pair of castles, which also opened a fire, within point-blank shot. This fire was returned by the ships of the squadron in succession as they passed, and doubtless with some effect.

The damage sustained by the British ships in passing the Dardanells, for that object had now been attained, was comparatively trifling. Not a mast or yard had been shot away, and the only spars injured were the spritsail yard of the *Royal-George*, gaff of the *Canopus*, and maintopsail yard of the *Standard*. Nor was the loss of men by any means so great as might have been expected. The *Canopus* had three seamen killed, one petty-officer, eight seamen, and three marines wounded; the *Repulse*, one petty-officer and two seamen wounded; the *Royal-George*, two seamen and one marine killed, two petty officers, 22 seamen, and five marines wounded, total, three killed and 29 wounded; rather out of the usual proportion. The *Windsor-Castle* had seven seamen wounded: the remaining ships, namely, the *Standard*, *Meteor* (who had the misfortune to burst her 13-inch mortar), *Pompée*, *Thunderer*, *Lucifer*, *Endymion*, and *Active*, no one hurt; total, six killed and 51 wounded.

A little above the castle of Abydos, and stretching on towards Point Pesquies, or Nagara Burun, on the Asiatic side, lay the Turkish squadron, of which we have before spoken, consisting of one 64-gun ship, with a rear-admiral's flag, one 40-gun frigate, with the flag of the captain pasha, two frigates of 36, and one of 32 guns, four corvettes, one of 22, one of 18, and two of 10 guns, two armed brigs, and two gun-boats. One of the brigs, on observing the approach of the British, cut her cables, and made sail for Constantinople with the intelligence; and yet no ship, as it appears, was detached in pursuit of her. With more gallantry than discretion, the Turkish ships fired at the British van, as soon as it arrived abreast of them. Having returned this fire, the *Canopus*, *Repulse*, *Royal-George*, and *Windsor-Castle*, stood on to an anchorage about three miles above the point; while Sir Sidney, with the *Pompée*, *Thunderer*, *Standard*, and frigates, ran in and anchored within musket-shot of the Turkish squadron, as well as of a redoubt on the point, mounting 31 heavy guns.

At about 10 A.M., the firing commenced, and in half an hour the Turkish 64 ran on shore on the Asiatic side of the stream. In a few minutes afterwards the pasha's frigate, and all the other vessels, except one frigate, one corvette, and one gun-boat, did the same. The two latter were captured. The frigate cut her cables to escape from the heavy fire of the *Pompée* and Thun-

derer, and was making for the European side ; when the Active, by signal weighed and stood after her, but was unable to prevent the Turks from running their ship on shore. Captain Moubray then sent his boats, under the command of Lieutenant George Wickens Willes and Walter Croker, who took out the crew of the frigate, and afterwards destroyed her.

As the redoubt on the point maintained its fire, and the Turkish ships that had run on shore near it kept up their colours, while a part of the crews remained armed on the beach, and a considerable body of Asiatic troops, both horse and foot, appeared on the hills, the British were under the necessity of continuing the cannonade. A few shells from the *Pompée* dispersed the Asiatics, and Lieutenant Mark Oates, of that ship's marines, landed and brought off their green standard. Meanwhile the boats of the *Thunderer* and *Standard*, under the command of Lieutenants John Carter, John Waller, and Thomas Colby, boarded and destroyed the three Turkish frigates on shore on the Asiatic side ; and Lieutenant Edward Nicolls of the *Standard's* marines, to whom the duty of burning the 40-gun frigate had been assigned, struck and carried off the flag of the captain pasha. Profiting by the consternation of the Turks from the explosions on all sides of them, Lieutenant Nicolls, accompanied by Lieutenant of marines William Finmore and Lieutenant Lestock Francis Boileau, entered the redoubt, the Turks retreating as the party approached. He then set fire to the gabions, and spiked the guns ; eight of which were brass, and carried immensely large marble balls. The expected explosion of the line-of-battle ship, which the *Repulse*, by signal from the commander-in-chief, was assisting the *Pompée's* boats to destroy, obliged the British to retire from the shore before they had quite completed the demolition of the redoubt. The boats detached upon this service were commanded by Lieutenant William Fairbrother Carroll, having under him Lieutenant Walter Croker, Lieutenants of marines David Holt and William Lawrie, master's mate David Sinclair, and midshipmen Thomas Smith, George Parkyns, Edmund Lyons, and Norfolk King.

The loss sustained by the British in their engagement with the Turkish squadron and the redoubt amounted to three seamen and one marine killed, and one officer,* nine seamen, and four marines wounded, belonging to the *Thunderer*, five seamen wounded belonging to the *Pompée*, one officer and five seamen wounded belonging to the *Standard*, and one marine wounded, to the *Endymion* ; total four killed and 26 wounded : making, with the previous loss, 10 killed and 77 wounded, the amount in the official return.

* In consequence of the manner in which the general return of loss is drawn up at the foot of Sir John Duckworth's public letter, we are unable to specify what officer was wounded in any of the separate services performed during this expedition.

At 5 P. M., having destroyed the Turkish squadron, and left the *Active*, in conjunction with the prize-corvette, gun-boat, and a division of the *Pompée's* boats to effect the total destruction of the battery, Sir Sidney with the remainder of his division got under way; and, Sir John having also weighed, the whole squadron pursued its course up the channel, with a strong breeze from the south by west, which was as fair as it could blow. At 8 P. M., the ships passed Galipoli, and, entering the sea of Marmora, stood for Constantinople. The British admiral carried little sail during the night; and on the following day, the 20th, the wind lessened considerably. The delay caused by this double misfortune made it nearly 10 P. M. before the squadron came to anchor; and then, not off the town of Constantinople, but off the Prince's islands, about eight miles from it.

On the 21st, at daybreak, the wind blew moderately from the south-east; and every one in the squadron, except the admiral and the ambassador, expected probably that the ships would weigh, and, in the letter as well as spirit of Sir John's instructions, proceed off the town, to be ready to bombard it the instant Mr. Arbuthnot should give the word. In fact it would appear that, as the ambassador, his suite, and the British residents of Constantinople were completely out of the hands of the Turks, and as hostilities had actually commenced between the latter and the British, the whole of the contingencies referred to in Sir John's instructions were got rid of, and that therefore the admiral was now at liberty to act upon his own responsibility. Sir John, however, thought otherwise, and preferred consulting the ambassador, whose pacific disposition he must by this time have known. The British squadron, consequently, remained at anchor; and the *Endymion* was the only vessel that moved, or that made an attempt to move, towards Constantinople.

The frigate, with the ambassador's despatches, anchored at about 11 h. 30 m. A. M., within four miles of the town, that being as near as, according to Sir John's letter, the lightness of the wind and the strength of the current would permit her to approach. In these despatches Mr. Arbuthnot declares, "that the British fleet will avail itself of the first favourable wind to proceed towards Constantinople;" tells the Turks, that "the arrival of the fleet ought to convince them that, when orders have been given to British officers, no difficulties, no dangers, can retard their execution a single moment;" and promises that, "in case a favourable answer arrives on the day following at sunset, all hostile demonstration shall cease."

On the 21st, at daybreak, "Sir John Thomas Duckworth, vice-admiral of the white and knight of the bath,"* as he very

* This honour was conferred upon him on the 6th of June, 1801, on his return from taking quiet possession of the Danish West-India islands, and probably as a compensation for his loss of prize-money to the almost immediate restoration of the captured colonies.

properly styles himself, fires his first epistolary broadside at the Turkish fleet. He informs the Sublime Porte that, "having it in his power to destroy the capital and all the Turkish vessels, the plan of operations which his duty prescribes to him is, in consequence, very clearly marked out." Was ever any thing so happily expressed? The vice-admiral then demands, as the only alternative, to be put in possession of the Turkish ships and of stores sufficient for their equipment, and gives the Turkish government half an hour after the translation of his note to the reis effendi, to determine upon the proposal.

As a proof of the conciliatory spirit of the Turks, and of how much was to be expected from them by negotiation, they refused to permit the flag of truce to land. On the same evening Mr. Arbuthnot addressed a note to the reis effendi, and declared, that "the answer to the admiral's note must be delivered in half an hour." Whether or not the officer who carried this note was permitted to land is uncertain. Midnight of the 21st produced another threatening note from the admiral, beginning thus: "As it has been discovered by our glasses, that the time granted the Sublime Porte to take its decision is employed in warping the ships of war into places more susceptible of defence, and in constructing batteries along the coast, it is the duty of the vice-admiral to lose no time."*

Daybreak on the 22d arrived, and with it appeared at the admiral's mast-head the gladdening signal of "Prepare to weigh." The breeze, which continued to blow from the south-east, freshened in the forenoon; but the preparative flag still stuck fast to No. 66. Towards 4 P. M. the wind began to slacken, and at 5 P. M. subsided to nearly a calm. The ships remained at their anchors; and the opportunity of showing, that the threats, of which the admiral and the ambassador had been so lavish, were not empty boastings, was lost. The effect of mortified pride was very serious upon the ambassador; for he was taken sick that very afternoon, and became so very ill on the day following, that the admiral, whose frame was formed of tougher materials, had the whole burden of diplomacy upon himself.

Sir John's first letter in the character of ambassador bears date on the 23d, and is written in a very lofty and choleric tone. The vice-admiral begins by practising what, in moderate language, may be called a *ruse*. He says: "When the Active joins me, or even when my squadron shall be joined by *all* our naval force, even that shall not occasion any alteration in the terms I have proposed. I must tell you frankly, I will not consent to lose any more time. I owe it to my sovereign and to my own honour not

* These extracts are from the copies of the correspondence in the London journals, as translated from the *Moniteur*. This, which may account for the occasional obscurity of the language, is the only way in which they have been made public.

to suffer myself to be duped, and those who are capable of thinking so meanly of others, justly become themselves the object of suspicion. You are putting your ships of war in motion; you take every method of increasing the means of defence; but if the Sublime Porte really wishes to save its capital from the dreadful calamities which are ready to burst upon it, the thought of which is shocking to our feelings of humanity, you will be sent here very early to-morrow morning with full powers to conclude with me the work of peace, which Mr. Arbuthnot would by this time have set out to conclude on shore, if he had not been prevented by a very serious indisposition. I now declare to you, for the last time, that no consideration whatever shall induce me to remain at a distance from your capital a single moment beyond the period I have now assigned; and you are sufficiently acquainted with the English character, not to be ignorant that, in a case of unavoidable necessity, we are less disposed to threaten than to execute. But understand me well. Our object is peace and amity: this depends on you."

Can it be wondered that the Turkish minister, having the shrewd Sebastiani at his elbow, should laugh at all this verbiage, and treat with contempt both the writer and the government of which he was the organ? First, the fleet of the Turks is demanded: now, merely that the latter will remain at peace; or, in other words, that they will allow Sir John to repass the Dardanells without further molestation. Well, the Turks agree to treat; and Sir John, on February 24, says: "Considering the very great importance of the affair, not only as it regards the Sublime Porte and Great Britain, but the whole world, I have come to the resolution of personally conducting it." The admiral then proposes that a Turkish minister shall be sent on board either the *Endymion* or the *Royal-George*; or he is willing himself to go on shore on any of the Prince's islands. The Turks name Kadikioi on the Asiatic side. Sir John Duckworth now discovers that "there is no precedent of an admiral, or commander-in-chief, quitting his squadron." He also declares, that the place is "too far distant." Whatever may have been the vice-admiral's motives for declining to trust himself among the Turks, they were such, apparently, as no arguments could overcome. Sir John therefore wished to depute rear-admiral Louis to be his representative on shore.

Whether the latter felt, that he who wore the honours, should also share the dangers, of the ambassadorship, or that he considered the negotiation, like the rest of this celebrated war of words, to be all vapour, Sir Thomas Louis preferred remaining on board his ship. The only persons, therefore, whose lives were placed in jeopardy, were a young midshipman named Harwell, and four lads belonging to the *Endymion*; who, on their way to the island of Protá in the frigate's jollyboat, to buy

provisions of the Greek inhabitants, had been boarded by a party of Turks from the main and carried to Constantinople. A demand to have these lads restored formed the third stage of this protracted correspondence; and a flat refusal to deliver them up completed the climax of insolence and barbarity on one side, and of humiliation and disgrace on the other.

On the 27th, in the morning, it was discovered that the Turks had landed on the island of Prota, one of the Prince's islands, and the nearest to the anchorage of the British squadron; and that they were erecting a battery to annoy the latter. The marines of the squadron, under Captain R. Kent belonging to the *Canopus*, were prepared for disembarking; and the *Repulse* and *Lucifer*, having been ordered to cover the boats, proceeded towards the island. The two ships, on their approach, began to scour the beach, with their grape, when, instantly, a number of Turks quitted the island in their boats; and one boat, containing 11 men, supposed to comprise the remainder of all those who had landed, was captured. In the afternoon the discovery was made, that some Turks were still on the island of Prota. The marines of the *Canopus* immediately pushed off for the island, landed; and, pursuing the Turks to a monastery with loop-holes for musketry, got worsted, with the loss of their brave commander and of several of their party. The signal having been made for assistance, the marines and armed boats' crews of the *Royal-George*, *Windsor-Castle*, and *Standard*, hastened to the rescue of their comrades on shore. A smart skirmish ensued; and, in the height of it, an officer arrived from the admiral, with orders for the detachments to return on board. The different boats' crews reached their respective ships soon after dark, with the loss of two officers; and five petty officers, seamen, and marines killed, and two officers, and 17 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded; total, seven killed and 19 wounded.

Here was an enterprise that, had it succeeded, would have almost atoned for the imbecility and irresolution which had characterized every preceding act of the expedition. On the island of Prota, when attacked by the British, were two very important personages, General Sebastiani and the chief aga of the Janizaries. Had these men been brought on board the squadron, Sir John might at least have obtained, as the price of their ransom, leave to quit, what he so feelingly calls, "a sea environed with enemies," without harm to himself or his ships. A clever negotiator, indeed, might have effected a surprising change in the political views and intentions of the Sublime Porte.

It was not merely that the force, originally detached against the Turks upon the island of Prota, was inadequate to the purpose; it was, that the small reinforcement afterwards sent had received directions "to bring off the *Canopus's* people, but to avoid being drawn into danger." These were Sir John Duckworth's positive orders; and even his permission to Rear-admiral

Louis, to send the first party, consisting of the marines of the *Canopus*, was not conceded without the neutralizing accompaniment, "that no risk whatever must be run, but if it could be effected without hazarding the people, it might." Who expects that military operations are to be conducted without risk? If the detachments were "not to pursue their object should it be attended with any hazard," Sir John might as well have sent a party of old women to drive away the Turks. Such milk-and-water wishy-washy measures will never succeed. And yet, not the slightest imputation attaches to the officers or men who landed on *Prota*: all acted as British seamen and marines will ever act when left to themselves; but, in the midst of their glorious career, comes the chilling order for them to re-embark and return to their ships.

The calm weather of the 25th and 26th had been succeeded on the 27th by a westerly wind, which blew during the whole of the 28th; but the Turks had learned by experience, that the British admiral had no real intention to molest their town or their fleet. The latter they had been suffered partially to equip, and the former to protect by batteries at every assailable point. That the French engineers and Turkish workmen had not been idly employed at a distance from the capital, we shall presently have occasion to show. By daybreak on the 1st of March the wind had shifted to the north-east; which was as fair as it could blow for quitting the territories of a people so ignorant and fool-hardy, that no rhetoric could persuade, no threats intimidate them. Up went, at the Royal-George's mast-head, the signal to weigh; and the preparative flag, if hoisted along with it, was so quickly hauled down, that at 8 h. 25 m. A. M. the whole of the British ships were under sail, standing in line of battle.

Although the Turks had been 10 days equipping their fleet, they had not, it appears, been able to get ready for sea more than five sail of the line and four frigates. These were at anchor in the road. By way of a flourish, or, as Sir John says, to give the Turkish "fleet" an opportunity to come out and attack him, he stood on and off Constantinople during the day, and at night bore up for the Dardanells. On the 2d, at 5 P. M., daylight being preferred for passing the castles, the squadron came to an anchor about six miles above Point Pesquies, and was there joined by the *Active* frigate and her prize, the late Turkish corvette; which latter, by the admiral's orders, was given up to the prisoners.

On the 3d, at 7 h. 30 m. A. M., the squadron again weighed, and at 8 h. 15 m. A. M. bore up under topsails, with the wind fresh at north-east. The ships then proceeded down the channel in the same order in which they had sailed up,* except that the *Active* was ahead of the *Endymion*, and that, instead of the

* See p. 301.

Standard, the *Endymion* had the *Meteor* in tow. On approaching the castle of Abydos, hoping probably to propitiate the Turks, Sir John fired a salute of 13 guns. This produced an immediate return of shot and shells, both from the two castles and from the battery on Point Pesquies; which latter, since the passage up, had been repaired and remounted. The other batteries on both sides, successively as the ships arrived abreast of them, opened their fire and received a fire in return. The mutual cannonade was kept up until nearly 11 h. 40 m. A. M.; and at a little before noon the British squadron anchored off Cape Jani-zary, out of the reach of further molestation.

The improved state of the defences of the Dardanelles, since the passage up of the British, would naturally display its effects upon the latter in their passage down. We will take the ships in the order in which they descended the strait. The *Canopus* had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, by the stone shot, but escaped with the loss of only three seamen wounded. On board the *Repulse*, a stone shot, from the castle on the Asiatic side, came through between the poop and quarter-deck, and killed two quarter-masters, five seamen, and three marines, and wounded one lieutenant of marines, two corporals, and four privates, also two quarter-masters and a boatswain's mate; total, 10 killed and 10 wounded, the only loss which the *Repulse* on this occasion sustained. The same shot badly wounded the mizenmast, broke and carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage. The *Royal-George* had several lower shrouds cut away, and her masts slightly wounded: a large stone shot also stuck fast in her cut-water. Her loss amounted to two seamen and one marine killed, two officers, one petty-officer, 22 seamen, and two marines wounded; total, three killed and 27 wounded.* A stone shot of 800 pounds weight struck the mainmast of the *Windsor-Castle*, and cut it more than three quarters through: her loss amounted to three seamen killed, one petty-officer and 12 seamen wounded. On board the *Standard*, a stone shot from the castle of Sestos, weighing 770 pounds, and measuring six feet eight inches in circumference and two feet two inches in diameter, entered the lower deck, killed four seamen, and, having set fire to the salt-boxes which were on deck for immediate use, caused an explosion that badly wounded one lieutenant, three petty-officers, 37 seamen, and six marines. The alarm of fire that followed the explosion caused four seamen to leap overboard, all of whom were drowned; making the *Standard's* total loss by this single shot (and which was all she sustained) amount to eight killed and drowned, and 47 wounded. The *Pompée* had the good fortune to escape without being struck by a shot, in hull, masts, rigging, or sails. The *Thunderer*, on the other hand, was a

* See p. 302.

good deal damaged, and had two seamen killed, one lieutenant, one midshipman, 10 seamen, and two marines wounded. The *Lucifer* had no one hurt. The *Active* received a granite shot weighing 800 pounds, and measuring six feet six inches in circumference, which passed through her side two feet above the water, and lodged on the orlop deck, close to the magazine-scuttle, without injuring a man. The aperture made by it was so wide, that Captain Moubray, on looking over the side to ascertain what damage it had done, saw two of his crew thrusting their heads through at the same moment. Had there been a necessity for hauling to the wind on the opposite tack, she must have gone down.* Her loss altogether amounted only to her boatswain, four seamen, and three marines wounded. The *Endymion* had three seamen killed, and one lieutenant and eight seamen wounded. The *Meteor* had the misfortune, about a quarter of an hour before she got abreast of the castle of Abydos, to part the hawser by which the *Endymion* had been towing her. The *Endymion* did not wait to take the *Meteor* again in tow, but hastened past the batteries. These opened a tremendous fire upon the bomb, and all on board the squadron, knowing that the *Meteor's* magazine was above water, expected every instant to see her blown into the air. The stone shot flew about her in all directions, and some struck her hull. At length, after (as in the passage up she had done her 13-inch) bursting her 10-inch mortar, the *Meteor* got past the batteries, with the loss of one lieutenant of the marine artillery and seven seamen wounded. We may notice in passing, that the *Lucifer's* magazine was also above water, both bombs having originally been merchant vessels. The regular bombs, or those built as such, have their magazines below water, which is the proper place. It was certainly a very hazardous experiment, to take these bomb-vessels where they would be exposed to so close and heavy a fire as in the passage of the Dardanelles.

The total of the British loss in repassing the Dardanelles amounted to 29 killed and 138 wounded; and the total loss incurred in the expedition, to 46 killed, including the four drowned, and 235 wounded. The following appear to have been the officers who suffered on the occasion. Killed: Captain of marines R. Kent, of the *Canopus*, and Lieutenant George Lawrence Belli, of the *Royal-George*. Wounded: Lieutenants John Forbes and Nisbet Josiah Willoughby, and midshipmen George Holbrook, John Furneaux, — Dalrymple, John Alexander, John Wood Rouse, and Charles Cotesworth, of the *Royal-George*; master's mate John Nichols, and midshipman George Wray, of the *Canopus*; master's mate William Jones of the *Windsor-Castle*; Lieutenant of marines Thomas Marshall, and master's mate Joseph Magui of the *Repulse*; Lieutenants John

* Marshall's *Naval Biography*, vol. i., p. 809.

Waller and Thomas Colby, and midshipman — Moore, of the *Thunderer*; Lieutenant Daniel Harrington, Lieutenant of marines William Finmore, master's mates John Haines and William Smith, midshipman Charles Jay, and boatswains William Shorbridge of the *Standard*, and Mark Palmer of the *Active*; Lieutenant John Langdon of the *Endymion*, and Lieutenant of marine artillery George E. Ballchild, of the *Meteor*.

When the British admiral, as already related, dropped anchor off Cape Jamizary, he was joined by the Russian admiral with eight sail of the line. What followed we will give in the words of one who, naturally feeling a bias towards Sir John Duckworth,* never wilfully misses an opportunity of bepraising him. "Siniavin requested Sir John to return with him, and renew the attack or the negotiations; but this was declined, and it was observed, perhaps with too much national vanity, that where a British squadron had failed no other was likely to succeed.†

So much for the far-famed expedition to the Dardanelles. Had the board of admiralty of that day been better acquainted with the character of Sir John Thomas Duckworth, they would have sought elsewhere for an officer of "ability and firmness" to carry their orders into execution. There was one, indeed, not five days' sail from the mouth of the Dardanelles, whose ability and firmness had never been doubted, and whose local experience, and well-known influence with the Porte, eminently fitted him to be the conductor of such an enterprise. As soon as the Turks had decided to be hostile by firing at his ships, Rear-admiral Sir Sidney Smith would have considered himself as released from all further dependence upon the ambassador, and would have thought only of what was due to the honour of the British flag. On meeting the Turkish ships off Point Pesquies, he would have left two or three of his line-of-battle ships, and his frigates, to dispose of them, and, with the remainder of his squadron, would have dashed on to Constantinople. There, in defiance of currents and eddies, castles and granite balls, he would have hid his squadron close to the town, with his heaviest ship ready, at a moment's notice, to batter down the walls of the seraglio, if the terms which he had been instructed to demand were not strictly complied with. No one can doubt what would have been the result of a measure so prompt, so intimidating, and so practicable.

That there should have been no investigation of the causes that led to so palpable a defeat as the one we have just done relating, may appear extraordinary. An inquiry was undoubtedly in contemplation, but two or three circumstances conspired to prevent it from being prosecuted. On the 16th of May, 1808, Colonel Wood moved, in parliament, for the log of the *Royal-George*, with the view of grounding a charge against Sir John

* See p. 202.

† Brenton, vol. iv., p. 150.

Thomas Duckworth; but the House of Commons refused to grant the motion, on the principle, that the inquiry fell more properly under the cognizance of a court-martial. In four days afterwards the House was called upon to pass a vote of censure upon the planners of the expedition, the members of the late administration. This motion also was lost; although Mr. Canning, then foreign secretary, declared, "it was obvious that the expedition might have done more than it did," and Mr. Windham, late secretary at war, insisted, that "the failure of the enterprise could not be attributed to any misconduct on the part of the late government."

This was a broad hint; but Sir John Thomas Duckworth had already shown (see p. 304), that a side wind could make no impression upon him: he, therefore, did not demand an inquiry into his conduct, nor did any one else. The fact is, the public was so astounded at the idea of marble shot of 800 pounds weight, so convinced of the almost insurmountable difficulties of passing the Dardanells, and so satisfied with the admiral for having destroyed the Turkish "fleet," as most of the papers described the 64 and the three or four frigates,* that Sir John rather gained than lost credit for the discomfiture he had experienced.

It certainly was, to say the least of it, very injudicious to subject the acts of the admiral to the consent of the ambassador. The cabinet should have decided upon the measure, and the admiral alone have been charged with its execution. Although a tissue of contingencies and nicely-drawn distinctions may be unravelled in an instant by the professed diplomatist, a string of *ifs* and *buts* cannot fail to puzzle the understanding, and to mislead the judgment, of the unsophisticated sailor. He never succeeds so well, admitting his heart to be in the right place, as when he can see his way all clear before him to the very muzzles of the enemy's cannon.

The attack by the British on the capital of Turkey was immediately followed by the departure of an expedition against Alexandria in Egypt. On the 6th of March the British 74-gun ship *Tigre*, Captain Benjamin Hallowell, accompanied by the 38-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain Edward Fellowes, 16-gun brig-sloop *Wizard*, Captain Edmund Palmer, and 33 sail of transports, having on board about 5000 troops under Major-general Fraser, sailed from Messina in Sicily. On the 7th, in the night, during thick and blowing weather, the *Apollo* and 19 sail of transports parted company; and on the 15th the *Tigre*, with the remaining 14, reached the Arab's tower. On the 16th the *Tigre* alone stood in towards Alexandria, to ascertain from Major Missit, the British resident, and Mr. Briggs, the vice-consul, who were expected to be on board the *Wizard*, which had been

* In Ralfe's "Naval Chronology," vol. ii., p. 29, we are favoured with a view of the "Destruction of the Turkish fleet."

previously detached to receive them, the strength and disposition of the garrison and inhabitants. A favourable report being returned, the transports were called in from the offing; and, in the course of the evening, all the ships anchored off the entrance of the old or western harbour.

A summons was immediately sent, demanding possession of the town and fortresses. The morning, the 17th, brought a reply from the governor, that he would defend the place to the last extremity. On the same evening, therefore, between 600 and 700 troops, along with five field-pieces, and 56 seamen under Lieutenant James Boxer, were disembarked, without opposition, near the ravine that runs from lake Mareotis to the sea; but, owing to the heavy surf which got up in the night, the remainder, consisting of about 300 men, were not landed until the following day. On the evening of this day, the 18th, the troops moved forward, and attacked and carried the enemy's advanced works, with the slight loss of seven killed and 10 wounded. On the 19th, the Apollo and the missing transports appeared in the offing. On joining the Tigre, the Apollo proceeded, with all the transports, to Aboukir bay; where, on the following day, the 20th, the remainder of the troops were landed without opposition, the castle of Aboukir having previously been secured. The appearance of such a reinforcement induced the Turkish governor to offer terms of capitulation, similar to those which the British had proposed. On the same afternoon these terms were accepted; and at 2 A.M. on the 21st, possession was taken of the heights of Caffarille and Cretin, and immediately afterwards of the city of Alexandria itself, the garrison of which amounted only to 467 troops and sailors.

In the old or western harbour of Alexandria were found two Turkish frigates and one corvette. One frigate mounted 28 long 18-pounders (French caliber) on the main deck, and six long 8-pounders and six 18-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and fore-castle; total 40 guns, all brass. The other frigate mounted 26 long brass 12, and eight long brass 6 pounders, total 34 guns; and the corvette 14 long 6, and two long 18 pounders, also of brass.

On the 22d vice-admiral Duckworth, with a part of his squadron, arrived on the coast. The arrival of this reinforcement induced Major-general Fraser to attack Rosetta and Rhamanieh, chiefly to get a supply of provisions for the garrison. The troops advanced and took possession, without resistance, of the heights of Abourmandour which command the town of Rosetta. In attempting, however, to possess themselves of that town, the troops were completely defeated, and returned to Alexandria with the loss of 400 officers and men killed and wounded, including among the former, the major-general himself. Famine now threatened the city of Alexandria, and Vice-admiral Sir John Duckworth, leaving the command of the squadron to

Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis (who died soon afterwards on board the *Canopus*), quitted the coast, for England; where, on the 26th of May, the *Royal George* safely arrived.

The further operations of the British in Egypt, being wholly of a military nature, need not be here detailed. It may suffice to state, that the troops, being overpowered by numbers, suffered reverses; and after losing upwards of 1000 of their number in killed, wounded, and prisoners, were compelled, in the middle of September, to evacuate Egypt, and re-embark on board their ships. This the British were permitted to do by a convention with the governor of Egypt; who, immediately on their departure, entered the city of Alexandria at the head of a powerful army, and reboisted on its lofty towers, the standard of Mahomet.

While on the subject of Turkish affairs, we must give some account of the naval war carried on between Russia and the Porte. Vice-admiral Seniavin, who made so bold a proposal to Sir John Thomas Duckworth, had been educated in the British navy, and, if we are rightly informed, subsequently gave a proof of his attachment by retiring from service while hostilities existed between Russia and England. The squadron now under his orders, and of which Rear-admiral Greig was the second in command, consisted of the

Gun-ship

- | | |
|----|-------------------|
| 80 | Rafael. |
| 74 | { Twerday (flag). |
| | { Motchnoy. |
| | { St.-Cafael. |
| | { St.-Helena. |
| | { Yarowflaul. |
| | Moscow. |

Gun-ship

- | | |
|----|--------------|
| 66 | { Ratvizan. |
| | { St.-Petro. |
| 60 | { Skomor. |
| | { Brig. |
| 26 | { Kilduyn. |
| | { Venus. |

With this fleet, having taken possession of the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos, and placed a garrison in the latter, the Russian admiral blockaded the Dardanells. Another Russian squadron cruised off the mouth of the Bosphorus, and effectually cut off all communication between Constantinople and the Black Sea.

Imboldened by their success over a formidable squadron of the far-famed British, the Turks hastened to equip their fleet to act against the Russians in the Archipelago. With this stimulus to their exertions, the Turks managed, by the middle of May, to equip a squadron of eight sail of the line, six frigates, some ship and brig corvettes, and about 50 gun-vessels. On the 19th this fleet passed the Dardanells, and, finding that the Russian admiral had gone to the island of Imbro, steered for Tenedos. Here the Turks endeavoured to land a body of troops, but were repulsed, and stood over to the coast of Naxos. On the 22d the two fleets got a sight of each other; and that of the Turks immediately crowded sail to escape through the Dar-

danells. After a running fight of two hours, the Turkish admiral succeeded in sheltering himself under the guns of the castles that guard the straits, but not without, it appears, losing three of his ships by stranding upon Cape Janizary.

Owing to this disaster, it was not until the 22d of June that the Turks were again able to make their appearance outside the Dardanells. On that day 10 sail of the line, including one three-decker, with six frigates and five smaller vessels, anchored off the island of Imbro. They shortly afterwards steered for Tenedos, and, disembarking a strong body of Turks, retook the island. On the 1st of July the Russian fleet descried the Turkish fleet off the island of Lemnos. An engagement ensued, which lasted all day, and terminated in the alleged loss to the Turks of three ships of the line and three frigates. The latter and two of the former were driven on shore. The other was captured, and proved to be the ship of the captain bey, mounting 80 brass guns, and manned with 774 men; of whom, exclusive of the loss on board the other ships, 230 were killed and 160 wounded: a sufficient proof of the obstinate manner in which the Turks had defended themselves. That they were by no means so skilful as they were brave, is evident from the small loss sustained by the Russians; which amounted, on board of all their ships, to only 135 killed and 409 wounded. It was a circumstance as singular as it was fortunate, that, on board the captured Turkish ship, were found young Harwell and his four fellow-prisoners. A short time afterwards, falling in with the Kent 74, Captain Edward Oliver Osborn, the Russian admiral sent them on board that ship.

Having completely defeated the Turks, and compelled them a second time to retire to the Dardanells, Vice-admiral Seniavin took measures to recover possession of Tenedos. On the 9th he appeared off this island with his fleet, and summoned the Turkish general to surrender upon a capitulation. This the latter did; and on the 10th the Turkish garrison, numbering 4600 men, was transported to the coast of Asia. The treaty of Tilsit, of which we have already given some account, having effected a total change in the politics of Alexander, Vice-admiral Seniavin, on the 24th of August, concluded an armistice with the Porte. He then, after detaching Rear-admiral Greig, with the Moscow, St.-Petro, and some smaller vessels, to take possession of the island of Corfu, ceded to Russia by France under the treaty above-named, hastened, with the remaining nine sail of the line and one frigate, to get out of the Mediterranean and into the Baltic, before the expected rupture between Russia and England should render that a difficult undertaking.

BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE FLEETS.

At the very time that the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with invectives against England, for violating the neutrality of Denmark, the French emperor was marching an army to the frontiers of Portugal; and that not because the latter had relaxed her neutrality in favour of Great Britain, but because she had hitherto refused wholly to abrogate it in favour of France. Napoléon had the modesty to demand, that Portugal should shut her ports against the commerce of England, and should detain the subjects of the latter and sequester their property; thus compelling the prince regent virtually to declare war against the ancient ally of his house, merely to indulge the rancour of the French emperor, and assist him with a fleet of ships in his meditated plan of adding Ireland to the number of his conquests. Awed, at length, by the near approach of General Junot and an army of 40,000 men, and swayed probably by the arguments of the powerful French faction that existed in the heart of his capital, the prince regent, on the 20th of October, declared by proclamation, that he had judged it proper "to accede to the cause of the continent," and shut his ports against the men-of-war and merchantmen of Great Britain.

Intelligence of this proceeding reached England early in November; and the following nine sail of the line, which had been previously got ready, quitted Portsmouth and Plymouth, under the command of Rear-admiral Sir Sidney Smith, bound straight to the Tagus:

Gun-ship		
120	Hibernia.....	{ Rear-Ad. (b.) Sir William Sidney Smith. Captain Charles Marsh Schomberg.
98	London.....	
80	Foudroyant...	" Thomas Western.
	Elizabeth.....	" Norborne Thompson.
	Conqueror.....	" Honourable Henry Curzon.
74	Marlborough..	" Israel Pellew.
	Monarch.....	" Graham Moore.
	Plantagenet...	" Richard Lee.
	Bedford.....	" William Bradley.
		" James Walker.

In the autumn of the preceding year a threat of Napoléon's, that he would conquer Portugal, had induced the British government to send Earl St.-Vincent and a squadron to Lisbon, with the offer of money and troops to assist in repelling the invaders; or, should that, in the state of the country, be deemed impracticable, and the prince regent prefer a removal to his South-American dominions, the admiral was to protect him and his family thither. But the sudden hostility of Russia and Prussia compelled the French emperor to direct the whole of his energies against them; and Portugal, for the present, was allowed to retain her independence. Napoléon's successful career in the

north having again left him at leisure, he once more bent his view upon Portugal, and with more earnestness than ever.

A case for British interference had thus again occurred, and it remained to be seen, whether the prince regent, in aid of the "continental cause," meant to make a further trial of the forbearance of England; or, in fulfilment of former assurances, would consent to retire, with his family, fleet, and adherents, to a safe asylum in the Brazils. Suffering his fears, however, again to get the better of his discretion, the prince regent, on the 8th of November, signed an order for the detention of the few British subjects, and of the inconsiderable portion of British property, that yet remained in Lisbon. Immediately on the publication of this order, the British ambassador, Lord Strangford, demanded his passports, presented a final remonstrance against the recent conduct of the Portuguese court, and on the 17th joined Sir Sidney's squadron, which had just arrived off the coast.

A rigid blockade was forthwith declared, and enforced, by the British admiral against the Tagus. After this measure had been tried for a few days, Lord Strangford, on the 27th, went to Lisbon, in the ship-sloop *Confiance*, Captain James Lucas Yeo, bearing a flag of truce, to propose to the Portuguese government, as the only condition upon which the blockade would be raised, the alternative, of either surrendering the fleet to England, or of employing it in the removal of the prince regent and his family to the Brazils. Convinced by the reasoning of Lord Strangford, assured, in the fullest degree, of British protection, and not uninfluenced, probably, by a suspicion of Buonaparte's real views respecting the house of Braganza, of which the *Moniteur* had just given a hint, by threatening that the dynasty of Braganza should no longer exist, the prince regent, on the same day, proclaimed his intention to retreat, with the queen his mother, and all the royal family, to his dominions in America, there to establish himself in the city of Rio de Janeiro until a general peace; and he appointed a regency to govern the kingdom in his absence.

It fortunately happened that the bulk of the Portuguese fleet, whether prepared for this or for some other purpose, was in readiness to put to sea. Accordingly, on the 29th, in the morning, Vice-admiral don Manuel d'Acunha Sottomayor, with the 84-gun ship *Principe-Reale*, 74s *Conde-Henrique*, *Medusa*, *Principe-de-Brazil*, and *Rainha-de-Portugal*, 64s *Alfonso-d'Albuquerque*, *Don-Joan-de-Castro*, and *Martino-de-Freitas*; frigates *Minerva*, of 44, *Golfinho*, of 36, and *Urania* and another, with whose name we are unacquainted, of 32 guns; three 20-gun brig corvettes, and one 12-gun schooner, having on board the whole of the royal family of Braganza, along with many of the prince's faithful counsellors and adherents, and accompanied by about 20 large armed merchant ships, filled with cargoes and passengers, set sail from Lisbon. In the course of a few hours

this fleet, conveying, altogether, about 18,000 Portuguese inhabitants, arranged itself under the protection of that of the British; and the friendly junction of the two fleets was immediately announced by a reciprocal salute of 21 guns.

The above eight sail of the line, four frigates, and four smaller vessels, comprised the whole of the Portuguese navy, except one 74, the *Vasco-de-Gama*, under repair and nearly ready, and another 74 and 64, and five frigates and corvettes, that were unserviceable. As a proof that the efficient ships of that navy, with the royal family and loyal inhabitants on board, had not been too precipitate in their retreat, on the 30th, which was the very day after their departure, General Junot, with the advanced division of the French army, entered Lisbon. Having accompanied the Portuguese fleet to latitude $37^{\circ} 47'$ north, and longitude $14^{\circ} 17'$ west, and waited till the ships had reassembled, after a severe gale of wind, Sir Sidney, on the 6th of December, detached Captain Moore, with the *Marlborough*, *London*, and *Bedford*, to attend the fleet to the Brazils, and, with the remainder of his squadron, parted company. One of the Portuguese ships of the line, being deemed unfit to proceed on the voyage, bore up for England. The remainder, escorted by Captain Moore, pursued their voyage, and on the 19th of January landed the prince regent at Bahia. Captain Moore, with the British and Portuguese men of war, then proceeded to Rio de Janeiro.

The object of Sir Sidney in parting company was to watch the motions of the nine Russian sail of the line under Vice-admiral Seniavin; who, finding it dangerous to proceed further to the northward, had anchored in the Tagus. This step on the part of England was rendered necessary by the menacing tone which Russia had recently assumed. On the supposition that this Russian squadron was still in the Mediterranean, Sir Sidney had been ordered to detach the *Foudroyant*, *Conqueror*, and *Plantaganet*, as a reinforcement to Rear-admiral Purvis off Cadiz; but he now, of course, kept those ships with him, and with his five sail of the line cruised off the mouth of the Tagus.

After Sir Sidney had been a week performing this duty, Commodore Peter Halkett joined from England, with, besides his own ship, the *Ganges*, the 74s *Defence* and *Alfred*, Captain Charles Ekins and John Bligh, and the 64s *Ruby* and *Agamemnon*, Captains John Draper and Jonas Rose. These ships had sailed from Portsmouth on the 6th, just four days after the Emperor of Russia's hostile declaration against England had been received by the British government. Of this declaration, and of that which speedily followed it, we shall reserve any remarks we may have to make, until the next year's operations in the Baltic come under our notice. It may suffice to state here, that the Russian squadron, under Vice-admiral Seniavin, remained safe blocked up in the Tagus on the last day of the present year.

LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 6th of January the British 38-gun frigate *Impérieuse*, Captain Lord Cochrane, while passing the basin of Arcasson to the southward of the Gironde, on her way to join the squadron of Commodore Keats off Chasseron lighthouse, detached her boats, under the orders of Lieutenant David Mapleton, assisted by midshipmen the Honourable William John Napier and Mr. Houston Stewart, and assistant-surgeon George Gilbert to bring out of the basin whatever vessels might be found there. As a preliminary step, Lieutenant Mapleton attacked and carried Fort Roquette, which was intended for the defence of the entrance to the inlet. A large quantity of military stores was there destroyed, four long 36-pounders, two field-pieces and a 13-inch mortar spiked, the platoons and carriages burnt, and the fort laid in ruins; and, as a proof that this enterprise was as judiciously as it was gallantly conducted, not a man of the party was hurt. In his letter on this subject Lord Cochrane mentions the capture or destruction of several French merchant vessels, but it does not appear that any were found in the basin of Arcasson.

On the 21st of January, at daybreak, the British 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Galatea*, Captain George Sayer, cruising off the coast of Caraccas on the Spanish Main, discovered from the mast-head a sail in the south-east, steering for La Guayra; but which sail soon altered her course for Barcelona. At noon, the frigate then nearly becalmed, the stranger was made out to be an enemy's man-of-war brig, and was, in fact, the French brig-corvette *Lynx*, mounting fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two long eights, with a complement of 161 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Jean-Mathieu Fargenel, from Gaudaloupe, bound to the Caraccas with despatches. At this time, having the advantage of a light land wind, and assisted by her sweeps, the *Lynx* was fast leaving the *Galatea*; so much so, that at 2 P.M. the brig's topgallantsails, as viewed from the frigate, were scarcely above the horizon. Still, shut in as he brig was between the frigate and the coast, Captain Sayer conceived that he might obtain possession of her by the assistance of his boats.

Accordingly, at a very few minutes past 2 P.M., six boats, containing five officers, 50 seamen, and 20 marines, 75 in all, and placed under the command of first Lieutenant William Coombe (left leg of wood), pushed off from the ship in the following order, each boat taking the one next to her in tow: short gig, commanding officer's name unknown; long gig, master's mate John Green: green cutter, third Lieutenant Robert Gibson; pinnace, second Lieutenant Henry Walker; barge, Lieutenant Coombe; and launch, master's mate Barry Sarafield. The brig,

at this time, was to the eastward of Cape Codera, which bore from the frigate south-east distant about four leagues. At 3 p.m. finding that the boats gained very little on the brig, Lieutenant Coombe directed them to separate and make the best of their way, with the exception, that no boat, without orders, was to row ahead of the barge. At 6 p.m. the Lynx bore east-south-east distant about four leagues. Mr. Green in the long gig now advanced ahead to reconnoitre, with orders by all means to keep sight of the brig, and, in the event of its growing dark, to hoist a light.

At 8 h. 30 m. p.m. Lieutenant Coombe's boat, having got within musket-shot of the chase, lay to on her oars, that the men might arm, and in order to give the sternmost boats time to come up. The long gig now joined, with a confirmation of the warlike character of the enemy, and that she was under all sail, with sweeps out. In 10 minutes more the sternmost boats, except the short gig, got up, and began also to arm and prepare for the attack: which was to be made in two lines; the lee line, consisting of the barge, pinnace, and long gig, was to board on the starboard quarter, and the weather line, consisting of the green cutter and launch, on the larboard quarter; and the boats of both lines to steer close in between the sweeps and the brig's sides.

In this order, the five boats (the short gig left behind) undauntingly advanced. At 8 h. 50 m. Lieutenant Coombe, being within pistol-shot of the Lynx, then with a light land wind going about two knots an hour, hailed her twice, but received no answer. The British instantly gave three cheers, and in another five minutes were close alongside the French brig. The latter, having trained her guns aft in readiness, repulsed the assailants with a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, wounding, among others, Lieutenant Coombe, by a musket-bullet which passed through the muscular part of his left or legless thigh. A second attempt was made to board, with no better success than the first. The boats now dropped and poured through the brig's stern and quarter ports a destructive fire of musketoons and small arms, which cleared the deck of many officers and men who had crowded aft to repel the boarders.

Having succeeded thus far, the boats again dashed alongside. After an arduous struggle, in which Lieutenant Walker fell dead of his third wound, the British gained the brig's deck. The latter now became the scene of a most desperate and bloody conflict, which, in about five minutes, terminated in favour of the boarders; but not until they had strewed the deck with dead and wounded Frenchmen, and driven the remainder, some upon the bowsprit and jib-boom, and others up the shrouds and down the hatchway. Thus, in about 15 minutes from the first attempt to board, were the Galatea's boats in possession of the

French brig-corvette, in chase of which they had been seven hours pulling, part of the time under a burning sun. Just as the action was over the short gig joined.

The loss sustained by the British in achieving this truly gallant exploit was very severe. The killed consisted of Lieutenant Walker, five seamen, and three marines; the severely wounded of Lieutenant Coombe, master's mate Sarsfield, one petty officer, five seamen, and three marines; and the slightly wounded, of master's mate Green, one petty officer, eight seamen and one marine: total, nine killed and 22 wounded; including four out of the five officers who had commanded the boats, and comprising nearly half the number of British present in the action. The short gig, it will be observed, was absent, with at least five men, and one to keep each remaining boat would leave 65 for boarding the brig.

The loss among the Frenchmen was also severe. The Lynx, out of a complement, as acknowledged by themselves, of 161 men and boys, had her third lieutenant (late captain of the Buonaparte privateer, and since restored to his former rank in the French navy), 13 petty officers, seamen, and soldiers killed, her captain, first lieutenant (both badly), four other officers, and 14 petty officers, seamen, and soldiers wounded, the greater part of them badly; total, 14 killed and 20 wounded.

Having secured the private signals and the magazine, Lieutenant Coombe gave orders to get the wounded off the deck, the dead hove overboard, and the studding-sails hauled down. The sweeps were then brought in-board, and the boats veered astern. By this time a light breeze had sprung up from the south-west, of which immediate advantage was taken, and the brig stood to the northward, in expectation of falling in with the frigate. The prize then hoisted two lights vertical at the mast-head, and fired several blue-lights, to indicate her situation. Such, however, had been the distance of the Galatea at the period of the attack, that the latter did not make her appearance until 2 A. M., on the 22d. Signals of recognition having been exchanged between the two vessels, Lieutenant Gibson, at 3 A. M., was despatched to Captain Sayer with information of the successful result of the enterprise; and at 5 A. M., the Lynx and Galatea were within a few fathoms of each other.

When all the circumstances of this boat-attack are taken into consideration, no one will dispute that, although in a few instances it may have been equalled, it has never been surpassed. The distance which the boats had to pull, the shutting in of day, and the loss of sight of their ship, the great force of the enemy, his determined resistance, and the heavy loss which it inflicted on the assailants, required a considerable share of courage to sustain, and of skill and valour to overcome. The prize, too, was not an armed merchant vessel or privateer, but a national brig of war, fully manned, mounted, and equipped, and,

no slight advantage, under sail and going two knots through the water when the British attacked her. Nor did the difficulties end with the contest. There were less than 50 British to overawe and keep in subjection, during an anxious period of nearly six hours, more than 120 Frenchmen. The *Lynx*, being a fine vessel of 337 tons, and only two years old, was purchased for the use of the British navy. A *Lynx*, however, being already in the service, the name of the prize was changed to the *Heureux*; and her first commander was he who had the best right to her, the gallant William Coombe.

On the 27th of January, at daylight, Soramine river on the coast of Guayana bearing south by east distant 26 miles, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Jason*, Captain Thomas Cochrane, descried and chased a ship and brig, evidently cruisers, about six miles upon her weather beam. At 10 h. 15 m. A. M. the *Jason* brought the ship to action, and presently compelled her to haul down her colours. The prize proved to be the late British sloop of war *Favourite*, mounting 16 long 6-pounders and two 12-pounder carronades on the main deck, and eleven 12-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle; total, 29 guns, all English caliber, with a complement of 150 men, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Gabriel-Etienne-Louis Le Marant-Kerdaniel. The brig in her company, when first chased, was a corvette of 14 brass 8-pounders and 120 men.

On the 26th of January, late in the evening, the 18-gun ship-sloop *Lark*, Captain Robert Nicholas, cruising off the Spanish Main, chased, and early on the 27th captured, two Spanish guarda-costa schooners; one the *Postillon*, of one long 12-pounder, two 6-pounders, and 76 men, the other the *Carmen*, of one 12-pounder, four 6-pounders, and 72 men, each commanded by a Lieutenant of the Spanish navy.

On the 1st of February, having the prizes in company, with 10 men in each, the *Lark* discovered a convoy of market-boats, protected by two gun-boats and an armed schooner. The market-boats ran on shore; but the gun-boats and schooner sought refuge in a creek of Zispata bay, protected by a four-gun battery. The *Lark* followed these vessels into the bay, and soon silenced the fort. Not being able, owing to the shallowness of the water, to enter the creek, the *Lark* anchored off the mouth of it; and, taking with him the whole of the sloop's remaining officers and crew, amounting to about 100 men and boys, Captain Nicholas proceeded up the creek in his boat. The Spaniards, relying upon their numbers, rowed out to meet the British, and, until the latter closed, kept up a resolute fire. They then fled. Captain Nicholas seized this opportunity of boarding with his single boat the sternmost gun-vessel, carrying one long 24 and two 6 pounders. The vessel ran on shore, but was carried after a desperate resistance; by which, out of 16 men in the captain's boat, three were dangerously, and himself severely, wounded.

All further success was now at an end; for, in following the other gun-boat and the armed schooner up the creek, the pilot missed the channel, and ran the two guarda-costa prizes on shore. As there was no prospect of getting the vessels afloat, the action was continued in that situation until 5 P. M. Mr. Richard Pound the purser, and two men, being now added to the list of wounded, Captain Nicholas gave up the attempt, and directed Lieutenant John Bull to destroy the two schooners, and cover the retreat of the boats; a service which he effectually executed.

On the 14th of February the British 20-gun ship *Bacchante*, Captain James Richard Dacres, and 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Mediator*, Captain William Furlong Wise, cruising off Cape Raphael, island of St. Domingo, captured the French national schooner *Dauphin*, of one long 12 and (when chased but since thrown overboard) two 4 pounders, with a crew of 71 men. It was now decided to make an attack upon the adjacent fort of Samana, a notorious nest for privateers. For this purpose the prize was to be sent in under French colours, and the *Mediator*, an Indiaman purchased into the service, and so far well adapted for deception, disguised as a neutral.

In this way the schooner, the frigate, and the 20-gun ship stood through the intricate channel into the harbour; and, so well was the stratagem conducted, and so skilfully were the *Mediator* and *Bacchante* piloted by their respective masters, that these vessels anchored within half a mile of the fort of Samana before they were discovered. The fort, which was manned chiefly by privateersmen, then commenced firing, and the *Mediator*, whose situation was the nearest, and *Bacchante*, fired in return. After the mutual cannonade had continued four hours, Captain Wise, assisted by Lieutenants Henry Lorraine Baker, John Norton, and — Shaw, proceeded with the boats of the two ships, and gallantly stormed, and without any further loss carried, the fort.

In the harbour were found an American ship and an English schooner, prizes to the privateers belonging to the port; also two French schooners, fitting for sea as cruisers. Considering the heavy fire maintained by the fort, and its commanding situation, the British loss was not so great as might have been expected. It amounted to one master's mate (Thomas H. M'Kenzie) and two seamen of the *Bacchante* wounded, and two seamen killed, and 13 seamen and one marine wounded on board the *Mediator*; total, two killed and 16 wounded.

On the 1st of March, while the British 50-gun ship *Glatton*, Captain Thomas Seccombe, and 14-gun brig *Hirondelle*, Lieutenant George A. E. Skinner, were at anchor off the island of Tenedos in the Archipelago, information was received that one of the annual Turkish ships, from Alexandria to Constantinople, was at anchor in the port of Sigri. Captain Seccombe immediately despatched the boats of the *Glatton*, under the orders of Lieutenant Edward Watson, assisted by lieutenant of marines

Charles A. Trusson and George Augustus Edward Sandwith, and covered by the *Hirondelle*, to cut out the vessel. In this service the boats fully succeeded, but with the loss of Lieutenant Watson and four men killed, and nine wounded. The ship had formerly been a French corvette of 18 guns, 10 of which she at this time mounted.

On the 15th of March the British 22-gun ship *Comus*, Captain Conway Shipley, cruising off the island of Grand Canaria, sent her boats, under the orders of Lieutenants George Edward Watts and Hood Knight, assisted by Lieutenant of marines George Campbell, to cut out some vessels in the harbour of Puerta de Haz. In this the party completely succeeded, without incurring any greater loss than one person (Lieutenant Campbell) wounded, although the vessels, which consisted of six merchant brigs, were moored near to, and defended by the cross fire of, three batteries.

On the 8th of May Captain Shipley again sent his boats, three in number, into Grand Canaria, commanded as before by Lieutenants Watts and Hood, to whom master's mate Jeaffreson Miles was this time added. The object of attack was a large armed felucca, lying under the protection of a strong fort and two batteries. Notwithstanding the fire from these, as well as of musketry from between 30 and 40 soldiers sent to assist in her defence, Lieutenant Watts, in his single boat, most gallantly boarded the felucca, and nearly cleared her decks before the two remaining boats from bad pulling were enabled to get up. On their arrival the vessel was quickly carried.

The cables of the vessel, which proved to be a Spanish packet from Cadiz to Buenos-Ayres, were now cut; and, as the enemy had used the precaution to carry her sails and rudder on shore, the boats began taking her in tow. Just at that moment a hawser, fast under water astern, was manned in the fort, and, before it could be cut, the vessel was dragged nearly under the muzzles of the guns. An exceedingly heavy fire then commenced, and was continued from all the batteries until the vessel got out of sight. This very gallant enterprise was performed with the comparatively trifling loss of one man killed and five wounded, including Lieutenant Watts himself severely in several places, but not dangerously. Of the Spanish troops, 21 were made prisoners, including 18 wounded: the remainder, except a few who swam on shore, were killed. For his gallantry on this occasion, Lieutenant Watts was soon afterwards promoted to the rank of commander.

Between England and the United States of America, a spirit of animosity, caused chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted to be such, from on board of American merchant vessels, had long unhappily subsisted. It is, we believe an acknowledged maxim of public law, as well that no nation, but the one he belongs to, can release a subject from his

natural allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction of another independent state be not infringed, every nation has a right to enforce the services of her subjects, wherever they may be found. Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over her merchant vessels upon the high seas, as to exclude a belligerent nation from the right of searching them for contraband of war, or for the property or persons of her enemies. And, if in the exercise of that right the belligerent should discover on board of the neutral vessel a subject who has withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the neutral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver him up; more especially, if that subject is proved to be a deserter from the sea or land service of the former.

When, by the maritime ascendancy of England, France could no longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as a neutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all the perjury and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her belligerent rights. The high commercial importance of the United States, thus acquired, coupled with a similarity in language, and to a superficial observer, a resemblance in person, between the natives of America and of Great Britain, has occasioned the former to be the principal, if not the only, sufferers by the exercise of the right of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity to emigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurements to foreigners; particularly to British seamen, whom, by a process peculiar to themselves, they can naturalize, as quickly as a dollar can exchange masters, and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to, be filled up. It is the knowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers, when searching for deserters from their service, so harsh in their scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations.

The crew of a vessel, armed or unarmed, sailing under the flag of the United States, usually consists of one or more of the following classes: 1. Native American citizens; 2. American citizens, wherever born, who were such at the definitive treaty of peace in 1783; 3. Foreigners in general, who may or may not have become citizens of America subsequently to the treaty in question; 4. Deserters from the British army or navy, whether natives of Britain or of any other country.

To the first class Great Britain cannot have the shadow of a right; and, from such of the second as were British born, she barred herself by the treaty acknowledging the independence of the revolted colonies. Of the third class, the only portion which England can have any pretension to seize, are the subjects of the power or powers with whom she may be at war, and her own native subjects. With respect to the former, the very act of entering on board a neutral implies that the foreigner has

thrown off his belligerent character: he is a non-combatant of the most unequivocal description, and, as such, entitled to exemption from seizure. A passenger, especially if a military man, may be an exception.

With respect to her own subjects serving on board neutral vessels, Great Britain claims a right to take them, because she considers that they owe to her an allegiance previous and paramount to that exacted of them by the neutral. There can hardly be a doubt, as it appears to us, that a belligerent may take her native seafaring subjects from a neutral merchant vessel. We shall not, however, stop to discuss a subject that branches into so many ramifications, but proceed to the fourth class, deserters from the British army or navy. If such deserter owes a natural allegiance to the nation on board of whose vessel he is serving, he is in his proper place, and no other nation has a right to molest him. If he owes no natural allegiance to either, the right of present possession may be allowed to step in, and decide the claim on behalf of the neutral. If, on the contrary, the nation that claims him as a deserter, can claim him also as a native subject, surely that nation, a belligerent too, has a right to withdraw him from the service of the neutral. Having submitted these few remarks, we shall proceed to relate one or two occurrences, to which they will be found closely to apply.

In consequence of the two French 74-gun ships *Patriote* and *Eole* lying at anchor in one of the rivers of the Chesapeake,* it became necessary that a small British force should be stationed off the coast, to watch their motions. At the commencement of the present year that force consisted of the two 74-gun ships *Bellona* and *Triumph*, Captains John Erskine Douglas and Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, Bart.; with a few smaller vessels. At this time the British store-ship (a reduced 44) *Chichester*, Captain Edward Stopford, lay alongside the navy-wharf at Gosport, Virginia; where she had been hove down to be repaired, in consequence of having got on shore in the vicinity of Hampton roads.

Early in the month of February Captain Saunders, the commandant of Fort Nelson, with one sergeant, one corporal, and four privates, all under arms, proceeded to the lodgings of Captain Stopford near the wharf, and demanded to have three men, represented to have deserted from the fort, and to be then on board the *Chichester*, restored to him. Captain Stopford went with the party to the *Chichester*; and, after a long search, the deserters were found, and delivered to the American commandant, who immediately marched them to the fort. "Captain Stopford," says a sergeant of marines belonging to the *Bellona*, examined at the court-martial which will hereafter be noticed,

* See p. 211

“directed Mr. Brookes, one of the midshipmen of the ship, to be confined, for telling Captain Saunders, that he thought it was not right to give up their deserters, when they would not give up ours.”

As the three men, thus taken out of a British ship of war, were all natives of Great Britain, one born at Londonderry, another at Manchester, and the third in some part of the United Kingdom, we must suppose that they were delivered up because the *Chichester*, circumstanced as she was, had no means of opposing force to force. It was therefore the prevalence of power over right; and that, be it recollected on the part of the most vehement of all sticklers for right, the United States of America. Nay, at the very time of this occurrence, five marines and soldiers, all British-born subjects, had deserted from the *Chichester*; and three or four of them, with the British uniform on their backs, had since enlisted in the American land service, and been repeatedly seen by their late comrades, wearing the American military uniform. It was to these five deserters from the *Chichester*, that the young midshipman so spiritedly alluded. To the repeated demands made by Captain Douglas for the restoration of these men, the only answer obtained was, that, if any deserters had entered the American service, they had been sent with a detachment into the country; which was likely enough.

But the *Chichester* was not the only British ship in the *Chesapeake*, whose men deserted to the United States and were refused to be delivered up. The *Bellona*, *Belleisle*, and *Triumph* 74s, *Melampus* frigate, and the 16-gun ship-sloop *Halifax*, Captain Lord James Townshend, had each a similar complaint to make. The case of the last-named ship deserves particular mention. On the 7th of March, at 6 P. M., as the *Halifax* was lying in Hampton roads, the jollyboat, with midshipman Robert Turner and five men, was sent to weigh a kedge-anchor, which had been dropped for swinging the ship. Profiting by the thickness of the weather, the men took the boat from the midshipman, and pulled with her towards the shore. Mr. Turner hailed the ship repeatedly until silenced by William Hill, a native of Philadelphia, who threatened to murder him if he did not desist. The boat soon afterwards reached Sewel's Point, and the five men jumped out of her, leaving the midshipman to get back to the *Halifax* in the best manner he could. One of the men has already been named. The remainder were, Richard Hubert, born in Liverpool; Henry Saunders, born in Greenock; George North, born in Kinsale; and Jenkin Ratford, born in London.

At this time the United States' 36-gun frigate *Chesapeake* Captain Charles Gordon, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore James Barron, was at an anchor in Hampton roads, fitting to proceed to the Mediterranean; and a rendezvous for seamen, under the command of Lieutenant Arthur Sinclair, was open

for her at the town of Norfolk. To this rendezvous, on the 9th, the five British deserters made their way, and all enlisted themselves to serve on board of the Chesapeake. On the day previous the British consul at Norfolk, Colonel John Hamilton, had been officially informed of the desertion of these men. So that Lieutenant Sinclair must have been acquainted with the circumstance; and, as a proof that he suspected a demand would be made for their restoration, this conscientious officer asked each of the men if he had not "a second name." Either he, or some one else, soon furnished, we have no doubt, the whole of the men with second names. At all events it was afterwards clearly proved, that Jenkin Ratford had been entered in the Chesapeake's books by the name of Wilson.

Lieutenant James Masters of the Halifax, who had been sent to give information to the British consul, saw the five deserters parading the streets of Norfolk with the recruiting party of the Chesapeake. On the 10th Captain Lord James Townshend went himself to the Chesapeake's rendezvous at Norfolk, and, presenting a list of names, asked Lieutenant Sinclair, if those five men, or any of them, had entered for his frigate. The lieutenant replied, as well he might, that none had entered "by those names," and referred the British captain to the magistrates. The magistrates were applied to, and so was the mayor, and so was Captain Decatur, but all in vain. Lord James afterwards met Ratford and Saunders in the street. The latter would have returned, but Ratford dissuaded him, and abused his late captain in the grossest manner. Lord James went again to Lieutenant Sinclair, and stated that, if the latter would allow him to go into the rendezvous, he, Lord James, would point out the deserters; but the American lieutenant refused to permit him.

A representation of all these circumstances was forthwith made to Vice-admiral the Honourable George Cranfield Berkeley, the British commander-in-chief on the North-American station, then residing at Halifax, Nova-Scotia; and in the early part of June the 50-gun-ship Leopard, Captain Salusbury Pryce Humphreys, the vice-admiral's flag-ship, sailed from Halifax for the Chesapeake, with an order, dated on the 1st of the month, and addressed to the different captains and commanders under the vice-admiral's command, directing, that, in case of meeting the American frigate Chesapeake at sea, and without the limits of the United States, they were to show to her captain that order, and to require to search his ship for deserters from the "Belleisle, Bellona, Triumph, Chichester, Halifax, and Zenobia cutter," and were to proceed and search for the same; and that, if a similar demand should be made by the American, he was to be permitted to search for any deserters from the United States' service, "according to the customs and usage of civilized nations on terms of peace and amity with each other."

On the 21st, at 8 A. M., the Leopard arrived off Cape Henry, and, running up Lynnhaven bay, anchored about noon in company with the Bellona and Melampus. On the 22d, at 4 A. M., the Leopard weighed and made sail, and at 6 A. M. reanchored about three miles to the northward of Cape Henry lighthouse, in company with the Triumph. At 7 h. 15 m. A. M. the United States' frigate Chesapeake weighed and put to sea from Hampton roads, with a moderate breeze at west-south-west, and at 9 A. M. passed the Bellona and Melampus in Lynnhaven bay: whereupon the Bellona made a signal to the Leopard, to weigh and reconnoitre in the south-east by east. At 9 h. 15 m. A. M. the latter did weigh and make sail in the direction prescribed, and at the same time observed the Chesapeake about three miles astern. At 1 P. M., the wind shifted to south-east, and obliged both ships to beat out. At 3 P. M., having arrived off Cape Henry, at the distance of between four and five leagues from the land, the Leopard bore down to speak the Chesapeake, then about two miles distant.

The wind being light, it was not until 3 h. 27 m. P. M. that the Leopard arrived within hail of the Chesapeake, Cape Henry, by the latter's account, then bearing north-west by north distant three leagues.* Captain Humphreys, hailing, said he had despatches from the British commander-in-chief. The answer to this was: "Send them on board; I shall heave to." This the Chesapeake accordingly did. At 3 h. 32 m. P. M. the Leopard also hove to; and in a few minutes Lieutenant John Meade went on board the Chesapeake, bearing, in addition to Vice-admiral Berkeley's order already recited, a letter from Captain Humphreys to Commodore Barron, adverting to the order enclosed, and expressing a hope that every circumstance might be amicably adjusted. At 4 h. 15 m. P. M., the boat not making her appearance, the Leopard recalled her by signal, and in six minutes Lieutenant Meade returned with Commodore Barron's reply, the commencing words of which are: "I know of no such men as you describe. The officers, that were on the recruiting service for this ship, were particularly instructed from the government, through me, not to enter any deserters from his Britannic majesty's ships; nor do I know, of any being here." The commodore then states, that his instructions are, not to permit the crew of his ship to be mustered by any but her own officers, that he wishes to preserve harmony, and that he hopes his answer will prove satisfactory.

The Leopard now edged down nearer to the Chesapeake; and Captain Humphreys, again hailing, said: "Commodore Barron, you must be aware of the necessity I am under of complying with the orders of my commander-in-chief." After the hail had been twice repeated, the only reply returned was: "I do not

* Commodore Barron's Letter.

understand what you say." Yet these words were distinctly heard by the hailing ship, and she was to windward. Resolved no longer to be trifled with, and observing on board the American frigate indications of intended resistance, the *Leopard* discharged a shot across the *Chesapeake's* fore-foot. In a minute's time a second shot was fired; and in two minutes more, or at 4 h. 30 m. P. M., nothing but evasive answers being returned to the hails of Captain Humphreys, the *Leopard* poured in her broadside. Commodore Barron then hailed. Upon this orders were given to cease firing; but, as the purport of the hail was only to intimate that he would send a boat on board the *Leopard*, and as the *Chesapeake* was now clearly seen making preparations to return the fire, the thing was considered to be an artifice to gain time, and the *Leopard* renewed her fire. The *Chesapeake* returned a few straggling shot, not one of which struck her opponent; and, at 4 h. 45 m. P. M., just as the *Leopard* had fired her third broadside, the American frigate hauled down her colours. As a proof that we have not underrated the *Chesapeake's* resistance, Commodore Barron, in his official letter, says: "Our resistance was but feeble." The log of the *Chesapeake* also says: "Having one gun ready, fired and hauled down her colours." And, in further confirmation, the *Leopard's* log states, that her fire was returned by only a few guns. Almost immediately after the surrender of the American frigate, her fifth lieutenant, Mr. Sidney Smith, came on board the *Leopard*, with a verbal message from Commodore Barron, signifying, that he considered the *Chesapeake* to be the *Leopard's* prize.

At 5 P. M., lieutenants Gordon Thomas Falcon, George Martin Guise, and John Meade, with several petty-officers and men, went on board the *Chesapeake*, to fulfil the object of Vice-admiral Berkeley's orders. The books of the *Chesapeake* were produced, and the crew mustered. One only of the five men that had deserted from the *Halifax* was found, Jenkin Ratford. He was dragged out of the coal-hole, and, on being brought to the quarterdeck, declared that he was an American, his name Wilson, and that he had never belonged to the *Halifax*. Unfortunately for him, the *Leopard's* purser, Mr. Abraham Preston, who had discharged Ratford into the *Halifax*, was present, and fully identified him. Three deserters from the *Melampus* frigate were also seized: William Ware, and Daniel Martin (a black man), the one born in Maryland, the other in Massachusetts, United States, and both pressed by the *Melampus* from an American brig in the bay of Biscay; also John Strachan, stated to have been born in Maryland, but of which there was some doubt. He had been pressed by the *Melampus* out of an English Guineaman, off Cape Finisterre, but had entered almost immediately afterwards.

Although about 12 other British subjects were mustered on board the *Chesapeake*, all known to be deserters from British

ships of war, the above four men were all that were taken out of her. With these, at 7 h. 30 m. P. M., the Leopard's boat returned to the ship; bringing also Lieutenant William Henry Allen, of the Chesapeake, with a letter from Commodore Barron, again offering to deliver up the frigate as a prize. To this Captain Humphreys replied, that, having fulfilled his instructions, he had nothing more to desire, but must proceed to rejoin his squadron. He then tendered assistance, and deplored the extremity to which he had been compelled to resort. At 8 P. M. the Leopard made sail towards Lynnhaven bay; and shortly afterwards the Chesapeake did the same towards Hampton roads.

Unfortunately this encounter, although bloodless to the Leopard, was not so to the Chesapeake; the latter having had three seamen killed, the commodore, one midshipman (James Broom), and eight seamen and marines slightly, and eight severely, wounded. It was afterwards reported, that two of the four remaining deserters from the Halifax were among the three men killed; but, as all the deserters, except perhaps Hill, he being a native American, appear to have been accommodated by their new masters with "second names," there is no getting at the fact from the returns, in which the names of the killed are, John Lawrence, James Arnold, and John Sheckley.

According to the items in the numerous "surveys" held upon the occasion, the three broadsides of the Leopard lodged 22 round shot in the Chesapeake's hull, irreparably injured her fore and main masts, badly wounded her mizenmast, cut away 13 lower shrouds and stays, shattered the foresail, mainsail, main topsail, and foretopmast staysail, injured and rendered unfit for service a spare fore topmast, and another spare spar, and damaged two boats. In addition, as appears by her log-minutes, the Chesapeake had three feet and a half water in the hold. Three more such broadsides would have sunk her. And yet, a writer in the "Naval Monument," an American publication, jeers the British for having done so little injury to the Chesapeake.

Although more than 60 years have elapsed since the British 50-gun ship has been excluded from the line of battle, Commodore Barron found it convenient to make "a line-of-battle ship" of the Leopard. Her real force will show how little she was entitled to that appellation. The Leopard's armament, upon the first and second decks, was precisely the same as mounted by other ships of her class; namely, 22 long 24, and the same number of long 12 pounders. Upon her quarterdeck and fore-castle, she mounted six carronades, 24-pounders, and two long 9-pounders, total 52 guns, besides an 18-pounder launch carronade. The Leopard had her full complement on board, consisting of 318 men and 25 boys: she had also on board, as passengers, 10 artillery-men, and three midshipmen belonging to some of the ships on the coast.

The Chesapeake measured 1135 tons, and at this time mounted 28 long 18-pounders upon the main deck, 14 carronades, 32-pounders, leaving a vacant port on each side, upon the quarterdeck, and two carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 12-pounders, leaving three vacant ports on each side, upon the forecastle; total 46 guns. This was the ship's peace establishment. The books of the Chesapeake bore the names of 440; but, among these, were 25 runnings and discharges. Consequently her actual complement consisted of 415; and, included in that number, were 10 boys or lads. There were also several passengers on board, going to the Mediterranean. That the Chesapeake had at least five lieutenants, appears by the signature of her "5th lieutenant" to several of the official documents relating to the action.

From this statement of the force of the two ships, it is clear that, had it not been for the unprepared state of the Chesapeake, the superiority of force on the part of the Leopard would only have been nominal. The American frigate threw a greater weight of shot in broadside, carried full 50 more men, and was nearly 100 tons larger, than the British "line-of-battle ship."

Notwithstanding that, in his note to Captain Humphreys, Commodore Barron disclaimed all knowledge of any deserters being on board the Chesapeake, Jenkin Ratford himself declared, at his trial, that both the commodore and Captain Gordon mustered the crew soon after the deserters from the Halifax had arrived on board. And even, in his official letter, the commodore admits, that three of the four men had been claimed as deserters; thus: "They (the Leopard's officers) called on the purser, who delivered his book, when the men were examined, and the three men demanded at Washington, and one man more, were taken away."

It was these "three men demanded at Washington" that, on two accounts, weakened the claim of the British. In the first place, the Melampus is not one of the ships named in the published copy of Vice-admiral Berkeley's order. Consequently the Leopard's captain, in taking away men who had deserted from the Melampus, exceeded what appear to have been his written instructions. And yet it is not improbable, that Captain Humphreys had received orders (perhaps verbal ones) to demand and take the Melampus's deserters, because Vice-admiral Berkeley officially declares to the former, that, throughout the whole of the transaction with the Chesapeake, he conducted himself most properly. In the next place, those very three men were all, as has already appeared, natives of the United States. Consequently, whether they had or had not deserted from the British, they were, if the position we have advanced is a tenable one, justly detained by the Americans.

This is the ground taken by the American president; and accordingly, in his proclamation of date July 2, interdicting all

British ships of war from entering the ports of the United States, Mr. Jefferson says: "This enormity was not only without provocation or justifiable cause, but was committed with the avowed purpose of taking by force, from a ship of war of the United States, a part of her crew; and, that no circumstance might be wanting to mark its character, it had been previously ascertained that the seamen demanded were natives of the United States." The assertion here made about the want of provocation, or of justifiable cause, is in the usual strain of American invective, where the British are the accused. Not so if the French offend; for, as a Boston newspaper informs us, when in the summer of the same year 1807, the United States' sloop of war *Hornet* lay in the port of Lorient, a French officer and a party of men went on board, and seized and carried off five Frenchmen, naturalized citizens of the United States, and who had been several years in the American naval service; but not a murmur was heard on the subject.

The statement respecting the birthplace of "the seamen demanded" is, and was probably meant to be, equivocal. If it refers to the "three men demanded at Washington," the assertion may be true; but, if to the whole of the deserters demanded of Commodore Barron, it is not so. The officers of the *Leopard*, we must own, would have given a fairer colour to the transaction; they would, indeed, have deprived the American president of the power of dwelling, with any effect, upon its "enormity," had they left the *Melampus's* three men where they found them, and taken an equal number, or the whole if they pleased, of the 12 British subjects, also composing a part of the crew of the *Chesapeake*, and, to strengthen the former's claim upon them, also deserters from British ships of war.

All four of the recovered seamen, namely, the one belonging to the *Halifax* and the three to the *Melampus*, were tried at *Halifax*, *Nova-Scotia*, on the 26th of August, 1807. *Jenkin Ratford* was found guilty of mutiny, desertion, and contempt, and hanged at the fore yard-arm of the *Halifax*, the ship from which he had deserted. The three remaining prisoners were also found guilty of desertion, and sentenced to receive each 500 lashes; but the men were afterwards pardoned.

The account of the attack upon the *Chesapeake* reached London on the 26th of July; and on the 2d of August, before any demand for redress had been made by the American minister in London, the British government caused to be conveyed to the latter, a disavowal of the right to search ships in the national service of any state for deserters, and a promise of suitable reparation for the unauthorized act of the British officer. On the 6th Mr. Munroe transmitted to his government the note of Mr. Secretary Canning; and on the same or the following day arrived American newspapers, with Mr. Jefferson's interdictory proclamation. Encouraged by the proclamation, the citizens of

the United States, especially along the shores of Chesapeake bay, treated every thing that was British with the greatest indignity: they destroyed 200 water casks belonging to the *Melampus*, and committed numerous outrages of a similar description. This showed that the offer of redress had been prematurely made; particularly when coupled with Mr. Munroe's instructions, received soon afterwards, and submitted to the British government.

Notwithstanding the violent conduct of the United States, as made known by their newspapers, and by the introduction, in the American minister's note, of subjects foreign to the immediate cause of complaint, the British government, by a public instrument, dated on the 16th of October, and entitled, "A proclamation for recalling and prohibiting seamen from serving foreign princes and states," declared, that the claim to the seizure of deserters from the national ships of other powers could not again be brought forward by British naval officers. In addition to all this, Vice-admiral Berkeley, the officer who had issued the order to search the Chesapeake, was recalled from his command; and at a subsequent day, two (one having died) of the three deserters from the *Melampus*, being, as before stated, natives of the United States of America, were sent back to their country.

On the 19th of April, the British gun-brig *Richmond*, Lieutenant Samuel Scudamore Heming, working up towards Cape Mandigo, on the coast of Portugal, discovered a lugger with Spanish colours flying, at anchor in a little bay about six leagues to the northward of Peruche. Lieutenant Heming immediately began preparations for destroying her, and, in the evening as soon as it was dark, detached the gig and jollyboat, with Sub-lieutenant George Bush and boatswain's mate Ebenezer Lyons. The two boats pulled boldly into the bay, and in the face of a heavy fire, which wounded three of the men, boarded and carried the lugger privateer *Galliard*, of four 4-pounders and 36 men; all of whom, except 12, jumped overboard and escaped to the shore.

Deeming it unfair to make use of the labours or good fortune of a contemporary without an acknowledgment, and being desirous to set an example to those who have already given proofs, that they require some stronger stimulus than a mere consciousness of doing wrong to deter them from the meanness of plagiarism, we shall again transcribe from the pages of Captain Edward Brenton's work an account of the proceedings of his brother's ship.

"The Spartan frigate of 38 guns, commanded by Captain (now Sir J.) Brenton, met with a severe loss on the 14th of May, off Nice; she had been all day chasing a polacre ship, and at sunset both were becalmed at the distance of about five miles from each other: the vessel appeared to be an unarmed merchant ship. The boats of the Spartan with the two senior lieutenants,

Weir and Williams, and 70 of the best men, pulled alongside in two divisions, and attempted to board her on the bow and quarter with the usual determination and valour of British seamen; but the vessel was defended by a numerous and equally gallant crew, with boarding nettings and every other means of resistance. The first discharge from their great-guns and musketry laid 63 of our brave fellows low, the first and second lieutenants and 26 men being killed or mortally wounded; seven men only remained unhurt. The few remaining hands conducted the boats back to the ship. The narrow escape of one of the men was very remarkable. James Bodie, the cockswain of the berge, was missing. The deceased men were all laid out on the main deck: the wife of Bodie, a beautiful young woman, flew with a lantern from one to the other in search of her husband, but in vain: all the survivors declared that he had undoubtedly perished; they saw him wounded, and fall between the ship and the boat. The poor woman became delirious, got into the barge on the booms, and taking the place lately occupied by Bodie, could with difficulty be moved from it. A few days, with the soothing kindness of the officers and crew, produced a calm, but settled grief. At Malta a subscription of 80 guineas was made for her, and she was sent to her parents in Ireland. Some weeks elapsed when the Spartan spoke a neutral vessel from Nice, and learnt that a polacre had arrived there, after a severe action with the boats of a frigate; that she had beaten them off, and that when they had left her, a wounded Englishman was discovered holding by the rudder chain; he was instantly taken on board, and after being cured of his wounds, sent off to Verdun. Captain Brenton concluding that this could be no other than his cockswain, wrote to his friends at that dépôt, and the fact turned out to be as he had supposed. Mrs. Bodie was made acquainted with the miraculous escape of her husband, who remained a prisoner four years. He was at length restored to his family, and now enjoys a birth on board the Royal-Charlotte yacht, with his old captain; his wife is with him, and both are highly and deservedly respected.

"Before she had recovered from this misfortune, the Spartan had a narrow escape from capture: proceeding from Palermo towards Toulon, she fell in with a French 74-gun ship, two frigates, and a brig. Captain Brenton determined to watch their motions during the night, and the enemy gave chase to him: at daylight they had got within three miles, but a light breeze springing up, the Spartan ran along the east side of Cabrera, pursued by the ship of the line; the frigates and the corvette went round the west side in hopes of cutting her off, the Spartan dying nearly becalmed, while they were coming up at the rate of seven miles an hour: the headmost frigate being within range, tried single shot, which striking the object, she gave her whole broadside. Captain Brenton would not allow a shot to be re-

turned. In a few minutes the French frigate was involved in a dense cloud of her own smoke, and lay becalmed, while the Spartan, having received very little damage from their shot, kept the breeze, and left her unskilful pursuers to themselves. We notice this fact as a warning to young officers when similarly situated, to confine their whole attention to trimming their sails; for not only does the firing destroy a breeze of wind, but even in fresh gales the motion of the guns, and the men, are unfavourable to the velocity of the ship.”*

This account, in our opinion, contains a far from unimportant omission, the names of the French ships. That omission we have been enabled to supply. The 74 was the *Annibal*, late British *Hannibal*, captured at Algeziras,† one frigate the *Pomone*, the other the *Incorruptible*, and the corvette the *Victorieuse*. The captain of one of the frigates is represented to have been afterwards broken by a court-martial at Toulon for his conduct on this occasion; although, we confess, we cannot see upon what ground. The above extract certainly shows none; and we have not been able to find, in any French publication, a word on the subject.

On the 5th of June, at 7 h. 30 m. A. M., the British 38-gun frigate *Pomone*, Captain Robert Barrie, cruising off the *Pertuis Breton*, discovered and chased in the north-east three armed brigs. On approaching near, a convoy was discovered under their escort. At about 9 A. M. the *Pomone* got within random-shot of one of the brigs, when the wind entirely failed. Having also to tack from the *Barges d'Olonne*; which she did not do until within 400 yards of them, the *Pomone* lost all chance of cutting off either of the armed brigs. Some of the frigate's shot reaching the convoy, two, supposed to be naval transports, ran on shore, and a third vessel, a brig, was deserted by her crew. Captain Barrie immediately despatched Lieutenant John Jones, in the six-oared cutter, to take possession, as well of this brig as of any others that were not close to the shore. This service Lieutenant Jones performed with great judgment and gallantry, and fortunately without loss, although the grape from the shore and from the gun-brig passed through and through his boat.

One of the gun-brigs now making a show of sweeping out, Captain Barrie sent Lieutenant James Wallace Gabriel, with three boats, to meet her. As, however, the brig retreated under the protection of the batteries and of the numerous musketry which lined the beach, Lieutenant Gabriel was recalled, and directed to proceed towards *St.-Gilles*; where several vessels, part of the convoy belonging to the three gun-brigs, were observed to be nearly becalmed. With these vessels the lieutenant afterwards came up, and captured 14 of them, without

* Brenton, vol. iv., p. 159.

† See vol. iii., p. 117.

the least resistance, the crews of the vessels, which consisted of brigs, sloops, and chasse-marées, taking to their boats as the British approached.

On the 6th of June the British 14-gun brig *Port-d'Espagne*, Lieutenant James Pattison Stewart, cruising in the gulf of *Paria*, detached Lieutenant Hall and 25 men, in a prize schooner disguised as a neutral, to attack a Spanish privateer, which, otherwise, there was no chance of overtaking. After exchanging musketry and receiving the fire from her guns, Lieutenant Hall, in a very cool and brave manner, laid the privateer on board, and quickly carried her, although the *Mercedes*, as was her name, mounted two carriage-guns and two swivels, and had a crew of 30 men. Out of these, three men were killed, one drowned, and three wounded. On the British side two men only were wounded.

On the 30th of April the British 38-gun frigate *Uranie*, Captain Christopher Laroche, arrived off the port of Cherbourg, to watch the motions of a French 40-gun frigate and brig-corvette, which had recently come from the arsenal into the road, preparatory to an escape to sea. The frigate was, we believe, the *Département-de-la-Manche*, or, as for brevity she was called, the *Manche*, launched on the 27th of the preceding December, a fine frigate, afterwards captured by the British, and found to measure nearly 1100 tons. The brig was either the *Cigne* or the *Papillon*, of 16 guns. It is but fair to state, that although rating as a 38-gun frigate, the *Uranie*, on account of a recent reduction in her armament, was inferior to any ship of her class. Being an old French ship (the same that captured the *Thames* in 1793*), the *Uranie* had been found too weak to carry long 18-pounders, and a battery of long 12-pounders had been substituted. Her quarterdeck and forecastle armament was, we believe, the same as that of her class, 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines; making her total number of guns 46. Her complement, also, appears to have been the same, 281 men and boys; but the *Uranie* was at this time between 30 and 40 men short.

On the 5th of May, at 2 h. 30 m. P. M., when the *Uranie* lay at an anchor between Cape La Hague and Cherbourg, the French brig came out of the road and stood to the northward, as if to reconnoitre the frigate; but, just as the latter was preparing to slip and go in chase, the brig put back. On the 15th, at 4 h. 30 m. P. M., when the *Uranie*, in company with the 12-gun brig *Rebuff*, Lieutenant John Whiston, was standing towards Cherbourg with the wind at west-north-west, the weather, which had been thick and hazy, suddenly cleared up and discovered the French frigate and brig, with five launches, standing out. The *Uranie* cleared for action. At 4 h. 45 m. the French vessels

* See vol. i., p. 107.

stood in shore, and in another quarter of an hour stood out again. The *Uranie* thereupon wore, and hove to on the larboard tack, Cape La Hague west six or eight miles. A thick fog then came on, and concealed the *Manche* and her consort from view. They, in the mean time, had put back to the road.

On the 16th, in the forenoon, the *Uranie* and *Rebuff* again stood in towards Cherbourg; and, on arriving close off the road, the *Uranie* hoisted her colours and fired a gun. On the 6th of June the brig came out through the east passage, and, at 3 P.M., after receiving from the *Uranie* a distant broadside, stood back through the western passage, or that at the opposite extremity of the dike. On the 7th, at 1 h. 35 m. P.M., Cape La Hague south-south-west six or seven leagues, the *Uranie*, then, it appears, alone, discovered the *Manche* and her consort to the eastward. The *Uranie*, having the wind from the westward, bore up under all sail in chase of the French frigate and brig, then standing in; but which, at 3 h. 30 m. P.M. put about and stood for the *Uranie*, as if intending to engage. The *Uranie* shortened sail. At 4 P.M. the two French vessels bore up and made all sail for Cherbourg, followed leisurely by the *Uranie* until 5 P.M., when, having arrived nearly off the mouth of the harbour, the latter hove to.

On the 16th the 12-gun brig *Defender*, Lieutenant George Plowman, joined company. On the 18th, at 10 h. 30 m. just as the *Defender* had been detached to the northward, the *Manche* and her attendant were seen coming out of Cherbourg. The *Defender* was immediately recalled; and the two British vessels, about noon, with the wind at north-west by west, bore up in chase under topsails, topgallantsails, and foresail. At 15 minutes past noon the French frigate and brig tacked towards the British frigate and brig; whereupon the *Uranie* hauled up her foresail. At 1 h. 45 m. P.M. the French vessels tacked in shore, or from the latter. The *Uranie* then set her foresail. At this time the *Manche* had hauled up her courses, with the apparent intention of waiting for the British frigate to close; but the former soon afterwards, still keeping her courses up, edged away towards Cherbourg. The *Uranie* and *Defender* then fired their bow guns, but without effect. It was now perceived that the *Manche*, under topsails and topgallantsails, considerably outsailed the *Uranie* with her foresail set. Upon this, at 3 h. 20 m. P.M., the two British vessels hauled off, and hove to on the larboard tack, with their heads to the northward.

On the 22d, at noon, Cherbourg south by east three or four leagues, and the wind moderate from the west-north-west, the *Uranie* and *Defender*, then under topsails and topgallantsails, on the starboard or in-shore tack, discovered the *Manche* and brig-corvette coming out of the road, through, we believe, the eastern passage, and standing towards them on the larboard tack. At 40 minutes past noon the *Uranie* tacked to the north-

ward, apparently to speak the Defender. At 0 h. 45 m. P. M. the two French vessels tacked in shore, and in five minutes afterwards Captain Laroche spoke Lieutenant Plowman, and directed him to keep upon the Uranie's weather quarter. The Uranie then tacked in shore, and at 1 h. 15 m. P. M. the French frigate and brig tacked towards the former. The Uranie then set her foresail. At 1 h. 45 m. P. M. the Manche and her consort tacked in shore, and at 2 P. M. bore up. The Uranie and Defender then bore up in chase. At 2 h. 15 m. P. M. the British frigate set her mainsail, and at 2 h. 40 m. her royals, and was gaining fast on the French vessels, they having little wind in shore. At 3 h. 20 m. the Uranie, followed by the Defender, hauled off on the larboard tack, and, having fired her starboard broadside at the enemy without any visible effect, shortened sail and hove to.

It appears that, early in the month of July, the ship's company addressed a letter to the board of admiralty, complaining that their captain had not done his utmost to bring the enemy's frigate to action. As soon as a knowledge of this fact reached the officers, they, as was natural, became alarmed for the character of the ship and themselves, and applied for a court-martial upon Captain Laroche. The court sat at Portsmouth, from the 20th to the 24th of July inclusive. The charges were confined to what took place on the 15th of May and 22d of June.

As well as we can gather from the brief and imperfect abstract of the proceedings of the trial given in the public prints,* the conduct of the Uranie on the last-named day was the principal cause of complaint. It is stated that the Uranie wore or stood from the enemy for some time, and was an hour before she was ready for action, and that there was great confusion on board; that, had Captain Laroche done his utmost, he might have cut off the corvette, and must have brought the frigate to action if she did not abandon the corvette; and that he passed the enemy's frigate within gun-shot, giving a broadside, and wore, and must have been in close action in a few minutes, if he had chased the frigate and carried all sail.

In his defence Captain Laroche stated, that he had anchored off the road, and had fired at the frigate in defiance; that he had carried all the sail he could, with safety to the ship then on a lee shore, and close in with it; that it behoved him to be cautious, as the Minerve had been captured by running ashore upon the same spot;† and that the Uranie was foul in her bottom and could not sail, and that, while she carried "only thirty-six 12-pounders, the enemy's frigate carried fifty 18-pounders." Here there must certainly be a mistake. The force of the Uranie, as far as we can get at it, has already been

* See Naval Chronicle, vol. xviii., p. 158.]

† See vol. iii., p. 160.

stated ; and we know that the force of the *Manche*, when captured by the British a year or two afterwards, was officially reported at 44 guns. At all events the sentence pronounced upon the *Uranie's* Captain was : " The charge being in part proved, Captain Laroche is sentenced to be dismissed from the command of his majesty's ship *Uranie*."

On the 6th of August, late in the evening, the British 38-gun frigate *Hydra*, Captain George Mundy, cruising off the coast of Catalonia, chased into the harbour of Begur three armed vessels, a polacre ship and two polacre brigs. On the following morning, the 7th, the *Hydra* reconnoitred the port, and discovered that the vessels were strongly defended both by nature and art, lying in a narrow harbour, under the close protection of a battery and tower upon a cliff on one side, and of rocks and bushes, admirably calculated for musketry, on the other. But having great faith in the firmness and resources of his people, Captain Mundy resolved to attempt cutting out the vessels.

Accordingly, at 50 minutes past noon, the *Hydra* came to an anchor, with springs on her cables, at the entrance of the harbour, and began the attack. A smart fire was returned by the battery and shipping ; but which, after an hour's continuance, began to abate. Perceiving this, Captain Mundy despatched a division of his boats, with 50 seamen and marines, under the command of Lieutenant Edward O'Brien Drury, second of the ship, assisted by Lieutenants of marines John Hayes and Edward Pengelly, midshipman John Finlayson, and captain's clerk (a volunteer) Robert Hendrick Goddard, with orders to land on the flank of the enemy, and drive him from the battery. Notwithstanding the heavy fire kept up by the *Hydra*, the detachments became exposed to a cross discharge of langridge from the shipping and fort, and of musketry from the rocks. Unshaken, however, the British advanced ; and, having mounted the cliff, which was of most difficult access, attacked the fort with so much intrepidity, that the enemy, having spiked the guns, consisting of four long 24-pounders, rushed out on one side, as the *Hydra's* officers and men entered at the other.

This gallant achievement enabled the *Hydra* to direct her fire solely at the vessels, which still maintained a steady cannonade upon the party on shore. Leaving Lieutenant Hayes and nearly the whole of the marines in charge of the guns in the battery, with orders to occupy the heights which commanded the decks of the vessels, as well as the opposite side of the harbour, where the enemy was numerously posted, Lieutenant Drury, with the remainder of the marines and the whole of the seamen of his division, advanced towards the town. As soon as the town was cleared, the French crews abandoned their vessels, and, formed in groups among the rocks and bushes, fired on the seamen, as the latter, having seized the boats on the beach, were boarding

the polacres. Meanwhile another party of French sailors, having gained a height above Lieutenant Hayes and his men, annoyed the latter excessively, notwithstanding that some of the Hydra's guns kept playing upon the spot.

By 3 h. 30 m. p. m. Lieutenant Drury was in complete possession of the vessels; and the seamen, with characteristic intrepidity and coolness, deliberately carried out hawsers to the very rocks occupied by the enemy, and continued warping out their prizes in the teeth of a fresh breeze, and in defiance of a galling fire of musketry. On seeing this, Captain Mundy despatched his third lieutenant, James Little, with the remainder of the boats, to assist Lieutenant Drury and his little party; and at 4 p. m. the three prizes rounded the point of the harbour. The marines then re-embarked, under a heavy discharge of musketry from the enemy, who had collected his whole force to harass the British rear.

The captured polacres were the ship Prince-Eugene of 16 guns and 130 men, brig Belle-Caroline, of 12 guns and 40 men, both belonging to Marseille, and brig Carmen-de-Rosario, of four guns and 40 men. Among the fortunate circumstances attending this very spirited and well-conducted enterprise, was that it was achieved with so slight a loss, as one seaman killed and two wounded on board the Hydra, and Mr. Goddard and three seamen and marines wounded of the detachment on shore. The frigate's damages, also, were confined to a few shot in the hull, slightly-wounded fore and mizen topmasts and foretopsail yard, and some trifling injury to her rigging. The name of Lieutenant Drury, in the list of commanders at the latter part of the year 1807, shows that his gallantry met its due reward.

On the 18th of August the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Confiance*, Captain James Lucas Yeo, cruising within a few miles of Guardia on the coast of Portugal, received information that a lugger privateer was in that port. It being calm, Captain Yeo despatched, to cut the vessel out, the boats of the *Confiance*, under Lieutenant William Hovenden Walker, assisted by master's mate, Massey Hutchinson Herbert and midshipman George Forder. Although the privateer was moored under two forts, one of four 24-pounders and the other of six 18-pounders, with 160 troops stationed at them, and that both the latter and the forts opened a heavy fire upon the boats long before they reached the vessel, Lieutenant Walker and his party, in the most gallant manner, boarded and carried her, without the slightest loss. She proved to be the *Reitrada*, of one long 12 and two 4 pounders, with a crew of thirty men; one of whom was killed, and several wounded: the remainder leaped overboard and effected their escape.

On the 25th of August the British 38-gun frigate *Clyde*, Captain Edward William Campbell Rich Owen, cruising off the French coast between Ypont and Fécamp, despatched her boats,

under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas Strong, to intercept a coasting sloop passing along the shore from the westward. As soon as she found the boats in pursuit of her, the sloop ran on shore near Ypont ; where she was defended by a battery, also by two parties of men with musketry, one stationed on the beach, the other on the cliff, and by a field-piece and a mortar. Notwithstanding the opposition thus experienced, Lieutenant Strong and his party boarded and floated the sloop ; and, although the boats were struck in several places, and were forced by the strength of the tide to tow the sloop within point-blank shot of the batteries at Fécamp, not a man of the British was hurt.

On the 23d of August, at 8 h. 30 m. P. M., while the 18-gun brig-sloop Weasel, Captain John Clavell, was lying becalmed within five or six miles of the harbour of Corfu, waiting for one of her boats, which, about an hour before, she had detached to the town, an officer of the Russian navy came on board from Mr. Kirk, the late British consul at Corfu, with information that a French garrison was in possession of the island. This brig thus fortunately apprized of her danger, immediately made the signal of recal to her boat, and repeated it with several guns. At length the boat returned ; and at 10 P. M. the Weasel crowded sail for the north passage, intending to proceed direct to Malta with the intelligence which had reached her at so critical a moment.

On the 24th, at 3 h. 30 m. A. M., the brig observed three trabacculos, working in between Corfu and some adjacent rocks. Supposing the vessels to contain French troops, the Weasel fired a shot at them, and eventually compelled all three vessels to run on shore among the rocks, where they must have been considerably damaged. Observing three other trabacculos just outside the rocks, the Weasel made sail after, and at 5 A. M. captured them. The prizes were found to have on board between them 251 French soldiers, commanded by Colonel Devilliers, going as a reinforcement to the garrison of Corfu. Captain Clavell took on board the brig, for their better accommodation, the French colonel and his family, and several other officers ; and, for the safety of the Weasel and her little crew, he caused the arms and ammunition of his numerous prisoners to be also brought on board.

On the same afternoon, having hoisted French colours by way of a decoy, the Weasel captured another small vessel, having on board a courier with despatches and a party of 20 French soldiers. This vessel, being of no value, was destroyed ; as, for the same reason, was one of the trabacculos. With the remaining two in tow, the Weasel made sail for Malta, and on the 29th anchored in Valetta harbour.

No small share of credit was due to Captain Clavell for his address as well in capturing the prizes, as in overawing and keeping in subjection, for the space of six days, upwards of 250

male prisoners, with a crew, admitting all the Weasel's complement to have been on board, of only 120 men and boys. There being no Gazette account of this affair, we freely confess, that it would have entirely escaped us but for the notice taken of it by a contemporary. Whether or not our contemporary's account, when we came to search the Weasel's log-book for particulars caused us any disappointment, will appear by a reference to the account itself. "After the peace of Tilsit, the Russians gave up Corfu to the French. A garrison was despatched to take possession of it, but meeting with Captain Clavell, in the Weasel brig of war, the whole force was defeated and taken by that officer."*

On the 1st of October, in the morning, as the British Leeward-island packet Windsor-Castle, acting Captain William Rogers, was in latitude 13° 53' north, longitude 58° 1' west, on her passage to Barbadoes, with the mails, a privateer was seen approaching under all sail. The packet used her utmost exertions to escape; but, finding it impossible, began to prepare herself for making a stout resistance. At noon the schooner got within gun-shot, hoisted French colours, and opened her fire; which was immediately returned from the chase-guns of the Windsor-Castle. This was continued until the privateer came near, when she hailed the packet in very opprobrious terms, and desired her to strike her colours. On meeting a prompt refusal, the schooner ran alongside, grappled the packet, and attempted to board. In this the Frenchmen were unexpectedly defeated by the pikes of the packet's crew, and sustained a loss of eight or 10 in killed and wounded. The privateer now endeavoured to cut away the grapplings and get clear; but the packet's main yard, being locked in the schooner's rigging, held her fast.

Great exertions continued to be made on both sides; and Captain Rogers, evinced considerable judgment and zeal in ordering a part of his men to shift the mails as circumstances required, or to cut them away in case the privateer should succeed in the conflict. At about 3 P.M. one of the packet's guns, a 9-pounder carronade loaded with double-grape, canister, and 100 musket-balls, was brought to bear upon the privateer, and was discharged, with dreadful effect at the moment the latter was making a second attempt to board. Soon after this Captain Rogers, followed by five men of his little crew, leaped upon the schooner's decks, and, notwithstanding the apparently overwhelming odds against him, succeeded in driving the privateer's men from their quarters, and ultimately in capturing the vessel.

The Windsor-Castle mounted six long 4-pounders and two 9-pounder carronades, with a complement of 28 men and boys; of whom she had three killed and 10 severely wounded: her main yard and mizenmast were carried away, and her rigging, fore and

aft, greatly damaged. The captured schooner was the *Jeune-Richard*, mounting six long 6-pounders and one long 18-pounder on a traversing carriage, with a complement, at the commencement of the action, of 92 men; of whom 21 were found dead on her decks, and 33 wounded.

From the very superior number of the privateer's crew still remaining, great precaution was necessary in securing the prisoners. They were accordingly ordered up from below, one by one, and were placed in their own irons successively as they came up. Any attempt at a rescue being thus effectually guarded against, the packet proceeded, with her prize, to the port of her destination; which, fortunately for the former, was not very far distant.

This achievement reflects the highest honour upon every officer, man, and boy, that was on board the *Windsor-Castle*; and, in particular, the heroic valour of her commander, so decisive of the business, ranks above all praise. Had Captain Rogers stayed to calculate the chances that were against him, the probability is, that the privateer would have ultimately succeeded in capturing the packet; whose light carronades could have offered very little resistance at the usual distance at which vessels engage; and whose very small crew, without such a *coup de main*, ay, and without such a leader, could never have brought the combat to a favourable issue.

On the 7th of October, in the evening, the British 22-gun ship *Porcupine*, Captain the Honourable Henry Duncan, having chased a trabaccolo (one of the many variously rigged small vessels employed in the Mediterranean), into Zupiano, a harbour of the small island of that name in the Adriatic, despatched her cutter and jollyboat, under the orders of Lieutenant George Price, first of the ship, assisted by Lieutenant Francis Smith, to endeavour to bring the vessel out. As the two boats were rounding the point which forms the entrance of the harbour, a gun-boat, under the Italian flag, opened a fire of round and grape upon them. Observing this Captain Duncan recalled the boats; but, as soon as it was dark, detached them again to attack the gun-vessel.

Having taken a guard-boat, sent by the latter to look out for them, mounting a 4-pounder swivel, and manned with French soldiers, the boats pushed on for the gun-vessel; which, expecting the attack, had moored herself to the shore with four cables. In spite of this preparation, and of a heavy fire of grape and musketry opened upon them, Lieutenant Price and his party gallantly boarded and captured the Venetian gun-boat *Safo*, mounting one long 24-pounder and several large swivels, and commanded by Anthonio Ghega, enseigne de vaisseau, with a crew of 50 men, most of whom leaped overboard. This very gallant enterprise was executed with so slight a loss as one seaman and one marine wounded.

On the 27th of November Lieutenant Price, in the cutter of

the Porcupine, then cruising between Ragusa and the island of Curzola, captured two small vessels from the first-named port, under a fire of musketry from the shore, by which one of his men was wounded. On the 29th the same enterprising officer went with the boats into the harbour of Zuliano, and destroyed a number of small vessels, together with the wine that was in the magazines for the use of the French troops. A trabacculo, laden with wood, was the only vessel afloat in the harbour, and she was brought out.

While the boats were returning, another trabacculo was seen coming down. The Porcupine gave chase; but Lieutenant Price, anticipating the wishes of his captain, pulled to windward and captured the vessel. She proved to be from Ragusa bound to Curzola, having on board stores of every description for guns and mortars, two $6\frac{1}{2}$ inch brass mortars, two $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch brass howitzers, four new 18-pounder gun-carriages, plank and every material for constructing a battery on the island to which she was bound, and a great quantity of shot and shells. Both this and the former service were performed without a casualty.

On the 25th of October the British 18-gun ship-sloop Herald, Captain George M. Hony, cruising off the fortress of Otranto in the Adriatic, observed an armed trabacculo at an anchor under it. Conceiving it practicable, under cover of night, to cut the vessel out, Captain Hony detached his boats, commanded by Lieutenant Walter Foreman; who, in the face of a heavy fire of great guns and musketry, both from the vessel and the shore, gallantly boarded and brought out the French privateer César of four 6-pounders. The crew defended her until the boats were alongside, when all except four escaped by a stern hawser. Of Lieutenant Foreman's party, Mr. James Wood, the carpenter, was the only person hurt: he was wounded dangerously. On board the Herald two men were slightly wounded by shot from the fortress, and the ship's hull and rigging slightly damaged.

On the 24th of November, at 9 h. 30 m. A. M., the island of Terriffa in sight bearing north-east by north, and the wind very light from the west-north-west, the British hired armed brig Anne, of ten 12-pounder carronades, Lieutenant James M'Kenzie, having in her company the late Spanish lugger-privateer Vansigo of seven guns (six long 4, and one long brass 12 pounder), with nine of the Anne's 39 men on board as a prize-crew, observed 10 Spanish gun-boats rowing towards her from the shore. At 10 A. M. the headmost vessel fired a shot, and hoisted a red flag. Finding that, owing to the calm state of the weather, it was impossible to escape, Lieutenant M'Kenzie shortened sail to receive his opponents.

At 10 h. 15 m. A. M., the three headmost gun-boats closed, and commenced the action. At 10 h. 30 m., the remaining seven closing, the lugger, after having previously hailed the Anne to

say she had three men killed, struck her colours. At 11 A.M. the Anne succeeded in dismasting one of the gun-boats. Finding that two others had struck, she now discontinued the action; but Lieutenant M'Kenzie did not think it prudent to attempt to take possession, the Anne having on board 42 prisoners, with only 30 men to guard them, and being, moreover, charged with despatches.

At 11 h. 10 m. A.M., having got round by the assistance of her sweeps, the Anne reopened her fire upon five gun-boats, that had taken possession of the Vansigo, and were again closing on the Anne's starboard quarter, as if with an intention to board. Meeting with a warmer salute than they expected, and observing that the British were prepared to repel any attempt at boarding, the Spaniards, at about 1 P.M., swept out of gun-shot, carrying with them the Anne's prize.

Notwithstanding that six of the largest of these 10 gun-boats were, for nearly an hour and a half, within pistol-shot of the Anne, their fire did not injure a man on board. The official account contains no statement, nor even supposition, relative to the force, in guns or men, of these Spanish gun-boats. By a little research, however, it is discovered, that several Spanish vessels of this class, captured nearly in the same quarter, and about the same time, mounted four guns each, generally two long 24 and two long 8 pounders, with a complement of from 40 to 60 men. Hence Lieutenant M'Kenzie's performance, in repulsing 10 such opponents, did him and the 29 officers and men of the Anne very great credit.

On the night of the 6th of November the boats of the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Renommée*, Captain Sir Thomas Livingstone, Bart., and 18-gun brig-sloop *Grasshopper*, Captain Thomas Searle, cruising in company in the neighbourhood of Carthage, were sent under the orders of Lieutenant William Webster, of the former ship, to endeavour to cut out some enemy's vessels lying at anchor under the Torre de Estacio. By 4 A.M. on the 7th a Spanish brig and a French tartar, each mounting six guns, with a proportionate number of men, were in possession of the British boats; but the wind was so light and the current so strong, that both vessels ran aground without the possibility of getting them off. While the boats and captured vessels were in this state, a constant fire of grape and canister was maintained upon them from the guns on the tower; whereby several of the prisoners were wounded, as well as two of the British, Mr. Thomas Bastin, purser of the *Grasshopper*, who was a volunteer and commanded a boat upon the occasion, and Henry Garrett, cockswain of the *Renommée*'s pinnace, both very badly. Under these circumstances, especially as there were several women and children in the prizes, some of whom were badly wounded, Lieutenant Webster was induced to abandon the vessels without setting them on fire.

On the 11th of December, at 11 A.M. as the *Renommée* and *Grasshopper* were cruising on the same station, the latter, being on the look-out, descried a brig under way, and two settees at anchor, off Cape Palos, and immediately made sail to cut off the former. On observing the *Grasshopper's* intention, the two settees also weighed and stood towards their consort. The *Grasshopper* continued working to windward, and at noon lost sight of the *Renommée*.

At about half an hour after noon, having got within range, the *Grasshopper* opened a heavy fire of round and grape upon the brig. A running fight was maintained (about 15 minutes of it close) until 2 h. 30 m. P.M.; when the latter, which was the Spanish brig of war *San-Josef*, of ten 24-pounder carronades and two long sixes, commanded by Lieutenant Don Antonio de Torres, ran on shore under Cape Negrete, and struck her colours. The greater part of her crew, which, upon leaving Carthage on the preceding evening, numbered 99 men, then swam on shore, and effected their escape. Seeing the fate of their companion, the two settees, which were the *Medusa* of 10 guns and 77 men, and the *Aigle* of eight guns and 50 men, tacked and made sail to the eastward.

The *Grasshopper* now shortened sail and anchored, in order to attempt getting her prize afloat. This was at length effected, in the face of a body of troops assembled on the cliffs; and who, by their constant discharges of musketry, severely wounded one of the *Grasshopper's* men, the only loss she sustained. It was not, however, with entire impunity, for the *Grasshopper* fired at the musketeers several well-directed broadsides. This was a very creditable little affair on the part of Captain Searle, his first lieutenant, Cornelius Willes, of whom he speaks in the highest terms, and his remaining officers and men.

On the 3d of December, at 10 A.M., latitude 14° 48' north, longitude 59° 14' west, the British brig-sloop *Curieux*, mounting 10 carronades, 18-pounders, and eight long 6-pounders, with a crew on board of rather less than 100 men and boys, commanded by Captain John Sherriff, while standing on the starboard tack with the wind from the north-east, discovered in the north-north-west, or right ahead, a strange ship steering under easy sail on the opposite tack. This was the late Liverpool slave-ship *British-Tar*, but now the French privateer *Revanche*, of 24 long guns, chiefly, it is believed, English 9-pounders, and one long French 18-pounder upon a traversing carriage on the forecastle, with a crew of 200 men, commanded by Captain Vidal.

At 11 A.M., as the ship passed almost within gun-shot to leeward of her, the *Curieux* made the private signal. That not being answered, the brig soon afterwards tacked in chase, and at 1 P.M. discharged her bow gun at the *Revanche*; who fired one stern-chaser in return, hoisted her colours, and set more sail, edging away to the southward. At 2 P.M., having arrived

abreast of the ship on the larboard and weather side, the brig brought her to close action. This continued for an hour; by which time the *Curieux* had her braces, bow-lines, and tiller-ropes shot away. Seeing the unmanageable state of her opponent, the *Revanche*, at 3 h. 15 m. P. M., ran on board the *Curieux* on the starboard side a little before the mainmast. In this position the ship discharged her traversing gun and musketry; by which the brig's main boom was shot away, Captain Sherriff and four or five of the men killed, and several wounded.

Finding themselves too warmly received, the privateer's men would not board, but retreated to the quarterdeck; whence they kept up, for the space of ten minutes, an incessant and a very destructive fire of musketry. Lieutenant Thomas Muir, upon whom the command of the brig had devolved, now prepared to board; but, being supported by only 10 seamen, the marines, and the boatswain, he was obliged to relinquish the attempt. At about this time, one of the *Curieux's* men having hoisted the ship's grappling overboard (in doing which he lost his right arm by a shot), the *Revanche* dropped astern. Presently afterwards, hauling up, the privateer crossed the stern of the *Curieux*, and, after firing into her two great guns and a volley of musketry, crowded sail to the north-west. Nor was the *Curieux*, whose shrouds and back-stays were shot away, and two topmasts and jib-boom wounded, in a condition to make sail in pursuit.

The loss on board the *Curieux* amounted to eight killed, including her captain, and 14 wounded. That on board the *Revanche*, according to a paragraph in the *Moniteur*, amounted to two killed and 13 wounded. The *Curieux*, as soon as she had partially refitted herself, made sail for Barbadoes, and anchored the next day in Carlisle bay.

Lieutenant Muir was subsequently tried by a court-martial at Barbadoes, for the escape of the privateer, and was slightly reprimanded for not having done his utmost, after the death of his captain, to take or destroy the enemy's ship. Had, by any chance, the *Revanche* been captured and carried into Carlisle bay by one of the cruisers upon the station, her force would have been fully known; and we cannot conceive that the commanding officer of a gun-brig (for, virtually, the *Curieux* was no more) would, under all the circumstances of this case, have been otherwise than honourably acquitted.

We are now entering upon a case which some may think not quite pertaining to Naval History. It was, however, an occurrence that happened on board a British ship of war, and one which, for a considerable time after it became generally known, excited an intense interest in the public mind.

In the summer of the present year Robert Jeffery, a native of Polpero in Cornwall, aged 18 years, entered on board the Lord Nelson privateer of Plymouth, and about eight days afterwards, when the privateer had put into Falmouth, was pressed by an

officer belonging to the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Recruit*, captain the honourable Warwick Lake. The *Recruit* soon afterwards sailed for the West Indies. In the month of November, when the crew of the *Recruit* were on short allowance of water, Jeffery, who was armourer's mate on board, took, according to Captain Lake's account, "a bottle with some rum in it," from the gunner's cabin; and on the 10th of December, by his own acknowledgment, went to the spruce-beer cask and drew off about two quarts. A shipmate saw and informed against Jeffery, and Captain Lake ordered the sergeant of marines to "put him in the black list."

On the 13th of December the *Recruit* was passing the desert island of Sombrero, which stands about 80 miles to the south-west of St. Christopher. Captain Lake then ordered Jeffery to be landed upon that island. Accordingly at 6 p.m., the poor fellow was placed in a boat, with the second lieutenant of the brig, Richard Cotton Mould, a midshipman and four seamen, and landed upon the uninhabited island of Sombrero, without shoes on his feet, or any other clothes than those on his back, and without even a biscuit for food. Observing that his feet were cut by the rocks, Lieutenant Mould gave him a pair of shoes, which he had begged of one of the men, together with a knife, and his own and the midshipman's pocket handkerchiefs for making signals. The lieutenant then advised this victim of tyranny and oppression to keep a sharp look-out for vessels, and pulled back to the *Recruit*. Her captain's vengeance being thus gratified, the brig filled and made sail from an island, until then little known except as a land-fall or point of bearing for navigators, but subsequently blazed about in every quarter of the globe, and never named without an execration upon the (must we say) British officer, who had acted so inhuman a part.

Rear-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, the commander-in-chief at the Leeward islands, the instant the brig joined him, reprimanded Captain Lake for his conduct, and sent back the *Recruit* to Sombrero, to bring away the man if he should chance to be alive. On the 11th of February the *Recruit* anchored off the island, and her officers landed and searched it over; but neither Jeffery, nor his body, nor his bones were any where to be found. By almost a miracle, as it will appear, the man's life was spared.

After he had been thus left to perish by his tyrant of a captain, Jeffery wandered about for eight days, subsisting upon some limpets that he found among the rocks, the crevices of which also afforded him rain water to drink. He saw several vessels pass, but was too weak to hail them at the distance at which they were. At length, on the morning of the ninth day, the schooner *Adams*, of Marblehead, Massachusetts, John Dennis, master, came to the island, saved the poor fellow from a lingering death, and landed him at Marblehead.

There Jeffery resided, following his trade of a blacksmith, until the summer of 1810, when the noise which his case made in England induced the British government to send for him home. He was brought first to Halifax, Nova-Scotia; and thence, in the 10-gun schooner *Thistle*, Lieutenant Peter Procter, to Portsmouth. On the 22d of October, Jeffery attended at the admiralty, where he received his discharge, and had the R taken off his name; by which he became entitled to all arrears of pay. The friends of the late (for he had then, as will be seen presently, ceased to bear the title) Captain Lake made him a liberal compensation for the hardships he had undergone, and Jeffery returned to his native village of Polpero a much richer man than he had quitted it three years before.

On the 5th and 6th of February, 1810, which was soon after it had become known that Jeffery was living, a court-martial assembled on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth, to try Captain Lake for having put a seaman of the *Recruit* on shore upon an uninhabited island. Captain Lake admitted that he landed Jeffery upon *Sombrero*, but urged as his excuse, that he "thought the island was inhabited;" thereby not only exposing his own ignorance, but impugning the professional knowledge of his two lieutenants, and particularly of his master, of whom, as Captain Lake admits, he had to inquire the name of the island. The court, which was numerous and respectably composed, found Captain the Honourable Warwick Lake guilty of the charge, and sentenced him to be dismissed from the British navy.

COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—COAST OF AFRICA.

As a necessary consequence of the occupation of Portugal by the French, the island of Madeira fell into the hands of the British. On the 24th of December a British squadron, consisting of the

Gun-ship		
74	{ Centaur	{ rear-admiral (b.) Sir Samuel Hood,
	{ York	{ Captain William Henry Webley,
	{ Captain	{ " Robert Barton,
64	{ Intrepid	{ " Isaac Wolley,
	{	{ " Richard Worsley,
<i>Frigates, Africaine, Alceste, Shannon, and Success,</i>		

escorting some transports having a body of troops under Major-General Beresford, anchored in Funchal bay, within a cable's length of the forts, to be ready to act hostilely, should any opposition be experienced. None, however, was offered; and before dark the troops were landed and in possession of all the forts. On the next day the terms of capitulation were agreed to, and on the following day, the 26th, duly signed by the governor of the island, Pedro Fagundes Bacellar d'Antas e Meneses,

as he signs himself, on the one part, and the commanding officers of the British sea and land forces on the other.

WEST INDIES.

On the 29th of November, 1806, Captain Charles Brisbane of the 38-gun frigate *Arethusa*, accompanied by the *Latona*, of the same force, Captain James Athol Wood, and the 44-gun frigate *Anson*, Captain Charles Lydiard, sailed from Port-Royal, Jamaica, with orders from Vice-admiral Dacres, the commander-in-chief on that station, to reconnoitre the island of Curaçoa, and sound the minds of the inhabitants respecting the sincerity of their alleged inclination to ally themselves to Great Britain. Owing to the continued violence of the trade-wind and the strength of the north-westerly current, it was not until the 22d of December, in the evening, that the squadron reached the west end of Aruba, a small island situated about a degree to the westward of, and a dependency upon, Curaçoa. There the three frigates anchored, and on the following evening were joined by the 38-gun frigate *Fisgard*, Captain William Bolton, then on his way to Jamaica, but whom Captain Brisbane had received permission from the admiral to take under his orders.

Having more taste, as well as more talent, for fighting than for diplomatizing, Captain Brisbane naturally conceived that he could effect less by the latter mode than by the former. He was fully sensible, too, that the way to get possession of a place so strongly fortified, both by nature and art, as Curaçoa, with only four frigates and their crews, was not to lie to off the port, there to make a display of his weakness, and wait while the Dutch governor and his council slumbered through the forms of a negotiation, and the Dutch forts and soldiers got ready more effectually to resist an attack, but to dash right into the harbour, and, pointing the muzzles of his guns into the windows and doors of the burghers, carry every thing by a vigorous storm.

This was the plan which Captain Brisbane resolved to adopt, and every preparative arrangement was soon made for facilitating its execution. Each frigate had her allotted station. The bulk of her crew was divided into storming companies, commanded by lieutenants and by the captain as their leader. The boatswain was placed at the head of a party with ladders and crow-bars; and the master, with the necessary number of hands, was to have charge of the ship, while the boarders and stormers were performing their part of the enterprise. To prevent any confusion from the different crews casually mixing together when on shore, each ship's company, with the officers attached to them, wore some peculiarity of dress, or some badge or mark that could be readily distinguished. On the 24th, at 8 A.M., Captain Brisbane, with his four frigates, weighed and made sail, intending to strike the blow at daybreak on new year's day, the previous eve being that on which every loyal Dutchman makes it a point to

steep his senses in forgetfulness. On the 1st of January, at 1 A. M., the high land of St.-Barbary's on the east end of Curaçoa made its appearance. It was necessary to make this end of the island, to have the benefit of the regular trade or south-east wind in running for the harbour of St.-Ann, situated on the south-east side of Curaçoa; and which, as being the capital of the colony and its principal naval dépôt, was to be the first object of attack. The frigates now hove to, hoisted out their boats, and took them in tow with small cablets.

Of the nature and extent of the difficulties that stood in the way of success, some idea may be formed by a brief description of the harbour of St.-Ann, and its sea-defences. The entrance to the harbour, according to Mr. Mantor's chart, is only 50 fathoms wide, and is defended by regular fortifications; the principal of which, Fort Amsterdam, standing on the right of the entrance, mounts 60 pieces of cannon, in two tiers. Athwart the harbour, which nowhere exceeds a quarter of a mile in width, were the Dutch 36-gun frigate *Halstaar*, Captain Cornelius J. Evertz, and 20-gun ship-corvette *Surinam*, Captain Jan Van-Nes, exclusive of two large armed schooners. There was a chain of forts on Misselburg height; and that almost impregnable fortress Fort-République, situated upon a high hill at the bottom of the harbour, and almost within grape-shot distance, enfiladed the whole.

At 5 A. M., every preparation having been made for an immediate attack by storm, the four British frigates, the *Arethusa* leading, followed in close order by the *Latona*, *Anson*, and *Fisgard*, bore up, with an easterly wind, for the mouth of the harbour. At daylight the *Arethusa*, with a flag of truce at the fore, entered the port; but the Dutch forts and shipping, taking no notice of the flag, opened upon the British frigate a smart though ineffective fire. Just at this moment the wind shifted to north, and checked at once the further progress of the *Arethusa*. Fortunately, however, not many minutes elapsed ere the wind, in a squall, changed back to north-east; thereby enabling the whole of the squadron, except the *Fisgard*, which frigate grounded on the west side, to lay up along the harbour. The three remaining British frigates, after an unavoidable delay of some minutes on the part of the *Anson*, then anchored in positions for opening their several broadsides upon the Dutch forts, frigate, and corvette.

Upon the capstan of the *Arethusa*, whose jib-boom was over the wall of the town, Captain Brisbane now wrote, and sent off to the governor, the following summons: "The British squadron are here to protect, and not to conquer you; to preserve to you your lives, liberty, and property. If a shot is fired at any one of my squadron after this summons, I shall immediately storm your batteries. You have five minutes to accede to this determination." No notice being taken of this summons, the flag of



ADMIRAL, SIR CHARLES BRISBANE.

ENGRAVED BY W. GREATBATCH, FROM AN ORIGINAL PICTURE, BY

J. NORTHCOTE, R.A.



truce was hauled down; and at 6 h. 15 m. A.M. the British squadron commenced the action. As soon as the ships had fired about three broadsides each, Captain Brisbane, at the head of a portion of his crew, boarded and carried the Dutch frigate; whereupon the *Latona* warped close alongside and took possession. Meanwhile a party of the *Anson's* men, headed by Captain Lydiard, had boarded and secured the Surinam.

This done, Captains Brisbane and Lydiard pulled straight for the shore, and, landing together, proceeded, at 7 h. 30 m. A.M., to storm Fort Amsterdam. The vigour of the assault was irresistible. Some of the British breaking open the sea-gate with their crowbars, while others escalated the walls, the fort, although garrisoned by 275 regular troops, was carried in about ten minutes; as, shortly afterwards, and with equal quickness and facility, were one or two minor forts, the citadel, and the town. On the return of Captains Brisbane and Lydiard to their respective ships, a fire was opened upon Fort République, which fire the fort might have silenced in half an hour; and 300 seamen and marines were landed to attack it in the rear, which service they would have found a very difficult one to execute. By 10 A.M., however, or a little after, the British flag waved on the walls of Fort République; and, by noon, the whole island of Curaçoa had capitulated to the British arms.

This unparalleled morning's work was achieved with no greater loss to the British, than two seamen killed and five wounded belonging to the *Arethusa*, one killed and two wounded belonging to the *Latona*, and seven wounded belonging to the *Anson*; total, three killed and 14 wounded; and the only spar shot or carried away was the spritsail yard of the *Arethusa*. The loss on the part of the Dutch was much more severe. The *Halstaar* had her captain and two petty officers killed, and three others badly wounded; the Surinam, one seaman killed, her commander (dangerously), one lieutenant, one midshipman, and one seaman wounded; and the schooner *Flying-Fish* (*Viligende-Vis*) one killed and one wounded; total, five killed and eight wounded, exclusive of the loss on shore, represented to have amounted, in killed and wounded together, to nearly 200 men. The Dutch ships were bravely defended; and so probably would have been the forts, had not the hour and the suddenness of the attack completely scared the drowsy garrisons, and the occupation of the harbour by the enemy's ships prevented the junction of a considerable reinforcement which had assembled at Otrabandj.

The capture of a valuable Dutch colony, by four British frigates and their ships' companies, was an exploit of which even four British sail of the line, and a dozen transports with troops, might have been proud. Captain Brisbane, the planner and leader of the enterprise, was knighted by his sovereign, and all four captains received medals commemorative of the brilliant service they had performed. Nor were the most distinguished

of the subordinate gallant participators overlooked. Lieutenants John Parish, first of the *Arethusa*, and Thomas Ball Sullivan, first of the *Anson*, both of whom assisted at the storming of Fort Amsterdam, were made commanders.

As soon as war was declared by Denmark for the attack upon her capital and the seizure of her fleet, her powerful enemy proceeded to gain possession of the Danish colonies. Accordingly, on the 16th of December, an expedition, the naval force under the command of Rear-admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander Cochrane, and the military under that of General Bowyer, sailed from Carlisle bay, Barbadoes, and on the 21st anchored off the island of St.-Thomas. A summons was then sent in to the Danish governor, Colonel Van-Scholten; who after a short parley acceded to the terms, and the island and its dependencies were on the same day formally surrendered to Great Britain. On the 25th the island of Santa-Croix followed the example of its neighbour. No ships of war were found in the harbours of either island, but a great many merchant vessels, nearly the whole of them under the Danish flag.

SOUTH AMERICA.

In our last year's account of the proceedings in the Rio de la Plata, we left Commodore Sir Home Popham and Brigadier-general Backhouse in the possession of Maldonado harbour, and of the small island of Gorreti near its entrance.* On the 5th of January Rear-admiral Stirling, in the *Ardent* 64, with a small convoy, arrived at Maldonado, to supersede Commodore Sir Home Popham. The rear-admiral also brought out Brigadier-general Sir Samuel Auchmuty to take the command of the troops. On the 13th Maldonado was evacuated without opposition, and a small garrison only was left in Gorreti. It was now determined to invest Monte-Video, a strong town, mounting on its different batteries 160 pieces of cannon, and respectably garrisoned; and the following was the British naval force ready to co-operate in the attack :

Gun-ship			
64	Diadem.....	{	Rear-ad. (w.) Charles Stirling.
		{	Captain Samuel Warren.
	Raisable	"	Josias Rowley.
	Ardent	"	Ross Donnelly.
	Lancaster.....	"	William Fothergill.
Gun-frig.			
38	Leda.....	"	Robert Honeyman.
32	Unicorn.....	"	Lucius Hardyman.
	Medusa.....	"	Honourable Duncombe Pleydell Bouverie.
Sloops, troop-ships, gun-brigs, &c.			

Accordingly on the 16th, in the morning, the ships having assembled off the island of Flores, a landing was effected in a small bay a little to the westward of the *Caretas* rocks, and about eight miles to the eastward of the town. The strength of

* See p. 214.

the breeze, and the intricacy of the navigation, rendered it very difficult for a covering force to approach near enough to be of much use; but the frigates, under the directions of Captain Lucius Hardyman of the Unicorn, got so close as to command the beach, had any opposition been offered by the body of troops in view on the heights.

On the 19th the army, including about 800 seamen and marines under the orders of Captains Ross Donnelly and John Palmer (the latter of the ship-sloop Pheasant), moved forward, and in the evening the ships of war and transports dropped off Chico bay; near to which, and at about two miles from the town, the troops encamped, having during the march had a slight skirmish with parties of the enemy. Such was the shallowness of the water in front of Monte-Video, that the ships could lend no effectual co-operation in the siege, beyond landing a part of their men, guns, and stores, and cutting off all communication between Colonna and Buenos-Ayres. On the 25th the general opened his breaching batteries, and the lighter vessels of the squadron opened a distant cannonade. The siege continued, with doubtful result, until the 2d of February, when a breach was reported practicable. In the evening a summons was sent to the governor, to which no answer was returned; and on the morning of the 3d, before day, the breach was most gallantly stormed, and the town and citadel carried. The loss sustained by the army, from its first landing to the termination of the siege, amounted to 192 killed, 421 wounded, and eight missing.

The distance from the shore at which the ships were obliged to anchor, the constant high wind and heavy swell, and the distance which the guns, when landed, had to be dragged over a heavy sandy road, rendered the duty of the seamen particularly arduous. For these and other services, so many were required, that the daily number of men absent from the squadron, including the division imbodyed with the army, was about 1400; and the Diadem herself was frequently left with only 30 men on board. The loss sustained by the navy on shore amounted to six seamen killed, one sub-lieutenant (George Stewart), three midshipmen (the Honourable Charles Leonard Irby, Henry Smith, and John Morrison), and 24 seamen and marines wounded, and four seamen missing.

So low was the stock of powder reduced by the protracted length of the siege, that, when the breach was made, no greater quantity remained on board the ships of war, transports, and fleet of English merchantmen in company, than would have furnished two days' further consumption. None of the few Spanish vessels of war found in the harbour were of much value. A corvette of 28 guns was burnt by the crew. There were two or three other unserviceable corvettes, and some schooners of war; also 21 gun-boats. The remaining vessels were merchantmen.

In the course of May a reinforcement of about 5000 British troops arrived, under Brigadier-general Crawford; who thereupon superseded Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On the 15th of June Brigadier-general Crawford himself was superseded by Lieutenant-general Whitelocke, and Rear-admiral Stirling, by Rear-admiral George Murray, whose flag was on board the 64-gun ship Polyphemus, Captain Peter Heywood. An attack upon Buenos-Ayres was to be the next object of the expedition. The small share which the navy, on account of the shallowness of the approaches by water, was enabled to take in the disgraceful campaign that ensued, relieves us from the task of recording particulars. It may suffice to state, that on the 28th of June a landing was effected, without opposition, within 30 miles of Buenos-Ayres; that on the 5th of July an attack was made on the town; that the British troops, under Brigadier-general Crawford, were overwhelmed by numbers, and compelled to surrender, with the loss of 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; and that on the 6th the commanding officer of Buenos-Ayres, general Liniers, offered to deliver up all prisoners, if the attack was discontinued and the British would consent to evacuate the river Plata in two months.

These terms were immediately submitted to by General Whitelocke; and thus ended all the hopes of the British in this quarter. The Buenos-Ayrean campaign had not, however, passed wholly without benefit: it showed the folly of relying upon the specious representations of traders and renegadoes, respecting the dissatisfied state of the people of any country which they had visited or fled from. It showed, also, the advantage of noticing, in a proper manner, the first symptom of shyness that an officer discovers. Had some little qualm of this kind, which notoriously affected Lieutenant-colonel Whitelocke at Saint-Domingo, stripped him of his uniform, Lieutenant-general Whitelocke would not have been present at Buenos-Ayres, to sacrifice a gallant army and cast a slur upon the British name.

EAST INDIES.

Being desirous to ascertain if the information was correct, that the two Dutch 68-gun ships, which had escaped from Batavia in the preceding year,* were at Gressie, or Griesse, on the river Sourabaya, at the eastern extremity of Java, and distant about 540 miles from the capital of the island, Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, in the month of June, despatched from Madras the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Caroline, Captain Peter Rainier, and 12-pounder frigate Psyché, Captain Fleetwood Broughton Reynolds Pellew, with orders to reconnoitre the port. On the 29th of August the two frigates arrived off Point Panka, the

* See p. 268.

eastern extremity of Java, and, by a ship from Batavia captured on the 30th, ascertained that the *Pluto* and *Revolutie* were not merely lying inactive at Gressie, but they were in too bad a state to admit of repair.

Having executed the primary object of their mission, the two frigates stood to the westward; and at midnight the *Psyché* alone, the *Caroline* having parted company in chase, anchored off the port of Samarang, which lies about 200 miles nearer to Batavia than Sourabaya. At daylight on the 31st the *Psyché* weighed and stood into the road. The boats, having in the mean time been got ready, were despatched, under the orders of Lieutenant Lambert Kersteman, assisted by midshipman Charles Sullivan, to bring out the vessels at anchor in the road. This service Lieutenant Kersteman gallantly executed, towing out, from under a heavy but ineffectual fire opened upon the boats by the batteries of the town, an armed schooner of eight guns, and a large merchant brig.

The early part of the morning having discovered two ships (one evidently a cruiser) and a brig at anchor outside, the *Psyché*, as soon as she had collected her boats and destroyed their two prizes, made sail after the strange vessels, which by this time had weighed, and were endeavouring to escape. At 3 h. 30 m. P. M., finding the frigate was overtaking them, the three vessels bore up and ran themselves on shore about nine miles to the westward of Samarang, opening upon the *Psyché* a well-directed fire. This, on anchoring in three fathoms, the latter returned, but, on account of the distance at which the shoal water obliged her to keep, with little apparent effect. In a few minutes, however, one of the ships, which proved to be the *Resolutie*, armed merchant ship of 700 tons, with a valuable cargo on board, struck her colours. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M., just as the *Psyché* was hoisting out her boats to attempt carrying the second ship by boarding, she also struck, and proved to be the Dutch national corvette *Scipio*, of 24 guns and 150 men, Captain Carrage, who was mortally wounded on the occasion. Shortly afterwards the brig, which was the *Ceres*, a remarkably fine vessel in the Dutch company's service, mounting 12 guns, with a crew of 70 men, fired a broadside and hauled down her colours. By the persevering exertions of the *Psyché*'s officers and men, all three of the prizes were got afloat the same night without injury. This was a very spirited, gallant affair; and we find, after a lapse of nearly thirty years, the captain of the *Psyché* knighted. The companionship of the *Bath*, which he wore previous to his late reward, was very inadequate for the service he had rendered.

With the intelligence communicated by his son, Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, on the 20th of November, sailed from Malacca with the *Culloden* and *Powerful* 74s, frigates *Caroline* and *Fox*, sloops *Victoire*, *Samarang*, *Seaflower*, and *Jaseur*, and

transport Worcester, having on board a detachment of troops under Lieutenant-colonel Lockhart. On the 5th of December the squadron arrived off Point Panka; and a commission, with a flag of truce, was immediately sent to the commandant of the Dutch naval force, for the surrender of the ships of war lying at Gressie. The Dutch commodore thought fit to detain the boat, and to place in arrest the persons on board of her: he then sent one of his officers to Sir Edward, with information of the unwarrantable step he had taken, accompanied with a flat refusal to deliver up the ships, although they were all in a dismantled state, with their guns on shore.

On the next morning, the 6th, the Culloden and Powerful, having been lightened, sailed up, accompanied by the remainder of the squadron, to Gressie, cannonading a battery of twelve 9 and 18 pounders at Sambelangan on the island of Madura; the fire from which, with hot shot, struck several of the ships, but hurt no person on board, and was very soon silenced. The governor and council of Sourabaya, a settlement about 15 miles higher up the river, and to which Gressie was subordinate, released the gentlemen of the commission and the boat's crew, disclaimed the violent measures pursued by the commodore, and offered to treat. A treaty was accordingly concluded for delivering up the ships of war, consisting, as already mentioned, of the two 68-gun ships Pluto and Revolutie, also a sheer-hulk (late a 68-gun ship), the Kortenaar, together with the Rutkoff company's ship, pierced for 40 guns. But the Dutch commodore had previously scuttled the whole of them. On the 11th the British completed the destruction of the ships, by setting them on fire; and then proceeded to destroy the guns and military stores in the garrison of Gressie, and at the battery of Sambelangan.

APPENDIX.

No. 1. See p. 7.

The following short table will show the numerical loss sustained by each ship, also her principal damages in rigging, masts, and yards, or hull.

Ships.	Loss.		Principal damages, as officially reported.			
	K.	W.	Rigging, &c.	Masts and yards.		Hull, &c.
				Shot away.	Wounded.	
Hero.....	1	4	Much cut.	<i>None report.</i>	Fore and main masts and topmasts, badly.	Several shots between wind & water.
Ajax	2	16	"	Main yard & driver-boom	<i>None reported.</i>	One lowerdeck gun disabled, starbrd bumpkin shot away.
Triumph ...	5	6	"	Drivr-boom	Bowsprit & mainmast.	Two lowerdeck guns disabled.
Barfleur	3	7	<i>No damage reported.</i>	<i>None report.</i>	Foremost & foreyard.	} <i>No damage reported.</i>
Agamem. ...	0	3	"	Foretopsail yd & mizen topmast.	Fore and main yards and main topmast.	
Windsor-Castle }	10	35	Much cut.	Fore topmast, and a great part of fore top.	Head of foremast, fore and main yards and bowsprit.	
Defiance	1	7	"	Mizentop-sail yard.	Mainmast, foreyard, & driver-boom.	
Prince of Wales }	3	20	"	Foretopsail yard.	Mizen topmast & main yd badly.	Rudd. shot thro' two feet above water's edge.
Repulse ...	0	4	"	<i>None report.</i>	Bowsprit badly.	Knee of the head damaged.
Raisnable	1	1	<i>No damage reported.</i>	"	Cross-jack yard.	Some shots struck, &c.
Dragon.....	0	4	"	"	<i>None reported.</i>	} <i>No damage reported.</i>
Glory	1	1	Much cut,	"	Fore yard.	
Warrior	0	0	"	"	Spritsail yd, fore-topgallant yd, & driver-boom	
Thunderer..	7	11	"	"	Mizenmast, fore yard, & maintopsail yard.	Upper cheek of knee of head shot thro', &c.
Malta	5	40	"	Mizentop-sail yard	Mizenmast and topmast, and fore topmast, also main yard badly.	<i>No damage reported.</i>
Egyptienne	0	0	} <i>No damage reported.</i>	<i>None report.</i>	<i>None reported.</i>	
Sirius	2	3		"		

No. 2. See p. 7.

The following statement will show the exact loss sustained by each ship of the combined fleet, in killed and wounded :

	K.	W.	Total.
Argonauta	4	3	7
Terrible	1	4	5
America	3	8	11
Espana.....	3	6	9
San-Rafaël	53	114	167
Firme	41	97	138
Pluton	8	22	30
Mont-Blanc.....	6	11	17
Atlas	10	32	42
Berwick	2	8	10
Neptune	1	7	8
Bucentaure	3	3	6
Formidable	4	6	10
Intrépide.....	5	5	10
Scipion	0	0	0
Swiftsure	0	0	0
Indomptable	1	1	2
Aigle	4	0	4
Achille.....	0	0	0
Algésiras	0	0	0
Total	149	327	476

{ including captain and two lieutenants
among the killed.

including captain among the killed.

No. 3. See p. 11.

Je ne me propose point d'aller chercher l'ennemi, je veux même l'éviter pour me rendre à ma destination ; mais, si nous le rencontrons, point de manœuvre honteuse : elle découragerait nos équipages et entraînerait notre défaite. Si l'ennemi est sous le vent à nous, maîtres de notre manœuvre, nous formerons notre ordre de bataille et nous arriverons sur lui tous à la fois : chacun de nos vaisseaux combat celui qui lui correspond dans la ligne ennemie et ne doit pas hésiter à l'aborder si la circonstance lui est favorable. — Tout capitaine qui ne serait pas dans le feu, ne serait pas à son poste, et un signal pour l'y rappeler serait une tâche déshonorante pour lui. Les frégates doivent également prendre part à l'action ; je n'en ai pas besoin pour les signaux ; elles doivent choisir le point où leur co-opération peut être avantageuse, pour décider la défaite d'un vaisseau ennemi, ou pour soutenir un vaisseau français trop vivement pressé, et lui donner le secours de la remorque ou tout autre qui lui serait nécessaire.—*Victoires et Conquêtes*. tome xvi., p. 109.

No. 4. See p. 13.

L'amiral Calder, avec des forces inférieures, rencontre les flottes espagnole et française combinées ; il engage, en les poursuivant, une affaire d'avant-garde et prend deux vaisseaux. Il est mit en jugement et censuré ; parce qu'on suppose qu'en renouvelant le combat, il pouvait obtenir un succès plus décisif. Qu'aurait-on fait de Calder, en Angleterre, s'il eût commandé la flotte la plus nombreuse, et perdu deux vaisseaux, en fuyant une affaire qui devait présenter une si belle chance au savoir et à la vaillance ? Qu'aurait-on fait des capitaines ?—*Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne*, par Dupin. Deuxième partie, tome ii., p. 17.

No. 5. See p. 20.

1°. Il n'a pas débarqué à la Martinique et à la Gadeloupe le 67^e régiment, et les troupes que l'amiral Magon avait à bord. 2°. Il a exposé ces colonies en ne renvoyant que par quatre frégates douze cents hommes de l'élite des garnisons. 3°. Il s'est mal comporté dans le combat du 23 juillet, en ne réattaquant pas une escadre dégrée qui avait deux vaisseaux à la traine. 4°. Arrivé au Ferrol, il a laissé la mer à l'amiral Calder, quand il attendait une escadre de cinq vaisseaux, et n'a point croisé devant le Ferrol jusqu'à l'arrivée de cette escadre. 5°. Il a été instruit que l'escadre voyait des vaisseaux ennemis mener la frégate la Didon à la remorque, et il n'a point fait chasser ces vaisseaux pour dégager la frégate. 6°. Il est parti du Ferrol le 14 août, et au lieu de venir sur Brest, il s'est dirigé sur Cadix, violant ainsi ses instructions positives. 7°. Enfin, il a su que l'escadre de Lallemand devait

venir à Vigo prendre des ordres et il a appareillé du Ferrol sans donner de nouveaux ordres à cet officier, lui ayant au contraire fait remettre des instructions toutes opposées qui compromettaient cette escadre, puisqu'elle avait ordre de se rendre à Brest, tandis que lui Villeneuve allait à Cadix.—*Précis des Evénemens*, tome xii., p. 84.

No. 6. See p. 30.

L'ennemi ne se bornera pas à se former sur une ligne de bataille parallèle à la nôtre, et à venir nous livrer un combat d'artillerie, dont le succès appartient souvent au plus habile, mais toujours au plus heureux ; il cherchera à entourer notre arrière-garde, à nous traverser, et à porter sur ceux de nos vaisseaux qu'il aurait désunis des pelotons des siens pour les envelopper et les réduire. Dans ce cas, c'est bien plus de son courage et de son amour de la gloire qu'un capitaine-commandant doit prendre conseil que des signaux de l'amiral qui, engagé lui-même dans le combat, et enveloppé dans la fumée, n'a peut-être plus la facilité d'en faire. Rien ne doit nous étonner dans la vue d'une escadre anglaise : leurs vaisseaux de 74 n'ont pas cinq cents hommes à bord ; ils sont harassés par une croisière de deux ans ; ils ne sont pas plus brave que nous, et ont infiniment moins de motifs pour se bien battre, moins d'amour de la patrie. Ils sont habiles à la manœuvre. Dans un mois, nous le serons autant qu'eux. Enfin, tout se réunit pour nous donner la confiance des succès les plus glorieux et d'une nouvelle ère pour la marine impériale.—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 110.

No. 7. See p. 59.

En un clin d'œil, les gaillards de ce vaisseau furent déserts ; les braves du Redoutable voulurent s'y précipiter ; mais la rentrée de deux vaisseaux y mit obstacle. Afin d'y remédier, le capitaine Lucas donna l'ordre d'amener la grande vergue de son vaisseau, et d'en faire un pont pour passer à bord du vaisseau ennemi. Dans ce moment, le vaisseau à trois ponts le Téméraire aborda le Redoutable du côté opposé au Victory, en lui lâchant toute sa bordée. L'effet de cette bordée fut terrible sur l'équipage du Redoutable, rassemblé alors tout entier sur les gaillards et les passavans : près de 200 hommes furent mis hors de combat ; le brave capitaine Lucas, quoique blessé, demeura sur le pont. L'arrivée du Téméraire ranimant le courage de l'équipage du Victory, le feu recommença à bord de ce vaisseau, qui le cessa ensuite presque entièrement pour se dégager d'avec le vaisseau français.—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, tome xvi., p. 174.

No. 8. See p. 83.]

Course and site of the ball as ascertained since death.

The ball struck the fore part of his lordship's epaulette ; and entered the left shoulder immediately before the processus acromion scapulæ, which it slightly fractured. It then descended obliquely into the thorax, fracturing the second and third ribs ; and after penetrating the left lobe of the lungs, and dividing in its passage a large branch of the pulmonary artery it entered the left side of the spine between the sixth and seventh dorsal vertebræ, fractured the left transverse process of the sixth dorsal vertebra, wounded the medulla spinalis, and fracturing the right transverse process of the seventh vertebra, made its way from the right side of the spine, directing its course through the muscles of the back ; and lodged therein, about two inches below the inferior angle of the right scapula. On removing the ball, a portion of the gold lace and pad of the epaulette, together with a small piece of his lordship's coat, was found firmly attached to it.

W. BEATTY.

No. 9. See p. 86.

"Nelson doit être cité comme le modèle des amiraux, par le soin extrême, qu'il apportait à pénétrer tous ses généraux et tous ses capitaines, de l'esprit des attaques qu'il se proposait d'entreprendre. Il leur développait son plan général d'opérations, les modifications que le temps ou les manœuvres de l'ennemi pourraient le forcer d'apporter à sa détermination primitive. Dès qu'une fois il avait bien expliqué son système aux commandans généraux et supérieurs de son armée, il se reposait sur eux du soin d'agir suivant les circonstances, pour se porter au point le plus favorable à l'exécution de l'entreprise ainsi concertée. Or, Nelson, qui put choisir les compagnons de sa gloire, eut le talent et le bonheur de trouver des hommes dignes de ses leçons et de sa confiance ; ils apprirent dans l'action, à suppléer ce que n'avait pu deviner sa prévoyance, et dans le succès, à surpasser jusqu'à son espérance."--Dupin's *Voyages*, &c. tome iv., p. 66.

No. 10. See p. 159.

By the Honourable William Cornwallis,
Admiral of the White,
Commander-in-chief,
&c. &c. &c.
Channel Fleet.

Your Lordship is hereby required and directed, in the ship you command, to proceed across the Bay of Biscay, with all expedition, to join Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, who was stationed (before the action) to look out for the enemy from thirty to forty leagues west of Cape Finisterre. Your Lordship will be very careful to obtain intelligence of the Enemy's squadrons, if either of them should have put to sea from Rochfort or Ferrol, and to give the earliest information, where you may from circumstances, believe them to be bound: And if you should fall in with a squadron of the Enemy's ships, continue, if possible, in sight, until you can ascertain their route, and then push on before them to make it known to me, or the officer commanding on that station, to which they seem to point their course.

Your Lordship is to follow Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder's orders if you fall in with him; otherwise you are to return and join me off Ushant, when the water on board the ship you command gets low.

Inclosed * is a direction from the Vice-Admiral for any of his Majesty's ships which may be sent to look for him.

Given on board the Ville-de-Paris,
off Ushant, 29th July, 1805,
WILLIAM CORNWALLIS.

To the Right Honourable
Lord William Fitz Roy,
Captain of his Majesty's Ship *Æolus*.

*(Copy).

Prince of Wales, 25th July, 1805,
at noon.

I shall part company with you this day, and make the best of my way to the rendezvous off Cape Finisterre, with the hope of falling in with Lord Nelson; if upon not finding his Lordship there in a short time after my arrival, I shall then proceed in search of the combined Squadrons supposed to be gone for Ferrol.

ROBERT CALDER.

To Captain Boyles,
Windsor Castle.

No. 11. See p. 159.

(*Secret.*)

Ville-de-Paris, off Ushant,
29th July, 1805.

My Lord,

In addition to the Orders given you this morning, I now send you, having this moment received it by the Nile, Vice-admiral Sir Robert Calder's Rendezvous, No. 52,* on which he intends to cruise for a few days, and afterwards to leave the Dragon there for a week.

Your Lordship will therefore proceed, taking charge of the inclosed despatch for the vice-admiral : But on your not falling in with, or getting any information of him, or intelligence of the enemy, you are, at the expiration of *seven* days, to rejoin me, after looking out for him.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

WM. CORNWALLIS.

To the Right Honourable
Lord William Fitz Roy,
Captain of his Majesty's Ship *Æolus*.

* Cape Finisterre S. E. thirty-eight leagues.

No. 12. See p. 184.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, doubled and sheathed, &c.

		Strengthened with diagonal braces.
Gun-ship		
98	{ Formidable.... }	From top of the side down to eight strakes under the wale.....
	{ London... .. }	
	{ Prince George... .. }	
80	{ Cæsar	From ditto down to six strakes under the wale.....
	{ Gibraltar	
		From lower sill of upperdeck ports to between the floor and first futtock-heads.....
74	{ Pompée..... }	From top of side down to eight strakes under the wale.....
	{ Audacious..... }	
	Bellona.....	From lower sill of upperdeck ports down to keel.....
	Canada	From ditto down to between the floor and first futtock-heads.....
	Captain.	From top of side down to six strakes under the wale.....
	Edgar.....	From upper part of wales to keel.....
	Ganges.....	Same as Gibraltar.
	Majestic	Main wales only.
	Powerful	From lower sill of gundeck ports.....
	Resolution	From upper part of wales to first futtock- heads.....
	Thunderer.....	
	Zealous.....	From lower sill of gun deck to keel.....
64	{ Africa..... }	With 3-inch deal from ports to first futtock- heads and thence to keel with inch stuff.
	{ Belliqueux..... }	
	Dictator.....	Same as Africa.
	Nassau.....	With 2-inch stuff from gundeck ports to keel.
	Stately	Same as Belliqueux.
Gun-frig.		
38	{ Sibylle	On bottom, with 1½ inch stuff.
	{ Virginie..... }	
	{ Thetis..... }	From ports to keel with 3-inch deal.
36	{ Unité..... }	
	{ Thalia..... }	On bottom with inch board. With inch stuff from second strake below floor heads to keel.

Also six 12 and 9 pounder frigates and one store-ship.

No. 13. See p. 184.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1805.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
80	(K) Formidable.....	Captured November 3, by a British squadron under Sir Richard John Strachan.
74 {	(M) Duguay-Trouin	
	„ Mont-Blanc	
	„ Scipion	Wrecked, October 24 or 25, off Rota, near Cadiz.
80 {	„ Indomptable	
	„ Bucentaure, <i>rec.</i>	Captured October 21, at the battle of Trafalgar. The Achille was accidentally burnt before possession could be taken; and the Bucentaure and Algésiras were recaptured, but the former was wrecked immediately afterwards. The remainder of the prizes, except the Swiftsure, were lost or destroyed.
	„ Achille	
	„ Aigle	
	„ Algésiras, <i>rec.</i>	
74 {	„ <i>Berwick</i>	
	„ Fougueux	
	„ Intépide	
	„ Redoutable.....	
	(O) <i>Swiftsure</i>	
Gun-frig.		
	„ Atalante	Wrecked, December, near the Cape of Good Hope.
40 {	(Z) Didon	Captured, August 10, by the Phoenix frigate, off Cape Finisterre.
	„ Ville-de-Milan	Captured, February 23, by the Leander 50, Halifax station.
38	„ Libre	Captured, December 24, by the Egyptienne and Loire, off Rochefort.
32 {	(H) <i>Cleopatra</i>	Recaptured with Ville-de-Milan.
	(G) Psyché	Captured, February 14, by the British frigate San-Fiorenzo, East Indies.

No Dutch vessel of war above a gun-brig taken in 1805.

No. 14. See p. 184.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1805.

Name.		How, when, and where lost.
Gan-ship		
80	(K) San-Rafaël	Captured, July 22, by Sir Robert Calder, off Cape Finisterre.
74	(N) Firme	
130	... Santísima-Trinidad	Captured, October 21, at the battle of Trafalgar. Santa-Ana and Neptuno recaptured ; Rayo (captured 24th) wrecked ; and Santísima-Trinidad, Monarca, and San-Augustin, destroyed by the British.
112	... Santa-Ana, <i>rec.</i>	
100	... Rayo	
80	{ ... Argonauta	
	{ ... Neptuno, <i>rec.</i>	
	{ ... Bahama	
	{ ... Monarca	
74	{ ... San-Augustin	
	{ (N) San-Ildefonso	
	{ ... San-Juan Nepomuceno ...	

No. 15. See p. 184.

An abstract of French and Spanish ships of the line and frigates, captured (not reckoning those recaptured immediately afterwards), &c., during the year 1805.

		Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F. & S. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
		Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line	Fr.	12	...	1	...	...	13	5
	Sp.	10	...	1	...	...	11	5
Frigates.....	Fr.	5	...	1	...	...	6	4
Total.....		27	...	3	...	...	30	14

No. 16. See p. 184.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1805.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship			
54	(S) Calcutta.....	Daniel Woodriff.....	Captured, Sept. 26, by a French squadron, near Scilly.
44	(V) Sheerness ...	Lord George Stuart..	Wrecked, January 7, in a gale off Trincomalée bay, Ceylon : crew saved.
Gun-frig.			
36	{ (C) Blanche.....	Zachary Mudge	Captured, July 19, by a French frigate, two corvettes, and a brig, West Indies.
	{ „ Doris.....	Patrick Campbell	Wrecked, Jan. 21, on a sunken rock in Quiberon bay : crew saved.
32	(H) Cleopatra ...	Sir R. Laurie, Bart...	Captured, Feb. 17, by the Ville-de-Milan French frig. off the coast of North America.
Ship-slp.			
	(Q) Arrow	Rich. Budd Vincent..	Captured, Feb. 4, by the French frigates Hortense and Incorruptible, Mediterranean.
Gun-sh. slp.			
	{ (R) Cyane	Hon. Geo. Cadogan..	Captured, May 12, by the French frigates Hortense and Hermione, near Martinique.
18	{ (S) Hawke	James Tippet	Foundered, in May or June, in the Channel : crew perished.
	{ „ Imogène	Henry Vaughan	Foundered, March 1, on passage from Leeward islands : crew saved.
	{ „ Orquiro.....	Charles Balderson ...	Foundered, in October, near Jamaica : 95 of crew perished.
16	{ (T) Fly	Pownoll B. Pellew...	Wrecked, May, on the Carysfort reef, gulf of Florida : crew saved.
	{ „ Ranger.....	Charles Coote.....	Captured, July 17, by the Rochefort squadron.
14	(X) Orestes	Thomas Brown	Wrecked, July 11, on the Splinter-sand, Dunkerque road : crew saved.
G. b. slp.			
18	{ (Y) Raven	William Layman	Wrecked, January 29, in Cadiz bay : crew, except two men, saved.
	{ (Z) Seagull	Henry Burke	Foundered, exact date unknown : crew perished.
bb	(d) Acheron.....	Arthur Farquhar	Captured with the Arrow.

No. 16—*continued.*

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-brig			
12 {	(h) Biter	Geo. T. Wingate...	Wrecked, November 10, near Calais : crew saved.
	" Bouncer	Samuel Bassan	Wrecked, February, off Dieppe : crew saved, but made prisoners.
	" Plumper	James H. Garrety..	Captured, Aug., by five French gun-brigs off St.-Malo.
	" Teazer	Geo. Lewis Kerr...	Wrecked, November 18, near St.-Valery : crew saved.
	" Woodlark	Thomas Innes	Wrecked, August, in St.-Aubin's bay, Jersey : crew saved.
Gun-sch.			
14 (i)	<i>Pigmy</i>	William Smith	Foundered, March, near Jamaica : crew saved.
10 (l)	<i>Redbridge</i>	J. Blower Gibbs...	Captured, August 5, by the Rochefort squadron.
6 (n)	Dove	Alexander Boyack	Wrecked, October 2, on the Jordan quay, Cuba : crew saved, but made prisoners.
4 {	(o) Barracouta	J. Orchard	Wrecked, December, off the Texel : crew saved, but made prisoners.
	" Pigeon	John Luckraft	

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line	...	...	...	...	...	...
" under the line	10	...	11	5	...	26
Total	10	...	11	5	...	26

No. 17. See p. 184.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 91,000 seamen and 29,000 marines	5,850,000	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.	4,680,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers ; also the expense of sea-ordnance	1,435,353	12	11
„ additional pay to officers and seamen between May 1 and December 31	193,158	2	4
„ such measures as the exigency of affairs may require for Great Britain and for Ireland	3,000,000	0	0
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work	1,980,830	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service, and the maintenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness . .	1,695,000	0	0
„ Hospitals for seamen	30,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service . .	£18,864,341	15	3

No. 18. See p. 206.

Vérone, le 16 Juin, 1805.

Monsieur Decrès, M. Jérôme Bonaparte ne peut être capitaine de vaisseau ; ce serait une innovation funeste que de lui permettre de prendre un grade lui-même. Dans ce sens, sa conduite est d'une légèreté sans exemple, et sa justification n'a pas de sens. Non-seulement M. Jérôme n'a pas le droit de nommer un enseigne lieutenant, mais je désavoue cette nomination : cette conduite est tout-à-fait ridicule. Quand il aurait eu un combat et qu'il aurait pris un vaisseau anglais, il n'aurait pas le droit de donner un grade, mais seulement recommander ceux qui se seraient distingués.—*Précis des Evénemens*, tome xi., p. 279.

No. 19. See p. 278.

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1806.

Name.		How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship		
120	... Impérial	Destroyed, after an action, on February 6, with a British squadron under Vice-admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth, off the road of Santo-Domingo, West Indies.
72	... Diomède	
80	(K) Alexandre	Captured by the same squadron.
	(M) Brave	
	" Jupiter	
74	... Impétueux	Destroyed, September 14, after having been driven on shore by two British 74s and a frigate, near Cape Henry, United States of America.
	(M) Marengo	Captured, March 13, by a British squadron under Vice-admiral Sir J. B. Warren, latitude 26° 16' north, longitude 29° 25' west.
Gun-frig.	(Z) Belle-Poule	
	" Armide	Captured, September 25, by a British squadron under Commodore Sir Samuel Hood, off Rochefort.
	" Gloire	
	" Indefatigable	
	" Minerve	Captured, July 19, by the British frigate Blanche, off the Faro islands.
	" Guerrière	
40	" Présidente	Captured, September 27, by a British squadron under Rear-admiral Sir Thomas Louis, latitude 47° 17' north, longitude 6° 52' west.
	" Rhin	Captured, July 18, by the British 74 Mars, off Rochefort.
	" Volontaire	Captured, March 4, by a British squadron under Commodore Sir H. Popham, Cape of Good Hope.

No. 20. See p. 278.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Dutch navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1806.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship	...Bato	{ Destroyed, January 9, by the Dutch, at the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope.
64	...Terrible	
		{ Wrecked, May 28, in the East Indies.
Gun-frig.	(G) Maria-Riggersbergen . .	{ Captured, October 18, by the British frigate Caroline, in Batavia road, East Indies.
32	" Pallas	
	... Phœnix	{ Destroyed, November 28, on being attacked by a British squadron under Rear-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, Bart., in Batavia road.

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the Spanish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1806.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-brig	34 (D) Pomona	{ Captured, August 23, by the British Frigates Arethusa and Anson, off Cuba.

An abstract of French, Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line and frigates captured, &c. during the year 1806.

		Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F.D.&S. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
		Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line .	{ Fr.	4	3	..	..	..	7	4
	{ Du.	..	1	1	..	..	2	..
Frigates	{ Fr.	9	..	..	..	..	9	9
	{ Du.	2	1	..	..	..	3	1
	{ Sp.	1	..	..	..	..	1	1
Total.		16	5	1	..	..	22	15

No. 21. See p. 278.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1806.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
	Gun-ship		
74	(M) <i>Brave</i> ,.....	Edmond Boger	Foundered, April 12, off the Western islands, on passage from Jamaica: crew, except three, saved.
64	(P) <i>Athénien</i> ,...	Robert Raynsford.....	Wrecked, October 27, on the rocks, called Esquerques, near Tunis: captain and 396 of crew perished.
	Gun-p. ship		
22	{ (N) <i>Constance</i> , Alex. S. Burrowes.....		Captured, October 12, after getting on shore in action, in the bay of Erqui, coast of France.
	{ „ <i>Heureux</i>	John Morrison.....	Foundered, on passage from West Indies to Halifax: crew perished.
	G. ship.		
18	(R) <i>Favourite</i> , John Davie.....		Captured, January 6, off Cape de Verd Islands, by a French squadron.
	{ (T) <i>Martin</i> ... Thomas Prowse.....		Foundered, on passage to Barbadoes, with all the crew.
16	{ „ <i>Wolf</i>	George C. M'Kenzie...	Wrecked, September 5, on Heneaga, one of the Bahama islands: crew saved.
	{ (U) <i>Serpent</i> ... John Waller		Foundered, on Jamaica station, with all the crew.
	Gun-brig		
14	(f) <i>Seaforth</i> ... George Steel.....		Foundered, by upsetting, February, off the Leeward island station: crew, except two, perished.
	{ (g) <i>Adder</i>	Molyneux Shuldham.....	Captured, December 9, near Abreval, where she was driven ashore.
12	{ „ <i>Clinker</i> ... John Salmon.....		Foundered, December, in a cruise off Havre: crew perished.
	{ „ <i>Manley</i> ... Martin White.....		Captured, January, by some Dutch gun-boats, in the river Ems.
10	(h) <i>Papillon</i> .. William Woolsey.....		Foundered, on Jamaica station: crew perished.

No. 21—*continued*.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-sch.			
12	(k) <i>Redbridge</i>	Edward Burt.....	Wrecked, November 4, on the Providence station : crew saved.
10	(1) <i>Tobago</i>	(name unknown).....	Captured, October, 18, by the Général-Ernouf French privateer, near Gaudaloupe.
	„ <i>Unique</i>	George R. Brand.....	Captured, February 23, by a French privateer, on the Leeward island station.
	„ <i>Zenobia</i>	(name unknown).....	Wrecked, exact date unknown, on the coast of Florida.
6	(n) <i>Belem</i>	James Groves.....	Captured, August 12, at the recapture of Buenos Ayres.
	„ <i>Dominica</i>	Robert Peter.....	Captured, date unknown.
4	(o) <i>Berbice</i>	James George Gooding	Foundered, exact date unknown, off Demerary : crew saved.
T.S.	(q) <i>Dover</i>	(in ordinary).....	Burnt, by accident, in August off Woolwich.

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line.....	...	...	1	1	...	2
„ under the line.....	8	...	3	7	1	19
Total.....	8	...	4	8	1	21

No. 22. See p. 280.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 91,000 seamen and 29,000 marines, for one lunar month from January 1, and for 98,600 seamen, and 31,400 marines, from January 28.....	6,337,500	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.....	5,070,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers; also the expense of sea-ordnance.....	1,557,934	9	3
„ the extraordinaries; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work	2,134,903	0	0
„ the expense of the transport-service, and maintenance of prisoners of war in health and sickness at home and abroad.....	2,000,000	0	0
„ sick and wounded seamen.....	300,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service ...	£17,400,337	9	3

NOTES

TO

ANNUAL ABSTRACTS.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 14.

- Teak-built Indiamen.
 - The Salsette (named Pitt for a short time, then restored to her former name), built of teak at the East-India Company's yard at Bombay.
 - Teak-built; had been an Indiaman.
 - The same.
 - The Bermuda and Indian; built at the island of Bermuda, of the pencil-cedar. See vol. ii., p. 396, note S*.
 - Built at Bermuda, also of cedar. These vessels averaged 111 tons, and were a slight improvement upon those built at the same island in the preceding year, and remarked upon at vol. iii., p. 376, note i.
 - Number of hired vessels about 94.
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NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 15.

- The Clyde; built of fir, after the fir-frigate of the same name launched in 1796. See vol. ii., p. 395, note A*.
- The Alexandria, of fir also, and the last-built frigate of this class.
- A new class; resembling in size and construction the British-built of the K class, but registered as "22-gun ships," and too generally called so, to be otherwise classed in these Abstracts. The first establishment of the class was 22 long nines on the main deck, and eight 24-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle; but before any of the ships were launched, the establishment was altered to twenty-two 32-pounder carronades, eight 18-pounder carronades, and two long sixes, total 32 guns. The Comus and Laurel, it is believed, were the only ships armed according to the original plan, and the first was afterwards allowed two additional long sixes for her forecastle. Of all the classes in the British navy, the 22-gun class exhibits the greatest difference between the rated and the mounted force of its ships.
- In the year 1805, 18 more of these miserable "men of war" were ordered to be built; six of them at Bermuda, the remainder in ports of England. See vol. iii., p. 376.
- Number of hired vessels about 80.



THE END OF VOL. IV.

WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.

GRAND TOTAL.		Abstract.									
		Built.				Converted to other classes.		Sold, taken to pieces, &c.		TOTAL of Decrease.	
		King's yards.		Mercha, yards							
No.	Tons.	No	Tons.	No	Tons.	No	Tons.	No	Tons.	No	Tons.
3	7741	...	...	...	...						
1	2351										
2	4855										
2	4575										
5	10732										
2	4554	1	2276								
3	6363										
11	21470										
11	23759	...	...	...	...						
14	26740	1	1929								
22	41055	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1903	1	1903
32	55530	1	1745	...	...						
44	71580	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	3255	2	3255
36	49782	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1370	1	1370
2	2511										
190	333598	3	5950	...	...	...	...	4	6528	4	6528
2	2682	...	...	...	...						
...	...	...	...	...	...6	...	...	...	...	1	1176
16	17111	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1063	1	1063
2	1823										
2	1774	...	...	...	...6	...	...	...	...	1	906
6	8304										
1	1277										
3	3474	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1183	1	1183
30	32752			3	224						



